



**Brunei Department of Civil Aviation**

**Negara Brunei Darussalam**

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## **Brunei Aviation Requirements**

# **BAR 6 Part SPA Specific Approvals – Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material**

## NOTES

The content of this document is arranged as follows: The acceptable means of compliance (AMC) appear first, followed by the related and guidance material (GM) paragraph(s). In case of certification specifications (CS), a CS paragraph is followed by the related GM paragraph.

All elements (i.e. AMC, CS, and GM) are colour-coded and can be identified according to the illustration below.

**Acceptable Means of Compliance**

**Certification Specifications**

**Guidance Materials**

**Table of Contents**

<b>Table of Contents .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Control of this Document .....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Amendment .....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Subpart A - General Requirements .....</b>	<b>11</b>
GM1 SPA.GEN.100(a) Competent Authority .....	11
AMC1 SPA.GEN.105(a) Application for a specific approval .....	11
<b>Subpart B - Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) Operations .....</b>	<b>12</b>
GM1 SPA.PBN.100 PBN operations.....	12
AMC1 SPA.PBN.105(b) PBN operational approval .....	13
AMC1 SPA.PBN.105(c) PBN operational approval.....	19
GM1 SPA.PBN.105(c) PBN operational approval.....	19
AMC1 SPA.PBN.105(d) PBN operational approval .....	21
AMC2 SPA.PBN.105(d) PBN operational approval .....	21
AMC3 SPA.PBN.105(d) PBN operational approval .....	24
AMC1 SPA.PBN.105(e) PBN operational approval .....	25
AMC1 SPA.PBN.105(f) PBN operational approval .....	25
<b>Subpart C - Operations with Specified Minimum Navigation Performance (MNPS).....</b>	<b>26</b>
GM1 SPA.MNPS.100 MNPS operations.....	26
AMC1 SPA.MNPS.105 MNPS operational approval .....	26
<b>Subpart D - Operations in Airspace with Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM) .....</b>	<b>27</b>
AMC1 SPA.RVSM.105 RVSM operational approval .....	27
AMC2 SPA.RVSM.105 RVSM operational approval .....	27
AMC3 SPA.RVSM.105 RVSM operational approval .....	30
GM1 SPA.RVSM.105(d)(9) RVSM operational approval.....	30
AMC1 SPA.RVSM.110(a) RVSM equipment requirements.....	30
<b>Subpart E - Low Visibility Operations (LVO) .....</b>	<b>31</b>
AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(a) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits .....	31
AMC2 SPA.LVO.100(a) Low -visibility operations and operations with operational credits .....	32
GMC1 SPA.LVO.100(a) Low -visibility operations and operations with operational credits .....	32
GMC2 SPA.LVO.100(a) Low -visibility operations and operations with operational credits .....	32
AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits .....	32
AMC2 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits .....	33
AMC3 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits .....	33
GM1 SPA.LVO.100 Low visibility operations and operations with operational credits.....	35
GM1 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits.....	36

GM2 SPA.LVO.100 Low visibility operations and operations with operational credits .....	36
GM2 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low visibility operations and operations with operational credits .....	36
GM3 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low visibility operations and operations with operational credits .....	37
GM4 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits .....	39
AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits.....	39
AMC2 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits.....	40
AMC3 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits.....	40
AMC4 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits.....	41
GM1 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits .....	44
GM2 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits .....	44
GM3 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits .....	44
GM4 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits .....	45
GM5 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits .....	47
GM6 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits .....	47
AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(a) Specific approval criteria .....	47
AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria .....	48
AMC2 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria .....	48
AMC3 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria .....	49
AMC4 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria .....	49
AMC5 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria .....	49
AMC6 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria .....	50
AMC7 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria .....	50
GM1 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria .....	50
AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(g) Specific approval criteria .....	51
AMC2 SPA.LVO.105(g) Specific approval criteria .....	51
GM1 SPA.LVO.105(g) LVO Specific approval criteria.....	52
GM2 SPA.LVO.105(g) LVO Specific approval criteria.....	53
GM3 SPA.LVO.105(g) LVO Specific approval criteria.....	54
AMC1 SPA.LVO.120 Flight crew training and qualifications.....	55
AMC1 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures.....	61
AMC2 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures.....	65
AMC3 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures.....	65
AMC4 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures.....	66
GM1 SPA.LVO.120 Flight crew training and qualifications.....	80
AMC1 SPA.LVO.120(a) Flight crew competence .....	80
AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(a) Flight crew competence .....	80
AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(a) Flight crew competence .....	80
AMC1 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence .....	82
AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence .....	83
AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence .....	87
AMC4 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence .....	90

AMC5 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence .....	91
AMC6 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence .....	91
AMC7 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence .....	91
<b>Subpart F - Extended Range Operations with Two-Engined Aeroplanes (ETOPS) .....</b>	<b>97</b>
GM1 SPA.ETOPS.105 ETOPS operational approval .....	97
<b>Subpart G - Transport of Dangerous Goods.....</b>	<b>98</b>
AMC1 SPA.DG.105(a) Approval to transport dangerous goods .....	98
AMC1 SPA.DG.105(b) Approval to transport dangerous goods .....	98
GM1 SPA.DG.105(b)(6) Approval to transport dangerous goods .....	98
AMC1 SPA.DG.110(a) Dangerous goods information and documentation .....	98
AMC1 SPA.DG.110(b) Dangerous goods information and documentation .....	99
<b>Subpart H - Helicopter Operations with Night Vision Imaging Systems .....</b>	<b>100</b>
AMC1 SPA.NVIS.110(b) Equipment requirements for NVIS operations .....	100
GM1 SPA.NVIS.110(b) Equipment requirements for NVIS operations .....	100
GM1 SPA.NVIS.110(f) Equipment requirements for NVIS operations .....	100
AMC1 SPA.NVIS.120 NVIS operating minima .....	100
GM1 SPA.NVIS.130(e) Crew requirements for NVIS operations .....	101
GM1 SPA.NVIS.130(e) Crew requirements for NVIS operations .....	101
AMC1 SPA.NVIS.130(f) Crew requirements for NVIS operations .....	101
AMC1 SPA.NVIS.130(f)(1) Crew requirements for NVIS operations .....	105
GM1 SPA.NVIS.130(f) Crew requirements for NVIS operations .....	106
GM2 SPA.NVIS.130(f) Crew requirements for NVIS operations .....	108
GM3 SPA.NVIS.130(f) Crew requirements for NVIS operations .....	115
GM4 SPA.NVIS.130(f) Crew requirements for NVIS operations .....	115
AMC1 SPA.NVIS.140 Information and documentation .....	116
GM1 SPA.NVIS.140 Information and documentation .....	117
<b>Subpart I - Helicopter Hoist Operations .....</b>	<b>138</b>
AMC1 SPA.HHO.110(a) Equipment requirements for HHO .....	138
AMC1 SPA.HHO.130(b)(2)(ii) Crew requirements for HHO .....	138
AMC1 SPA.HHO.130(e) Crew requirements for HHO.....	138
AMC1 SPA.HHO.130(f)(1) Crew requirements for HHO .....	138
AMC1 SPA.HHO.140 Information and documentation .....	139
<b>Subpart J - Helicopter Emergency Medical Service Operations.....</b>	<b>140</b>
GM1 SPA.HEMS.100(a) Helicopter emergency medical service (HEMS) operations .....	140
GM1 SPA.HEMS.120 HEMS operating minima.....	142
GM1 SPA.HEMS.125(b)(3) Performance requirements for HEMS operations .....	143
AMC1 SPA.HEMS.125(b)(4) Performance requirements for HEMS operations .....	143

AMC1 SPA.HEMS.130(b)(2) Crew requirements .....	143
AMC1 SPA.HEMS.130(d) Crew requirements .....	143
AMC1 SPA.HEMS.130(e) Crew requirements.....	143
GM1 SPA.HEMS.130(e)(2)(ii) Crew requirements.....	143
AMC1 SPA.HEMS.130(e)(2)(ii)(B) Crew requirements .....	144
AMC1 SPA.HEMS.130(f)(1) Crew requirements .....	144
AMC1 SPA.HEMS.130(f)(2)(ii)(B) Crew requirements .....	145
AMC1 SPA.HEMS.135(a) HEMS medical passenger and other personnel briefing.....	145
AMC1.1 SPA.HEMS.135(a) HEMS medical passenger and other personnel briefing.....	145
AMC1 SPA.HEMS.135(b) HEMS medical passenger and other personnel briefing .....	145
AMC1 SPA.HEMS.140 Information and documentation .....	145
<b>Subpart K - Helicopter Offshore Operations.....</b>	<b>147</b>
GM1 SPA.HOFO.105(c) Approval for offshore operations .....	147
AMC1 SPA.HOFO.110(a) Operating procedures.....	147
AMC1 SPA.HOFO.110(a)(4) Operating procedures .....	147
AMC1 SPA.HOFO.110(b)(1) Operating procedures .....	147
AMC1 SPA.HOFO.110(b)(2) Operating procedures .....	147
AMC1.1 SPA.HOFO.110(b)(2) Operating procedures .....	147
AMC1 SPA.HOFO.110(b)(5) Operating procedures .....	148
GM1 SPA.HOFO.110(b)(9) Operating Procedures .....	148
AMC1 SPA.HOFO.115 Use of offshore locations .....	148
GM1 SPA.HOFO.115 Use of offshore locations .....	152
GM2 SPA.HOFO.115 Use of offshore locations .....	156
AMC1 SPA.HOFO.120 Selection of aerodromes and operating sites .....	156
AMC2 SPA.HOFO.120 Selection of aerodromes and operating sites .....	156
AMC1 SPA.HOFO.125 Offshore standard approach procedures (OSAPs) .....	158
AMC2 SPA.HOFO.125 Offshore standard approach procedures (OSAPs) .....	158
GM1 SPA.HOFO.125 Offshore standard approach procedures (OSAPs) .....	159
GM2 SPA.HOFO.125 Offshore standard approach procedures (OSAPs) .....	162
AMC1 SPA.HOFO.140 Performance requirements — take-off and landing at offshore locations .....	163
AMC1 SPA.HOFO.145 Flight data monitoring (FDM) programme.....	163
GM1 SPA.HOFO.145 Flight data monitoring (FDM) programme.....	163
GM2 SPA.HOFO.145 Flight data monitoring (FDM) programme.....	163
AMC1 SPA.HOFO.150 Aircraft tracking system .....	171
GM1 SPA.HOFO.150 Aircraft tracking system .....	171
AMC1 SPA.HOFO.155 Vibration health monitoring (VHM) system .....	171
GM1 SPA.HOFO.155 Vibration health monitoring (VHM) system .....	172
GM1 SPA.HOFO.160(a)(1) Additional equipment requirements.....	172
GM1 SPA.HOFO.160(a)(2) Additional equipment requirements.....	172
AMC1 SPA.HOFO.165(c) Additional procedures and equipment for operations in hostile environment .....	172

AMC1 SPA.HOFO.165(d) Additional procedures and equipment for operations in hostile environment.....	172
AMC1 SPA.HOFO.165(h) Additional procedures and equipment for operations in a hostile environment.....	173
GM1 SPA.HOFO.165(h) Additional procedures and equipment for operations in a hostile environment.....	173
AMC1 SPA.HOFO.165(i) Additional procedures and equipment for operations in a hostile environment.....	173
AMC1 SPA.HOFO.170(a) Crew requirements.....	174

**Subpart L - Single-Engined Turbine Aeroplane Operations At Night Or In Instrument Meteorological Conditions (Set-IMC)**  
**.....175**

AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105 SET-IMC operations approval.....	175
AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(a) SET-IMC operations approval.....	175
AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(b) SET-IMC operations approval.....	175
AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(c) SET-IMC operations approval.....	176
AMC2 SPA.SET-IMC.105(c) SET-IMC operations approval.....	177
AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) SET-IMC operations approval.....	177
AMC2 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) SET-IMC operations approval.....	178
AMC3 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) SET-IMC operations approval.....	178
GM1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) SET-IMC operations approval.....	179
GM2 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) SET-IMC operations approval.....	179
AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(4) SET-IMC operations approval.....	183
AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(b) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations.....	183
AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(d) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations.....	183
AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(f) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations.....	183
GM1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(f) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations.....	183
GM1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(h) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations.....	183
GM1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(i)(7) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations.....	184
AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(l) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations.....	184

**Subpart M – ELECTRONIC FLIGHT BAGS (EFBs).....185**

AMC1 SPA.EFB.100(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — operational approval.....	185
AMC2 SPA.EFB.100(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval.....	186
AMC3 SPA.EFB.100(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs).....	187
AMC4 SPA.EFB.100(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs).....	188
GM1 SPA.EFB.100(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval.....	188
GM2 SPA.EFB.100(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval.....	189
AMC1 SPA.EFB.100(b)(1) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval.....	190
AMC1 SPA.EFB.100(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval.....	191
AMC1 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval.....	193
AMC2 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval.....	194
AMC3 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval.....	194
AMC4 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval.....	196
AMC5 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval.....	199
AMC6 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval.....	201

AMC7 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval .....	202
AMC8 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval .....	203
AMC9 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval .....	203
AMC10 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval .....	204
GM1 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval .....	206
GM2 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval .....	207
GM3 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval .....	208
GM4 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval .....	209
GM5 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval .....	209
GM6 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval .....	209
<b>Subpart N – HELICOPTER-IN-SPACE APPROACHES AND DEPARTURES WITH REDUCED VFR MINIMA .....</b>	<b>210</b>
AMC1 SPA.PINS-VFR.100 Helicopter point-in-space (PinS) approaches and departures with reduced VFR minima ...	210



## Control of this Document

### DC.1 Introduction

DC.1.1 Pursuant to Civil Aviation Order 2016 and the Civil Aviation (General) Regulations 2016 and their subsequent amendments, the following requirements are hereby established for compliance by all persons concerned, the Director of Civil Aviation is empowered to adopt and amend Brunei Aviation Requirements. In accordance herewith, the following requirement is hereby established for compliance by all persons concerned. This requirement shall be known as BAR 6 Part SPA Specific Approvals – Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material and any reference to this title shall mean referring to the requirements to be met for civil aviation in Brunei Darussalam.

### DC.2 Authority for this Requirement

DC.2.1 This BAR 6 Part SPA Specific Approvals – Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material is issued on the authority of the Director of Civil Aviation.

### DC.3 Applicability

DC.3.1 This BAR 6 Part SPA Specific Approvals – Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material is applicable to the aviation industry of Brunei Darussalam.

### DC.4 Scope

DC.4.1 BAR 6 Operation of Aircraft contains the operation of aircraft requirements of Brunei Darussalam, and shows compliance with ICAO Annex 6. The requirements in BAR 6 are separated into the following parts with cross references between parts where applicable.

Part Air Operations Cover Requirement  
Part ARO Authority Requirements for Air Operations  
Part ORO Organisation Requirements for Air Operations  
Part DEF Definitions  
Part CAT Commercial Air Transport  
**Part SPA Specific Approvals**  
Part SPO Special Operations  
Part NCC Non Commercial with Complex Motor-Powered Aircraft  
Part NCO Non Commercial other than Complex Motor-Powered Aircraft

### DC.5 Definitions

DC.5.1 Terms not defined shall have the meaning given to them in the relevant legal instruments or international legal instruments in which they appear, especially as they appear in the Convention and its Annexes.

**Amendment**

Amendment Number	Date of Issue	Remarks
V01	1 <sup>st</sup> February 2017	Initial Issue
V02	1 <sup>st</sup> February 2018	First Amendment
V03	1 <sup>st</sup> May 2019	Second Amendment
V05	1 <sup>st</sup> December 2019	Third Amendment. Version renumbered to version 05 to make consistent with the whole of BAR 6.
V06	1 <sup>st</sup> December 2022	Fourth Amendment

# Part SPA - Specific Approvals

## Subpart A - General Requirements

### GM1 SPA.GEN.100(a) Competent Authority

#### DETERMINING THE PLACE WHERE AN OPERATOR IS RESIDING

For the purpose of this requirement, the concept of ‘place where the operator is residing’ is mainly addressed to a natural person.

The place where the operator resides is the place where the operator complies with his or her tax obligations.

Several criteria can be used to help determining a person’s place of residence. These include, for example:

- (a) the duration of a person’s presence on the territory of the countries concerned;
- (b) the person’s family status and ties;
- (c) the person’s housing situation and how permanent it is;
- (d) the place where the person pursues professional or non-profit activities;
- (e) the characteristics of the person’s professional activity; and
- (f) the Member State where the person resides for taxation purposes.

### AMC1 SPA.GEN.105(a) Application for a specific approval

#### DOCUMENTATION

- (a) Operating procedures should be documented in the operations manual.
- (b) If an operations manual is not required, operating procedures may be described in a manual specifying procedures (procedures manual). If the aircraft flight manual (AFM) or the pilot operating handbook (POH) contains such procedures, they should be considered as acceptable means to document the procedures.

## Subpart B - Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) Operations

### GM1 SPA.PBN.100 PBN operations

#### GENERAL

- (a) PBN operations are based on performance requirements, which are expressed in navigation specifications (RNAV specification and RNP specification) in terms of accuracy, integrity, continuity, availability and functionality needed for the proposed operation in the context of a particular airspace concept.

Table 1 provides a simplified overview of:

- (1) PBN specifications and their applicability for different phases of flight; and
  - (2) PBN specifications requiring a specific approval.
- (b) More detailed guidance material for the operational use of PBN applications can be found in ICAO Doc 9613 Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) Manual.
- (c) Guidance material for the design of RNP AR APCH procedures can be found in ICAO Doc 9905 RNP AR Procedure Design Manual.
- (d) Guidance material for the operational approval of PBN operations can be found in ICAO Doc 9997 Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) Operational Approval Manual.

**Table 1: Overview of PBN specifications**

Navigation Specification	En-Route		Arrival	Approach				Departure
	Oceanic	Continental		Initial	Intermediate	Final	Missed	
RNAV10	10							
RNAV 5		5	5					
RNAV 2		2	2					2
RNAV 1		1	1	1	1		1	1
RNP 4	4						1	
RNP 2	2	2					1	
RNP 1			1	1	1		1	1
A-RNP	2	2 OR 1	1-0.3	1-0.3	1-0.3	0.3	1-0.3	1-0.3
RNP APCH (LNAV)				1	1	0.3	1	
RNP APCH (LNAV/VNAV)				1	1	0.3	1	
RNP APCH (LP)				1	1		1	
RNP APCH (LPV)				1	1		1	
RNP AR APCH				1-0.3	1-0.1	0.3-0.1	1-0.1	
RNP 0.3 (H)		0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3		0.3	0.3

**AMC1 SPA.PBN.105(b) PBN operational approval**

**FLIGHT CREW TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS – GENERAL PROVISIONS**

- (a) The operator should ensure that flight crew members training programmes for RNP AR APCH include structured courses of ground and FSTD training.
- (1) Flight crew members with no RNP AR APCH experience should complete the full training programme prescribed in (b), (c), and (d) below.
  - (2) Flight crew members with RNP AR APCH experience with another Brunei operator may undertake an:
    - (i) abbreviated ground training course if operating a different type or class from that on which the previous RNP AR experience was gained;
    - (ii) abbreviated ground and FSTD training course if operating the same type or class and variant of the same type or class on which the previous RNP. AR experience was gained.
    - (iii) the abbreviated course should include at least the provisions of (d)(1), (c)(1) and (c)(2)(x) as appropriate.

- (iv) The operator may reduce the number of approaches/landings required by (c)(2)(xii) if the type/class or the variant of the type or class has the same or similar:
  - (A) level of technology (flight guidance system (FGS));
  - (B) operating procedures for navigation performance monitoring; and
  - (C) handling characteristics as the previously operated type or class.
- (3) Flight crew members with RNP AR APCH experience with the operator may undertake an abbreviated ground and FSTD training course:
  - (i) when changing aircraft type or class, the abbreviated course should include at least the provisions of (d)(1), (c)(1), (c)(2);
  - (ii) when changing to a different variant of aircraft within the same type or class rating that has the same or similar of all of the following:
    - (A) level of technology (flight guidance system (FGS));
    - (B) operating procedures for navigation performance monitoring; and
    - (C) handling characteristicsas the previously operated type or class.

A difference course or familiarisation appropriate to the change of variant should fulfil the abbreviated course provisions.
  - (v) when changing to a different variant of aircraft within the same type or class rating that has significantly different at least one of the following:
    - (A) level of technology (FGS);
    - (B) operating procedures for navigation performance monitoring; and
    - (C) handling characteristics,the provisions of (c)(1) and (c)(2) should be fulfilled.
- (4) The operator should ensure when undertaking RNP AR APCH operations with different variant(s) of aircraft within the same type or class rating, that the differences and/or similarities of the aircraft concerned justify such operations, taking into account at least the following:
  - (i) the level of technology, including the:
    - (A) FGS and associated displays and controls;
    - (B) FMS and its integration or not with the FGS; and
    - (C) on-board performance monitoring and alerting (OBPMA) system;
  - (ii) operating procedures, including:
    - (A) navigation performance monitoring;
    - (B) approach interruption and missed approach including while in turn along an RF leg;
    - (C) abnormal procedures in case of loss of system redundancy affecting the guidance or the navigation; and
    - (D) abnormal and contingency procedures in case of total loss of RNP capability; and
  - (iii) handling characteristics, including:
    - (A) manual approach with RF leg;
    - (B) manual landing from automatic guided approach; and
    - (C) manual missed approach procedure from automatic approach.
- (b) Ground training
  - (1) Ground training for RNP AR APCH should address the following subjects during the initial introduction of a flight crew member to RNP AR APCH systems and operations. For recurrent programmes, the curriculum need only review initial curriculum items and address new, revised, or emphasised items.

- (2) General concepts of RNP AR APCH operation
- (i) RNP AR APCH training should cover RNP AR APCH systems theory to the extent appropriate to ensure proper operational use. Flight crew members should understand basic concepts of RNP AR APCH systems, operation, classifications, and limitations.
  - (ii) The training should include general knowledge and operational application of RNP AR APCH instrument approach procedures. This training module should in particular address the following specific elements:
    - (A) the definitions of RNAV, RNP, RNP APCH, RNP AR APCH, RAIM, and containment areas;
    - (B) the differences between RNP AR APCH and RNP APCH;
    - (C) the types of RNP AR APCH procedures and familiarity with the charting of these procedures;
    - (D) the programming and display of RNP and aircraft specific displays, e.g. actual navigation performance;
    - (E) the methods to enable and disable the navigation updating modes related to RNP;
    - (F) the RNP values appropriate for different phases of flight and RNP AR APCH instrument procedures and how to select, if necessary;
    - (G) the use of GNSS RAIM (or equivalent) forecasts and the effects of RAIM ‘holes’ on RNP AR APCH procedures availability;
    - (H) when and how to terminate RNP navigation and transfer to conventional navigation due to loss of RNP and/or required equipment;
    - (I) the method to determine if the navigation database is current and contains required navigational data;
    - (J) the explanation of the different components that contribute to the total system error and their characteristics, e.g. drift characteristics when using IRU with no radio updating, QNH mistakes;
    - (K) the temperature compensation: Flight crew members operating avionics systems with compensation for altimetry errors introduced by deviations from ISA may disregard the temperature limits on RNP AR APCH procedures if flight crew training on use of the temperature compensation function is provided by the operator and the compensation function is utilised by the crew. However, the training should also recognise if the temperature compensation by the system is applicable to the VNAV guidance and is not a substitute for the flight crew compensating for the temperature effects on minimum altitudes or the DA/H;
    - (L) the effect of wind on aircraft performance during RNP AR APCH operations and the need to positively remain within RNP containment area, including any operational wind limitation and aircraft configuration essential to safely complete an RNP AR APCH operation;
    - (M) the effect of groundspeed on compliance with RNP AR APCH procedures and bank angle restrictions that may impact on the ability to remain on the course centreline. For RNP procedures, aircraft are expected to maintain the standard speeds associated with the applicable category unless more stringent constraints are published;
    - (N) the relationship between RNP and the appropriate approach minima line on an approved published RNP AR APCH procedure and any operational limitations if the available RNP degrades or is not available prior to an approach (this should include flight crew operating procedures outside the FAF versus inside the FAF);
    - (O) understanding alerts that may occur from the loading and use of improper RNP values for a desired segment of an RNP AR APCH procedure;
    - (P) understanding the performance requirement to couple the autopilot/flight director to the navigation system’s lateral guidance on RNP AR APCH procedures requiring an RNP of less than RNP 0.3;
    - (Q) the events that trigger a missed approach when using the aircraft’s RNP capability to complete an RNP AR APCH procedure;
    - (R) any bank angle restrictions or limitations on RNP AR APCH procedures;

- (S) ensuring flight crew members understand the performance issues associated with reversion to radio updating, know any limitations on the use of DME and VOR updating; and
  - (T) the familiarisation with the terrain and obstacles representations on navigation displays and approach charts.
- (3) ATC communication and coordination for use of RNP AR APCH
- (i) Ground training should instruct flight crew members on proper flight plan classifications and any ATC procedures applicable to RNP AR APCH operations.
  - (ii) Flight crew members should receive instruction on the need to advise ATC immediately when the performance of the aircraft's navigation system is no longer adequate to support continuation of an RNP AR APCH operation.
- (4) RNP AR APCH equipment components, controls, displays, and alerts
- (i) Theoretical training should include discussion of RNP terminology, symbology, operation, optional controls, and display features, including any items unique to an operator's implementation or systems. The training should address applicable failure alerts and limitations.
  - (ii) Flight crew members should achieve a thorough understanding of the equipment used in RNP operations and any limitations on the use of the equipment during those operations.
  - (iii) Flight crew members should also know what navigation sensors form the basis for their RNP AR APCH compliance, and they should be able to assess the impact of failure of any avionics or a known loss of ground systems on the remainder of the flight plan.
- (5) AFM information and operating procedures
- (i) Based on the AFM or other aircraft eligibility evidence, the flight crew should address normal and abnormal operating procedures, responses to failure alerts, and any limitations, including related information on RNP modes of operation.
  - (ii) Training should also address contingency procedures for loss or degradation of the RNP AR APCH capability.
  - (iii) The manuals used by the flight should contain this information.
- (6) MEL operating provisions
- (i) Flight crew members should have a thorough understanding of the MEL entries supporting RNP AR APCH operations.
- (c) Initial FSTD training
- (1) In addition to ground training, flight crew members should receive appropriate practical skill training in an FSTD.
- (i) Training programmes should cover the proper execution of RNP AR APCH operations in compliance with the manufacturer's documentation.
  - (ii) The training should include:
    - (A) RNP AR APCH procedures and limitations;
    - (B) standardisation of the set-up of the cockpit's electronic displays during an RNP AR APCH operation;
    - (C) recognition of the aural advisories, alerts and other annunciations that can impact on compliance with an RNP AR APCH procedure; and
    - (D) the timely and correct responses to loss of RNP AR APCH capability in a variety of scenarios embracing the breadth of the RNP AR APCH procedures the operator plans to complete.
- (2) FSTD training should address the following specific elements:
- (i) procedures for verifying that each flight crew member's altimeter has the current setting before commencing the final approach of an RNP AR APCH operation, including any operational limitations associated with the source(s) for the altimeter setting and the latency of checking and setting the altimeters for landing;



- (ii) use of aircraft RADAR, TAWS or other avionics systems to support the flight crew's track monitoring and weather and obstacle avoidance;
- (iii) concise and complete flight crew briefings for all RNP AR APCH procedures and the important role crew resource management (CRM) plays in successfully completing an RNP AR APCH operation;
- (iv) the importance of aircraft configuration to ensure the aircraft maintains any mandated speeds during RNP AR APCH operations;
- (v) the potentially detrimental effect of reducing the flap setting, reducing the bank angle or increasing airspeeds may have on the ability to comply with an RNP AR APCH operation;
- (vi) flight crew members understand and are capable of programming and/or operating the FMC, autopilot, autothrottles, RADAR, GNSS, INS, EFIS (including the moving map), and TAWS in support of RNP AR APCH operations;
- (vii) handling of TOGA to LNAV transition as applicable, particularly while in turn;
- (viii) monitoring of flight technical error (FTE) and related go-around operation;
- (ix) handling of loss of GNSS signals during a procedure;
- (x) handling of engine failure during the approach operation;
- (xi) applying contingency procedures for a loss of RNP capability during a missed approach. Due to the lack of navigation guidance, the training should emphasise the flight crew contingency actions that achieve separation from terrain and obstacles. The operator should tailor these contingency procedures to their specific RNP AR APCH procedures; and
- (xii) as a minimum, each flight crew member should complete two RNP approach procedures for each duty position (pilot flying and pilot monitoring) that employ the unique RNP AR APCH characteristics of the operator's RNP AR APCH procedures (e.g. RF legs, missed approach). One procedure should culminate in a transition to landing and one procedure should culminate in execution of an RNP missed approach procedure.

#### **FLIGHT CREW TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS — CONVERSION TRAINING**

- (d) Flight crew members should complete the following RNP AR APCH training if converting to a new type or class or variant of aircraft in which RNP AR operations will be conducted. For abbreviated courses, the provisions prescribed in (a)(2), (a)(3) and (a)(4) should apply.
  - (1) Ground training
 

Taking into account the flight crew member's RNP AR APCH previous training and experience, flight crew members should undertake an abbreviated ground training that should include at least the provisions of (b)(2)(D) to (I), (b)(2)(N) to (R), (b)(2)(S), and (b)(3) to (6).
  - (2) FSTD training
 

The provisions prescribed in (a) should apply, taking into account the flight crew member's RNP AR APCH training and experience.

#### **FLIGHT CREW TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS — RNP AR APCH PROCEDURES REQUIRING A PROCEDURE SPECIFIC APPROVAL**

- (e) Before starting an RNP AR APCH procedure for which a procedure-specific approval is required, flight crew members should undertake additional ground training and FSTD training, as appropriate.
  - (1) The operator should ensure that the additional training programmes for such procedures include as at least all of the following:
    - (i) the provisions of (c)(1), (c)(2)(x) as appropriate and customised to the intended operation;
    - (ii) the crew training recommendations and mitigations stated in the procedure flight operational safety assessment (FOSA); and
    - (iii) specific training and operational provision published in the AIP, where applicable.
  - (2) Flight crew members with prior experience of RNP AR APCH procedures for which a procedure specific approval is required may receive credit for all or part of these provisions provided the current operator's RNP AR APCH procedures are similar and require no new pilot skills to be trained in an FSTD.
  - (3) Training and checking may be combined and conducted by the same person with regard to (f)(2).

- (4) In case of a first RNP AR APCH application targeting directly RNP AR APCH procedures requiring procedure-specific approvals, a combined initial and additional training and checking, as appropriate, should be acceptable provided the training and checking includes all provisions prescribed by (a), (b), (c), (d) as appropriate, (e) and (f).

#### **FLIGHT CREW TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS — CHECKING OF RNP AR APCH KNOWLEDGE**

- (f) Initial checking of RNP AR APCH knowledge and procedures
- (1) The operator should check flight crew members' knowledge of RNP AR APCH procedures prior to employing RNP AR APCH operations. As a minimum, the check should include a thorough review of flight crew procedures and specific aircraft performance requirements for RNP AR APCH operations.
- (2) The initial check should include one of the following:
- (i) A check by an examiner using an FSTD.
  - (ii) A check by a TRE, CRE, SFE or a commander nominated by the operator during LPCs, OPCs or line flights that incorporate RNP AR APCH operations that employ the unique RNP AR APCH characteristics of the operator's RNP AR APCH procedures.
  - (iii) Line-oriented flight training (LOFT)/line-oriented evaluation (LOE). LOFT/LOE programmes using an FSTD that incorporates RNP AR APCH operations that employ the unique RNP AR APCH characteristics (i.e. RF legs, RNP missed approach) of the operator's RNP AR APCH procedures.
- (3) Specific elements that should be addressed are:
- (i) demonstration of the use of any RNP AR APCH limits/minimums that may impact various RNP AR APCH operations;
  - (ii) demonstration of the application of radio-updating procedures, such as enabling and disabling ground-based radio updating of the FMC (e.g. DME/DME and VOR/DME updating) and knowledge of when to use this feature;
  - (iii) demonstration of the ability to monitor the actual lateral and vertical flight paths relative to programmed flight path and complete the appropriate flight crew procedures when exceeding a lateral or vertical FTE limit;
  - (iv) demonstration of the ability to read and adapt to a RAIM (or equivalent) forecast, including forecasts predicting a lack of RAIM availability;
  - (v) demonstration of the proper set-up of the FMC, the weather RADAR, TAWS, and moving map for the various RNP AR APCH operations and scenarios the operator plans to implement;
  - (vi) demonstration of the use of flight crew briefings and checklists for RNP AR APCH operations with emphasis on CRM;
  - (vii) demonstration of knowledge of and ability to perform an RNP AR APCH missed approach procedure in a variety of operational scenarios (i.e. loss of navigation or failure to acquire visual conditions);
  - (viii) demonstration of speed control during segments requiring speed restrictions to ensure compliance with an RNP AR APCH procedure;
  - (ix) demonstration of competent use of RNP AR APCH plates, briefing cards, and checklists;
  - (x) demonstration of the ability to complete a stable RNP AR APCH operation: bank angle, speed control, and remaining on the procedure's centreline; and
  - (xi) (xi) knowledge of the operational limit for deviation from the desired flight path and of how to accurately monitor the aircraft's position relative to vertical flight path.

#### **FLIGHT CREW TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS — RECURRENT TRAINING**

- (g) The operator should incorporate recurrent training that employs the unique RNP AR APCH characteristics of the operator's RNP AR APCH procedures as part of the overall training programme.
- (1) A minimum of two RNP AR APCH should be flown by each flight crew member, one for each duty position (pilot flying and pilot monitoring), with one culminating in a landing and one culminating in a missed approach, and may be substituted for any required 3D approach operation.
- (2) In case of several procedure-specific RNP AR APCH approvals, the recurrent training should focus on the most demanding RNP AR APCH procedures giving credit on the less demanding ones.

## TRAINING FOR PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE FLIGHT PREPARATION

- (h) The operator should ensure that training for flight operation officers/dispatchers should include:
  - (1) the different types of RNP AR APCH procedures;
  - (2) the importance of specific navigation equipment and other equipment during RNP AR APCH operations and related RNP AR APCH requirements and operating procedures;
  - (3) the operator's RNP AR APCH approvals;
  - (4) MEL requirements;
  - (5) aircraft performance, and navigation signal availability, e.g. GNSS RAIM/predictive RNP capability tool, for destination and alternate aerodromes.

### AMC1 SPA.PBN.105(c) PBN operational approval

#### FLIGHT OPERATIONAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT (FOSA)

- (a) For each RNP AR APCH procedure, the operator should conduct a flight operational safety assessment (FOSA) proportionate to the complexity of the procedure.
- (b) The FOSA should be based on:
  - (1) restrictions and recommendations published in AIPs;
  - (2) the flyability check;
  - (3) an assessment of the operational environment;
  - (4) the demonstrated navigation performance of the aircraft; and
  - (5) the operational aircraft performance.
- (c) The operator may take credit from key elements from the safety assessment carried out by the ANSP or the aerodrome operator.

### GM1 SPA.PBN.105(c) PBN operational approval

#### FLIGHT OPERATIONAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT (FOSA)

- (a) Traditionally, operational safety has been defined by a target level of safety (TLS) and specified as a risk of collision of  $10^{-7}$  per approach operation. For RNP AR APCH operations, conducting the FOSA methodology contributes to achieving the TLS. The FOSA is intended to provide a level of flight safety that is equivalent to the traditional TLS, but using methodology oriented to performance-based flight operations. Using the FOSA, the operational safety objective is met by considering more than the aircraft navigation system alone. The FOSA blends quantitative and qualitative analyses and assessments by considering navigation systems, aircraft performance, operating procedures, human factor aspects and the operational environment. During these assessments conducted under normal and failure conditions, hazards, risks and the associated mitigations are identified. The FOSA relies on the detailed criteria for the aircraft capabilities and instrument procedure design to address the majority of general technical, procedure and process factors. Additionally, technical and operational expertise and prior operator experience with RNP AR APCH operations are essential elements to be considered in the conduct and conclusion of the FOSA.
- (b) The following aspects need to be considered during FOSA, in order to identify hazards, risks and mitigations relevant to RNP AR APCH operations:
  - (1) Normal performance: lateral and vertical accuracy are addressed in the aircraft airworthiness standards, aircraft and systems operate normally in standard configurations and operating modes, and individual error components are monitored/truncated through system design or flight crew procedure.
  - (2) Performance under failure conditions: lateral and vertical accuracy are evaluated for aircraft failures as part of the aircraft certification. Additionally, other rare-normal and abnormal failures and conditions for ATC operations, flight crew procedures, infrastructure and operating environment are assessed. Where the failure or condition results are not acceptable for continued operation, mitigations are developed or limitations established for the aircraft, flight crew and/or operation.
  - (3) Aircraft failures
    - (i) System failure: Failure of a navigation system, flight guidance system, flight instrument system for the approach, or missed approach (e.g. loss of GNSS updating, receiver failure, autopilot disconnect, FMS failure, etc.). Depending on the aircraft, this may be addressed through aircraft design or

- operating procedure to cross-check guidance (e.g. dual equipage for lateral errors, use of terrain awareness and warning system).
- (ii) Malfunction of air data system or altimetry: flight crew procedure cross-check between two independent systems may mitigate this risk.
- (4) Aircraft performance
- (i) Inadequate performance to conduct the approach operation: the aircraft capabilities and operating procedures ensure that the performance is adequate on each approach, as part of flight planning and in order to begin or continue the approach. Consideration should be given to aircraft configuration during approach and any configuration changes associated with a missed approach operation (e.g. engine failure, flap retraction, re-engagement of autopilot in LNAV mode).
  - (ii) Loss of engine: loss of an engine while on an RNP AR APCH operation is a rare occurrence due to high engine reliability and the short exposure time. The operator needs to take appropriate action to mitigate the effects of loss of engine, initiating a go-around and manually taking control of the aircraft if necessary.
- (5) Navigation services
- (i) Use of a navigation aid outside of designated coverage or in test mode: aircraft airworthiness standards and operating procedures have been developed to address this risk.
  - (ii) Navigation database errors: instrument approach procedures are validated through flight validation specific to the operator and aircraft, and the operator should have a process defined to maintain validated data through updates to the navigation database.
- (6) ATC operations
- (i) Procedure assigned to non-approved aircraft: flight crew are responsible for rejecting the clearance.
  - (ii) ATC provides 'direct to' clearance to or vectors aircraft onto approach such that performance cannot be achieved.
  - (iii) Inconsistent ATC phraseology between controller and flight crew.
- (7) Flight crew operations
- (i) Erroneous barometric altimeter setting: flight crew entry and cross-check procedures may mitigate this risk.
  - (ii) Incorrect procedure selection or loading: flight crew procedures should be available to verify that the loaded procedure matches the published procedure, line of minima and aircraft airworthiness qualification.
  - (iii) Incorrect flight control mode selected: training on importance of flight control mode, flight crew procedure to verify selection of correct flight control mode.
  - (iv) Incorrect RNP entry: flight crew procedure to verify RNP loaded in system matches the published value.
  - (v) Missed approach: bailed landing or rejected landing at or below DA/H.
  - (vi) Poor meteorological conditions: loss or significant reduction of visual reference that may result in a go-around.
- (8) Infrastructure
- (i) GNSS satellite failure: this condition is evaluated during aircraft qualification to ensure obstacle clearance can be maintained, considering the low likelihood of this failure occurring.
  - (ii) Loss of GNSS signals: relevant independent equipage, e.g. IRS/INS, is mandated for RNP AR APCH procedures with RF legs and approaches where the accuracy for the missed approach is less than 1 NM. For other approaches, operating procedures are used to approximate the published track and climb above obstacles.
  - (iii) Testing of ground navigation aids in the vicinity of the approach: aircraft and operating procedures should detect and mitigate this event.
- (9) Operating conditions

- (i) Tailwind conditions: excessive speed on RF legs may result in inability to maintain track. This is addressed through aircraft airworthiness standards on the limits of command guidance, inclusion of 5 degrees of bank manoeuvrability margin, consideration of speed effect and flight crew procedure to maintain speeds below the maximum authorised for the RNP AR APCH procedure.
- (ii) Wind conditions and effect on FTE: nominal FTE is evaluated under a variety of wind conditions, and flight crew procedures to monitor and limit deviations to ensure safe operation.
- (iii) Extreme temperature effects of barometric altitude (e.g. extreme cold temperatures, known local atmospheric or weather phenomena, high winds, severe turbulence, etc.): the effect of this error on the vertical path is mitigated through the procedure design and flight crew procedures, with an allowance for aircraft that compensate for this effect to conduct procedures regardless of the published temperature limit. The effect of this error on minimum segment altitudes and the DA/H are addressed in an equivalent manner to all other approach operations.

#### **AMC1 SPA.PBN.105(d) PBN operational approval**

##### **OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR RNP AR APCH**

- (a) MEL
  - (1) The operator's MEL should be developed/revised to address the equipment provisions for RNP AR APCH operations.
  - (2) An operational TAWS Class A should be available for all RNP AR APCH operations. The TAWS should use altitude values that are compensated for local pressure and temperature effects (e.g. corrected barometric and GNSS altitude), and include significant terrain and obstacle data.
- (b) Autopilot and flight director
  - (1) For RNP AR APCH operations with RNP values less than RNP 0.3 or with RF legs, the autopilot or flight director driven by the area navigation system should be used. Thus, the flight crew should check that the autopilot/flight director is installed and operational.
- (c) Preflight RNP assessment
  - (1) The operator should have a predictive performance capability, which can determine if the specified RNP will be available at the time and location of a desired RNP operation. This capability can be a ground service and need not be resident in the aircraft's avionics equipment. The operator should establish procedures requiring use of this capability as both a preflight preparation tool and as a flight-following tool in the event of reported failures.
  - (2) This predictive capability should account for known and predicted outages of GNSS satellites or other impacts on the navigation system's sensors. The prediction programme should not use a mask angle below 5 degrees, as operational experience indicates that satellite signals at low elevations are not reliable. The prediction should use the actual GNSS constellation with the RAIM (or equivalent) algorithm identical to or more conservative than that used in the actual equipment.
  - (3) The RNP assessment should consider the specific combination of the aircraft capability (sensors and integration), as well as their availability.
- (d) NAVAID exclusion
  - (1) The operator should establish procedures to exclude NAVAID facilities in accordance with NOTAMs (e.g. DMEs, VORs, localisers). Internal avionics reasonableness checks may not be adequate for RNP operations.
- (e) Navigation database currency
  - (1) During system initialisation, the flight crew should confirm that the navigation database is current. Navigation databases should be current for the duration of the flight. If the AIRAC cycle is due to change during flight, the flight crew should follow procedures established by the operator to ensure the accuracy of navigation data.
  - (2) The operator should not allow the flight crew to use an expired database.

#### **AMC2 SPA.PBN.105(d) PBN operational approval**

##### **FLIGHT CONSIDERATIONS**

- (a) Modification of flight plan

The flight crew should not be authorised to fly a published RNP AR APCH procedure unless it is retrievable by the procedure name from the aircraft navigation database and conforms to the charted procedure. The lateral path should not be modified; with the exception of accepting a clearance to go direct to a fix in the approach procedure that is before the FAF and that does not immediately precede an RF leg. The only other acceptable modification to the loaded procedure is to change altitude and/or airspeed waypoint constraints on the initial, intermediate, or missed approach segments flight plan fixes (e.g. to apply temperature corrections or comply with an ATC clearance/instruction).

(b) Mandatory equipment

The flight crew should have either a mandatory list of equipment for conducting RNP AR APCH operations or alternate methods to address in-flight equipment failures that would prohibit RNP AR APCH operations (e.g. crew warning systems, quick reference handbook).

(c) RNP management

Operating procedures should ensure that the navigation system uses the appropriate RNP values throughout the approach operation. If the navigation system does not extract and set the navigation accuracy from the on-board navigation database for each segment of the procedure, then operating procedures should ensure that the smallest navigation accuracy required to complete the approach or the missed approach is selected before initiating the approach operation (e.g. before the IAF). Different IAFs may have different navigation accuracy, which are annotated on the approach chart.

(d) Loss of RNP

The flight crew should ensure that no loss of RNP annunciation is received prior to commencing the RNP AR APCH operation. During the approach operation, if at any time a loss of RNP annunciation is received, the flight crew should abandon the RNP AR APCH operation unless the pilot has in sight the visual references required to continue the approach operation.

(e) Radio updating

Initiation of all RNP AR APCH procedures is based on GNSS updating. The flight crew should comply with the operator's procedures for inhibiting specific facilities.

(f) Approach procedure confirmation

The flight crew should confirm that the correct procedure has been selected. This process includes confirmation of the waypoint sequence, reasonableness of track angles and distances, and any other parameters that can be altered by the flight crew, such as altitude or speed constraints. A navigation system textual display or navigation map display should be used.

(g) Track deviation monitoring

- (1) The flight crew should use a lateral deviation indicator, flight director and/or autopilot in lateral navigation mode on RNP AR APCH operations. The flight crew of an aircraft with a lateral deviation indicator should ensure that lateral deviation indicator scaling (full-scale deflection) is suitable for the navigation accuracy associated with the various segments of the RNP AR APCH procedure. The flight crew is expected to maintain procedure centrelines, as depicted by onboard lateral deviation indicators and/or flight guidance during the entire RNP AR APCH operations unless authorised to deviate by ATC or demanded under emergency conditions. For normal operations, cross-track error/deviation (the difference between the area-navigation-system-computed path and the aircraft position relative to the path) should be limited to the navigation accuracy (RNP) associated with the procedure segment.
- (2) Vertical deviation should be monitored above and below the glide-path; the vertical deviation should be within  $\pm 75$  ft of the glide-path during the final approach segment.
- (3) Flight crew should execute a missed approach operation if:
  - (i) the lateral deviation exceeds one time the RNP value; or
  - (ii) the deviation below the vertical path exceeds 75 ft or half-scale deflection where angular deviation is indicated, at any time; or
  - (iii) the deviation above the vertical path exceeds 75 ft or half-scale deflection where angular deviation is indicated; at or below 1 000 ft above aerodrome level;

- (iv) unless the pilot has in sight the visual references required to continue the approach operation.
- (4) Where a moving map, low-resolution vertical deviation indicator (VDI), or numeric display of deviations are to be used, flight crew training and procedures should ensure the effectiveness of these displays. Typically, this involves demonstration of the procedure with a number of trained flight crew members and inclusion of this monitoring procedure in the recurrent RNP AR APCH training programme.
- (5) For installations that use a CDI for lateral path tracking, the AFM should state which navigation accuracy and operations the aircraft supports and the operational effects on the CDI scale. The flight crew should know the CDI full-scale deflection value. The avionics may automatically set the CDI scale (dependent on phase of flight) or the flight crew may manually set the scale. If the flight crew manually selects the CDI scale, the operator should have procedures and training in place to assure the selected CDI scale is appropriate for the intended RNP operation. The deviation limit should be readily apparent given the scale (e.g. full-scale deflection).
- (h) System cross-check
  - (1) The flight crew should ensure the lateral and vertical guidance provided by the navigation system is consistent.
- (i) Procedures with RF legs
  - (1) When initiating a missed approach operation during or shortly after the RF leg, the flight crew should be aware of the importance of maintaining the published path as closely as possible. Operating procedures should be provided for aircraft that do not stay in LNAV when a missed approach is initiated to ensure the RNP AR APCH ground track is maintained.
  - (2) The flight crew should not exceed the maximum airspeed values shown in Table 1 throughout the RF leg. For example, a Category C A320 should slow to 160 KIAS at the FAF or may fly as fast as 185 KIAS if using Category D minima. A missed approach operation prior to DA/H may require compliance with speed limitation for that segment.

**Table 1: Maximum airspeed by segment and category**

Indicated airspeed (Knots)					
Segments	Indicated airspeed by aircraft category				
	Cat A	Cat B	Cat C	Cat D	Cat E
Initial & intermediate (IAF to FAF)	150	180	240	250	250
Final (FAF to DA)	100	130	160	185	As specified
Missed approach (DA/H to MAHP)	110	150	240	265	As specified
Airspeed restriction*	As specified				

\*Airspeed restrictions may be used to reduce turn radius regardless of aircraft category.

- (j) Temperature compensation
 

For aircraft with temperature compensation capabilities, the flight crew may disregard the temperature limits on RNP procedures if the operator provides pilot training on the use of the temperature compensation function. It should be noted that a temperature compensation by the system is applicable to the VNAV guidance and is not a substitute for the flight crew compensating for temperature effects on minimum altitudes or DA/H. The flight crew should be familiar with the effects of the temperature compensation on intercepting the compensated path as described in EUROCAE ED-75C/RTCA DO-236C Appendix H.
- (k) Altimeter setting
 

Due to the performance-based obstruction clearance inherent in RNP instrument procedures, the flight crew should verify that the most current aerodrome altimeter is set prior to the FAF. The operator should take precautions to switch altimeter settings at appropriate times or locations and request a current altimeter setting if the reported setting may not be recent, particularly at times when pressure is reported or expected to be rapidly decreasing. Execution of an RNP operation necessitates the current altimeter setting for the aerodrome of intended landing. Remote altimeter settings should not be allowed.
- (l) Altimeter cross-check

- (1) The flight crew should complete an altimetry cross-check ensuring both pilots' altimeters agree within  $\pm$ 100 ft prior to the FAF but no earlier than when the altimeters are set for the aerodrome of intended landing. If the altimetry cross-check fails, then the approach operation should not be continued.
  - (2) This operational cross-check should not be necessary if the aircraft systems automatically compare the altitudes to within 75 ft.
- (m) Missed approach operation

Where possible, the missed approach operation should necessitate RNP 1.0. The missed approach portion of these procedures should be similar to a missed approach of an RNP APCH procedure. Where necessary, navigation accuracy less than RNP 1.0 may be used in the missed approach segment.

- (1) In many aircraft, executing a missed approach activating take-off/go-around (TOGA) may cause a change in lateral navigation. In many aircraft, activating TOGA disengages the autopilot and flight director from LNAV guidance, and the flight director reverts to track-hold derived from the inertial system. LNAV guidance to the autopilot and flight director should be re-engaged as quickly as possible.
  - (2) Flight crew procedures and training should address the impact on navigation capability and flight guidance if the pilot initiates a missed approach while the aircraft is in a turn. When initiating an early missed approach operation, the flight crew should follow the rest of the approach track and missed approach track unless a different clearance has been issued by ATC. The flight crew should also be aware that RF legs are designed based on the maximum true airspeed at normal altitudes, and initiating an early missed approach operation will reduce the manoeuvrability margin and potentially even make holding the turn impractical at missed approach speeds.
- (n) Contingency procedures
- (1) Failure while en route
 

The flight crew should be able to assess the impact of GNSS equipment failure on the anticipated RNP AR APCH operation and take appropriate action.
  - (2) Failure on approach
 

The operator's contingency procedures should address at least the following conditions:

    - (i) failure of the area navigation system components, including those affecting lateral and vertical deviation performance (e.g. failures of a GPS sensor, the flight director or autopilot);
    - (ii) loss of navigation signal-in-space (loss or degradation of external signal).

### AMC3 SPA.PBN.105(d) PBN operational approval

#### NAVIGATION DATABASE MANAGEMENT

- (a) The operator should validate every RNP AR APCH procedure before using the procedure in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) to ensure compatibility with their aircraft and to ensure the resulting path matches the published procedure. As a minimum, the operator should:
  - (1) compare the navigation data for the procedure(s) to be loaded into the FMS with the published procedure.
  - (2) validate the loaded navigation data for the procedure, either in an FSTD or in the actual aircraft in VMC. The depicted procedure on the map display should be compared to the published procedure. The entire procedure should be flown to ensure the path is flyable, does not have any apparent lateral or vertical path disconnects and is consistent with the published procedure.
  - (3) Once the procedure is validated, a copy of the validated navigation data should be retained for comparison with subsequent data updates.
  - (4) For published procedures, where FOSA demonstrated that the procedure is not in a challenging operational environment, the flight or FSTD validation may be credited from already validated equivalent RNP AR APCH procedures.
- (b) If an aircraft system required for RNP AR APCH operations is modified, the operator should assess the need for a validation of the RNP AR APCH procedures with the navigation database and the modified system. This may be accomplished without any direct evaluation if the manufacturer verifies that the modification has no effect on the navigation database or path computation. If no such assurance from the manufacturer is available, the operator should conduct initial data validation with the modified system.



- (c) The operator should implement procedures that ensure timely distribution and insertion of current and unaltered electronic navigation data to all aircraft that require it.

**AMC1 SPA.PBN.105(e) PBN operational approval**

**REPORTABLE EVENTS**

The operator should report events which are listed in AMC2 ORO.GEN.160.

**AMC1 SPA.PBN.105(f) PBN operational approval**

**RNP MONITORING PROGRAMME**

- (a) The operator approved to conduct RNP AR APCH operations, should have an RNP monitoring programme to ensure continued compliance with applicable rules and to identify any negative trends in performance.
- (b) During an interim approval period, which should be at least 90 days, the operator should at least submit the following information every 30 days to the Brunei DCA.
- (1) Total number of RNP AR APCH operations conducted;
  - (2) Number of approach operations by aircraft/system which were completed as planned without any navigation or guidance system anomalies;
  - (3) Reasons for unsatisfactory approaches, such as:
    - (i) UNABLE REQ NAV PERF, NAV ACCUR DOWNGRAD, or other RNP messages during approaches;
    - (ii) excessive lateral or vertical deviation;
    - (iii) TAWS warning;
    - (iv) autopilot system disconnect;
    - (v) navigation data errors; or
    - (vi) flight crew reports of any anomaly;
  - (4) Flight crew comments.
- (c) Thereafter, the operator should continue to collect and periodically review this data to identify potential safety concerns, and maintain summaries of this data.

## Subpart C - Operations with Specified Minimum Navigation Performance (MNPS)

### GM1 SPA.MNPS.100 MNPS operations

#### DOCUMENTATION

MNPS and the procedures governing their application are published in the Regional Supplementary Procedures, ICAO Doc 7030, as well as in national AIPs.

### AMC1 SPA.MNPS.105 MNPS operational approval

#### LONG RANGE NAVIGATION SYSTEM (LRNS)

- (a) For unrestricted operation in MNPS airspace an aircraft should be equipped with two independent LRNSs.
- (b) An LRNS may be one of the following:
  - (1) one inertial navigation system (INS);
  - (2) one global navigation satellite system (GNSS); or
  - (3) one navigation system using the inputs from one or more inertial reference system (IRS) or any other sensor system complying with the MNPS requirement.
- (c) In case of the GNSS is used as a stand-alone system for LRNS, an integrity check should be carried out.
- (d) For operation in MNPS airspace along notified special routes the aeroplane should be equipped with one LRNS.

## Subpart D - Operations in Airspace with Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM)

### AMC1 SPA.RVSM.105 RVSM operational approval

#### CONTENT OF OPERATOR RVSM APPLICATION

The following material should be made available to the Brunei DCA, in sufficient time to permit evaluation, before the intended start of RVSM operations:

- (a) Airworthiness documents  
Documentation that shows that the aircraft has RVSM airworthiness approval. This should include an aircraft flight manual (AFM) amendment or supplement.
- (b) Description of aircraft equipment  
A description of the aircraft appropriate to operations in a RVSM environment.
- (c) Training programmes, operating practices and procedures  
The operator should submit training syllabi for initial and recurrent training programmes together with other relevant material. The material should show that the operating practices, procedures and training items, related to RVSM operations in airspace that requires State operational approval, are incorporated.
- (d) Manuals and checklists  
The appropriate manuals and checklists should be revised to include information / guidance on standard operating procedures. Manuals should contain a statement of the airspeeds, altitudes and weights considered in RVSM aircraft approval, including identification of any operating limitations or conditions established for that aircraft type. Manuals and checklists may need to be submitted for review by the Brunei DCA as part of the application process.
- (e) Past performance  
Relevant operating history, where available, should be included in the application. The applicant should show that any required changes have been made in training, operating or maintenance practices to improve poor height-keeping performance.
- (f) Minimum equipment list  
Where applicable, a minimum equipment list (MEL), adapted from the master minimum equipment list (MMEL), should include items pertinent to operating in RVSM airspace.
- (g) Plan for participation in verification/monitoring programmes  
The operator should establish a plan for participation in any applicable verification/monitoring programme acceptable to the Brunei DCA. This plan should include, as a minimum, a check on a sample of the operator's fleet by an regional monitoring agency (RMA)'s independent height-monitoring system.
- (h) Continuing airworthiness  
Aircraft maintenance programme and continuing airworthiness procedures in support of the RVSM operations.

### AMC2 SPA.RVSM.105 RVSM operational approval

#### OPERATING PROCEDURES

- (a) Flight planning
  - (1) During flight planning the flight crew should pay particular attention to conditions that may affect operation in RVSM airspace. These include, but may not be limited to:
    - (vi) verifying that the airframe is approved for RVSM operations;
    - (vii) reported and forecast weather on the route of flight;
    - (viii) minimum equipment requirements pertaining to height-keeping and alerting systems; and
    - (ix) any airframe or operating restriction related to RVSM operations.
- (b) Pre-flight procedures
  - (1) The following actions should be accomplished during the pre-flight procedure:

- (i) Review technical logs and forms to determine the condition of equipment required for flight in the RVSM airspace. Ensure that maintenance action has been taken to correct defects to required equipment.
  - (ii) During the external inspection of aircraft, particular attention should be paid to the condition of static sources and the condition of the fuselage skin near each static source and any other component that affects altimetry system accuracy. This check may be accomplished by a qualified and authorised person other than the pilot (e.g. a flight engineer or ground engineer).
  - (iii) Before take-off, the aircraft altimeters should be set to the QNH (atmospheric pressure at nautical height) of the airfield and should display a known altitude, within the limits specified in the aircraft operating manuals. The two primary altimeters should also agree within limits specified by the aircraft operating manual. An alternative procedure using QFE (atmospheric pressure at aerodrome elevation/runway threshold) may also be used. The maximum value of acceptable altimeter differences for these checks should not exceed 23 m (75 ft). Any required functioning checks of altitude indicating systems should be performed.
  - (iv) Before take-off, equipment required for flight in RVSM airspace should be operative and any indications of malfunction should be resolved.
- (c) Prior to RVSM airspace entry
- (1) The following equipment should be operating normally at entry into RVSM airspace:
    - (i) two primary altitude measurement systems. A cross-check between the primary altimeters should be made. A minimum of two will need to agree within  $\pm 60$  m ( $\pm 200$  ft). Failure to meet this condition will require that the altimetry system be reported as defective and air traffic control (ATC) notified;
    - (ii) one automatic altitude-control system;
    - (iii) one altitude-alerting device; and
    - (iv) operating transponder.
  - (2) Should any of the required equipment fail prior to the aircraft entering RVSM airspace, the pilot should request a new clearance to avoid entering this airspace.
- (d) In-flight procedures
- (1) The following practices should be incorporated into flight crew training and procedures:
    - (i) Flight crew should comply with any aircraft operating restrictions, if required for the specific aircraft type, e.g. limits on indicated Mach number, given in the RVSM airworthiness approval.
    - (ii) Emphasis should be placed on promptly setting the sub-scale on all primary and standby altimeters to 1013.2 hPa / 29.92 in Hg when passing the transition altitude, and rechecking for proper altimeter setting when reaching the initial cleared flight level.
    - (iii) In level cruise it is essential that the aircraft is flown at the cleared flight level. This requires that particular care is taken to ensure that ATC clearances are fully understood and followed. The aircraft should not intentionally depart from cleared flight level without a positive clearance from ATC unless the crew are conducting contingency or emergency manoeuvres.
    - (iv) When changing levels, the aircraft should not be allowed to overshoot or undershoot the cleared flight level by more than 45 m (150 ft). If installed, the level off should be accomplished using the altitude capture feature of the automatic altitude-control system.
    - (v) An automatic altitude-control system should be operative and engaged during level cruise, except when circumstances such as the need to re-trim the aircraft or turbulence require disengagement. In any event, adherence to cruise altitude should be done by reference to one of the two primary altimeters. Following loss of the automatic height-keeping function, any consequential restrictions will need to be observed.
    - (vi) Ensure that the altitude-alerting system is operative.
    - (vii) At intervals of approximately 1 hour, cross-checks between the primary altimeters should be made. A minimum of two will need to agree within  $\pm 60$  m ( $\pm 200$  ft). Failure to meet this condition will require that the altimetry system be reported as defective and ATC notified

The usual scan of flight deck instruments should suffice for altimeter cross-checking on most flights.

- (viii) In normal operations, the altimetry system being used to control the aircraft should be selected for the input to the altitude reporting transponder transmitting information to ATC.
- (ix) If the pilot is notified by ATC of a deviation from an assigned altitude exceeding  $\pm 90$  m ( $\pm 300$  ft) then the pilot should take action to return to cleared flight level as quickly as possible.
- (2) Contingency procedures after entering RVSM airspace are as follows:
  - (i) The pilot should notify ATC of contingencies (equipment failures, weather) that affect the ability to maintain the cleared flight level and coordinate a plan of action appropriate to the airspace concerned. The pilot should obtain the guidance on contingency procedures is contained in the relevant publications dealing with the airspace.
  - (ii) Examples of equipment failures that should be notified to ATC are:
    - (A) failure of all automatic altitude-control systems aboard the aircraft;
    - (B) loss of redundancy of altimetry systems;
    - (C) loss of thrust on an engine necessitating descent; or
    - (D) any other equipment failure affecting the ability to maintain cleared flight level.
  - (iii) The pilot should notify ATC when encountering greater than moderate turbulence.
  - (iv) If unable to notify ATC and obtain an ATC clearance prior to deviating from the cleared flight level, the pilot should follow any established contingency procedures for the region of operation and obtain ATC clearance as soon as possible.
- (e) Post-flight procedures
  - (1) In making technical log entries against malfunctions in height-keeping systems, the pilot should provide sufficient detail to enable maintenance to effectively troubleshoot and repair the system. The pilot should detail the actual defect and the crew action taken to try to isolate and rectify the fault.
  - (2) The following information should be recorded when appropriate:
    - (i) primary and standby altimeter readings;
    - (ii) altitude selector setting;
    - (iii) subscale setting on altimeter;
    - (iv) autopilot used to control the aircraft and any differences when an alternative autopilot system was selected;
    - (v) differences in altimeter readings, if alternate static ports selected;
    - (vi) use of air data computer selector for fault diagnosis procedure; and
    - (vii) the transponder selected to provide altitude information to ATC and any difference noted when an alternative transponder was selected.
- (f) Crew training
  - (1) The following items should also be included in-flight crew training programmes:
    - (i) knowledge and understanding of standard ATC phraseology used in each area of operations;
    - (ii) importance of crew members cross-checking to ensure that ATC clearances are promptly and correctly complied with;
    - (iii) use and limitations in terms of accuracy of standby altimeters in contingencies. Where applicable, the pilot should review the application of static source error correction/position error correction through the use of correction cards; such correction data should be available on the flight deck;
    - (iv) problems of visual perception of other aircraft at 300 m (1 000 ft) planned separation during darkness, when encountering local phenomena such as northern lights, for opposite and same direction traffic, and during turns;
    - (v) characteristics of aircraft altitude capture systems that may lead to overshoots;
    - (vi) relationship between the aircraft's altimetry, automatic altitude control and transponder systems in normal and abnormal conditions; and

- (vii) any airframe operating restrictions, if required for the specific aircraft group, related to RVSM airworthiness approval.

### **AMC3 SPA.RVSM.105 RVSM operational approval**

#### **CONTINUING AIRWORTHINESS**

- (a) Maintenance programme

The aircraft maintenance programme should include the instructions for continuing airworthiness issued by the type certificate holder in relation to the RVSM operations certification in accordance with AMC1 ACNS.A.GEN.010.

- (b) Continuing airworthiness procedures

The continuing airworthiness procedures should establish a process to:

- (1) assess any modification or design change which in any way affects the RVSM approval;
- (2) evaluate any repairs that may affect the integrity of the continuing RVSM approval, e.g. those affecting the alignment of pitot/static probes, repairs to dents, or deformation around static plates;
- (3) ensure the proper maintenance of airframe geometry for proper surface contours and the mitigation of altimetry system error, surface measurements or skin waviness as specified in the instructions for continued airworthiness (ICA), to ensure adherence to RVSM tolerances. These checks should be performed following repairs or alterations having an effect on airframe surface and airflow.

- (c) Additional training may be necessary for continuing airworthiness and maintenance staff to support RVSM approval. Areas that may need to be highlighted for the initial and recurrent training of relevant personnel are:

- (1) Aircraft geometric inspection techniques;
- (2) Test equipment calibration and use of that equipment; and
- (3) Any special instructions or procedures introduced for RVSM approval.

- (d) Test equipment

The operator should ensure that maintenance organisations use test equipment adequate for maintenance of the RVSM systems. The adequacy of the test equipment should be established in accordance with the type certificate holder recommendations and taking into consideration the required test equipment accuracy and the test equipment calibration.

### **GM1 SPA.RVSM.105(d)(9) RVSM operational approval**

#### **SPECIFIC REGIONAL PROCEDURES**

- (a) The areas of applicability (by Flight Information Region) of RVSM airspace in identified ICAO regions is contained in the relevant sections of ICAO Document 7030/4. In addition, these sections contain operating and contingency procedures unique to the regional airspace concerned, specific flight planning requirements and the approval requirements for aircraft in the designated region.
- (b) Comprehensive guidance on operational matters for European RVSM airspace is contained in ICAO EUR Doc 009 entitled 'Guidance material on the implementation of a 300 m (1 000 ft) vertical separation minimum in the European RVSM airspace' with further material included in the relevant State aeronautical publications.

### **AMC1 SPA.RVSM.110(a) RVSM equipment requirements**

#### **TWO INDEPENDENT ALTITUDE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS**

Each system should be composed of the following components:

- (a) cross-coupled static source/system, with ice protection if located in areas subject to ice accretion;
- (b) equipment for measuring static pressure sensed by the static source, converting it to pressure altitude and displaying the pressure altitude to the flight crew;
- (c) equipment for providing a digitally encoded signal corresponding to the displayed pressure altitude, for automatic altitude reporting purposes;
- (d) static source error correction (SSEC), if needed to meet the performance criteria for RVSM flight envelopes; and
- (e) signals referenced to a flight crew selected altitude for automatic control and alerting. These signals will need to be derived from an altitude measurement system meeting the performance criteria for RVSM flight envelopes.

## Subpart E - Low Visibility Operations (LVO)

### AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(a) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits

#### LOW-VISIBILITY TAKE-OFF (LVTO) OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES IN AN RVR OF LESS THAN 400 M

(a) Required RVR

- (1) For multi-engined aeroplanes which, in the event of a critical engine failure at any point during take-off, can either stop or continue the take-off to a height of 1 500 ft above the aerodrome while clearing obstacles by the required margins, the criteria in Table 1 should apply:

**Table 1**  
**LVTO operations with aeroplanes — RVR versus facilities**

Minimum RVR	Facilities
300 m (day)	Centre line markings; and Runway edge lights.
300 m (night)	Centre line markings; and Runway edge lights; and Runway end lights or centre line lights.
150 m	Centre line markings; and Runway end lights; and Runway edge lights; and Runway centre line lights.
125 m	Centre line markings; and Runway end lights; and Runway edge lights (spaced 60 m or less); and Runway centre line lights (spaced 15 m or less).

- (2) For multi-engined aeroplanes not complying with the conditions in (a)(1), there may be a need to land immediately and to see and avoid obstacles. Such aeroplanes may be operated to the take-off minima shown in Table 2 and the marking and lighting criteria shown in Table 1, provided that they are able to comply with the applicable obstacle clearance criteria, assuming engine failure at the height specified:

**Table 2**  
**LVTO operations with aeroplanes — assumed engine failure height versus RVR**

Assumed engine failure height above the take-off runway (ft) versus RVR (m)	
Less than 50	Not less than 200
More than 50 but less than 100	Not less than 300

- (b) The reported RVR value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot assessment.  
(c) The minimum RVR value specified in Table 1 or 2 should be achieved for all reporting points representative of the parts of the runway from the point at which the aircraft commences the take-off until the calculated accelerate-stop distance from that point.

#### LVTO OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES IN AN RVR OF LESS THAN 125 M

- (d) For LVTO operations with an RVR of less than 125 m, the following additional elements should apply:  
(1) The runway has centre line lights spaced at intervals of 15 m or less;

- (2) If an ILS signal is used for lateral guidance, the ILS localiser signal meets the requirements for category III operations, unless otherwise stated in the AFM;
  - (3) If an ILS signal is to be used, low-visibility procedures (LVPs) include protection of the runway and, where an ILS localiser signal is used, it should include protection of the ILS-sensitive area unless otherwise stated in the AFM; and
  - (4) If a GLS signal is used for lateral guidance, the GLS performance type meets the requirements for category III operations (GAST D and to GBAS point to which guidance is required), unless otherwise stated in the AFM.
- (e) For LVTO operations with an RVR of less than 125 m, the reported RVR should be not less than the minimum specified in the AFM or, if no such minimum is specified, not less than 75 m.
- (f) The minimum required RVR should be achieved for all reporting points representative of the parts of the runway from the point at which the aircraft commences the take-off until the greater of the calculated take-off distance or accelerate-stop distance from that point.
- (g) The reported RVR value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot assessment.

**AMC2 SPA.LVO.100(a) Low -visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

**LVTO OPERATIONS – HELICOPTERS**

- (a) For take-off from onshore aerodromes or operating sites with IFR departure procedures, the criteria in Table 3 should apply:

**Table 3  
LVTO operations with helicopters — RVR versus facilities onshore**

RVR OR VIS (m) *	Facilities
Not less than 250 m or the rejected take-off distance, whichever is the greater	No light and no markings (day only)
Not less than 800	No light and no markings (day only)
Not less than 200 m	Runway edge/FATO light and centre line marking
Not less than 200 m	Runway edge/FATO light, centre line marking and relevant RVR information

\* On PinS departures to IDF, VIS should not be less than 800 m and ceiling should not be less than 250 ft.

- (b) For take-off from offshore helidecks where the take-off flight path is free of obstacles, the minimum RVR for take-off should not be less than:
- 500 m for single pilot operations; or
  - 250 m for two-pilot operations

**GMC1 SPA.LVO.100(a) Low -visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

**CLASSIFICATION OF LVTO OPERATIONS**

Take-off operations are classified as ‘normal take-off operations’ with an RVR at or above 550 m and ‘LVTO operations’ with an RVR below 550 m. Only LVTO operations in an RVR of less than 400 m require a specific approval.

**GMC2 SPA.LVO.100(a) Low -visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

**VISUAL SEGMENT FOR TAKE-OFF**

The value of 125 m RVR for take-off with 15 m centre line light spacing has been selected because flight deck geometry means that this will provide at least a 90-m visual segment for the large majority of aircraft types. In a 90-m visual segment the pilot is expected to be able to see six centre line light intervals (seven centre line lights) at 15 m spacing once lined up on the runway centre line.

**AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

**INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS IN LOW-VISIBILITY CONDITIONS — CAT II OPERATIONS**

For CAT II operations, the following should apply:



- (a) The DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and be not lower than the highest of:
- (1) the minimum DH specified in the AFM, if stated;
  - (2) the applicable obstacle clearance height (OCH) for the category of aircraft;
  - (3) DH to which the flight crew is qualified to operate; or
  - (4) 100 ft.
- (b) The lowest RVR minima to be used are specified in Table 4:

**Table 4**  
**CAT II operation minima: RVR (m) versus DH (ft)**

Aircraft categories		Auto-coupled or HUD to below DH*	
		A, B, C	D
DH (ft)	100-120	300	300/350
	121-140	400	400
	141-199	450	450

\*: An RVR of 300 m may be used for a Category D aeroplane conducting an Autoland or using HUDLS to touchdown.

**AMC2 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

**INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS IN LOW-VISIBILITY CONDITIONS – CAT III OPERATIONS**

For CAT III operations, the following should apply:

- (a) For operations in which a DH is used, the DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance and be not lower than:
- (1) the minimum DH specified in the AFM, if stated;
  - (2) the DH to which the flight crew is qualified to operate.
- (b) Operations with no DH should only be conducted if:
- (1) the operation with no DH is specified in the AFM;
  - (2) there is no published information indicating that the approach aid or aerodrome facilities cannot support operations with no DH; and
  - (3) the flight crew is qualified to operate with no DH.
- (c) The lowest RVR to be used should be determined in accordance with Table 5:

**Table 5**  
**CAT III operation minima: RVR (m) versus DH (ft)**

DH (ft)	Roll-out control/guidance system	RVR (m)*
50-99	Not required	175
0-49 or no DH	Fail-passive	125
	Fail-operational	(75)

\*Note: For a fail-passive or HUD roll-out control system, a lower RVR value (no lower than 75 m) can be used if stated in the AFM provided that the equipment demonstrated such capability as part of the certification process. This is provided that the operator has implemented the appropriate operating procedures and training.

**AMC3 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

**INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS IN LOW-VISIBILITY CONDITIONS – EFFECT ON LANDING MINIMA OF TEMPORARILY FAILED OR DOWNGRADED EQUIPMENT FOR APPROACH OPERATIONS WITH A DH BELOW 200 ft**

Only those facilities mentioned in Table 6 should be acceptable to be used to determine the effect of temporarily failed or downgraded equipment on the required RVR for CAT II/III approach operations.

- (a) The following conditions should be applied to Table 6:

- (1) multiple failures of runway/FATO lights other than those indicated in Table 6 are not acceptable;
- (2) failures of both the approach and runway/FATO lights are acceptable at the same time, and the most demanding consequence should be applied;
- (3) for approach operations with a DH below 200 ft, a combination of deficiencies in runway/ FATO lights and RVR assessment equipment are not permitted; and
- (4) failures other than ILS, GLS and MLS affect RVR only and not DH.

**Table 6**  
**Failed or downgraded equipment – effect on landing minima CAT II/III operations**

Failed or downgraded equipment		Effect on landing minima			
		CAT III no DH	CAT III DH<50ft	CAT III DH>= 50ft	CAT II
Failed or downgraded equipment	Navaid stand-by transmitter	Not allowed	RVR 200 m	No effect	
	Outer marker (ILS)	No effect the required height versus glide path can be checked using other means, e.g DME fix			
	Middle marker (ILS)	No effect			
	DME	No effect if replaced by RNAV (GNSS) information or the outer marker			
	RVR assessment systems	At least one RVR value to be available on the aerodrome	On runways equipped with two or more RVR assessment units, one may be inoperative		
	Approach lights	No effect	Not allowed for operations with DH > 50 ft	Not allowed	
	Approach lights except the last 210 m	No effect			Not allowed
	Approach lights except the last 420 m	No effect			
	Standby power for approach lights	No effect			
	Standby power for runway lights with 1-second switchover time	No effect	Not allowed	Day: RVR 550 m	Day: RVR 550 m
		No effect		Night: RVR 550 m	Night: RVR 550 m
	Edge lights	No effect	Day: No effect	Day: No effect	Day: no effect
			Night: RVR 550 m	Night: RVR 550 m	Night: not allowed
	Threshold	No effect	No effect	Day: No effect	Day: No effect
				Night: RVR 550 m	Night: not allowed
	Runway end lights	No effect if centre line lights are serviceable			
	Centre line lights	Day: RVR 200 m	Not allowed	Day: RVR 300 m	Day: RVR 350 m
		Night: not allowed		Night: RVR 400 m	Night: RVR 550 m with HUD or autoland)
	Centre line lights spacing increased to 30 m	RVR 150 m		No effect	
	TDZ lights	No effect	Day: RVR 200 m	Day: RVR 300 m	
Night: RVR 300 m			Night: RVR 550 m, 350 m with HUD or autoland		
Taxiway light system	No effect				

**Table 7**

**Failed or downgraded equipment —effect on landing minima Operational credits**

Failed or downgraded equipment		Effect on landing minima			
		SA CAT I	SA CAT II	EFVS-A	EFVS-L
Failed or downgraded equipment	Navaid stand-by transmitter	No effect			
	Outer marker (ILS)	No effect the required height check at 1000 ft			
	Middle marker (ILS)	No effect			
	RVR assessment systems	On runways equipped with two or more RVR assessment units, one may be inoperative			
	Approach lights	No allowed	Not allowed	As per IAP	As per IAP
	Approach lights except the last 210 m	Not allowed	No effect	As per IAP	As per IAP
	Approach lights except the last 420 m	No effect	No effect	As per IAP	As per IAP
	Standby power for approach lights	No effect			
	Edge lights	<b>Day:</b> No effect	<b>Day:</b> No effect	As per IAP	As per IAP
		<b>Night:</b> RVR 550 m	<b>Night:</b> RVR 550 m	As per IAP	As per IAP
	Threshold lights	<b>Day:</b> No effect	<b>Day:</b> no effect	As per IAP	As per IAP
		<b>Night:</b> not allowed	<b>Night:</b> RVR 550 m	As per IAP	As per IAP
	Runway end lights	No effect if centre line lights are serviceable		As per IAP	
	Centre line lights	<b>Day:</b> RVR 400 m	<b>Day:</b> RVR 300 m	As per IAP	As per IAP
		<b>Night:</b> RVR 550 m	<b>Night:</b> RVR 400 m	As per IAP	As per IAP
	Centre line lights spacing increased to 30 m	No effect	No effect	As per IAP	As per IAP
	TDZ lights	<b>Day:</b> no effect	<b>Day:</b> RVR 300 m	As per IAP	
		<b>Night:</b> no effect	<b>Night:</b> RVR 350 m	As per IAP	
Taxiway light system	No effect				

**GM1 SPA.LVO.100 Low visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

**DOCUMENTS CONTAINING INFORMATION RELATED TO LVOs AND OPERATIONS WITH OPERATIONAL CREDITS**

The following documents provide further information to low visibility operations (LVO):

- (a) ICAO Annex 2 — Rules of the Air;
- (b) ICAO Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft;
- (c) ICAO Annex 10 —Aeronautical Telecommunications (Volume I — Radio Navigation Aids);
- (d) ICAO Annex 14 — Aerodromes Vol. 1 (Volume I — Aerodrome Design and Operations);
- (e) ICAO Doc 8168 — PANS - OPS — Procedures For Air Navigation Services — Aircraft Operations;
- (f) ICAO Doc 9365 — Manual of All-Weather Operations;

- (g) ICAO Doc 9476 — Manual of surface movement guidance and control systems (SMGCS);
- (h) ICAO Doc 9157 — Aerodrome Design Manual;
- (i) ICAO Doc 9328 — Manual of RVR Observing and Reporting Practices;
- (j) ICAO EUR Doc 013 — European Guidance Material on All Weather Operations at Aerodromes;
- (k) ECAC Doc 17, Issue 3; and
- (l) CS-AWO All-weather operations.

### **GM1 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

#### **INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS IN LOW-VISIBILITY CONDITIONS — CLASSIFICATION OF STANDARD APPROACH OPERATIONS**

The different types of approach and landing operations are classified according to the lowest DH (or MDH) and RVR applicable to the approach type.

The classification of approach types does not depend on the technology used for the approach. The lowest minima specified do not take account of 'operational credits' that may allow for lower operating minima. The classification does not subdivide CAT III operations into CAT IIIA, IIIB, and IIIC. The actual minima applicable to any operation depends on the aircraft equipment and the specific LVO approval held by the air operator.

The AFM for aircraft certified for CAT III operations will state the lowest usable DH, or no DH. Some AFMs may refer to the previous ICAO classifications as follows:

- CAT IIIA: a DH lower than 30 m (100 ft) or no DH and an RVR not less than 175 m;
- CAT IIIB: a DH lower than 15 m (50 ft) or no DH and an RVR less than 175 m but not less than 50 m; and
- CAT IIIC: no DH and no RVR limitations

### **GM2 SPA.LVO.100 Low visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

#### **ILS AND GLS CLASSIFICATION**

- (a) The ILS and GBAS classification systems are specified in ICAO Annex 10 and GM2 SPA.LVO.110

#### **LOW-VISIBILITY CONDITIONS**

- (b) Low visibility conditions means meteorological conditions with a runway visual range (RVR) less than 550 m.

### **GM2 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

#### **INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS IN LOW-VISIBILITY CONDITIONS — EQUIPMENT CERTIFICATION FOR LOW-VISIBILITY APPROACH OPERATIONS OTHER THAN EFVS**

This GM describes the certification requirements of CS-AWO. Operators should always refer to CS-AWO for the actual requirements.

Aircraft suitable for low-visibility approach operations are certified according to the minimum usable DH which is stated in the AFM.

Certification specifications (CS-AWO) allow for systems to be certified for SA CAT I, CAT II or CAT III operations. Systems certified for CAT III operations may specify:

- a lowest usable DH of:
  - less than 100 ft but not less than 50 ft;
  - less than 50 ft; or
- No DH

Legacy systems may be described as capable of 'CAT 3A' or 'CAT IIIA' operations. This implies a minimum DH of less than 100 ft but not less than 50 ft. Systems described as capable of 'CAT 3B' or 'CAT IIIB' may be certified for a DH of less than 50 ft or no DH.

Operations to a DH of less than 100 ft but not less than 50 ft will typically require a fail-passive automatic landing system or a HUDLS or equivalent system. Operations to a DH of less than 50 ft will require a fail-operational landing system, a fail-passive go-around system, automatic thrust control and either automatic ground roll control or ground roll guidance using a HUDLS. For no DH operations, a fail-passive or fail-operational ground roll control system is required.

The RVR required for SA CAT I, CAT II and SA CAT II approach operations is determined by the DH and the aircraft approach speed category. The RVR required for CAT III approach operations is determined by the DH and the capability of the ground-roll control system. Operations with fail-passive roll control systems require a greater RVR than operations with fail-operational ground control systems because the pilots would need to have sufficient visibility to maintain lateral control in the event of a system failure.

### **GM3 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

#### **INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS IN LOW-VISIBILITY CONDITIONS — ESTABLISHMENT OF MINIMUM RVR FOR APPROACH OPERATIONS WITH A DH BELOW 200 ft**

(a) General

- (1) When establishing minimum RVR for CAT II and CAT III operations, operators should pay attention to the following information that originates in ECAC Doc17 3rd Edition, Subpart A. It is retained as background information and, to some extent, for historical purposes although there may be some conflict with current practices.
- (2) Since the inception of precision approach and landing operations various methods have been devised for the calculation of aerodrome operating minima in terms of DH and RVR. It is a comparatively straightforward matter to establish the DH for an operation but establishing the minimum RVR to be associated with that DH so as to provide a high probability that the required visual reference will be available at that DH has been more of a problem.

The methods adopted by various States to resolve the DH/RVR relationship in respect of CAT II and CAT III operations have varied considerably. In one instance there has been a simple approach that entailed the application of empirical data based on actual operating experience in a particular environment. This has given satisfactory results for application within the environment for which it was developed. In another instance a more sophisticated method was employed which utilised a fairly complex computer programme to take account of a wide range of variables. However, in the latter case, it has been found that with the improvement in the performance of visual aids, and the increased use of automatic equipment in the many different types of new aircraft, most of the variables cancel each other out and a simple tabulation can be constructed that is applicable to a wide range of aircraft. The basic principles that are observed in establishing the values in such a table are that the scale of visual reference required by a pilot at and below DH depends on the task that he/she has to carry out, and that the degree to which his/her vision is obscured depends on the obscuring medium, the general rule in fog being that it becomes more dense with increase in height. Research using flight simulation training devices (FSTDs) coupled with flight trials has shown the following:

- (i) most pilots require visual contact to be established about 3 seconds above DH though it has been observed that this reduces to about 1 second when a fail-operational automatic landing system is being used;
- (ii) to establish lateral position and cross-track velocity most pilots need to see not less than a three light segment of the centre line of the approach lights, or runway centre line, or runway edge lights;
- (iii) for roll guidance most pilots need to see a lateral element of the ground pattern, i.e. an approach light cross bar, the landing threshold, or a barrette of the touchdown zone light; and
- (iv) to make an accurate adjustment to the flight path in the vertical plane, such as a flare, using purely visual cues, most pilots need to see a point on the ground which has a low or zero rate of apparent movement relative to the aircraft.
- (v) With regard to fog structure, data gathered in the United Kingdom over a 20 year period have shown that in deep stable fog there is a 90 % probability that the slant visual range from eye heights higher than 15 ft above the ground will be less than the horizontal visibility at ground level, i.e. RVR. There are at present no data available to show what the relationship is between the slant visual range and RVR in other low visibility conditions such as blowing snow, dust or heavy rain, but there is some evidence in pilot reports that the lack of contrast between visual aids and the background in such conditions can produce a relationship similar to that observed in fog.

(b) CAT II operations

The selection of the dimensions of the required visual segments that are used for CAT II operations is based on the following visual provisions:

- (1) a visual segment of not less than 90 m will need to be in view at and below DH for pilot to be able to monitor an automatic system;
- (2) a visual segment of not less than 120 m will need to be in view for a pilot to be able to maintain the roll attitude manually at and below DH; and
- (3) for a manual landing using only external visual cues, a visual segment of 225 m will be required at the height at which flare initiation starts in order to provide the pilot with sight of a point of low relative movement on the ground.

Before using a CAT II ILS for landing, the quality of the localiser between 50 ft and touchdown should be verified.

(c) CAT III fail-passive operations

- (1) CAT III operations utilising fail-passive automatic landing equipment were introduced in the late 1960s and it is desirable that the principles governing the establishment of the minimum RVR for such operations be dealt with in some detail.
- (2) During an automatic landing the pilot needs to monitor the performance of the aircraft system, not in order to detect a failure that is better done by the monitoring devices built into the system, but so as to know precisely the flight situation. In the final stages the pilot should establish visual contact and, by the time the pilot reaches DH, the pilot should have checked the aircraft position relative to the approach or runway centre line lights. For this the pilot will need sight of horizontal elements (for roll reference) and part of the touchdown area. The pilot should check for lateral position and cross-track velocity and, if not within the pre-stated lateral limits, the pilot should carry out a missed approach procedure. The pilot should also check longitudinal progress and sight of the landing threshold is useful for this purpose, as is sight of the touchdown zone lights.

Where a fail-operational automatic landing and roll-out system is used, it is not considered necessary for the pilot to check the lateral position and cross-track velocity, and thus it is not necessary for the visual reference requirements to include horizontal elements of the lighting system.

- (3) In the event of a failure of the automatic flight guidance system below DH, there are two possible courses of action; the first is a procedure that allows the pilot to complete the landing manually if there is adequate visual reference for him/her to do so, or to initiate a missed approach procedure if there is not; the second is to make a missed approach procedure mandatory if there is a system disconnect regardless of the pilot's assessment of the visual reference available:
  - (i) If the first option is selected then the overriding rule in the determination of a minimum RVR is for sufficient visual cues to be available at and below DH for the pilot to be able to carry out a manual landing. Data presented in ECAC Doc 17 showed that a minimum value of 300 m would give a high probability that the cues needed by the pilot to assess the aircraft in pitch and roll will be available and this should be the minimum RVR for this procedure.
  - (ii) (The second option, to require a missed approach procedure to be carried out should the automatic flight-guidance system fail below DH, will permit a lower minimum RVR because the visual reference provision will be less if there is no need to provide for the possibility of a manual landing. However, this option is only acceptable if it can be shown that the probability of a system failure below DH is acceptably low. It should be recognised that the inclination of a pilot who experiences such a failure would be to continue the landing manually but the results of flight trials in actual conditions and of simulator experiments show that pilots do not always recognise that the visual cues are inadequate in such situations and present recorded data reveal that pilots' landing performance reduces progressively as the RVR is reduced below 300 m. It should further be recognised that there is some risk in carrying out a manual missed approach procedure from below 50 ft in very low visibility and it should therefore be accepted that if an RVR lower than 300 m is to be approved, the flight deck procedure should not normally allow the pilot to continue the landing manually in such conditions and the aircraft system should be sufficiently reliable for the missed approach procedure rate to be low.
- (4) These criteria may be relaxed in the case of an aircraft with a fail-passive automatic landing system that is supplemented by a head-up display that does not qualify as a fail-operational system but that gives guidance that will enable the pilot to complete a landing in the event of a failure of the automatic landing system. In this case it is not necessary to make a missed approach procedure mandatory in the event of a failure of the automatic landing system when the RVR is less than 300 m.

(d) CAT III fail-operational operations - with a DH

- (1) For CAT III operations utilising a fail-operational landing system with a DH, a pilot should be able to see at least one centre line light.
- (2) For CAT III operations utilising a fail-operational hybrid landing system with a DH, a pilot should have a visual reference containing a segment of at least three consecutive lights of the runway centre line lights.
- (e) CAT III fail operational operations - with no DH
  - (1) For CAT III operations with no DH the pilot is not required to see the runway prior to touchdown. The permitted RVR is dependent on the level of aircraft equipment.
  - (2) A CAT III runway may be assumed to support operations with no DH unless specifically restricted as published in the AIP or NOTAM.

**GM4 SPA.LVO.100(b) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

**INSTRUMENT APPROACH OPERATIONS IN LOW-VISIBILITY CONDITIONS — EFFECT ON LANDING MINIMA OF TEMPORARILY FAILED OR DOWNGRADED EQUIPMENT FOR APPROACH OPERATIONS WITH A DH BELOW 200 ft**

The instructions for the effect on landing minima of temporarily failed or downgraded equipment are intended for use both before flight and during flight. It is, however, not expected that the pilot-in-command/commander would consult such instructions after passing 1 000 ft above the aerodrome. If failures of ground aids are announced at such a late stage, the approach could be continued at the pilot-in-command/commander’s discretion. If failures are announced before such a late stage in the approach, their effect on the approach should be considered as described in Table 6, and the approach may have to be abandoned.

**AMC1 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

**OPERATIONS WITH OPERATIONAL CREDITS — SPECIAL AUTHORISATION CATEGORY I (SA CAT I)**

For special authorisation category I (SA CAT I) operations, the following should apply:

- (a) The DH of an SA CAT I operation should not be lower than the highest of:
  - (1) the minimum DH specified in the AFM, if stated;
  - (2) the applicable OCH for the category of aeroplane;
  - (3) the DH to which the flight crew is qualified to operate; or
  - (4) 150 ft.
- (b) Where the DH for an SA CAT I operation is less than 200 ft, it should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance.
- (c) The following visual aids should be available:
  - (1) approach lights as specified in Table 8;
  - (2) precision approach (PA) runway markings;
  - (3) category I runway lights.
- (d) The lowest RVR should not be lower than the higher of:
  - (1) the minimum RVR specified in the AFM, if stated; or
  - (2) the RVR specified in Table 8.

**Table 8**

**SA CAT I operation minima RVR (m) versus approach lighting system**

Class of light facility		FALS	IALS	BALS	NALS
DH(Fft)	150-160	400	500	600	700
	161-200	450	550	650	750
	201-210	450	550	650	750

	211-220	500	550	650	800
	221-230	500	600	700	900
	231-240	500	650	750	1 000
	241-249	550	700	800	1 100

\*Note: For class of approach lighting facility, see GM2 CAT.OP.MPA.110.

**AMC2 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

**OPERATIONS WITH OPERATIONAL CREDITS — SPECIAL AUTHORISATION CATEGORY II (SA CAT II)**

For special authorisation category II (SA CAT II) operations, the following should apply:

- (a) The DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, if so determined by the aircraft certification process, and be not lower than the highest of:
  - (1) the minimum DH specified in the AFM, if stated;
  - (2) the applicable OCH for the category of aeroplane;
  - (3) the DH to which the flight crew is qualified to operate; or
  - (4) 100 ft.
- (b) The following visual aids should be available:
  - (1) approach lights as specified in Table 9;
  - (2) precision approach runway markings;
  - (3) category I runway lights.
- (c) The lowest RVR minima to be used are specified in Table 9:

**Table 9**

**SA CAT II operation minima: RVR (m) versus DH (ft)**

Class of light facility		FALS	IALS	BALS	NALS
DH(Fft)	100-120	350	450	600	700
	121-140	400	500	600	700
	141-160	400	500	600	750
	161-199	400	550	650	750

**AMC3 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

**OPERATIONS WITH OPERATIONAL CREDITS — EFVS OPERATIONS TO A RUNWAY**

When conducting EFVS operations to a runway:

- (a) the DA/H used should be the same as for operations without EFVS;
- (b) the lowest RVR minima to be used should be determined:
  - (1) in accordance with criteria specified in the AFM for the expected weather conditions; or
  - (2) if no such criteria are specified, by reducing the RVR determined for operation without the use of EFVS/CVS in accordance with Table 10;
- (c) where the lowest RVR to be used, determined in accordance with (b), is less than 550 m, then this should be increased to 550 m unless LVPs are established at the aerodrome of intended landing;



- (d) where the EFVS is part of a CVS, it is only the EFVS element that should provide the operational credits. The other part of the CVS, the synthetic vision system (SVS), should not provide operational credits.

**Table 10**

**Operations using EFVS/CSV – RVR/CMV reduction**

RVR/CMV (m) required without the use of EFVS	RVR/CMV (m) with the use of EFVS
550	350*
600	400*
650	450*
700	450*
750	500*
800	550
900	600
1 000	650
1 100	750
1 200	800
1 300	900
1 400	900
1 500	1 000
1 600	1 100
1 700	1 100
1 800	1 200
1 900	1 300
2 000	1 300
2 100	1 400
2 200	1 500
2 300	1 500
2 400	1 600
* Reported RVR should be available (no CMV conversion).	

**AMC4 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

**OPERATIONS WITH OPERATIONAL CREDITS — HELICOPTER SPECIAL AUTHORISATION CATEGORY I (HELI SA CAT I) OPERATIONS**

For HELI SA CAT I operations, the following should apply:

- (i) HELI SA CAT I operations should only be conducted to a runway with an approach lighting system. The following visual aids should be available:
  - (1) standard runway day markings, approach lights, runway edge lights, threshold lights, and runway end lights;
  - (2) for operations with an RVR below 450 m, runway centre line markings.

- (ii) An ILS/MLS that supports a HELI SA CAT I operation should be an unrestricted facility.
- (iii) The helicopter should be:
  - (1) equipped with a 3-axis autopilot capable of flying the approach to the minima;
  - (2) able to maintain  $V_y$  in IMC on a coupled Type B approach;
  - (3) equipped with a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance; and
  - (4) equipped with two independent navigation aids capable of Type B CAT I approaches and certified for CAT I.
- (iv) The DH of a HELI SA CAT I operation should not be lower than the highest of:
  - (1) the minimum DH specified in the AFM, if stated;
  - (2) the minimum height to which the PA aid can be used without the specified visual reference;
  - (3) the applicable OCH for Category A aeroplanes or the OCH for Category H if available;
  - (4) the DH to which the flight crew is qualified to operate;
  - (5) 130 ft on a CAT II landing system;
  - (6) 150 ft on a CAT I ILS certified to Class I/C/1 or MLS certified to 100 ft/E/1; or
  - (7) 200 ft on other landing systems;
  - (8) 200 ft unless the autopilot is a 4-axis autopilot with automatic level-off capability.
- (v) The lowest RVR minima to be used are specified in Table 11.

**Table 11**

**HELI SA CAT I operation minima**

<b>RVR versus approach lighting system</b>				
<b>DH (ft)</b>	<b>Class of light facility</b>			
	<b>FALS</b>	<b>IALS</b>	<b>BALS</b>	<b>NALS</b>
201–250	450	650	7 0	1 000
181–200	300	450	6 0	900
151–180	300	350	5 0	750
130–150	300	300	4 0	600

- (vi) Operations
  - (1) The minimum crew should be two pilots or one pilot and a technical crew member. The technical crew member should be seated in the front seat and be allocated no other task than assisting the pilot, from the initial approach fix (IAF) onwards.
  - (2) On a CAT II landing system, the flight crew should use the radio altimeter or other equivalent device for the determination of the DH.
  - (3) On a CAT I ILS, the flight crew should use the altimeter for the determination of the DH. The crew should cross-check the altitude with the radio altimeter or equivalent device, considering the local geography.
  - (4) The AFCS and radio altimeter should be serviceable prior to commencing the approach.
  - (5) The approach should be flown in coupled 4-axis mode down to minima or below.
  - (6) The flight crew should promptly initiate a go-around if any of the following conditions are met below a 1 000-ft height:
    - (i) discrepancy in altitude/radio altitude information;
    - (ii) discrepancy in navigation information;
    - (iii) partial or total failure of an AFCS system or navigation system;
    - (iv) deviation of  $\frac{1}{4}$  scale or more on the landing system navigation display.

- (7) The planning minima at the alternate where a HELI SA CAT I approach is envisaged should be as defined in Table 12.

**Table 12**

**Planning minima at the alternate with HELI SA CAT I operations**

Type of approach	Aerodrome ceiling	Weather minima RVR/VIS
<b>Two or more usable Type B instrument approach operations***</b>	DA/H* + 100 ft	RVR** + 300 m
<b>One usable Type B instrument approach operation</b>	DA/H + 150 ft	RVR + 450 m

\* The higher of the usable DA/H or MDA/H.

\*\* The higher of the usable RVR or VIS.

\*\*\* Compliance with CAT.OP.MPA.192(d) should be ensured.

- (8) Under commercial air transport, if no other alternate is selected and the weather forecast at destination is not based on Part-MET of Regulation (EU) 2017/373, the planning minima at the alternate where a HELI SA CAT I approach is envisaged should be as defined in Table 13.

**Table 13**

**Planning minima at the alternate with HELI SA CAT I operations with alternative weather source at destination**

Type of approach	Aerodrome Ceiling	Weather minima RVR/VIS
<b>Two or more usable Type B instrument approach operations ***</b>	DA/H* + 200 ft	RVR ** + 600 m
<b>One usable Type B instrument approach operation</b>	DA/H + 300 ft	RVR + 900 m

\* The higher of the usable DA/H or MDA/H.

\*\* The higher of the usable RVR or VIS.

\*\*\* Compliance with CAT.OP.MPA.192(d) should be ensured.

(vii) Crew training and competency

- (1) Under CAT, NCC and SPO, the aerodrome used for HELI SA CAT I operations should be considered as a Category C aerodrome under ORO.FC.105.
- (2) A crew member should undergo training to determine the eligibility of a HELI SA CAT I approach as determined under points (a) to (c), and to determine the applicable minima under points (d) and (e).
- (3) A crew member should have the relevant knowledge to implement the operating procedures described in point (f)
- (4) A crew member that is involved in HELI SA CAT I operations should undergo initial and recurrent training to proficiency using a suitable FSTD, including one approach and landing and one go-around using the lowest minima defined in points (d) and (e).
- (5) The recurrent training should have a validity of 6 calendar months. The validity period should be counted from the end of the month when the check was taken. When the training is undertaken within the last 3 months of the validity period, the new validity period should be counted from the previous expiry date.
- (6) In addition to (5), a technical crew member that is involved in HELI SA CAT I operations should be trained to perform navigation and monitoring functions under IFR, as described under AMC3 SPA.NVIS.130(f). The training and checking should include all of the following on the given helicopter type:
  - (i) initial and recurrent general training;
  - (ii) initial and recurrent monitoring training;
  - (iii) initial and recurrent navigation training;
  - (iv) initial and recurrent aircraft/FSTD training focusing on crew cooperation with the pilot;
  - (v) line flying under supervision (LIFUS);
  - (vi) initial and recurrent operator proficiency checks, which should meet all of the following criteria:
    - (A) the technical crew member should complete an operator proficiency check to demonstrate competence in carrying out normal, abnormal and emergency procedures, covering the relevant aspects associated with the flight operational tasks described in the operations manual and not covered in the line check;
    - (B) the initial training course should include an operator proficiency check;

- (C) the operator proficiency check should be valid for a given helicopter type. In order to consider an operator proficiency check to be valid for several helicopter types, the operator should demonstrate that the types are sufficiently similar from the technical crew member's perspective;
- (D) the validity period of the operator proficiency check should be 12 calendar months. The validity period should be counted from the end of the month when the check was performed. When the operator proficiency check is undertaken within the last 3 months of the validity period, the new validity period shall be counted from the original expiry date;
- (E) the operator proficiency check should be conducted by a suitably qualified instructor nominated by the operator to conduct flight crew operator proficiency checks;
- (vii) initial and recurrent line checks, which should meet all of the following criteria:
  - (A) the line check should be performed on the helicopter;
  - (B) the technical crew member should demonstrate competence in carrying out normal operations described in the operator's operations manual;
  - (C) the line check should take place after the completion of the LIFUS;
  - (D) the validity period of the line check should be 12 calendar months. The validity period should be counted from the end of the month when the check was performed. When the line check is undertaken within the last 3 months of the validity period, the new validity period should be counted from the original expiry date;
  - (E) the line check should be conducted by a suitably qualified commander nominated by the operator;
  - (F) any task-specific items may be checked by a suitably qualified technical crew member nominated by the operator and trained in CRM concepts and the assessment of non-technical skills.

### **GM1 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

#### **THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS WITH OPERATIONAL CREDITS**

For each specific class of standard take-off or approach operations, a standard combination of airborne equipment, aerodrome infrastructure and equipment, and procedures (system components) needs to be available to ensure the required performance of the total system. In real-life operations, one or more system components may exceed the required standard performance. The aim of the concept of operations with operational credits is to exploit such enhanced performance to provide operational flexibility beyond the limits of standard operations.

In certain circumstances it may be possible to achieve the required system performance without some standard items being available by using other enhanced equipment or procedures. In order to apply an operational credit, it is necessary that the equipment or procedures employed mitigate effectively the shortcomings in other system components. Another application of operational credits is to use the enhanced performance of certain system components to allow operations to lower than the standard minima. For approach operations, an operational credit can be applied to the instrument or the visual segment or both.

Where an operational credit allows operation to lower than standard minima, this is not considered a separate approach classification.

### **GM2 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

#### **OPERATIONS WITH OPERATIONAL CREDITS — SPECIAL AUTHORISATION CATEGORY I (SA CAT I) OPERATIONS**

SA CAT I is an operational credit that exploits a navigation solution with superior performance to that required for standard CAT I by extending the instrument segment of CAT I approach operations. This navigation solution may be an ILS installation with the necessary performance coupled to a suitably certified autoland system or a HUD or equivalent display system or SVGS. The extended instrument segment means that the DH can be reduced from the standard minimum of 200 down to 150 ft. The lower DH allows a corresponding reduction in the RVR required for the approach.

SA CAT I is not a separate approach classification; it is an operational credit applied to a CAT I operation.

### **GM3 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits**

#### **OPERATIONS WITH OPERATIONAL CREDITS — SPECIAL AUTHORISATION CATEGORY II (SA CAT II) OPERATIONS**

SA CAT II is an operational credit that applies to the visual segment of an approach conducted where aerodrome, runway and approach lighting systems do not meet the usual requirements for a CAT II precision lighting system. SA CAT II exploits the performance of a suitably certified HUDLS or autoland system. The DH will be the same as for standard CAT II, and the required RVR will depend on the class of light facility installed.

SA CAT II is not a separate approach classification; it is an operational credit applied to a CAT II operation usually in a CAT I runway.

## GM4 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits

### OPERATIONS WITH OPERATIONAL CREDITS — EFVS OPERATIONS

- (a) (EFVS operations, if approved, exploit the improved visibility provided by the EFVS to allow an operational credit applied to the visual segment of an instrument approach. An EFVS cannot be used to extend the instrument segment of an approach and thus the DH for operation with an EFVS is always the same as for the same approach conducted without an operational credit.
- (b) EFVS operations require specific approval from the competent authority in accordance with Part-SPA. However, other EFVS operations may be conducted by operators and without a specific approval if specifically covered in accordance with Part-CAT, Part-NCC or Part-SPO (e.g. 'EFVS 200').
- (c) Equipment for EFVS operations
- (1) In order to conduct EFVS operations, a certified EFVS is used. An EFVS is an enhanced vision system (EVS) that also incorporates a flight guidance system and displays the image on a HUD or an equivalent display. The flight guidance system will incorporate aircraft flight information and flight symbology.
  - (2) For operations for which a minimum flight crew of more than one pilot is required, the aircraft will also be equipped with a suitable display of EFVS sensory imagery for the pilot monitoring the progress of the approach.
  - (3) Legacy systems may be certified as 'EVS with an operational credit'. Such a system may be considered an EFVS used for approach (EFVS-A).
  - (4) Aircraft holding a type certificate issued by a third country may be certified for operations equivalent to EFVS operations. Specific approval for an operational credit for EFVS operations will be available only if the operator can demonstrate that the equipment meets all the requirements for certification in accordance with CS-AWO.
  - (5) For approaches for which natural visual reference is not required prior to touchdown, the EFVS (EFVS used for landing (EFVS-L)) will additionally display:
    - (i) flare prompt or flare guidance information; and
    - (ii) height AGL.
- (d) Suitable approach procedures
- (1) For types of approach operation, refer to AMC1 SPA.LVO.110 'Additional verification of the suitability of runways for EFVS operations'.  
EFVS operations may be used for 3D approach operations. These may include operations based on non-precision approach (NPA) procedures, approach procedures with vertical guidance and PA procedures including approach operations requiring specific approvals, provided that the operator holds the necessary approvals.  
  
An NPA procedure flown using vertical guidance from computer-generated navigation data from ground-based, space-based, self-contained navigation aids, or a combination of these may be considered a 3D instrument approach operation, so EFVSs may be used for NPA procedures provided that vertical guidance is available to the pilot.
  - (2) Offset approaches  
The extent to which EFVSs can be used for offset approaches will depend on the FOV of the specific system. Where an EFVS has been demonstrated to be usable with a final approach track offset more than 3 degrees from the runway centre line, this will be stated in the AFM.  
  
Instrument approach procedures (IAPs) may have the final approach course significantly offset from the centre line of the runway and still be considered 'straight-in approaches'. Many approach procedures with an offset final approach course are constructed so that the final approach course crosses the runway centre line extended well out from the runway. Depending on the construction of a particular procedure, the wind conditions and the available FOV of a specific EFVS installation, the required visual references may not come into view before the aircraft reaches the DH.
  - (3) Circling approaches  
EFVSs incorporate a HUD or an equivalent system so that the EFVS image is visible in the pilot's forward external FOV. Circling operations require the pilot to maintain visual references which may not be directly ahead of the aircraft and may not be aligned with the current flight path. EFVSs cannot therefore be used in place of natural visual reference for circling approaches.
- (e) For aerodrome operating minima for EFVS operations, refer to AMC3 SPA.LVO.100(c).

The performance of EFVSs depends on the technology used and weather conditions encountered. The minimum RVR for an approach is based on the specific capabilities of the installed equipment in the expected weather conditions, so the RVR for a particular operation is determined according to criteria stipulated in the AFM.

Table 10 has been provided to allow calculation of an appropriate RVR for aircraft where the AFM does not contain criteria to determine the minimum usable RVR. This table has been developed after an operational evaluation of two different EVSs both using infrared sensors, along with data and support provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Approaches were flown in a variety of conditions including fog, rain and snow showers, as well as at night to aerodromes located in mountainous terrain. Table 10 contains conservative figures to cater for the expected performance of infrared sensors in the variety of conditions that might be encountered.

- (f) The conditions for commencement and continuation of the approach are in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.305, NCC.OP.230, NCO.OP.210 and SPO.OP.215 as applicable.

Pilots conducting EFVS operations may commence an approach and continue that approach below 1 000 ft above the aerodrome or into the final approach segment (FAS) if:

- (1) the reported RVR or converted meteorological visibility (CMV) is equal to or greater than the lowest RVR minima determined; and
- (2) all the conditions for conducting EFVS operations are met.

If any equipment required for EFVS operations is unserviceable or unavailable, then the conditions for conducting EFVS operations would not be satisfied, and the approach cannot be commenced. Operators may develop procedures for flight crew to follow in the event of unserviceability arising after the aircraft descends below 1 000 ft above the aerodrome or into the FAS. Such procedures should ensure that the approach is not continued unless the RVR is sufficient for the type of approach that can be conducted with equipment that remains available. In the event of failure of the equipment required for EFVS operations, a go-around would be executed unless the RVR reported prior to commencement of the approach was sufficient for the approach to be flown without the use of EFVS in lieu of natural vision.

- (g) EFVS image requirements at the DA/H are specified in AMC7 SPA.LVO.105(c).

The requirements for features to be identifiable on the EFVS image in order to continue approach below DH are more stringent than the visual reference requirements for the same approach flown without EFVS. This is necessary because the EFVS might not display the colour of lights used to identify specific portions of the runway and might not consistently display the runway markings. Any visual approach path indicator using colour-coded lights may be unusable.

- (h) Obstacle clearance in the visual segment

The 'visual segment' is the portion of the approach between the DH and the runway threshold. In the case of EFVS operations, this part of the approach may be flown using the EFVS image as the primary reference and there may be obstacles that are not always identifiable on an EFVS image. Approach procedures designed in accordance with PANS-OPS criteria is required to ensure that the visual segment is protected for obstacles by the visual segment surface (VSS) that extends from 60 m before the threshold to the location of the OCH. Procedures not designed in accordance with PANS-OPS may have not been assessed for terrain or obstacle clearance below the OCH and may not provide a clear vertical path to the runway at the normally expected descent angle. SA CAT I and CAT II/III runways subject to EU aerodrome regulations are required to provide an OFZ, which offers protection from obstacles in the visual segment. Standard CAT I runways may also provide an OFZ and if not, the lack of an OFZ shall be indicated, according to ICAO Annex 4, normally on the approach chart.

- (i) Visual reference requirements at minimum height to continue approach without natural visual reference

For operations other than EFVS to touchdown, natural visual reference is required before landing. The objective of this requirement is to ensure that the pilot will have sufficient visual reference to land. The visual reference should be the same as the one required for the same approach flown without the use of EFVS. The specific height at which this is required will depend on the capability of the aircraft installation and will be specified in the AFM. For aircraft certified for EFVS operations but where no such height is specified in the AFM, natural visual reference is required by a height of 100 ft above the threshold elevation.

Specific EFVSs may have additional requirements that must be fulfilled at this height to allow the approach to continue, such as a requirement to check that the elements of the EFVS display remain correctly aligned and scaled to the external view. Any such requirements will be detailed in the AFM.

- (j) Use of EFVS to touchdown

In order for the use of EFVS to touchdown to be approved, the EFVS will provide flare prompt or flare guidance (EFVS-L). This mitigates the fact that a 2D image and a narrow FOV displayed by the EFVS may cause erroneous perceptions of depth or height. The EFVS will also display height above the runway by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance. Unless the operator has verified that the terrain ahead of the threshold and landing system assessment area (LSAA) slope is suitable for the use of a radio altimeter, such a system should not be relied upon to provide accurate information about the height of the aircraft above the runway threshold until the aircraft is over the runway surface.

(k) Go-around

A go-around will be promptly executed if the required visual references are not maintained on the EFVS image at any time after the aircraft has descended below the DA/H or if the required visual references are not distinctly visible and identifiable using natural vision after the aircraft is below the minimum height to continue approach without natural visual reference (if applicable). It is considered more likely that an operation with EFVS could result in initiation of a go-around below the DA/H than the equivalent approach flown without EFVS. According to AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(f), operators involved in EFVS operations should keep records of the number of successful and unsuccessful approaches using EFVS in order to detect and act on any undesirable trends. For category II and III PA procedures designed in accordance with PANS-OPS criteria, obstacle protection is provided for a go-around initiated below the DH (balked landing) by means of an obstacle free zone (OFZ). An OFZ may also be provided for category I PA procedures. Where an OFZ is not provided for a category I PA, this may be indicated on the approach chart. NPA procedures and approach procedures with vertical guidance provide obstacle clearance for the missed approach based on the assumption that the missed approach is executed at or above the DH. The DH should be located at or before the MAPt.

### GM5 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits

#### OPERATIONS WITH OPERATIONAL CREDITS — COMBINED VISION SYSTEMS

A combined vision system (CVS) consisting of an EFVS and an SVS can be approved for EFVS operations if it meets all the certification requirements for an EFVS.

### GM6 SPA.LVO.100(c) Low-visibility operations and operations with operational credits

#### OPERATIONS WITH OPERATIONAL CREDITS — HELICOPTER SPECIAL AUTHORISATION CATEGORY I (HELI SA CAT I) OPERATIONS

HELI SA CAT I is an operational credit that exploits a navigation solution with superior performance to that required for standard CAT I by extending the instrument segment of CAT I approach operations. This navigation solution may be an ILS installation with the necessary performance coupled to a suitably certified 3- or 4-axis autopilot capable of handling low speeds, together with the superior outside visibility of the helicopter on the visual segment, and the go-around performance of a helicopter. The better outside visibility and the lower speed allows a reduction in the RVR required for the approach, for a given DH. With a 4-axis autopilot and auto-level-off capability, the DH can also be reduced from the standard minimum of 200 ft down to 150 or 130 ft.

HELI SA CAT I is not a separate approach classification; it is an operational credit applied to a CAT I operation.

### AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(a) Specific approval criteria

#### AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION FOR THE INTENDED OPERATIONS

- (a) Aircraft used for LVTO in an RVR of less than 125 m should be equipped with a system certified for the purpose.
- (b) Aircraft used for low-visibility approach operations should be equipped in accordance with the applicable airworthiness requirements and certified as follows:
  - (1) For CAT II operations, the aircraft should be certified for CAT II operations.
  - (2) For CAT III operations, the aircraft should be certified for CAT III operations.
  - (3) For SA CAT I, the aircraft should be certified for SA CAT I operations.
  - (4) For SA CAT II, the aircraft should be certified for CAT II operations and be equipped with HUDLS or fail-passive autoland or better.
  - (5) For EFVS operations, the aircraft should be equipped with a certified EFVS-A or EFVS-L.

### GM1 SPA.LVO.105(a) Specific approval criteria

#### AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION — EQUIPMENT ELIGIBLE FOR LOW VISIBILITY TAKE-OFF IN AN RVR LESS THAN 125M

Systems that are used to qualify for take-off in an RVR less than 125 m typically allow the pilot to use the external visual cues as well as instrumented guidance to track the runway centre line. The kind of systems in use today include paravisual display (PVD) and HUD. It is expected that EFVSs will be certified for take-off guidance in the future. Where the PVD or HUD uses an ILS localiser signal as reference, the ILS sensitive area must be protected by the LVPs at the aerodrome.

#### **AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria**

##### **OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR LVOs**

Prior to commencing an LVO, the pilot-in-command/commander should be satisfied that:

- (a) the status of visual and non-visual facilities is as required;
- (b) if LVPs are required for such operations, LVPs are in effect; and
- (c) the flight crew members are appropriately qualified.

#### **AMC2 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria**

##### **OPERATING PROCEDURES – GENERAL**

- (a) Operating procedures should be established for all types of LVOs and operations with operational credits for which an operator is seeking approval. The operating procedures should:
  - (1) be consistent with the AFM;
  - (2) be appropriate to the technology and equipment to be used;
  - (3) specify the duties and responsibilities of each flight crew member in each relevant phase of flight;
  - (4) ensure that flight crew workload is managed to facilitate effective decision-making and monitoring of the aircraft; and
  - (5) minimise, as much as practical, the deviation from normal procedures used for routine operations (non-LVOs).
- (b) Operating procedures should include:
  - (1) the required checks for the satisfactory functioning of the aircraft equipment, both before departure and in flight;
  - (2) the correct seating and eye position;
  - (3) determination of aerodrome operating minima;
  - (4) the increment to be added to minima for use by pilots-in-command/commanders who are new to the aircraft type, if applicable
  - (5) the effect on aerodrome operating minima of temporarily failed or downgraded ground equipment;
  - (6) the effect on aerodrome operating minima of the failure or change of the status of any aircraft systems;
  - (7) when the LVPs at the aerodrome are required. LVPs are required:
    - (i) for low-visibility flight approach operations;
    - (ii) for LVTOs with RVR less than 400 m.

If an operator selects an aerodrome with equivalent procedures, where the term 'LVPs' is not used (e.g. regional procedures), the operator should verify that suitable procedures are established to ensure an equivalent level of safety to that achieved at approved aerodromes. This situation should be clearly noted in the operations manual or procedures manual, including guidance to the flight crew on how to determine that the suitable procedures are in effect at the time of an actual operation. Note: the AFM may state that some elements of LVPs are not required and therefore the equivalent level of safety may be established on that basis;

  - (8) a requirement for an 'approaching minima' call-out to prevent inadvertent descent below the DA/H;
  - (9) the requirement for height call-outs below 200 ft to be based on the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, if applicable;
  - (10) the required visual references;
  - (11) the action to be taken in the event of loss of the required visual references; and
  - (12) the maximum allowable flight path deviations and action to be taken in the event that such deviations occur.



- (c) Operators required to comply with the requirements of Annex III (Part-ORO) to this Regulation should include operating procedures in the operations manual as required by ORO.MLR.100. The operators to which Part-ORO does not apply should include the operating procedures in a 'procedures manual'.

#### **AMC3 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria**

##### **OPERATING PROCEDURES — CAT II**

For CAT II operations, the following should apply:

- (a) The flight crew should consist of at least two pilots.
- (b) The approach should be flown using a certified system as identified in the AFM.
- (c) If the approach is flown using autopilot, for a manual landing the autopilot should remain engaged until after the pilot has achieved visual reference.
- (d) All height call-outs below 200 ft above the runway threshold elevation should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance.
- (e) The DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, if so determined by the aircraft certification process.
- (f) At DH, the following visual references should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot:
  - (1) a segment of at least three consecutive lights, which are the centre line of the approach lights or TDZ lights or runway centre line lights or edge lights or a combination of these; and
  - (2) a visual reference that should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach lighting crossbar, or the landing threshold, or a barrette of the TDZ lighting unless the operation is conducted using a HUD or an equivalent system to touchdown.

#### **AMC4 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria**

##### **OPERATING PROCEDURES — CAT III**

For CAT III operations, the following should apply:

- (a) The flight crew should consist of at least two pilots.
- (b) The approach should be flown using a certified system as identified in the AFM.
- (c) All height call-outs below 200 ft above the runway threshold elevation should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance.
- (d) For operations in which a DH is used, the DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, if so determined by the aircraft certification process.
- (e) At DH, the following visual references should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot:
  - (1) for operations conducted either with fail-passive flight control systems or with the use of an approved HUD or equivalent display system: a segment of at least three consecutive lights, which are the centre line of the approach lights, or TDZ lights, or runway centre line lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of these; and
  - (2) for operations conducted either with fail-operational flight control systems or with a fail-operational hybrid landing system using a DH: at least one centre line light to be attained and maintained by the pilot.
- (f) For operations with no DH, there is no specification for visual reference with the runway prior to touchdown.

#### **AMC5 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria**

##### **OPERATING PROCEDURES — SA CAT I**

For SA CAT I operations, the following should apply:

- (a) The approach should be flown using a certified system as identified in the AFM.
- (b) All height call-outs below 200 ft above the runway threshold elevation should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance.
- (c) The DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, if so determined by the aircraft certification process.
- (d) At DH the following visual references should be visible to the pilot:

- (1) a segment of at least three consecutive lights, which are the centre line of the approach lights, or TDZ lights, or runway centre line lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of these; and
- (2) a visual reference that should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach lighting crossbar, or the landing threshold, or a barrette of the TDZ lighting unless the operation is conducted utilising an approved HUD or an equivalent system usable down to 120 ft above the runway threshold.

#### **AMC6 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria**

##### **OPERATING PROCEDURES — SA CAT II**

For SA CAT II operations, the following should apply:

- (a) The flight crew should consist of at least two pilots.
- (b) The approach should be flown using a certified HUDLS or autoland system as identified in the AFM.
- (c) All height call-outs below 200 ft above the runway threshold elevation should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance.
- (d) The DH should be determined by the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, if so determined by the aircraft certification process.
- (e) At DH the visual references should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot:
  - (1) a segment of at least three consecutive lights, which are the centre line of the approach lights or TDZ lights, or runway centre line lights, or runway edge lights or a combination of these;
  - (2) a visual reference that should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach lighting crossbar, or the landing threshold, or a barrette of the TDZ lighting.

#### **AMC7 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria**

##### **OPERATING PROCEDURES — EFVS OPERATIONS TO A RUNWAY**

For EFVS operations to a runway, the following should apply:

- (a) The approach should be flown using a certified EFVS-A or EFVS-L as identified in the AFM.
- (b) The pilot flying should use the EFVS throughout the approach.
- (c) In multi-pilot operations, the pilot monitoring should monitor the EFVS-derived information.
- (d) The approach between the final approach fix (FAF) and the DA/H should be flown using vertical flight path guidance mode (e.g. flight director)
- (e) The approach may be continued below the DA/H provided that the pilot can identify on the EFVS image either:
  - (1) the approach light system; or
  - (2) both of the following:
    - (i) the runway threshold identified by the beginning of the runway landing surface, the threshold lights or the runway end identifier lights; and
    - (ii) the TDZ identified by the TDZ lights, the TDZ runway markings or the runway edge lights.
- (f) Unless the aircraft is equipped with a certified EFVS-L, a missed approach should be executed promptly if the required visual reference is not distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot without reliance on the EFVS by the following height above the threshold:
  - (1) the height below which an approach should not be continued if natural visual reference is not acquired by the crew as stated in the AFM; or
  - (2) if the AFM does not specify such a height, 100 ft.

#### **GM1 SPA.LVO.105(c) Specific approval criteria**

##### **FLIGHT CREW ACTIONS IN CASE OF AUTOPILOT FAILURE AT OR BELOW DH IN FAILS-PASSIVE CAT III OPERATIONS**

For operations to actual RVR values less than 300 m, a missed approach procedure is assumed in the event of an autopilot failure at or below DH. This means that a missed approach procedure is the normal action.

However, the wording recognises that there may be circumstances where the safest action is to continue the landing. Such circumstances include the height at which the failure occurs, the actual visual references, and other malfunctions. This would typically apply to the late stages of the flare. In conclusion, it is not forbidden to continue the approach and complete the landing when the pilot-in-command/commander determines that this is the safest course of action. The operator's policy and the operational instructions should reflect this information.

#### **AMC1 SPA.LVO.105(g) Specific approval criteria**

##### **SAFETY ASSESSMENT — MONITORING, DATA COLLECTION AND PERFORMANCE INDICATORS**

- (a) The operator should monitor LVOs and operations with operational credits in order to validate the effectiveness of the applicable aircraft flight guidance systems, training, flight crew procedures, and aircraft maintenance programme, and to identify hazards.
- (b) Data should be collected whenever an LVO or an operation with an operational credit is attempted regardless of whether the approach is abandoned, is unsatisfactory, or is concluded successfully. The data should include records of the following:
  - (1) occasions when it was not possible to commence an approach due to deficiencies or unserviceabilities of related airborne equipment;
  - (2) occasions when approaches were discontinued, including the reasons for discontinuing the approach and the height above the runway at which the approach was discontinued;
  - (3) occasions when system abnormalities required pilot intervention to ensure a continued approach or safe landing;
  - (4) landing performance, whether or not the aircraft landed satisfactorily within the desired touchdown area with acceptable lateral velocity or cross-track error. The approximate lateral and longitudinal position of the actual touchdown point in relation to the runway centre line and the runway threshold, respectively, should be recorded.
- (c) Data about LVOs should be collected by means of the operator's flight data monitoring programme supplemented by other means including reports submitted by flight crew. Operators that do not have a flight data monitoring programme should use reports submitted by flight crew as the primary means of gathering data.
- (d) Performance indicators should include the following:
  - (1) the rate of unsuccessful low-visibility approaches, i.e. the number of attempted approaches terminating in discontinued approaches, approaches where pilot intervention was required to ensure a continued approach or safe landing or where landing performance was unsatisfactory, compared to the number of low-visibility approaches attempted;
  - (2) measures of performance of the airborne equipment for low-visibility approaches or operations with operational credits;
  - (3) safety performance indicators related to other specific risks associated with LVOs.
- (e) The following information should be retained for at least 5 years:
  - (1) the total number of low-visibility approaches or operations with an operational approval attempted or completed, including practice approaches, by aircraft type; and
  - (2) reports of unsatisfactory approaches and/or landings, by runway and aircraft registration, in the following categories:
    - (i) airborne equipment faults;
    - (ii) ground facility difficulties;
    - (iii) missed approaches because of air traffic control (ATC) instructions; or
    - (iv) other reasons.

#### **AMC2 SPA.LVO.105(g) Specific approval criteria**

##### **SAFETY ASSESSMENT PRIOR TO OBTAINING AN APPROVAL**

- (a) Prior to commencing LVOs or operations with operational credits, an operator should demonstrate to the competent authority that such operations will achieve an acceptable level of safety. This requires the operator to gather data from operations using the relevant systems and procedures and conduct safety assessments taking that data into account.
- (b) The operator applying for the approval of low-visibility approach operations should determine the minimum number of approaches required to gather sufficient data to demonstrate an acceptable level of safety and the time period over which such data should be gathered.
- (c) If an operator is applying for more than one LVO approval or an approval for operation with operational credits for a particular aircraft type, then data gathered from operations using the systems and procedures designed for one

classification of operations or operation with operational credits may be used to support the application for another classification of operations or operation with operational credits provided the following elements are similar:

- (1) type of technology, including:
    - (i) flight control/guidance system (FGS) and associated displays and controls;
    - (ii) flight management system (FMS) and level of integration with the FGS;
    - (iii) use of HUD or an equivalent display system; and
    - (iv) use of EFVS;
  - (2) operational procedures, including:
    - (i) alert height;
    - (ii) manual landing/automatic landing;
    - (iii) no DH operations;
    - (iv) use of HUD or an equivalent display system in hybrid operations; and
    - (v) use of EFVS to touchdown; and
  - (3) handling characteristics, including:
    - (i) manual landing from automatic or HUD or an equivalent display system guided approach;
    - (ii) manual missed approach procedure from automatic approach; and
    - (iii) automatic/manual roll-out.
- (d) An operator holding an approval for low-visibility approach operations or operations with operational credits may use data gathered from approaches conducted using one aircraft type to support an application for approval for a different aircraft type or variants provided the following elements are similar:
- (1) type of technology, including the following:
    - (i) FGS and associated displays and controls;
    - (ii) FMS and level of integration with the FGS;
    - (iii) use of HUD or an equivalent display system; and
    - (iv) use of EFVS;
  - (2) operational procedures, including:
    - (i) alert height;
    - (ii) manual landing/automatic landing;
    - (iii) no DH operations;
    - (iv) use of HUD or an equivalent display system in hybrid operations; and
    - (v) use of EFVS to touchdown; and
  - (3) handling characteristics, including:
    - (i) manual landing from automatic or HUD or an equivalent display system guided approach;
    - (ii) manual missed approach procedure from automatic approach; and
    - (iii) automatic/manual roll-out.

### **GM1 SPA.LVO.105(g) LVO Specific approval criteria**

#### **SPECIFIC APPROVAL CRITERIA - SUCCESSFUL APPROACH AND LANDING**

- (a) The purpose of this GM is to provide operators with supplemental information regarding the criteria for a successful approach and landing.
- (b) An approach may be considered to be successful if:
  - (1) from 500 ft to start of flare:
    - (i) speed is maintained within +/-5 kt of the intended speed, disregarding rapid fluctuations due to turbulence;
    - (ii) no relevant system failure occurs; and
  - (2) from 300 ft to DH:
    - (i) no excess deviation occurs; and
    - (ii) no centralised warning gives a missed approach procedure command (if installed).
- (c) A landing may be considered to be successful if:
  - (1) no relevant system failure occurs;
  - (2) no flare failure occurs;

- (3) no de-crab failure occurs (if installed);
  - (4) longitudinal touchdown is beyond a point on the runway 150 m after the threshold and before the end of the touchdown zone light (TDZ) light (750 m from the threshold);
  - (5) lateral touchdown with the outboard landing gear is not outside the TDZ edge;
  - (6) sink rate is not excessive;
  - (7) bank angle does not exceed a bank angle limit; and
  - (8) no rollout failure or deviation (if installed) occurs.
- (d) More details can be found in EASA publications CS AWO.A.ALS.106, CS AWO.B.CATII.113 and AMC AWO.B.CATII.113

### GM2 SPA.LVO.105(g) LVO Specific approval criteria

#### SAFETY PERFORMANCE MONITORING

- (a) Data gathering for safety performance monitoring of LVOs and operations with operational credits will need to include sufficient information for the operator to identify hazards and assess the risks associated with LVOs and operations with operational credits.
- (b) The following data relating to LVOs and operations with operational credits may be gathered via flight crew reports, flight data monitoring or other means, as appropriate:
  - (1) date and time;
  - (2) aircraft details (type and registration);
  - (3) airport, approach procedure, final approach and take-off area (FATO) and/or runway used;
  - (4) the type of LVO or operation with operational credits attempted or completed;
  - (5) weather conditions including wind, reported RVR and natural phenomena that restrict visibility;
  - (6) the reason for a discontinued approach (if applicable);
  - (7) details of any pilot intervention to ensure a continued approach or safe landing;
  - (8) adequacy of speed control;
  - (9) trim at time of automatic flight control system disengagement (if applicable);
  - (10) compatibility of automatic flight control system, flight director and raw data;
  - (11) an indication of the position of the aircraft relative to the centre line when descending through to 100 ft;
  - (12) touchdown position relative to the TDZ;
  - (13) an assessment of the sink rate, lateral velocity and bank angle at touchdown;
  - (14) the nature of any problems encountered by the crew in relation to operating procedures or training; and
  - (15) any human factors issues that arose in relation to the operation.
- (c) Where data is gathered as part of the operator's flight data monitoring programme, procedures should be established to ensure that information that is only available directly from the flight crew or other sources (e.g. weather information) is captured.
- (d) In order to assess the risks associated with LVOs and operations with operational credits, operators may consider hazards with the potential to result in the following unacceptable safety outcomes:
  - (1) loss of control in flight;
  - (2) runway overrun or excursion;
  - (3) controlled flight into terrain
  - (4) runway incursion and ground collision; and
  - (5) airborne conflict.
- (e) Operators' safety control processes will ensure that LVOs and operations with operational credits:
  - (1) meet the safety objectives and performance standards established in the operator's safety policy;
  - (2) achieve at least the same level of safety as operations other than LVOs and operations without operational credits; and
  - (3) have a continuously improving safety performance.
- (f) Two methods to determine the rate of unsuccessful low-visibility approaches are described below:
  - (1) Fail/pass method (binary): the rate of unsuccessful low-visibility approaches determined in accordance with GM1 SPA.LVO.105(g) should not exceed 5 %. If the unsuccessful operations appear to occur on a given aircraft, aircraft series or runway, specific mitigation measures need to be established and a separate specific rate may need to

be calculated and monitored. Note: the term ‘aircraft series’ is explained in GM5 SPA.LVO.110. Operators may choose to apply a lower rate than 5 %.

- (2) Continuous method: this method may be selected by operators with a flight data monitoring programme. This methodology is more refined and allows identifying undesirable trends earlier and possibly before they become severe. This method applies an event monitoring methodology in which the deviations from the nominal performance are categorised according to their severity (severity index). For each event (criterion), a level of deviation may be defined as follows:
  - (i) Low (‘green’): the deviation is small and within the limits of nominal behaviour. No action is required.
  - (ii) Medium (‘yellow’): the deviation is above the criteria for low (‘green’) and below the criteria for high (‘red’). No corrective action should be required based on an isolated occurrence; however, a corrective action should be taken if the situation does not improve, or a negative trend is identified. The monitoring should then focus on the particular runway or aircraft series or combination of those.
  - (iii) High (‘red’): the deviation is undesirably high. Investigation and corrective action should be undertaken even based on an isolated occurrence. The threshold for level high (‘red’) may be based on the criteria of GM1 SPA.LVO.105(g).

### GM3 SPA.LVO.105(g) LVO Specific approval criteria

#### DATA GATHERING FOR SAFETY ASSESSMENT PRIOR TO OBTAINING AN APPROVAL

- (a) General The intention of the safety assessment is to validate the use and effectiveness of the applicable aircraft flight control and guidance systems, procedures, flight crew training and aircraft maintenance programme. The intention is not to repeat the statistical analysis required for certification of equipment, but rather to demonstrate that the various elements of the ‘total system’ for LVOs work together for a particular operator.
- (b) Data gathering for safety assessment — LVTOs
  - (1) If the procedures used for LVTOs are not significantly different from those used for standard take-offs, it may be sufficient for operators to conduct only a small number of take-offs using the procedures established for LVTOs for the purpose of data gathering. The following could be considered as a minimum:
    - (i) For LVTOs in an RVR of 125 m or more if procedures are similar to those used for standard take-offs: 1 take-off;
    - (ii) For LVTOs in an RVR of less than 125 m or any other LVTOs using specific procedures: 10 take-offs.
  - (2) An operator holding an approval for LVTOs on one aircraft type and applying the approval for LVTOs on another type or variant may use data from LVTOs conducted on the first type if the following are similar:
    - (i) level of technology, including flight deck displays, HUD or an equivalent guidance system;
    - (ii) operational procedures; and
    - (iii) handling characteristics.
- (c) Data gathering for safety assessment — approach operations with a DH below 200 ft

The data required for the safety assessment needs to be gathered from approaches conducted in a representative sample of expected operating conditions. The operator needs to take seasonal variations in operating conditions such as prevalent weather, planned destinations and operating bases, and ensure that the approaches used for data gathering are conducted over a sufficient period of time to be representative of the planned operation.

In order to ensure that the data is representative of planned operations, approaches are conducted at a variety of airports and runways. If more than 30 % of the approaches are conducted to the same runway, the operator may increase the number of approaches required and take measures to ensure that the data is not distorted.

The number of approaches used for data gathering will depend on the performance indicators and analysis methods used by the operator. The operator will need to demonstrate that the operation for which approval is sought will achieve an acceptable level of safety. The following figures may be considered a minimum for an operator without previous experience of low-visibility approach operations:

- (1) for approval of operations with a DH of not less than 50 ft: 30 approaches;
- (2) for approval of operations with a DH of less than 50 ft: 100 approaches.

Approaches conducted for the purpose of gathering data in order to conduct a safety assessment prior to obtaining an LVO approval may be conducted in line operations or any other flight where the operator’s procedures are used.

Approaches may also be conducted in an FSTD if the operator is satisfied that this would be representative of the operation.

The data gathered from these approaches will only be representative if all required elements of the total system for LVOs are in place. These include not only operating procedures and airborne equipment, but also airport and ATC procedures and ground- or space-based navigation facilities. If the operator chooses to collect data from approaches conducted without all required elements in place, then the data analysis takes into account the effect of at least the following:

- (1) air traffic services (ATS) factors including situations where a flight conducting an instrument approach is vectored too close to the FAF for satisfactory lateral and vertical path capture, lack of protection of ILS sensitive areas or ATS requests to discontinue the approach;
  - (2) misleading navigation signals such as ILS localiser irregularities caused by taxiing aircraft or aircraft overflying the localiser array;
  - (3) other specific factors that could affect the success of LVOs that are reported by the flight crew.
- (d) Safety considerations for approaches used for data gathering If an operator chooses to collect data from approaches conducted without all required elements of the total system for LVOs in place, then the operator takes actions to ensure an acceptable level of safety.
- (e) Sharing of data: operators may use data from other operators or aircraft manufacturers to support the safety assessment required to demonstrate an acceptable level of safety. The operator applying for a specific approval would need to demonstrate that the data used was relevant to the proposed operation.
- (f) It is expected that operators will have more than 6 months or at least 1 000 hours of total operational experience on the aircraft model before they can have sufficient data to set up meaningful performance indicators and establish whether planned LVOs would achieve an acceptable level of safety.

### **AMC1 SPA.LVO.120 Flight crew training and qualifications**

#### **GENERAL PROVISIONS**

- (a) The operator should ensure that flight crew training programmes for LVO include structured courses of ground, FSTD and/or flight training.
- (1) Flight crew members with no CAT II or CAT III experience should complete the full training programme prescribed in (b), (c), and (d) below.
  - (2) Flight crew members with CAT II or CAT III experience with a similar type of operation (auto-coupled/auto-land, HUDLS/hybrid HUDLS or EVS) or CAT II with manual land, if appropriate, with another state acceptable to the Brunei Darussalam operator may undertake an:
    - (i) abbreviated ground training course if operating a different type or class from that on which the previous CAT II or CAT III experience was gained;
    - (ii) abbreviated ground, FSTD and/or flight training course if operating the same type or class and variant of the same type or class on which the previous CAT II or CAT III experience was gained. The abbreviated course should include at least the provisions of (d)(1), (d)(2)(i) or (d)(2)(ii) as appropriate and (d)(3)(i). The operator may reduce the number of approaches/landings required by (d)(2)(i) if the type/class or the variant of the type or class has the same or similar:
      - (A) level of technology - flight control/guidance system (FGS);
      - (B) operating procedures;
      - (C) handling characteristics;
      - (D) use of HUDLS/hybrid HUDLS; and
      - (E) use of EVS,as the previously operated type or class, otherwise the provisions of (d)(2)(i) should be met.
  - (3) Flight crew members with CAT II or CAT III experience with the operator may undertake an abbreviated ground, FSTD and/or flight training course.
    - (i) When changing aircraft type or class, the abbreviated course should include at least the provisions of (d)(1), (d)(2)(i) or (d)(2)(ii) as appropriate and (d)(3)(i).

- (ii) When changing to a different variant of aircraft within the same type or class rating that has the same or similar:
  - (A) level of technology - FGS;
  - (B) operating procedures - integrity;
  - (C) handling characteristics;
  - (D) use of HUDLS/Hybrid HUDLS; and
  - (E) use of EVS,as the previously operated type or class, a difference course or familiarisation appropriate to the change of variant should fulfil the abbreviated course provisions.
- (iii) When changing to a different variant of aircraft within the same type or class rating that has a significantly different:
  - (A) level of technology - FGS;
  - (B) operating procedures - integrity;
  - (C) handling characteristics;
  - (D) use of HUDLS/Hybrid HUDLS; or
  - (E) use of EVS,the provisions of (d)(1), (d)(2)(i) or (d)(2)(ii) as appropriate and (d)(3)(i) should be fulfilled.
- (4) The operator should ensure when undertaking CAT II or CAT III operations with different variant(s) of aircraft within the same type or class rating that the differences and/or similarities of the aircraft concerned justify such operations, taking into account at least the following:
  - (i) the level of technology, including the:
    - (A) FGS and associated displays and controls;
    - (B) FMS and its integration or not with the FGS; and
    - (C) use of HUD/HUDLS with hybrid systems and/or EVS;
  - (ii) operating procedures, including:
    - (A) fail-passive / fail-operational, alert height;
    - (B) manual landing / automatic landing;
    - (C) no DH operations; and
    - (D) use of HUD/HUDLS with hybrid systems;
  - (iii) handling characteristics, including:
    - (A) manual landing from automatic HUDLS and/or EVS guided approach;
    - (B) manual missed approach procedure from automatic approach; and
    - (C) automatic/manual rollout.

#### **GROUND TRAINING**

- (b) The initial ground training course for LVO should include at least the following:
  - (1) characteristics and limitations of the ILS and/or MLS;
  - (2) characteristics of the visual aids;
  - (3) characteristics of fog;
  - (4) operational capabilities and limitations of the particular airborne system to include HUD symbology and EVS characteristics, if appropriate;
  - (5) effects of precipitation, ice accretion, low level wind shear and turbulence;
  - (6) effect of specific aircraft/system malfunctions;



- (7) use and limitations of RVR assessment systems;
- (8) principles of obstacle clearance requirements;
- (9) recognition of and action to be taken in the event of failure of ground equipment;
- (10) procedures and precautions to be followed with regard to surface movement during operations when the RVR is 400 m or less and any additional procedures required for take-off in conditions below 150 m
- (11) significance of DHs based upon radio altimeters and the effect of terrain profile in the approach area on radio altimeter readings and on the automatic approach/landing systems;
- (12) importance and significance of alert height, if applicable, and the action in the event of any failure above and below the alert height;
- (13) qualification requirements for pilots to obtain and retain approval to conduct LVOs; and
- (14) importance of correct seating and eye position.

#### **FSTD TRAINING AND/OR FLIGHT TRAINING**

- (c) FSTD training and/or flight training
  - (1) FSTD and/or flight training for LVO should include at least:
    - (i) checks of satisfactory functioning of equipment, both on the ground and in flight;
    - (ii) effect on minima caused by changes in the status of ground installations;
    - (iii) monitoring of:
      - (A) automatic flight control systems and auto-land status annunciators with emphasis on the action to be taken in the event of failures of such systems; and
      - (B) HUD/HUDLS/EVS guidance status and annunciators as appropriate, to include head-down displays;
    - (iv) actions to be taken in the event of failures such as engines, electrical systems, hydraulics or flight control systems
    - (v) the effect of known unserviceabilities and use of MELs;
    - (vi) operating limitations resulting from airworthiness certification;
    - (vii) guidance on the visual cues required at DH together with information on maximum deviation allowed from glide path or localiser; and
    - (viii) the importance and significance of alert height if applicable and the action in the event of any failure above and below the alert height.
  - (2) Flight crew members should be trained to carry out their duties and instructed on the coordination required with other crew members. Maximum use should be made of suitably equipped FSTDs for this purpose.
  - (3) Training should be divided into phases covering normal operation with no aircraft or equipment failures but including all weather conditions that may be encountered and detailed scenarios of aircraft and equipment failure that could affect CAT II or III operations. If the aircraft system involves the use of hybrid or other special systems, such as HUD/HUDLS or enhanced vision equipment, then flight crew members should practise the use of these systems in normal and abnormal modes during the FSTD phase of training.
  - (4) Incapacitation procedures appropriate to LVTO, CAT II and CAT III operations should be practised.
  - (5) For aircraft with no FSTD available to represent that specific aircraft, operators should ensure that the flight training phase specific to the visual scenarios of CAT II operations is conducted in a specifically approved FSTD. Such training should include a minimum of four approaches. Thereafter, the training and procedures that are type specific should be practised in the aircraft.
  - (6) Initial CAT II and III training should include at least the following exercises:
    - (i) approach using the appropriate flight guidance, autopilots and control systems installed in the aircraft, to the appropriate DH and to include transition to visual flight and landing;

- (ii) approach with all engines operating using the appropriate flight guidance systems, autopilots, HUDLS and/or EVS and control systems installed in the aircraft down to the appropriate DH followed by missed approach - all without external visual reference;
  - (iii) where appropriate, approaches utilising automatic flight systems to provide automatic flare, hover, landing and rollout; and
  - (iv) normal operation of the applicable system both with and without acquisition of visual cues at DH.
- (7) Subsequent phases of training should include at least:
- (i) approaches with engine failure at various stages on the approach;
  - (ii) approaches with critical equipment failures, such as electrical systems, auto flight systems, ground and/or airborne ILS, MLS systems and status monitors;
  - (iii) approaches where failures of auto flight equipment and/or HUD/HUDLS/EVS at low level require either:
    - (A) reversion to manual flight to control flare, hover, landing and rollout or missed approach; or
    - (B) reversion to manual flight or a downgraded automatic mode to control missed approaches from, at or below DH including those which may result in a touchdown on the runway;
  - (iv) failures of the systems that will result in excessive localiser and/or glideslope deviation, both above and below DH, in the minimum visual conditions specified for the operation. In addition, a continuation to a manual landing should be practised if a head-up display forms a downgraded mode of the automatic system or the head-up display forms the only flare mode; and
  - (v) failures and procedures specific to aircraft type or variant.
- (8) The training programme should provide practice in handling faults which require a reversion to higher minima.
- (9) The training programme should include the handling of the aircraft when, during a fail-passive CAT III approach, the fault causes the autopilot to disconnect at or below DH when the last reported RVR is 300 m or less.
- (10) Where take-offs are conducted in RVRs of 400 m and below, training should be established to cover systems failures and engine failure resulting in continued as well as rejected take-offs.
- (11) The training programme should include, where appropriate, approaches where failures of the HUDLS and/or EVS equipment at low level require either:
- (i) reversion to head down displays to control missed approach; or
  - (ii) reversion to flight with no, or downgraded, HUDLS guidance to control missed approaches from DH or below, including those which may result in a touchdown on the runway.
- (12) When undertaking LVTO, LTS CAT I, OTS CAT II, CAT II and CAT III operations utilising a HUD/HUDLS, hybrid HUD/HUDLS or an EVS, the training and checking programme should include, where appropriate, the use of the HUD/HUDLS in normal operations during all phases of flight.

### CONVERSION TRAINING

- (d) Flight crew members should complete the following low visibility procedures (LVPs) training if converting to a new type or class or variant of aircraft in which LVTO, LTS CAT I, OTS CAT II, approach operations utilising EVS with an RVR of 800 m or less and CAT II and CAT III operations will be conducted. Conditions for abbreviated courses are prescribed in (a)(2), (a)(3) and (a)(4).
- (1) Ground training
- The appropriate provisions are as prescribed in (b), taking into account the flight crew member's CAT II and CAT III training and experience.
- (2) FSTD training and/or flight training
- (i) A minimum of six, respectively eight for HUDLS with or without EVS, approaches and/or landings in a FSTD. The provisions for eight HUDLS approaches may be reduced to six when conducting hybrid HUDLS operations.
  - (ii) Where no FSTD is available to represent that specific aircraft, a minimum of three, respectively five for HUDLS and/or EVS, approaches including at least one missed approach procedure is required on

the aircraft. For hybrid HUDLS operations a minimum of three approaches is required, including at least one missed approach procedure.

- (iii) Appropriate additional training if any special equipment is required such as head-up displays or enhanced vision equipment. When approach operations utilising EVS are conducted with an RVR of less than 800 m, a minimum of five approaches, including at least one missed approach procedure are required on the aircraft.

(3) Flight crew qualification

The flight crew qualification provisions are specific to the operator and the type of aircraft operated.

- (i) The operator should ensure that each flight crew member completes a check before conducting CAT II or III operations.
- (ii) The check specified in (d)(3)(i) may be replaced by successful completion of the FSTD and/or flight training specified in (d)(2).

(4) Line flying under supervision

Flight crew member should undergo the following line flying under supervision (LIFUS):

- (i) For CAT II when a manual landing or a HUDLS approach to touchdown is required, a minimum of:
  - (A) three landings from autopilot disconnect; and
  - (B) four landings with HUDLS used to touchdown,  
  
except that only one manual landing, respectively two using HUDLS, to touchdown is required when the training required in (d)(2) has been carried out in a FSTD qualified for zero flight time conversion.
- (ii) For CAT III, a minimum of two auto-lands, except that:
  - (A) only one auto-land is required when the training required in (d)(2) has been carried out in a FSTD qualified for zero flight time conversion;
  - (B) no auto-land is required during LIFUS when the training required in (d)(2) has been carried out in a FSTD qualified for zero flight time (ZFT) conversion and the flight crew member successfully completed the ZFT type rating conversion course; and
  - (C) the flight crew member, trained and qualified in accordance with (B), is qualified to operate during the conduct of LIFUS to the lowest approved DA/H and RVR as stipulated in the operations manual.
- (iii) For CAT III approaches using HUDLS to touchdown, a minimum of four approaches.

#### TYPE AND COMMAND EXPERIENCE

(e) Type and command experience

- (1) Before commencing CAT II operations, the following additional provisions should be applicable to pilots-in-command/commanders, or pilots to whom conduct of the flight may be delegated, who are new to the aircraft type or class:
  - (i) 50 hours or 20 sectors on the type, including LIFUS; and
  - (ii) 100 m should be added to the applicable CAT II RVR minima when the operation requires a CAT II manual landing or use of HUDLS to touchdown until:
    - (A) a total of 100 hours or 40 sectors, including LIFUS, has been achieved on the type; or
    - (B) a total of 50 hours or 20 sectors, including LIFUS, has been achieved on the type where the flight crew member has been previously qualified for CAT II manual landing operations with an operator acceptable to the Brunei Darussalam;
    - (C) for HUDLS operations the sector provisions in (e)(1) and (e)(2)(i) should always be applicable; the hours on type or class do not fulfil the provisions.
- (2) Before commencing CAT III operations, the following additional provisions should be applicable to pilots-in-command/commanders, or pilots to whom conduct of the flight may be delegated, who are new to the aircraft type:
  - (i) 50 hours or 20 sectors on the type, including LIFUS; and

- (ii) 100 m should be added to the applicable CAT II or CAT III RVR minima unless he/she has previously qualified for CAT II or III operations with an operator acceptable to the Brunei Darussalam, until a total of 100 hours or 40 sectors, including LIFUS, has been achieved on the type.

### RECURRENT TRAINING AND CHECKING

- (f) Recurrent training and checking – LVO
  - (1) The operator should ensure that, in conjunction with the normal recurrent training and operator's proficiency checks, the pilot's knowledge and ability to perform the tasks associated with the particular category of operation, for which the pilot is authorised by the operator, are checked. The required number of approaches to be undertaken in the FSTD within the validity period of the operator's proficiency check should be a minimum of two, respectively four when HUDLS and/or EVS is utilised to touchdown, one of which should be a landing at the lowest approved RVR. In addition one, respectively two for HUDLS and/or operations utilising EVS, of these approaches may be substituted by an approach and landing in the aircraft using approved CAT II and CAT III procedures. One missed approach should be flown during the conduct of an operator proficiency check. If the operator is approved to conduct take-off with RVR less than 150 m, at least one LVTO to the lowest applicable minima should be flown during the conduct of the operator's proficiency check.
  - (2) For CAT III operations the operator should use a FSTD approved for this purpose.
  - (3) For CAT III operations on aircraft with a fail-passive flight control system, including HUDLS, a missed approach should be completed by each flight crew member at least once over the period of three consecutive operator proficiency checks as the result of an autopilot failure at or below DH when the last reported RVR was 300 m or less.

### LVTO OPERATIONS

- (g) LVTO with RVR less than 400 m
  - (1) Prior to conducting take-offs in RVRs below 400 m, the flight crew should undergo the following training:
    - (i) normal take-off in minimum approved RVR conditions;
    - (ii) take-off in minimum approved RVR conditions with an engine failure:
      - (A) for aeroplanes between V1 and V2 (take-off safety speed), or as soon as safety considerations permit;
      - (B) for helicopters at or after take-off decision point (TDP); and
    - (iii) take-off in minimum approved RVR conditions with an engine failure:
      - (A) for aeroplanes before V1 resulting in a rejected take-off; and
      - (B) for helicopters before the TDP.
  - (2) The operator approved for LVTOs with an RVR below 150 m should ensure that the training specified by (g)(1) is carried out in a FSTD. This training should include the use of any special procedures and equipment.
  - (3) The operator should ensure that a flight crew member has completed a check before conducting LVTO in RVRs of less than 150 m. The check may be replaced by successful completion of the FSTD and/or flight training prescribed in (g)(1) on conversion to an aircraft type.

### LTS CAT I, OTS CAT II, OPERATIONS UTILISING EVS

- (h) Additional training provisions
  - (1) General
 

Operators conducting LTS CAT I operations, OTS CAT II operations and operations utilising EVS with RVR of 800 m or less should comply with the provisions applicable to CAT II operations and include the provisions applicable to HUDLS, if appropriate. The operator may combine these additional provisions where appropriate provided that the operational procedures are compatible.
  - (2) LTS CAT I
 

During conversion training the total number of approaches should not be additional to the requirements of Subpart FC of BAR 6, Part ORO.FC provided the training is conducted utilising the lowest

applicable RVR. During recurrent training and checking the operator may also combine the separate requirements provided the above operational procedure provision is met and at least one approach using LTS CAT I minima is conducted at least once every 18 months.

(3) OTS CAT II

During conversion training the total number of approaches should not be less than those to complete CAT II training utilising a HUD/HUDLS. During recurrent training and checking the operator may also combine the separate provisions provided the above operational procedure provision is met and at least one approach using OTS CAT II minima is conducted at least once every 18 months.

(4) Operations utilising EVS with RVR of 800 m or less

During conversion training the total number of approaches required should not be less than that required to complete CAT II training utilising a HUD. During recurrent training and checking the operator may also combine the separate provisions provided the above operational procedure provision is met and at least one approach utilising EVS is conducted at least once every 12 months.

**AMC1 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures**

**SUITABLE AERODROMES – ASSESSMENT – AEROPLANES**

(a) The assessment of the suitability of an aerodrome, including instrument flight procedures, for the intended operations comprises the availability of:

- (1) suitable navigation facilities and associated instrument flight approach procedures;
- (2) suitable aerodrome operating procedures, including LVPs, and the compatibility with the intended aircraft operations; and
- (3) suitable runway and runway environment characteristics and facilities.

(b) The assessment of the suitability of an aerodrome, including instrument flight procedures, for the intended operations should be made by means of one or a combination of the following:

- (1) An assessment of previous operational data for the particular aerodrome, runway and instrument flight procedures. This entails the verification of the availability of previous operational data, such as records of approaches flown in the same aerodrome, with the same procedures and aircraft type.
- (2) A desktop assessment of the:
  - (i) aerodrome data;
  - (ii) instrument flight procedures; and
  - (iii) the aircraft data and capabilities. This desktop assessment compares aircraft data and capabilities and the aerodrome and instrument approach characteristics. If the aircraft data is compatible with the aerodrome and instrument approach procedure characteristics, the aerodrome and runway should be considered suitable for the intended LVO;
- (3) An operational assessment This is meant to be used if the suitability of the aerodrome for the intended operations could not be positively assessed by means of the other methods. In that case, an operational assessment becomes necessary, and actual flights should be performed. The operational assessment should consider the level of complexity of the aerodrome characteristics.

**ASSESSMENT OF PREVIOUS OPERATIONAL DATA**

(c) Previous operational data refers to data from:

- (1) the operator itself, or when not available;
- (2) the following entities:
  - (i) the State of the aerodrome or the competent authority issuing the operator's LVO approval;
  - (ii) the type certificate holder of the aircraft; or
  - (iii) other operators.

(d) Previous operational data should only be used if:

- (1) it concerns the same runway and there were no relevant changes to the runway and runway environment;
- (2) it is derived in accordance with Table 14 below for the intended operation; and

- (3) there is no safety concern for such operation.
- (e) Previous operational data may be credited to an aircraft if it is from:
- (1) the same aircraft make and model, unless the credit from the same aircraft make and model is restricted by any of the entities in point (c)(2); or
  - (2) another aircraft model, if stated in the AFM or additional data from the TC/STC holder.

**Table 14**

<b>Intended operation</b>	<b>Operation from which previous operational data was derived – subject to the conditions specified in points (c), (d) and (e)</b>	<b>Remark</b>
SA CAT I – automatic landing	CAT I/II/III – automatic landing SA CAT I – automatic landing SA CAT II – automatic landing LTS CAT I – automatic landing.	Automatic landing in hybrid systems may also be used
SA CAT I – HUDLS	CAT II/III – HUDLS SA CAT I – HUDLS SA CAT II – HUDLS LTS CAT I – HUDLS	
SA CAT II – automatic landing	CAT II/III – automatic landing SA CAT II – automatic landing	Automatic landing in hybrid systems may also be used
SA CAT II – HUDLS	SA CAT II – HUDLS CAT II/III – HUDLS	
CAT II – HUD to below DH with manual landing	CAT II – HUD to below DH with manual landing	Data related to the LSAA should only be used in
	CAT II or CAT III – automatic landing CAT II or CAT III HUDLS SA CAT II HUDLS	The case of HUDLS or automatic landing
CAT II – auto-coupled to below DH with manual landing	CAT II – auto-coupled to below DH with manual landing CAT II or CAT III – automatic landing SA CAT II automatic landing	
CAT II – automatic landing	CAT II – automatic landing SA CAT II – automatic landing CAT III automatic landing	Automatic landing in hybrid systems may also be used

CAT II – HUDLS	CAT II or CAT III – HUDLS SA CAT II – HUDLS	
CAT III – HUDLS	CAT III – HUDLS	
CAT III – automatic landing	CAT III – automatic landing	If the hybrid system uses automatic landing, then the data may be used as any CAT III system.
CAT III – hybrid system	CAT III – hybrid system based on same components	
EFVS operations requiring flare prompt or flare command, i.e. EFVS-L	EFVS operations requiring flare prompt or flare commands	

Note: Previous operational data should be based on the same kind of xLS (e.g. ILS to ILS, MLS to MLS or GLS to GLS). Data related to landing system performance derived from infrastructure systems with lower performance may be used on systems with higher performance (e.g. data derived from a CAT II ILS may be used on a CAT III ILS). However, an ILS may qualify a GLS operation under the following conditions:

- The performance of the ILS installation on which the data is based can only be credited to the ILS point promulgate.
- An ILS facility performance category II installation can only be credited an operation using GAST C.
- An ILS facility performance category III installation can only be credited to an operation GAST C or GAST D

#### DESKTOP ASSESSMENT — AERODROME DATA, INSTRUMENT FLIGHT PROCEDURE AND AIRCRAFT DATA AND CAPABILITIES

- (f) The desktop assessment should correspond to the nature and complexity of the operation intended to be carried out and should take into account the hazards and associated risks inherent in these operations.
- (g) The assessment should include the AFM or additional data from the TC/STC holder, instrument flight procedures and aerodrome data. For landing systems, the runway or airport conditions should include as a minimum:
- (1) the approach path slope;
  - (2) the runway elevation;
  - (3) the type of xLS navigation means intended to be used;
  - (4) the average slope of the LSAA; and
  - (5) the ground profile under the approach path (pre-threshold terrain). The distance should be calculated from the published threshold. It should be 300 metres, unless otherwise stated by the AFM or additional data from the TC/STC holder, the State of the aerodrome or AIP data, or the competent authority issuing the operator’s LVO approval.
- Note: The above points assume a CAT II or CAT III runway. For other types of runways, the operator may need to consider other factors.
- (h) In addition to (g), additional elements may need to be included in the assessment if stated by:
- (1) the AFM, or additional data from the TC/STC holder; or
  - (2) the State of the aerodrome or AIP data; or
  - (3) the competent authority issuing the operator’s LVO approval.

- (i) For EFVS operations, the following applies: If the system used to perform an EFVS operation contains a flare cue, each aircraft type/equipment/runway combination should be verified before authorising the use of EFVS-L, on any runway with irregular pre-threshold terrain (not within the certification assumption for pre-threshold terrain), if the LSAA presents significant slope change.

**OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT**

- (j) When performing an operational assessment, the operator should verify each aircraft type and runway combination by successfully completing the determined number of approaches and landings according to the process in point (l) below and the conditions determined in Table 15.

**Table 15**

Type of approach	RVR/VIS
CAT III	CAT II conditions if the approach was previously successfully assessed in CAT II operations
CAT II & CAT III	CAT I conditions
EFVS-A	As per instrument approach no EFVS credits
SA CAT I & SA CAT II	CAT I conditions

- (k) The operational assessment should validate the use and effectiveness of the aircraft flight guidance systems, and operating procedures for the intended operation applicable to a specific instrument flight procedure and runway.
- (l) The process to determine the number of approaches and landings should be based on identified risks and agreed with the competent authority, and comprise the following steps:
- (1) Identify the risks related to the landing system (based on the AFM or additional data from the TC/STC holder) which may include limitations in the conditions during the operational assessment (e.g. to perform the assessment under a non-commercial flight).
  - (2) Determine complexity of the runway based on:
    - (i) a set of criteria based on the certification assumptions identified in the AFM or additional data from the TC/STC holder;
    - (ii) availability and quality of runway data supporting the risk assessment;
    - (iii) other known factors identified.
  - (3) Scale the number of required approaches based on complexity.
- (m) The operational assessment may be performed in a commercial flight.
- (n) If the operator has different variants of the same type of aircraft, utilising the same landing systems, the operator should show that the variants have satisfactory operational performance, but there is no need to conduct a full operational assessment for each variant/runway combination.
- (o) The operator may replace partially or completely the approaches and landings to a particular runway, if approved by the competent authority, with:
- (1) simulations made by the aircraft manufacturer or approved design organisations, if the terrain is properly modelled in the simulation;
  - (2) a verification using an FSTD, if the FSTD is suitable for the operational assessment.

**ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION OF THE SUITABILITY OF RUNWAYS FOR EFVS OPERATIONS**

- (p) The assessment of the suitability of the aerodrome should include whether the approach and runway lights installed (notably incandescent or LED lights) are adequate for the EFVS equipment used by the operator.
- (q) Additionally, the operator should assess obstacles for the following operations:
- (1) NPA procedures;
  - (2) APV;
  - (3) category I PA procedures on runways where an OFZ is not provided; and



- (4) approach procedures not designed in accordance with PANS-OPS or equivalent criteria.
- (r) The assessment in point (q) should determine whether:
  - (1) obstacle protection can be ensured in the visual segment from DA/H to landing, without reliance on visual identification of obstacles or in the event of a balked landing; and
  - (2) obstacle lights installed (notably incandescent or LED lights) are adequate for the EFVS equipment used by the operator.
- (s) If the assessment determines that:
  - (1) obstacle clearance cannot be ensured in the visual segment without reliance on visual identification of obstacles, the operator should not authorise EFVS operations to that runway or restrict the operation to the type and/or category of instrument approach operations where obstacle protection is ensured.

Note: Obstacles of a height of less than 50 ft above the threshold may be disregarded when assessing the VSS.
  - (2) obstacle protection is not assured in the event of a go-around initiated at any point prior to touchdown, the operator should not authorise the operation unless procedures to mitigate the risk of inadequate obstacle protection are developed and implemented.
- (t) If the AFM stipulates specific requirements for approach procedures, the operational assessment should include a determination of whether these requirements can be met.

#### **AMC2 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures**

##### **SUITABLE INSTRUMENT FLIGHT APPROACH PROCEDURES**

- (a) CAT II instrument approach operations should only be conducted using a CAT II IAP.
- (b) CAT III instrument approach operations should only be conducted using a CAT III IAP.
- (c) SA CAT I operations should only be conducted using a SA CAT I IAP or, if not available, a CAT I IAP that includes an OCH based on radio altimeter.
- (d) SA CAT II operations should only be conducted using a SA CAT II IAP or, if not available, a CAT II IAP.
- (e) EFVS operations should only be conducted using an IAP which is offset by a maximum of 3 degrees unless a different approach offset is stated in the AFM.

#### **AMC3 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures**

##### **SUITABLE AERODROMES — RUNWAY AND RUNWAY ENVIRONMENT — NAVIGATION FACILITIES — APPROACH OPERATIONS OTHER THAN EFVS OPERATIONS**

- (a) For CAT II instrument approach operations, a PA runway category II or category III category II approach lights; (2) standard runway markings; (3) category II runway lights.
- (b) For CAT III instrument approach operations, a PA runway category III should be used. The following visual aids should be available:
  - (1) category III approach lights;
  - (2) standard runway markings;
  - (3) category III runway lights.
- (c) For SA CAT I operations:
  - (1) where an ILS or MLS or GLS is used, it should not be promulgated with any restrictions affecting its usability and should not be offset from the extended centre line;
  - (2) where an ILS or GLS is used, it should be at least the minimum ILS or GLS classification stated in the AFM and meet any of the required minimum performance parameters stated in the AFM;
  - (3) the glide path angle is 3.0o ; a steeper glide path, not exceeding 3.5 o and not exceeding the limits stated in the AFM, can be approved provided that an equivalent level of safety is achieved; and
  - (4) runway markings, category I approach lights as well as runway edge lights, runway threshold lights, and runway end lights should be available.


- (d) For SA CAT II operations:
- (1) where an ILS or MLS or GLS is used, it should not be promulgated with any restrictions affecting its usability and should not be offset from the extended centre line;
  - (2) where an ILS or GLS is used, the following applies:
    - (i) if the AFM provides such data, the minimum ILS or GLS classification stated in the AFM; or
    - (ii) when such data is not provided:
      - (A) where an GLS is used, it should be certified to at least GAST-C and to the GBAS point D;
      - (B) where an ILS is used, it should be certified to at least class II/D/2
  - (3) the glide path angle is 3.0o ; a steeper glide path, not exceeding 3.2o , can be approved provided that the operator demonstrates an equivalent level of safety; and
  - (4) the following visual aids should be available:
    - (i) standard runway markings, category I approach lights as well as runway edge lights, runway threshold lights and runway end lights; and
    - (ii) for operations with an RVR of less than 400 m, centre line lights.

**AMC4 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures**

**COLLECT AND DEVELOP AIRPORT DATA NOT CONTAINED IN THE AIP — AEROPLANES**

When the operator wishing to use an aerodrome where its relevant data for the purpose of LVO is not provided or some data is not provided, the operator should develop procedures to collect or develop the necessary data. The procedure should be specific to the State of the aerodrome or the area of operation and should be approved by Brunei DCA.

Starting Point AMC1 SPA.LVO.110



**GM1 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures**

**ASSESSMENT OF AERODROMES FOR THE INTENDED OPERATIONS — AEROPLANES**

A diagram with a schematic of the assessment described in AMC1 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures is provided below:

Starting Point AMC1 SPA.LVO.110

## GM2 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures

### SUITABLE AERODROMES — ASSESSMENT — AVAILABILITY OF SUITABLE NAVIGATION FACILITIES

As detailed in point (a) of AMC1 SPA.LVO.110, the assessment of the suitability of an aerodrome, including instrument flight procedures, for the intended operations comprises the availability of suitable navigation facilities and associated instrument flight approach procedures.

When assessing the availability of suitable navigation facilities, the following information is relevant.

- (a) Classification for ILS: the ILS classification, e.g. 'III/E/4', II/T/3, 'I/C/2', etc., is defined in ICAO Annex 10 Volume 1 by using three characters:
- (1) I, II or III: this character indicates conformance to the facility performance category which is usually associated with the approach operational category,
  - (2) A, B, C, T, D or E: this character defines the ILS points to which the localiser/glide path has been verified to be conformal to the course structure of a localiser CATII/III or glide path CAT II/III (where glide path is always limited to T).
  - (3) 1, 2, 3 or 4: this number indicates the level of integrity and continuity of service. The integrity relates to the trust which can be placed in localiser or glide path not radiating false guidance signals. The continuity of service relates to the rarity of signal interruptions. The minimum levels of integrity and continuity of service are represented by a single descriptor 'level' which would typically be associated as follows:
    - (i) Level 1: the localiser's or glide path's integrity or continuity of service have not been demonstrated or they have been demonstrated but at least one of them does not meet the level 2 requirements.
    - (ii) Level 2 is the performance objective for ILS equipment used to support LVOs when ILS guidance for position information in the landing phase is supplemented by visual cues/references.
    - (iii) Level 3 is the performance objective for ILS equipment used to support operations which place a high degree of reliance on ILS guidance for positioning through touchdown.
    - (iv) Level 4 is the performance objective for ILS equipment used to support operations which place a high degree of reliance on ILS guidance throughout touchdown and roll-out.

Further information may be found in ICAO Annex 10 Volume 1.

- (b) GBAS facility classification (GFC)

The facility classification, e.g. i.e. 'C/G1/35/H', refers to the station serving all approaches to a given airport and is defined in ICAO Annex 10 Volume 1 using four elements:

- (1) Facility approach service type (FAST): (A-D) indicate the service types supported by the navigation facility, i.e. 'C' means FAST C, which denotes a facility meeting all the performance and functional requirements necessary to support GBAS approach service type (GAST) C. GAST C has been designed to meet requirements for CAT I as well as, with additional constraints, CAT II. GAST D has been designed to meet requirements for CAT III. A downgrade from GAST D to C is possible and announced in the avionics.
- (2) Ranging source types: these indicate what ranging sources are augmented by the ground subsystem. i.e. 'G1' means GPS ('G2': SBAS, 'G3': GLONASS, 'G4': reserved for Galileo, etc.).
- (3) Facility coverage: this defines the outer horizontal coverage of the GBAS positioning service expressed in nautical miles. '0' is for facilities that do not provide positioning service. The facility coverage for position service does not indicate the coverage for the GBAS approach service. The information on the coverage for the approach service is contained in the 'Service volume radius from the GBAS reference point' to the nearest kilometre or nautical mile as described in point (d) below.
- (4) Polarisation: this indicates the polarisation of the VHF Data Broadcast (VDB) signal. E indicates elliptical polarisation (option), and H indicates horizontal polarisation (standard). Aircraft operators that use vertically polarised receiving antennas will have to take this information into account when managing flight operations, including flight planning and contingency procedures.

Further information may be found in ICAO Annex 10 Volume 1.

- (c) Approach facility designation (AFD) for GBAS The approach facility designation, e.g. 'EDDF/G25A/20748/S/C' or 'ABCD/XABC/21278/150/CD', describing parameters for an individual approach procedure, is defined in ICAO Annex 10 using five elements:

- (1) GBAS identification: 4-character facility identifier, e.g. ABCD.
  - (2) Approach identifier: 4-character approach identifier, e.g. XABC.
  - (3) Channel number: 5-digit channel number (20 001 – 39 999) associated with the approach.
  - (4) Approach service volume: this indicates the inner limit of the service volume either by a numerical value in feet corresponding to the minimum decision height (DH), e.g. '150', or by the GBAS points (i.e. A, B, C, T, D, E, or S). The GBAS points are equivalent to the ILS points, where 'S' is only specific to GBAS and denotes the stop end of the runway.
  - (5) Supported service types: these designate the supported GBAS service types (A-D). Further information may be found in ICAO Annex 10 Volume 1.
- (d) Service volume radius from the GBAS reference point Maximum use distance (Dmax): the maximum distance (slant range) from the GBAS reference point to the nearest kilometre or nautical mile within which pseudo-range corrections are applied by the aircraft system.

Note: This parameter does not indicate the distance within which VHF data broadcast field strength requirements for the approach service are met.

Further information may be found in ICAO Annex 10 Volume 1.

#### **TYPE OF xLS NAVIGATION MEANS**

- (e) In the context of AMC1 SPA.LVO.110 point (g)(3), 'type of xLS navigation means' means the facilities external to the aircraft and the associated limitations (if any) which have been used as the basis for certification.

### **GM3 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures**

#### **SUITABLE AERODROMES — ASSESSMENT — SUITABLE RUNWAY AND RUNWAY ENVIRONMENT CHARACTERISTICS**

- (a) As detailed in point (a) of AMC1 SPA.LVO.110, the assessment of the suitability of an aerodrome, including instrument flight procedures, for the intended operations comprises the availability of suitable runway and runway environment characteristics.
- (b) For operations based on radio altimeter or other device measuring the height over the ground:
- (1) the suitability of the indication of the DH should be based on data covering the actual DH location. This indication should be expected to be stable and continuous;
  - (2) The suitability of the indication of the alert height (where applicable) should be based on data covering the actual alert height location. This indication should be expected to be stable and continuous.
  - (3) The primary source of information to determine the suitability should be the precision approach terrain chart (PATC). If the information is not conclusive, the operator may collect and develop airport data not contained in the AIP. More information can be found in GM10 SPA.LVO.110.
- (c) For runways intended to be used for CAT III, CAT II, SA CAT II and SA CAT I operations, the State of aerodrome should provide a PATC. More information is provided in GM7 SPA.LVO.110.
- (d) There should be a radio altimeter operating area for runways intended to be used for EFVS-L, CAT III, CAT II, SA CAT II and SA CAT I operations. The ICAO aerodrome provisions detail that the radio altimeter operating area extends to at least 300 m from the runway threshold with a width of 60 metres on either side of the extended centre line of the runway. The width may be reduced to not less than  $\pm 30$  metres if such a reduction does not affect the safety of aircraft operations as assessed by the aerodrome operator in cooperation with affected stakeholders. Slope changes should be kept to a minimum.
- (e) Information on pre-threshold terrain and its effect on radio altimeters and automatic flight control systems (AFCS) is contained in the Manual of All-Weather Operations (ICAO Doc 9365, Section 5.2.)

#### **SUITABLE AERODROMES — ASSESSMENT — PREVIOUS OPERATIONAL DATA - RUNWAY AND RUNWAY ENVIRONMENT**

- (f) As detailed in point (d)(1) of AMC1 SPA.LVO.110, previous operational data should only be used to assess the suitability of an aerodrome for the intended operations when it concerns the same runway and there were no relevant changes to the runway and runway environment.
- (g) Relevant changes to the runway and runway environment may include changes to:
- (1) the pre-threshold terrain, including the radio altimeter operating area;

- (2) runway dimensions;
- (3) the average slope of the landing system assessment area (LSAA);
- (4) visual aids including approach lights and runway lights;
- (5) the obstacle free zone (OFZ);
- (6) the visual segment surface (VSS) — only relevant for operational credits in the visual segment (EFVS).

#### **GM4 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures**

##### **SUITABLE AERODROMES — ASSESSMENT — PREVIOUS OPERATIONAL DATA PROVIDED BY THE STATE OF THE AERODROME**

- (a) As detailed in point (b)(1) of AMC1 SPA.LVO.110, the assessment of the suitability of an aerodrome, including instrument flight procedures, for the intended operations, may be made considering previous operational data for the particular aerodrome, runway and instrument flight procedures.
- (b) The following guidance is provided for the assessment of suitability of aerodromes for LVOs or operations with operational credits.
  - (1) If a State provides data related to airports or runways in its territory that are suitable for CAT II or CAT III operations with a specific aircraft model or group of aircraft models, those airports or runways may be considered suitable for the purpose of AMC2 SPA.LVO.110. Note: A CAT II or CAT III approved runway does not necessarily mean that the airport is suitable for the purpose of AMC2 SPA.LVO as the aerodrome's provisions may not ensure that the requirements for certain aircraft models are fulfilled.
  - (2) If a State provides data related to airports or runways in its territory that are found suitable for SA CAT I or SA CAT II, those airports or runways may be considered suitable for the purpose of AMC2 SPA.LVO.110. Note: In some States the concept of SA CAT I and SA CAT II may be different from the EU concept. The operator should consider these differences.
  - (3) If a State provides data related to airports or runways in its territory that are approved for CAT II/III operations but are designated as restricted or non-standard or irregular, those designated runways should be considered not suitable. The remaining CAT II/III runways of that State may be considered regular.
  - (4) A competent authority may provide data related to airports or runways that can be considered suitable for defined LVOs. The suitability statement could be credited by operators under the oversight of that authority.

#### **GM5 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures**

##### **SUITABLE AERODROMES — ASSESSMENT — PREVIOUS OPERATIONAL DATA — TERMINOLOGY: MAKE, MODEL, SERIES AND VARIANT**

The following terms, in accordance with the ICAO Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) taxonomy, are often used (e.g. AMC1 SPA.LVO.110):

- (a) Aircraft make: The aircraft make is the name assigned to the aircraft by the aircraft manufacturer when each aircraft was produced. In most cases, the aircraft make is the common name of the aircraft manufacturer; for example, Airbus, Boeing, Embraer, etc.
- (b) Aircraft model: An aircraft model is an aircraft manufacturer's designation for an aircraft grouping with a similar design or style of structure. In EASA type certificate data sheet (TCDS), this means the aircraft type certificate; for example, A330, B777.
- (c) Aircraft series: An aircraft series is an aircraft manufacturer's designation to identify differences within an aircraft model grouping. It provides a further specification to the aircraft type; for example, B777-232 where the series is the number 232. Some manufacturers define the so-called master series: An aircraft master series creates a grouping of similar aircraft series for analytical purposes and to identify aircraft series that share airworthiness properties. A master series contains aircraft series from within one aircraft model. For example, A320-100 and A320-200: the A320-100 master series only has one series (A320-111), while the A320-200 master series has many series (211, 212, 214, 215, 216, 231, 232, 233).

- (d) Aircraft variant; a variant defines different sets of limiting structural masses (e.g. MTOW, MLW, MZFW, etc.) within a series. For example, A320-232-007 or the A330-243 RR engine's variant 052. Variants are not covered in the ICAO Cast taxonomy; however, they may be specified in the EASA TCDS.
- (e) More information can be found in ICAO documentation under: <https://www.icao.int/publications/DOC8643/Pages/Search.aspx?msclkid=a28160bbd09311ecbbe633ef5f1957a4> and <http://www.intlaviationstandards.org/>.

#### **GM6 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures**

##### **SUITABLE AERODROMES — DESKTOP ASSESSMENT — DATA NOT PROVIDED IN THE AFM**

- (a) When the AFM or additional data from the TC/STC holder does not provide the information needed in AMC1 SPA.LVO.110 points (g)(1) to (5), the operator may contact the TC/STC holder to request such information. Otherwise the operator may seek to use previous operational data or perform operational demonstration in accordance with AMC1 SPA.LVO.110.

##### **SUITABLE AERODROMES — DESKTOP ASSESSMENT — USE OF PREVIOUS OPERATIONAL DATA**

- (b) In-service consolidated experience from already successfully demonstrated and consistently used runways with the specific aircraft type and with the same intended operations (typically CAT II/III) could be used to support the desktop assessment. The assessment criteria, for prethreshold terrain variation and LSAA slope, could then be defined by the prevailing complexity of the runway on which the operator already has in-service experience and where sufficient operational flight data is available to prove adequate performance of the automatic landing system.

#### **GM7 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures**

##### **SUITABLE AERODROMES — DESKTOP ASSESSMENT — AERODROME DATA SOURCES**

As detailed in point (b)(2) of AMC1 SPA.LVO.110, the assessment of the suitability of an aerodrome, including instrument flight procedures, for the intended operations, may be made by a desktop assessment, that should consider aerodrome data.

This GM describes some aerodrome data sources that ICAO Member States provide in accordance with ICAO Annex 4.

- (a) Type A and Type B aerodrome obstacle charts

Aerodrome obstacle charts come in two forms. Type A and B charts may be combined, and the chart is called aerodrome obstacle chart (ICAO Comprehensive). Where a terrain and obstacle chart is provided in electronic form, there is no need to provide Type A or B aerodrome obstacle charts.

- (b) Type A aerodrome obstacle chart (ICAO Annex 4, Chapter 3)

Type A aerodrome obstacle charts are found at most aerodromes approved for LVOs. The function of the Type A chart is to enable an operator to comply with the performance operating limitations in Annex 6. The Type A chart does not have to be provided if there are no take-off obstacles, but a note informing about this is needed according to ICAO Annex 4. The elevation is given to the nearest half-metre or nearest foot. Linear dimensions are shown to the nearest half metre.

- (c) Type B aerodrome obstacle chart (ICAO Annex 4, Chapter 4)

Type B aerodrome obstacle charts contain information about the elevation (at the centre line) of both runways plus the elevation at each significant change of the slope of the runway. The function of the Type B chart is:

- (1) the determination of minimum safe altitudes/heights including those for circling procedures;
- (2) the determination of procedures for use in the event of an emergency during take-off or landing;
- (3) the application of obstacle clearing and marking criteria; and
- (4) the provision of source material for aeronautical charts. Elevations and linear dimensions are shown to the nearest half metre.

- (d) Aerodrome terrain and obstacle Chart – ICAO (Electronic) (ICAO Annex 4, Chapter 5)

The function of this chart is to:

- (1) enable an operator to comply with the operating limitations of Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 5, and Part III, Section II, Chapter 3, by developing contingency procedures for use in the event of an emergency during a missed approach or take-off, and by performing aircraft operating limitations analysis; and
- (2) support the following air navigation applications:
  - (i) instrument procedure design (including circling procedure);
  - (ii) aerodrome obstacle restriction and removal; and
  - (iii) provision of source data for the production of other aeronautical charts.

Note that this chart may also contain the information required for the PATC.

According to ICAO Annex 4, from November 2015, this chart is made available for aerodromes regularly used by international aviation. The chart is made available in printed form on request.

(e) Aerodrome chart (ICAO Annex 4, Chapter 13)

According to ICAO Annex 4, an aerodrome chart is provided for aerodromes regularly used by international aviation. The function of this chart is to provide information to facilitate the ground movement of aircraft and in general also to provide essential operational information.

This chart contains information about the height of the threshold and, for PA runways, the highest point of the TDZ. This information may also be included in the text part of the AIP, Chapter AD2 (normally paragraph 2.12 – Runway Physical Characteristics). The elevation is provided to the nearest half metre.

(f) Precision approach terrain chart (PATC) (Annex 4, Chapter 6)

According to ICAO Annex 4, a PATC is made available for all PA runways Categories II and III at aerodromes used by international civil aviation, except where the requisite information is provided in the aerodrome terrain and obstacle chart – ICAO (Electronic). The chart includes:

- (i) a plan showing contours at 1 m (3 ft) intervals in the area 60 m on either side of the extended centre line of the runway, to the same distance as the profile, the contours to be related to the runway threshold;
- (ii) an indication where the terrain or any object thereon, within the plan defined in (i), differs by  $\pm 3$  m in height from the centre line profile and is likely to affect a radio altimeter;
- (iii) a profile of the terrain to a distance of 900 m from the threshold along the extended centre line of the runway. Where the terrain at a distance greater than 900 m from the runway threshold is mountainous or otherwise significant to users of the chart, the profile of the terrain should be shown to a distance not exceeding 2 000 m from the runway threshold.

(g) Summary

- (1) For the determination of runway slopes, the aerodrome obstacle chart, preferably the combined version, appears to provide the best information. The PATC appears to be the best source to determine the elevations and slopes in the approach area.
- (2) If the information provided by different parts of the AIP is inconsistent, this may indicate an error in the data and should be reported to the State of aerodrome or AIP issuing authority, unless the inconsistency is insignificant. It should however be noted that there may be different requirements for accuracy and resolution between different AIP charts or sections, which might cause values to differ slightly.
- (3) It may be difficult to conclusively state which chart is best for determining the runway slope in each case, but the primary source of information is the AIP, and therein the aerodrome obstacle chart and the PATC. As the aerodrome terrain and obstacle chart – ICAO (Electronic) becomes more available, it will probably take over as the primary source of information about both runways and pre-threshold terrain.

## **GM8 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures**

### **SUITABLE AERODROMES — OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT — PROCESS TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF APPROACHES AND LANDINGS — AEROPLANES**

- (a) When performing an operational assessment to determine the suitability of an aerodrome for the intended operations, the operator should have a process to determine the number of approaches and landings, in accordance with point (I) of AMC1 SPA.LVO.110. The following guidance provides examples of criteria that can be used to evaluate level complexity of the runway versus a landing system for the purpose of the determination

of the number of approaches and landings. Depending on the landing system used, some criteria might not be relevant, or others might need to be considered.

(1) Pre-threshold terrain profile

The typical length of pre-runway threshold is calculated from the published threshold (displaced threshold if present) to 300 m on the extended centre line unless otherwise specified by the AFM or additional data from the TC/STC holder, the State of the aerodrome or AIP data, or the competent authority issuing the operator's LVO approval. The complexity of the pre-threshold terrain profiles is described as follows:

(i) Simple

- (A) approximately + 1 m variation from runway threshold elevation in the typical length; or
- (B) previous experience in more constraining pre-threshold terrain in the same aircraft type or variant.

(ii) Moderate

- (A) presence of ARAS; or
- (B) approximately + 1 m variation from runway threshold elevation within the last 60 m prior to runway threshold; and
- (C) prior to 60 m and up to typical length: — moderate rising slope (less than 7 % rising); or — moderate 'sea wall' (less than 3 m).

(iii) Complex

- (A) approximately + 2 m variation from runway threshold elevation within the last 60 m prior to runway threshold; and
- (B) prior to 60 m and up to typical length:
  - significant rising slope (up to 15 % rising); or
  - significant 'see wall' (up to 6 m); or
  - significant change of slope (rising then descending or descending then rising close to the limit values)

(iv) Very complex

Outside any of the limits defined above for complex pre-threshold terrain profiles.

Note: The term 'sea wall' refers to sudden changes of terrain elevation that typically occur when runway thresholds are located near the sea. Sea level may change due to tides. Other cases of sudden terrain elevation may occur in other cases, a slope of 100 % may be considered as comparable to 'sea wall' (e.g. Boston USA).






Figure 1: Typical example of ‘very complex’ with greater than 6 m ‘sea wall’ at 300 m (Asturias, LEAS 29 dated 2007) that after suitability assessment and due to the presence of ARAS, may be changed to ‘moderate’.

Example: A pre-threshold terrain with the following features would be considered as ‘moderate’.

- (1) Less than 1 m variation of pre-threshold terrain elevation from runway threshold elevation, in the area from runway threshold up to 100 m prior to runway threshold
- (2) Less than 3 m variation of pre-threshold terrain elevation from runway threshold elevation, in the area from 100 m prior to runway threshold up to 300 m prior to runway threshold
- (2) Landing system assessment area (LSAA) slope

Note: 600 metres after the threshold is the standard length; however, depending on the landing system, other lengths might be relevant.

Although not recommended by ICAO Annex 14 Volume 1, slope variation in the LSAA can exist (refer to point 3.1.15 to point 3.1.18) and represent a factor of risk to be considered.

For the purpose of determining the relevant parameters characterising slope and slope variation, the following definitions may be used (Figure 1):

- Mean LSAA slope: Slope computed from runway threshold elevation up to runway elevation at 600 metres after the threshold.
- Deviation from mean LSAA slope: greatest elevation difference between any runway elevation inside LSAA and mean LSAA slope.




Figure 1: Mean LSAA slope & Deviation from mean LSAA slope

Note: Published runway profiles usually contain the position and elevation of each significant runway longitudinal slope change. Elevation at other location can be interpolated assuming straight slope between each published elevation. The highest / lowest elevation of the LSAA might not be the one where the deviation from mean LSAA slope is the greatest.

- (i) Simple
  - (A) Approximately + 0.4 % mean LSAA slope and less than 1 m (3 ft) variation around mean LSAA slope; or
  - (B) previous experience in more constraining touch down condition in the same aircraft type or variant.
- (ii) Moderate
  - Approximately + 0.8 % mean LSAA slope and less than 2 m (6 ft) variation around mean LSAA slope.
- (iii) Complex
  - Approximately + 1.0 % mean LSAA slope and less than 4 m (12 ft) variation around mean LSAA slope.
- (iv) Very complex
  - Outside any of the limits defined above.



Figure 2: Typical example of 'simple' LSAA Slope (ESSA 01L dated 2018)




Figure 3: Typical example of 'moderate' LSAA slope due to variation around mean LSAA slope greater than 1 m but lower than 2 m (EGNM 32 dated 2018)



Figure 4: Typical example of 'complex mean LSAA slope greater than 0.8% but lower than 1%' (EDD 23L dated 2009)

(b) Operational assessment programme: the following guidance provides examples of typical flight programmes that can be used to demonstrate suitability of a landing system using the operational assessment method, considering the overall level of runway irregularities.

Note: For CAT II operations with no use of autoland nor guidance for the flare manoeuvre, the programmes could be alleviated.

The flight programmes are expected to depend on the level of runway irregularities. Table 1 provides examples of criteria that can be used to determine the level of runway irregularities.

Pre-threshold / LSAA slope	Simple	Moderate	Complex	Very complex
Simple	Simple	Moderate	Complex	Very complex
Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Complex	Very complex
Complex	Complex	Complex	Complex	Very complex
Very complex	Very complex	Very complex	Very complex	Very complex

Table 1: Level of runway irregularities to scale the flight programme

## (1) Simple runway

For simple runways, unless other factors can be identified as a source of concern, no in-flight approach and landing may be required.

## (2) Moderate runway

For moderate runways, a minimum of one successful approach/landing using the procedures, equipment and operationally relevant heights (DH/AH) for the intended operations is performed in the meteorological conditions described in AMC1 SPA.LVO.110 Table 14. More approaches could be required if any issue is identified during this approach/landing.

## (3) Complex runway

For complex runways, an initial minimum of three approaches/landings using the procedures, equipment and operationally relevant heights (DH/AH) for the intended operations is performed in the meteorological conditions described in AMC1 SPA.LVO.110 Table 14, with at least one of the landings close to the maximum landing weight for the intended operation and the other two with other different conditions; for example, with a mid-weight in one and low weight in another or with different or wind conditions or aircraft configuration flap full/flap 3, or a combination of them. The flights for the assessment is conducted by pilots designated by the operator with defined minimum experience and qualifications, with procedures defined for the purpose. More approaches could be required if any issue is identified during these approaches/landings.

## (4) Very complex runway

For very complex runways, an initial minimum of four to six approaches/landings using the procedures, equipment and operationally relevant heights (DH/AH) for the intended operations is performed in the meteorological conditions described in AMC1 SPA.LVO.110 Table 14 in typical aircraft weight conditions in flights with no commercial passengers.

If no anomaly is observed after the first four to six approaches/landings, extend the condition progressively close to the maximum landing weight for the intended operation with at least 15 successful approaches or landings and report any anomalies with the meteorological conditions described in AMC1 SPA.LVO.110 Table 14 and with different conditions, for example with different range of weight conditions (high, mid, low) or with different wind conditions or aircraft configuration flap full/flap 3, or a combination of them. The flights for the assessment should be conducted by pilots designated by the operator with defined minimum experience and qualifications, with procedures defined for the purpose.

## (c) Operational assessment successful criteria

## (1) Data to be recorded

To assess adequate performance of the landing system, some form of quantitative data should be recorded and reviewed with the competent authority as verification of performance. Acceptable methods of data collection include but are not limited to:

- (i) Record of wind conditions and touch down point (can be observation).
- (ii) Record of pertinent landing system parameters (typically from a digital flight data recorder, quick-access recorder or equivalent) with sufficient sampling rate (typically higher than 1 sample per second) for the part of the flight paths of interest (typically from 300 ft height above touch down through de-rotation after touch down) including typically:
  - barometric altitude;
  - radio altitude;
  - glide path error;
  - vertical speed;
  - elevator command;
  - pitch attitude;
  - throttle position / thrust commanded;
  - airspeed;
  - mode transition or engagement.
- (iii) Photo or video recording of pertinent instrument or instrument and outside view allowing post-flight replay and review of the above parameters.

## (2) Data review and analysis to assess acceptable performance

The final approach, flare and touch down profile should be reviewed with the competent authority to ensure suitability of at least each of the following:

- (i) suitability of the resulting flight path;
- (ii) acceptability of any flight path deviation from the nominal path (e.g. glide path deviation, deviation from nominal flare profile);
- (iii) proper mode switching;
- (iv) suitable touch down point;
- (v) suitable sink rate at touch down;
- (vi) proper flare initiation altitude;
- (vii) suitability flare quality (e.g. no evidence of early or late flare, no over-flare or under flare, no undue 'pitch down' tendency at flare initiation or during flare, no flare oscillation, no abrupt flare, no inappropriate pitch response during flare, no unacceptable floating tendency, or other unacceptable characteristic that a pilot could interpret as a failure or inappropriate response of the landing system);
- (viii) no unusual flight control displacement (e.g. elevator control input spikes or oscillation);
- (ix) appropriate throttle/thrust retard (e.g. no early or late retard, no failure to retard, no undue reversal of retard, no undue pitch/thrust coupling);
- (x) appropriate speed decay in flare (e.g. no unusually low speed risking high pitch attitude and tail strike, no excessive float, appropriate speed decay even if well above Vref at flare initiation due to planned wind or gust compensation);
- (xi) proper mode initiation or mode transition relating to altitude or radio altitude inputs (e.g. crosswind alignment).

### **GM9 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures**

#### **SUITABLE AERODROMES — OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT — VERIFICATION USING AN FSTD**

- (a) When performing an operational assessment to determine the suitability of an aerodrome for the intended operations, the operator may replace partially or completely the approaches and landings by a verification using an FSTD, if the FSTD is suitable for the operational assessment, in accordance with point (o) of AMC1 SPA.LVO.110.

Using an FSTD to support an operational assessment can be useful when, for example, terrain criteria would qualify as 'complex' or 'very complex' (level of runway irregularities according to GM8 SPA.LVO.110).

FSTDs are usually designed with the objective of replicating the aspects relevant to the scope of flight training associated with the type and level of the FSTD qualification. FSTDs are usually not designed to be used in the context of an operational assessment of the aerodrome for the intended operations, and there may be limits to what an FSTD may be used for. It should be ensured that the capabilities of the FSTD can support the objectives of the operational assessment.

When using an FSTD, any relevant differences between the real aircraft and the FSTD should be taken into consideration. A full flight simulator (FFS) Level D certified for zero flight time training is generally the most suitable for such use

#### **TO APPLY A VERIFICATION USING AN FSTD, A SUITABLE FSTD SHOULD BE USED**

- (b) An FSTD should only be used if it is from:
  - (1) the same aircraft make and model, unless the same aircraft make and model is restricted by any of the entities in point (c)(2) AMC1 SPA.LVO.110; or
  - (2) another aircraft model, if stated in the AFM or additional data from the TC/STC holder.

The following factors should be considered:

- (1) Aircraft systems

The FSTD replicates the aircraft system in regard to the configuration and behaviour of the approach system or landing system. It covers all systems that are relevant and includes — as a minimum — the guidance and control systems, the relevant displays and the automatic call-outs.

The FSTD may be composed of actual aircraft components or simulated components either by the aircraft manufacturer or by another supplier (e.g. the FSTD manufacturer). If a version or standard of a system or component differs from the aircraft, the operator verifies with the TC/STC holder whether the differences have an impact on the performance or behaviour of the approach system or landing system.

(2) Pre-threshold and runway terrain

The aircraft operator ensures that all relevant pre-threshold and runway profile data is fed into the FSTD and is presentative of the real world. This could mean that additional features may need to be implemented in the terrain database of the FSTD, as the certification specifications for FSTDs require a realistic topography only for a very limited number of aerodromes.

If the pre-threshold terrain includes an artificial radio altimeter surface (ARAS), the ARAS may be verified in the FSTD, if it can be shown for this ARAS that the actual echoes of the radio altimeters can be adequately reproduced in the FSTD. This may be done by using flight data.

(3) Navigation facilities and associated instrument flight approach procedures

All relevant navigation facilities for the instrument flight approach procedures need to be adequately represented in the FSTD. It has to be taken into account that the FSTD representation of the signal in space is usually not realistic in the sense of the signal propagation and is limited to being a straight line in space, which is adequate for training purposes. Some FSTDs support, as a simulation feature for a failure case, a parallel displacement of target approach path; however, dynamic displacements (bends) or VHF noise in the signal are usually not simulated.

If the operation depends on a navigation aid, the use of the FSTD should be limited to the published service volume of the real-world navigation aid. The use of the FSTD outside this space is usually not meaningful as the signal performance and quality of the real-world navigation aid is not known.

(4) Runway environment characteristics and facilities

Whenever the flight operation relies on visual references in both natural or enhanced vision to control or monitor the flight path or to identify relevant obstacles, all relevant environment characteristics and facilities need to be suitably represented. In the case of an EFVS, the visual advantage of the system needs to be representative of the EFVS presentation in the aircraft. This could mean that additional features may need to be implemented in the visual database of the FSTD, as the certification specifications for FSTD require a realistic scenery only for a very limited number of aerodromes.

(5) Scope of FSTD verification

The minimum scope of the FSTD verification may be based on the level of runway irregularities as per GM8 SPA.LVO.110 (scaled approach).

### **GM10 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures**

#### **SUITABLE AERODROMES — ASSESSMENT — COLLECT AND DEVELOP AIRPORT DATA NOT CONTAINED IN THE AIP — AEROPLANES**

An AIP should be the primary means to collect the necessary data to perform the assessment of aerodromes for the intended operation. However, sometimes the relevant data may not be available. In that case, AMC4 SPA. LVO.110 establishes that the operator should develop procedures to collect or develop the necessary data.

In this context, the operator may use surveys and/or collected data from aeroplane sensors or data recorders. This method could be typically used to determine the pre-threshold terrain profile and partially the LSAA if not published by a State authority.

These options should be part of the LVO approval and could include, among others:

- (a) data from appropriate sensors (e.g. radio altimeter, GNSS position, LOC/GS deviations);
- (b) data collected from appropriate sensors stored in recorders;

- (c) FDM data, if appropriate. Sensors and data accuracy, including recorded sampling rate, should be considered in the usage of the collected data. When defined in the approval, the respective data might be used for other airplane types.

### **GM11 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures**

#### **SUITABLE AERODROMES — SUITABLE INSTRUMENT APPROACH PROCEDURES (IAPs) — SA CAT I AND SA CAT II**

ICAO design criteria for IAPs are contained in PANS-OPS (Doc 8168), Volume II.

The design criteria for SA CAT I are the same as those used for standard CAT I approaches, except that the procedures used for SA CAT I should have an OCH based on radio altimeter height loss, since the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance to determine the DH is prescribed.

PANS-OPS Volume II contains the following statement about OCH based on the use of a radio altimeter: 'If the radio altimeter OCA/H is promulgated, operational checks shall have confirmed the repeatability of radio altimeter information.' To assist in assessing the suitability of the approach area for the use of a radio altimeter, aerodromes may produce a precision approach terrain chart (PATC). Such a chart is a standard requirement for CAT II/III runways. The criteria for the PATC are contained in ICAO Annex 4, which explains the function as follows: 'The chart shall provide detailed terrain profile information within a defined portion of the final approach so as to enable aircraft operating agencies to assess the effect of the terrain on DH determination by the use of radio altimeters.' A DH of 150 ft is located approximately 600 m before the threshold on a 30 glide path.

For SA CAT I operations, the instrument approach chart should contain an OCH based on the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance, and the information in Part C of the operations manual must contain a DH based on the use of a radio altimeter. This procedure may be titled 'SA CAT I' or 'CAT I'.

For SA CAT II, the situation is similar. The design criteria are identical to those for CAT II approaches in PANS-OPS, the only exception being the lack of some lighting systems. The OCH and DH are based on the use of a radio altimeter or other device capable of providing equivalent performance.

Since some of the lighting systems are missing, it is unlikely that a State will publish the instrument approach chart as CAT II or OTS CAT II but preferably as SA CAT II, even though the design criteria are the same. If a State, however, promulgates such an instrument approach as CAT II, it can be used for SA CAT II operations.

SA CAT II operations can be conducted on regular CAT II runways and following CAT II procedures.

### **GM12 SPA.LVO.110 Aerodrome-related requirements, including instrument flight procedures**

#### **SUITABLE AERODROMES — VERIFICATION OF THE SUITABILITY OF RUNWAYS FOR EFVS OPERATIONS**

- (a) EFVS operations allow operation below the DA/H without 'natural' visual reference. Obstacles may not be obvious to the crew using the EFVS and thus the approach descent slope used has to ensure that obstacle protection will be provided in the visual segment.
- (b) When operating below the DA/H, pilots rely on the EFVS and, for EFVS-A operations, the pilot flying will need to acquire 'natural' visual reference at some point prior to touchdown (typically 100 ft above the threshold elevation). EFVS operations may present a higher probability of initiating a go-around below the DA/H than non-EFVS operations, depending on the equipment used.
- (c) The purpose of the assessment of the suitability of aerodromes of Instrument Approach Procedures (IAPs) is to confirm that clearance from terrain and obstacles will be available at every stage of the approach including the visual segment and, in the event of a go-around initiated below the DH, the missed approach segment. The assessment of the visual segment should be done with reference to the visual segment surface (VSS).
- (d) If a runway and an approach has been promulgated as suitable for EFVS operations, it may be assumed that the required obstacle clearance for the instrument segment and obstacle protection for the visual segment is assured and that the lighting systems are suitable. For EFVS-L operations, the pre-threshold terrain and LSAA need to be evaluated with regard to the function of flare cues or flare commands. Additionally, for runways not promulgated as suitable for EFVS operations, the operator may include the switch-over time for electrical power supply for the approach or runway lights in the safety assessment.
- (e) S TERPS and ICAO Doc 9905 'Required avigation Performance Authorisation Required (R P AR) Procedure Design annual' describe procedure design criteria that may be considered equivalent to PANS-OPS.
- (f) Procedures not designed in accordance with PANS-OPS may have not been assessed for obstacle protection below the OCH and may not provide a clear vertical path to the runway at the normal descent angle. IAPs do not

ensure obstacle clearance if a go-around is initiated below the DA/H. If an obstacle free zone (OFZ) is established, obstacle protection is provided for the go-around manoeuvre.

- (g) For approach procedures where obstacle protection is not assured for a balked landing, operational procedures available to the operator could include one or more of the following actions:
- (1) continue to the end of the runway and follow a published departure procedure for the landing runway (standard instrument departure or omnidirectional departure) in the event of a go-around below the DA/H;
  - (2) require that a go-around should be executed promptly if the required visual reference is not distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot without reliance on the EFVS by a height above the threshold that will ensure that obstacle protection. This height might be greater than 100 ft or the height below which an approach should not be continued if the flight crew does not acquire natural visual reference as stated in the AFM;
  - (3) develop an alternative lateral profile to be followed in the event of a go-around below the DA/H; and
  - (4) impose an aircraft mass restriction for EFVS operations so that the aircraft can achieve a sufficient missed approach climb performance to clear any obstacles in the missed approach segment if a go-around is initiated at any point prior to touchdown.
- (h) The terrain/obstacle clearance required in the missed approach phase for EFVS operations should be no less than for the same approach flown without EFVS.
- (i) Certain EFVSs may have additional requirements for the suitability of the runways to be used. These could include verification of the accuracy of charting information for the runway threshold or the type of approach lighting installed (incandescent or LED). The assessment of the suitability of aerodromes should include the verification that all such requirements can be satisfied before EFVS operations are authorised for a particular runway.

#### **GM1 SPA.LVO.120 Flight crew training and qualifications**

##### **FLIGHT CREW TRAINING**

The number of approaches referred to in AMC1 SPA.LVO.120 (g)(1) includes one approach and landing that may be conducted in the aircraft using approved CAT II/III procedures. This approach and landing may be conducted in normal line operation or as a training flight.

#### **AMC1 SPA.LVO.120(a) Flight crew competence**

##### **COMPETENCE OF THE FLIGHT CREW FOR THE INTENDED OPERATIONS — EXPERIENCE IN TYPE OR CLASS, OR AS PILOT-IN-COMMAND/COMMANDER**

To ensure that the flight crew is competent to conduct the intended operations, the operator should assess the risks associated with the conduct of low-visibility approach operations by pilots new to the aircraft type or class and take the necessary mitigations. Where such mitigations include an increment to the visibility or RVR for LVOs, this should be stated in the operations manual.

#### **AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(a) Flight crew competence**

##### **COMPETENCE OF THE FLIGHT CREW FOR THE INTENDED OPERATIONS — RECENT EXPERIENCE FOR EFVS OPERATIONS**

To be considered competent to conduct EFVS operations:

- (a) Pilots should complete a minimum of two approaches on each type of aircraft operated using the operator's procedures for EFVS operations during the validity period of each operator proficiency check or periodic demonstration of competence unless credits related to recent experience when operating more than one type are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with BAR 8. When the operator is approved for both EFVS-L and EFVS-A, a minimum of one approach in each EFVS operation should be completed.
- (b) If a flight crew member is authorised to operate as pilot flying and pilot monitoring during EFVS operations, the flight crew member should complete the required number of approaches in each operating capacity.

#### **AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(a) Flight crew competence**

##### **COMPETENCE OF THE FLIGHT CREW FOR THE INTENDED OPERATIONS — RECENT EXPERIENCE FOR SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II AND CAT III APPROACH OPERATIONS**

To be considered competent:



- (a) Pilots authorised to conduct low-visibility approach operations or operations with operational credits should complete at least two approaches using the operator's procedures for low-visibility approach operations or operations with operational credits, during the validity period of each operator proficiency check or periodic demonstration of competence, unless credits related to recent experience when operating more than one type are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with BAR 8.
- (b) If the operator is approved for more than one piece of aircraft equipment used (e.g. autoland, HUD, auto-coupled approach with manual landing, SVGS, etc.), pilots should complete at least one additional approach in the lowest approved RVR (either to go-around or landing) for each piece of aircraft equipment used during the validity period of each operator proficiency check or periodic demonstration of competence (e.g. two approaches CATII with autoland and one CAT II with auto-coupled to below DH with manual landing, two CATII autoland and one CATII HUD to below DH with manual landing or vice versa) unless credits related to recent experience when operating more than one type are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with BAR 8.
- (c) Pilots authorised to conduct low-visibility approach operations or operations with operational credits using HUDLS or equivalent display systems to touchdown should complete two approaches (e.g. an operator approved for CAT II/III HUDLS will do two CAT III HUDLS; other examples would be two CAT III autoland and two CAT III HUDLS to touchdown, two SA CAT II autoland and two SA CAT II HUDLS, or when combining several LVOs and equipment, two CAT III autoland and one CAT II auto-coupled to below DH with manual landing and two CAT III HUDLS to touchdown) using the operator's procedures for low-visibility approach operations or operations with operational credits using HUDLS, during the validity period of each operator proficiency check or periodic demonstration of competence unless credits related to recent experience when operating more than one type are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with BAR 8.
- (d) If a flight crew member is authorised to operate as pilot flying and pilot monitoring, the flight crew member should complete the required number of approaches in each operating capacity.

### GM1 SPA.LVO.120(a) Flight crew competence

#### COMPETENCE OF THE FLIGHT CREW FOR THE INTENDED OPERATIONS — EXPERIENCE IN TYPE OR CLASS, OR AS PILOT-IN-COMMAND/COMMANDER

As general guidance, the operator may use the following reference to assess the experience in type or class or as pilot-in-command/commander referred to in AMC1 SPA.LVO.120(a):

- (a) Before commencing CAT II operations, the following guidance applies to pilots-in-command/commanders or pilots to whom conduct of the flight may be delegated, who are new to the aircraft type:
  - (1) 50 hours or 20 sectors on the type, including LIFUS; and
  - (2) 100 m should be added to the applicable CAT II RVR minima when the operation requires a CAT II manual landing to touchdown until:
    - (i) a total of 100 hours or 40 sectors, including LIFUS, has been achieved on the type; or
    - (ii) a total of 50 hours or 20 sectors, including LIFUS, has been achieved on the type where the flight crew member has been previously qualified for CAT II manual landing operations with an EU operator;
  - (3) 100 m may be added to the applicable CAT II RVR minima when the operation requires the use of CAT II HUDLS to touchdown until:
    - (i) a total of 40 sectors, including LIFUS, has been achieved on the type; or
    - (ii) a total of 20 sectors, including LIFUS, has been achieved on the type where the flight crew member has been previously qualified for CAT II HUDLS to touchdown with an EU operator.

The sector provision in point (a)(1) may always be applicable; the hours on type or class may not fulfil the provisions.

- (b) Before commencing CAT III operations, the following additional provisions may apply to pilots-in-command/commanders or pilots to whom conduct of the flight may be delegated, who are new to the aircraft type:
- (1) 50 hours or 20 sectors on the type, including LIFUS; and
  - (2) 100 m may be added to the applicable CAT II or CAT III RVR minima unless they have been previously qualified for CAT II or III operations with an EU operator, until a total of 100 hours or 40 sectors, including LIFUS, has been achieved on the type.

### AMC1 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence

#### INITIAL TRAINING FOR LVTO IN AN RVR LESS THAN 400 M

The operator should ensure that the flight crew members have completed the following training and checking prior to being authorised to conduct take-offs in an RVR below 400 m unless credits related to training and checking for previous experience in LVTOs on similar aircraft types are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with BAR 8:

- (a) A ground training course including at least the following:
- (1) characteristics of fog;
  - (2) effects of precipitation, ice accretion, low-level wind shear and turbulence;
  - (3) the effect of specific aircraft/system malfunctions;
  - (4) the use and limitations of RVR assessment systems;
  - (5) procedures to be followed and precautions to be taken with regard to surface movement during operations when the RVR is 400 m or less and any additional procedures required for take-off in conditions below 150 m;
  - (6) qualification requirements for pilots to obtain and retain approval to conduct LVOs; and
  - (7) the importance of correct seating and eye position.
- (b) A course of FSTD/flight training covering system failures and engine failures resulting in continued as well as rejected take-offs. Such training should include at least:
- (1) normal take-off in minimum approved RVR conditions;
  - (2) take-off in minimum approved RVR conditions with an engine failure:
    - (i) for aeroplanes, between V1 and V2 (take-off safety speed) or as soon as safety considerations permit;
    - (ii) for helicopters, at or after the take-off decision point (TDP); and
  - (3) take-off in minimum approved RVR conditions with an engine failure:
    - (i) for aeroplanes, before V1 resulting in a rejected take-off; and
    - (ii) for helicopters, before the TDP.
- (c) The operator approved for LVTOs with an RVR below 150 m should ensure that the training specified in (b) is carried out in an FSTD. This training should include the use of any special procedures and equipment.
- (d) The operator should ensure that a flight crew member has completed a check before conducting LVTOs in RVRs of less than 150 m. The check should require the execution of:
- (1) at least one LVTO in the minimum approved visibility;

- (2) at least one rejected take-off at minimum approved RVR in an aircraft or FSTD.

For pilots with previous experience with an operator of LVTOs in RVRs of less than 150 m, the check may be replaced by successful completion of the FSTD and/or flight training specified in (a), (b) and (c).

### **AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence**

#### **INITIAL TRAINING AND CHECKING FOR SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II AND CAT III APPROACH OPERATIONS**

Operators should ensure that flight crew members complete the following training and checking before being authorised to conduct SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II and CAT III approach operations unless credits related to training and checking for previous experience on similar aircraft types are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with BAR 8

- (a) For flight crew members who do not have previous experience of low-visibility approach operations requiring an approval under this Subpart with an EU operator:

- (1) A course of ground training including at least the following:

- (i) characteristics and limitations of different types of approach aids;
- (ii) characteristics of the visual aids;
- (iii) characteristics of fog;
- (iv) operational capabilities and limitations of airborne systems to include symbology used on HUD/HUDLS or equivalent display systems, if appropriate;
- (v) effects of precipitation, ice accretion, low level wind shear and turbulence;
- (vi) the effect of specific aircraft/system malfunctions;
- (vii) the use and limitations of RVR assessment systems;
- (viii) principles of obstacle clearance requirements;
- (ix) the recognition of failure of ground equipment or in satellite approaches, the loss of signal in space and the action to be taken in the event of such failures;
- (x) procedures to be followed and precautions to be taken with regard to surface movement during operations when the RVR is 400 m or less and any additional procedures required for take-off in conditions below 150 m;
- (xi) the significance of DHs based upon radio altimeters and the effect of terrain profile in the approach area on radio altimeter readings and on automatic approach/landing systems. This applies also to other devices capable of providing equivalent information;
- (xii) the effect of the pre-threshold terrain and LSAA on airborne landing systems;
- (xiii) the significance of alert height, if applicable, and action in the event of any failure above and below the alert height;
- (xiv) qualification requirements for pilots to obtain and retain approval to conduct LVOs;
- (xv) the importance of correct seating and eye position; and
- (xvi) the significance of LVPs or equivalent procedures.

- (2) A course of FSTD training and/or flight training in two phases as follows:

- (i) Phase one (LVOs with aircraft and all equipment serviceable) — objectives
  - (A) understand the operation of equipment required for LVOs;
  - (B) understand the operating limitations resulting from airworthiness certification;
  - (C) practise the monitoring of automatic flight control systems and status annunciators;
  - (D) practise the use of HUD/HUDLS or equivalent display systems, where appropriate;
  - (E) understand the significance of alert height, if applicable;
  - (F) become familiar with the maximum lateral and vertical deviation permitted for different types of approach operation;
  - (G) become familiar with the visual references required at DH;
  - (H) master the manual aircraft handling relevant to low-visibility approach operations;
  - (I) practise coordination with other crew members; and
  - (J) become proficient at procedures for low-visibility approach operations with serviceable equipment.
  
- (ii) Phase one of the training should include the following exercises:
  - (A) the required checks for satisfactory functioning of equipment, both on the ground and in flight;
  - (B) the use of HUD/HUDLS or equivalent display systems during all phases of flight, if applicable;
  - (C) approach using the appropriate flight guidance, autopilots, and control systems installed on the aircraft to the appropriate DH and transition to visual flight and landing;
  - (D) approach with all engines operating using the appropriate flight guidance, autopilots and control systems installed on the aircraft, including HUD/HUDLS or equivalent display systems, down to the appropriate DH followed by a missed approach, all without external visual reference;
  - (E) where appropriate, approaches using autopilot to provide automatic flare, hover, landing and roll-out; and
  - (F) where appropriate, approaches using approved HUD/HUDLS or equivalent display system to touchdown.
  
- (iii) Phase two (low-visibility approach operations with aircraft and equipment failures and degradations) — objectives
  - (A) understand the effect of known aircraft unserviceability including use of the MEL;
  - (B) understand the effect of failed or downgraded equipment on aerodrome operating minima;
  - (C) understand the actions required in response to failures and changes in the status of automatic flight control/guidance systems including HUD/HUDLS or equivalent display systems;
  - (D) understand the actions required in response to failures above and below alert height, if applicable;
  - (E) practise abnormal operations and incapacitation procedures; and

- (F) become proficient at dealing with failures and abnormal situations during low-visibility approach operations.
  - (iv) Phase two of the training should include the following exercises:
    - (A) approaches with engine failures at various stages of the approach;
    - (B) approaches with critical equipment failures, such as electrical systems, auto-flight systems, ground or airborne approach aids and status monitors;
    - (C) approaches where failures of auto-flight or flight guidance systems, including HUDLS or equivalent display systems, require either:
      - (a) reversion to manual control for landing or go-around; or
      - (b) reversion to manual control or a downgraded automatic mode control for go-around from the DH or below, including those which may result in contact with the runway.

This should include aircraft handling if, during a CAT III fail-passive approach, a fault causes autopilot to disconnect at or below the DH when the last reported RVR is 300 m or less;

    - (D) failures of systems that will result in excessive lateral or vertical deviation both above and below the DH in the minimum visual conditions for the operation;
    - (E) incapacitation procedures appropriate to low-visibility approach operations; and
    - (F) failures and procedures applicable to the specific aircraft type.
  - (v) FSTD training should include:
    - (A) for approaches flown using HUDLS or equivalent display systems, a minimum of eight approaches;
    - (B) otherwise, a minimum of six approaches.
  - (vi) For aircraft for which no FSTDs representing the specific aircraft are available, operators should ensure that the flight training phase specific to the visual scenarios of low-visibility approach operations is conducted in a specifically approved FSTD. Such training should include a minimum of four approaches. Thereafter, type-specific training should be conducted in the aircraft.
- (3) A check requiring the completion of at least the following exercises in an aircraft or FSTD
- (i) Low-visibility approaches in simulated instrument flight conditions down to the applicable DH, using the flight guidance system. Standard procedures of crew coordination (task sharing, call-out procedures, mutual surveillance, information exchange and support) should be observed. For CAT III operations, the operator should use an FSTD approved for this purpose;
  - (ii) Go-around after approaches as indicated in (2) at any point between 500 ft above ground level (AGL) and on reaching the DH; and
  - (iii) Landing(s) with visual reference established at the DH following an instrument approach. Depending on the specific flight guidance system, an automatic landing should be performed.
- (4) For operators for which LIFUS is required by Part-ORO, practice in approaches during LIFUS, as follows:
- (i) For low-visibility approach operations using a manual landing;

- (A) if a HUDLS or equivalent display system is used to touchdown, four landings, or if the training required by (a)(2) was conducted in an FSTD qualified for zero flight-time training (ZFTT), two landings;
    - (B) otherwise, three landings, or if the training required by (a)(2) was conducted in an FSTD qualified for ZFTT, one landing;
  - (ii) For low-visibility operations using autoland:
    - (A) if the training required by (a)(2) was conducted in an FSTD qualified for ZFTT, one landing, or none if the flight crew member successfully completed a type rating based on ZFTT;
    - (B) otherwise, two landings.
- (b) For flight crew members who have previous experience of low-visibility approach operations requiring an approval under this Subpart with a Brunei operator, when changing to an aircraft for which a new class or type rating is required, within the same operator:
  - (1) A course of ground training as specified in (a)(1), taking into account the flight crew member's existing knowledge of low-visibility approach operations.
  - (2) A course of FSTD and/or flight training, as specified in (a)(2) above. If the flight crew member's previous experience of low-visibility approach operations is on a type where the following were the same or similar:
    - (i) the technology used in the flight guidance and flight control system;
    - (ii) operating procedures;
    - (iii) handling characteristics; and
    - (iv) the use of HUD/HUDLS or equivalent display systems,then the flight crew member may complete an abbreviated course of FSTD and/or flight training.
  - (3) An abbreviated course should meet the objectives described in (a)(2), need not include the number of approaches required by (a)(2)(v), but should include at least the following number of landings:
    - (i) if a HUDLS or an equivalent display system is utilised to touchdown, then four approaches including a landing at the lowest approved RVR and a go-around; or
    - (ii) otherwise, two approaches including a landing at the lowest approved RVR and a go-around.
- (c) For flight crew members who have previous experience of low-visibility approach operations requiring an approval under this Subpart with an EU operator, when joining another operator:
  - (1) A course of ground training as specified in (a)(1), taking into account the flight crew member's existing knowledge of low-visibility approach operations.
  - (2) A course of FSTD and/or flight training as specified in (a)(2) above. If the flight crew member's previous experience of low-visibility approach operations is on the same aircraft type and variant, or on a different type or variant where the following were the same or similar:
    - (i) the technology used in the flight guidance and flight control system;
    - (ii) operating procedures;
    - (iii) handling characteristics; and

- (iv) the use of HUD/HUDLS or equivalent display systems,

then the flight crew member may complete an abbreviated course of FSTD and/or flight training. Such an abbreviated course should meet the objectives described in (a)(2), need not include the number of approaches required by (a)(2)(v), but should include at least the following number of landings:

- (A) if a HUDLS or an equivalent display system is utilised to touchdown, then four approaches including a landing at the lowest approved RVR and a go-around; or

- (B) otherwise, two approaches including a landing at the lowest approved RVR and a go-around.

- (3) Practice in approaches during LIFUS as required by (a)(3) above unless the flight crew member's previous experience of low-visibility approach operations is on the same aircraft type and variant.

### **AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence**

#### **INITIAL TRAINING AND CHECKING FOR EFVS OPERATIONS**

Operators should ensure that flight crew members complete the following training and checking before being authorised to conduct EFVS operations unless credits related to training and checking for previous experience on similar aircraft types are defined in the operational suitability data established in accordance with BAR 8:

- (a) For flight crew members who do not have previous experience of EFVS operations requiring an approval under this Subpart with an EU operator:
  - (1) A course of ground training including at least the following:
    - (i) characteristics and limitations of HUDs/HUDLSs or equivalent display systems including information presentation and symbology;
    - (ii) EFVS sensor performance, sensor limitations, scene interpretation, visual anomalies and other visual effects;
    - (iii) EFVS display, control, modes, features, symbology, annunciations and associated systems and components;
    - (iv) the interpretation of EFVS imagery;
    - (v) the interpretation of approach and runway lighting systems and display characteristics when using EFVS;
    - (vi) weather associated with low-visibility conditions and its effect on EFVS performance;
    - (vii) pre-flight planning and selection of suitable aerodromes and approach procedures;
    - (viii) principles of obstacle clearance requirements;
    - (ix) the use and limitations of RVR assessment systems;
    - (x) normal, abnormal and emergency procedures for EFVS operations;
    - (xi) the effect of specific aircraft/system malfunctions;
    - (xii) procedures to be followed and precautions to be taken with regard to surface movement during operations when the RVR is 400 m or less;
    - (xiii) for EFVS-L, the effect of the pre-threshold terrain and LSAA on airborne landing systems;
    - (xiv) human factors aspects of EFVS operations;

- (xv) qualification requirements for pilots to obtain and retain approval for EFVS operations; and
  - (xvi) the significance of LVPs or equivalent procedures when operating below RVR 550 m.
- (2) A course of FSTD training and/or flight training in two phases as follows:
- (i) Phase one (EFVS operations with aircraft and all equipment serviceable) — objectives:
    - (A) understand the operation of equipment required for EFVS operations;
    - (B) understand operating limitations of the installed EFVS;
    - (C) practise the use of HUD/HUDLS or equivalent display systems;
    - (D) practise the set-up and adjustment of EFVS equipment in different conditions (e.g. day and night);
    - (E) practise the monitoring of automatic flight control systems, EFVS information and status annunciators;
    - (F) practise the interpretation of EFVS imagery;
    - (G) become familiar with the features needed on the EFVS image to continue approach below the DH;
    - (H) practise the identification of visual references using natural vision while using EFVS equipment;
    - (I) master the manual aircraft handling relevant to EFVS operations including, where appropriate, the use of the flare cue and guidance for landing;
    - (J) practise coordination with other crew members; and
    - (K) become proficient at procedures for EFVS operations.
  - (ii) Phase one of the training should include the following exercises:
    - (A) the required checks for satisfactory functioning of equipment, both on the ground and in flight;
    - (B) the use of HUD/HUDLS or equivalent display systems during all phases of flight;
    - (C) approach using the EFVSs installed on the aircraft to the appropriate DH and transition to visual flight and landing;
    - (D) approach with all engines operating using the EFVS, down to the appropriate DH followed by a missed approach, all without external visual reference;
    - (E) where appropriate, approaches using approved EFVS to touchdown.
  - (iii) Phase two (EFVS operations with aircraft and equipment failures and degradations) — objectives:
    - (A) understand the effect of known aircraft unserviceabilities including use of the MEL;
    - (B) understand the effect of failed or downgraded equipment on aerodrome operating minima;
    - (C) understand the actions required in response to failures and changes in the status of the EFVS including HUD/HUDLS or equivalent display systems;
    - (D) understand the actions required in response to failures above and below the DH;
-



- (E) practise abnormal operations and incapacitation procedures; and
  - (F) become proficient at dealing with failures and abnormal situations during EFVS operations.
- (iv) Phase two of the training should include the following exercises:
- (A) approaches with engine failures at various stages of the approach;
  - (B) approaches with failures of the EFVS at various stages of the approach, including failures between the DH and the height below which an approach should not be continued if natural visual reference is not acquired, requiring either:
    - (a) reversion to head-down displays to control missed approach; or
    - (b) reversion to flight with no, or downgraded, guidance to control missed approaches from the DH or below, including those which may result in a touchdown on the runway;
    - (c) incapacitation procedures appropriate to EFVS operations; and
    - (d) failures and procedures applicable to the specific EFVS installation and aircraft type.
- (v) FSTD training should include a minimum of eight approaches.
- (vi) If a flight crew member is to be authorised to operate as pilot flying and pilot monitoring during EFVS operations, then the flight crew member should complete the required FSTD training for each operating capacity.
- (3) For operators for which LIFUS is required by Part-ORO, practice in approaches during LIFUS, as follows:
- (i) if EFVS is used to touchdown, four landings; or
  - (ii) otherwise, three landings.
- (b) For flight crew members who have previous experience of EFVS operations requiring an approval under this Subpart with an EU operator, when changing to an aircraft for which a new class or type rating is required, with the same operator:
- (1) A course of ground training as specified in (a)(1), taking into account the flight crew member's existing knowledge of low-visibility approach operations.
  - (2) The course of FSTD and/or flight training required by (a)(2) above. If the flight crew member's previous experience of low-visibility approach operations is on a type where the following were the same or similar:
    - (i) the technology used in the EFVS sensor, flight guidance and flight control system;
    - (ii) operating procedures; and
    - (iii) handling characteristics,
- then the flight crew member may complete an abbreviated course of FSTD and/or flight training. Such an abbreviated course should meet the objectives described in (a)(2), need not include the number of approaches required by (a)(2)(v), but should include at least the following number of landings:
- (i) for EFVS to touchdown, four approaches including a landing at the lowest approved RVR and a go-around, or
  - (ii) otherwise, two approaches including a landing at the lowest approved RVR and a go-around.

- (c) For flight crew members who have previous experience of EFVS operations requiring an approval under this Subpart with an EU operator, when joining another operator:
- (1) A course of ground training as specified in (a)(1), taking into account the flight crew member's existing knowledge of low-visibility approach operations.
  - (2) The course of FSTD and/or flight training required by (a)(2) above. If the flight crew member's previous experience of EFVS operations is on the same aircraft type and variant with the same EFVS or on a different type or different EFVS where the following were the same or similar:
    - (i) the technology used in the EFVS sensor, flight guidance and flight control system;
    - (ii) operating procedures; and
    - (iii) handling characteristics,then the flight crew member may complete an abbreviated course of FSTD and/or flight training.
  - (3) Such an abbreviated course should meet the objectives described in (a)(2), need not include the number of approaches required by (a)(2)(v), but should include at least the following number of landings:
    - (i) for EFVS to touchdown, four approaches including a landing at the lowest approved RVR and a go-around, or
    - (ii) otherwise, two approaches including a landing at the lowest approved RVR and a go-around.
  - (4) Practice in approaches during LIFUS as required by (a)(3) above unless the flight crew member's previous experience of low-visibility approach operations is on the same aircraft type and variant.

#### **AMC4 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence**

##### **RECURRENT CHECKING FOR LVTO, SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II AND CAT III APPROACH OPERATIONS**

- (a) The operator should ensure that the pilots' competence to perform LVOs for which they are authorised is checked by completing at least the following exercises:
- (1) One or more low-visibility rejected take-off at minimum approved RVR at least once over the period between two operator proficiency checks or once at every periodic demonstration of competence.
  - (2) Pilots authorised for LVTO operations in an RVR of less than 150 m should additionally conduct at least one LVTO in the minimum approved visibility at each required operator proficiency check or periodic demonstration of competence or, for an ATQP operator, at each required operator proficiency check or alternatively at each required LOE.
  - (3) One or more low-visibility approaches in simulated instrument flight conditions down to a point between 500 ft AGL and the threshold (e.g applicable DH), followed by go-around, at each required operator proficiency check or periodic demonstration of competence; and
  - (4) One or more low-visibility approach and landings with visual reference established at the DH at each required operator proficiency check or periodic demonstration of competence.
- (b) Pilots authorised to conduct CAT III operations on aircraft with a fail-passive autoland system, or HUDLS or equivalent, should complete a missed approach at least once over the period of three consecutive operator proficiency checks or demonstrations of competence as the result of an equipment failure at or below the DH when the last reported RVR was less than 300 m. For ATQP operators, pilots authorised to conduct CAT III operations on aircraft with a fail-passive autoland system, or HUDLS or equivalent, should complete a missed approach at least once every two OPCs or LOE (a period of about 2 years).
- (c) CAT III approach operations should be conducted in an FSTD. Other exercises may be conducted in an FSTD or aircraft.

### **AMC5 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence**

#### **DIFFERENCES TRAINING FOR LVTO, SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II AND CAT III APPROACH OPERATIONS**

- (a) The operator should ensure that the flight crew members are provided with differences training or familiarisation whenever they are required to conduct low-visibility approach operations or operations with operational credits requiring an approval under this Subpart for which they are not already authorised, or whenever there is a change to any of the following:
- (1) the technology used in the flight guidance and flight control system;
  - (2) the operating procedures including:
    - (i) fail-passive/fail-operational;
    - (ii) alert height;
    - (iii) manual landing or automatic landing;
    - (iv) operations with DH or no DH operations;
  - (3) the handling characteristics;
  - (4) the use of HUD/HUDLS or equivalent display systems;
  - (5) the use of EFVS.
- (b) The differences training should:
- (1) meet the objectives of the appropriate initial training course;
  - (2) take into account the flight crew members' previous experience; and
  - (3) take into account the operational suitability data established in accordance with BAR 8.

### **AMC6 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence**

#### **RECURRENT CHECKING FOR EFVS OPERATIONS**

- (a) The operator should ensure that the pilots' competence to perform EFVS operations is checked at each required demonstration of competence or operator proficiency check by performing at least two approaches of which one should be flown without natural vision, to the height below which an approach should not be continued if natural visual reference is not acquired.
- (b) If a flight crew member is authorised to operate as pilot flying and pilot monitoring during EFVS operations, then the flight crew member should complete the required number of approaches in each operating capacity.

### **AMC7 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence**

- (a) The operator should ensure that the flight crew members authorised to conduct EFVS operations are provided with differences training or familiarisation whenever there is a change to any of the following:
- (1) the technology used in the EFVS sensor, flight guidance and flight control system;
  - (2) the operating procedures;
  - (3) the handling characteristics
- (b) The differences training should:

- (1) meet the objectives of the appropriate initial training course;
- (2) take into account the flight crew members' previous experience; and
- (3) take into account the operational suitability data established in accordance with BAR 8

### GM1 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence

#### FLIGHT CREW TRAINING

- (a) The number of approaches referred to in AMC2, AMC3, AMC4 and AMC6 to SPA.LVO.120(b) represents the minimum number of approaches that the flight crew members should conduct during initial and recurrent training and checking. More approaches or other training exercises may be required in order to ensure that flight crew members achieve the required proficiency.
- (b) Where flight crew members are to be authorised to conduct more than one kind of LVOs including operations with operational credits for which the technology and operating procedures are similar, there is no requirement to increase the number of approaches in initial training if the training programme ensures that the flight crew members are competent for all operations for which they will be authorised. Where flight crew members are to be authorised to conduct more than one kind of LVOs including operations with operational credits using different technology or operating procedures, then the required minimum number of approaches should be completed for each different technology or operating procedure.
- (c) Where flight crew members are authorised to conduct more than one kind of LVOs including operations with operational credits for which the technology and operating procedures are similar, then there is no requirement to increase the number of approaches flown during recurrent checking. However, where flight crew members are authorised to conduct more than one kind of LVOs including operations with operational credits using different technology or operating procedures, then the required number of approaches should be completed for each different technology or operating procedure.
- (d) Flight crew members are required to complete initial and recurrent FSTD training for each operating capacity for which they will be authorised (e.g. as pilot flying and/or pilot monitoring). A pilot who will be authorised to operate in either capacity will need to complete the minimum number of approaches in each capacity.
- (e) Approaches conducted in a suitably qualified FSTD and/or during a proficiency check or demonstration of competence may be counted towards the recent experience requirements. If a flight crew member has not complied with the recent experience requirements of AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(a) or AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(a), the required approaches may be conducted during recurrent training, an operator proficiency check or a periodic check of competence either in an aircraft or on an FSTD.
- (f) Table 1 presents a summary of initial training requirements for LVOs and operations with operational credits.
- (g) Table 2 presents a summary of recent experience and recurrent training/checking requirements for LVOs and operations with operational credits.

**Table 1**  
**Summary of initial training requirements for LVOs and operations with operational credits**

Approval	Airborne equipment	Previous experience	Reference	Practical (FSTD) training <sup>4</sup>	LIFUS (if required) <sup>4</sup>
CAT II	Auto coupled to below DH with manual landing	None	AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (a)(2)(v)	As required but not less than 6 approaches	3 landings or 1 landing <sup>1</sup>
		Previously qualified with the same operator, similar operations <sup>3</sup>	AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (b)(2)(ii)	2 approaches	None
		Previously qualified with a different EU operator, same type and variant	AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (c)(2)	2 approaches	None

		Previously qualified with a different EU operator, similar operations <sup>3</sup>	AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (c)(2)	2 approaches	3 landings or 1 landing <sup>1</sup>
SA CAT I CAT II SA CAT II CAT III	Autoland	None	AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (c)(2)	As required but not less than 6 approaches	2 landings or 1 landing <sup>1</sup> or no landings <sup>2</sup>
		Previously qualified with the same operator, similar operations <sup>3</sup>	AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (b)(3)(ii)	2 approaches	None
		Previously qualified with a different EU operator, same type and variant	AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (c)(2)	2 approaches	None
		Previously qualified with a different EU operator, similar operations <sup>3</sup>	AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (c)(2)	2 approaches	2 landings or 1 landing <sup>1</sup> or no landings <sup>2</sup>
CAT II SA CAT II CAT III	HUDLS / manual landing	None	AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (a)(2)(v)	As required but not less than 8 approaches	4 landings or 2 landings <sup>1</sup>
		Previously qualified with the same operator, similar operations <sup>3</sup>	AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (b)(3)(i)	4 approaches	None
		Previously qualified with a different EU operator, same type and variant	AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (c)(2)	4 approaches	None
		Previously qualified with a different EU operator, similar operations <sup>3</sup>	AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (c)(2)	4 approaches	4 landings or 2 landings <sup>1</sup>
SA CAT II CAT II SA CAT II CAT III	HUDLS / automatic landing	None	AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (a)(4)	As required but not less than 8 approaches	2 landings or 1 landing <sup>1</sup> or no landings <sup>2</sup>
		Previously qualified with the same operator, similar operations <sup>3</sup>	AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (b)(3)	4 approaches	None
		Previously qualified with a different EU operator, same type and variant	AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (b)(3)	4 approaches	None
		Previously qualified with a different EU operator, similar operations <sup>3</sup>	AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (c)(2)	4 approaches	2 landings or 1 landing <sup>1</sup> or no landings <sup>2</sup>
EFVS-A	EFVS with HUD / HUDLS	None	AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (a)(2)	As required but not less than 8 approaches	3 landings
		Previously qualified with the same operator, similar operations <sup>3</sup>	AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (b)(3)	2 approaches	None
		Previously qualified with a different EU operator, same type and variant	AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (c)(2)	2 approaches	None

		Previously qualified with a different EU operator, similar operations <sup>3</sup>	AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (c)(2)	2 approaches	3 landings
EFVS - L	EFVS with HUD/HUDLS	None	AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (a)(2)	As required but not less than 8 approaches	4 landings
		Previously qualified with the same operator, similar operations <sup>3</sup>	AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (b)(3)	4 approaches	None
		Previously qualified with a different EU operator, same type and variant	AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (c)(2)	4 approaches	None
		Previously qualified with a different EU operator, similar operations <sup>3</sup>	AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (c)(2)	4 approaches	4 landings

Notes:

- 1: Fewer landings during LIF S are required if a level 'D' FSTD is used for conversion training.
- 2: No landings are required if a candidate has completed the zero flight-time (ZFT) type rating.
- 3: 'Similar operations' implies that the level of technology, operating procedures, handling characteristics and HUD/HUDLS or equivalent display systems are the same or similar.
- 4: 'operational suitability data established in accordance with BAR 8 may define credits'

**Table 2**

**Summary of recent experience and recurrent training/checking requirements for LVOs and operations with operational credits**

LVO / operational credit	Airborne equipment	Recent experience 1, 2	Reference	Recurrent training / checking	Reference
LVTO	-	-	-	1 rejected take-off and 1 LVTO at minimum RVR1	AMC4 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (a)(1), (a)(2)
CAT II	Auto coupled below DH with manual landing	2 or more approaches <sup>4</sup>	AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(a) points (a) and (b)	AMC4 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (a)(1), (a)(2)	AMC4 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (a)(2), (a)(3)
SA CAT II	Autoland				
CAT II SA CAT II CAT III					
CAT II / III SA CAT I	HUDLS/manual landing	2 or 4 approaches		2 approaches including a landing	

SA CAT II			AMC3 SPA.LVO.120(a) point (c)		AMC4 SPA.LVO.120(b) point (b)
CAT II / III SA CAT I SA CAT II	HUDLS/ automatic landing				
Approach using EFVS	(HUD/HUDLS)	2 or 4 approaches	AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(a)	2 approaches <sup>3</sup>	AMC6 SPA.LVO.120(b)

Notes:

1: LVTO only required if the minimum approved RVR is less than 150m.

2: If a flight crew member is authorised to operate as pilot flying and pilot monitoring, then the flight crew member should complete the required number of approaches in each operating capacity.

3: One approach to be flown without natural vision, to the height below which an approach should not be continued if natural visual reference is not acquired.

4: ‘operational suitability data established in accordance with BAR 8 may define credits’

### GM2 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence

#### RECURRENT TRAINING AND CHECKING FOR EFVS OPERATIONS

In order to provide the opportunity to practise decision-making in the event of system failures and failure to acquire natural visual reference, the recurrent training and checking for EFVS operations is recommended to periodically include different combinations of equipment failures, go-around due to loss of visual reference and landings.

### GM3 SPA.LVO.120(b) Flight crew competence

#### INITIAL TRAINING AND CHECKING FOR SA CAT I, CAT II, SA CAT II AND CAT III APPROACH OPERATIONS

The ground training referred to in points (a)(1)(i) and (iv) of AMC2 SPA.LVO.120(b) may include:

- (a) airborne and ground equipment:
  - (1) technical requirements;
  - (2) operational requirements;
  - (3) operational reliability;
  - (4) fail-operational;
  - (5) fail-passive;
  - (6) equipment reliability;
  - (7) operating procedures;
  - (8) preparatory measures;
  - (9) operational downgrading; and
  - (10) communications; and
- (b) procedures and limitations:

- (1) operating procedures; and
- (2) crew coordination.



## Subpart F - Extended Range Operations with Two-Engined Aeroplanes (ETOPS)

### GM1 SPA.ETOPS.105 ETOPS operational approval

#### AMC 20-6

EASA Document AMC 20-6 provides further criteria for the operational approval of ETOPS.

## Subpart G - Transport of Dangerous Goods

### AMC1 SPA.DG.105(a) Approval to transport dangerous goods

#### TRAINING PROGRAMME

- (a) The operator should indicate for the approval of the training programme how the training will be carried out. For formal training courses, the course objectives, the training programme syllabus/curricula and examples of the written examination to be undertaken should be included.
- (b) Instructors should have knowledge of training techniques as well as in the field of transport of dangerous goods by air so that the subject is covered fully and questions can be adequately answered.
- (c) Training intended to give general information and guidance may be by any means including handouts, leaflets, circulars, slide presentations, videos, computer-based training, etc., and may take place on-the-job or off-the-job. The person being trained should receive an overall awareness of the subject. This training should include a written, oral or computer-based examination covering all areas of the training programme, showing that a required minimum level of knowledge has been acquired.
- (d) Training intended to give an in-depth and detailed appreciation of the whole subject or particular aspects of it should be by formal training courses, which should include a written examination, the successful passing of which will result in the issue of the proof of qualification. The course may be by means of tuition, as a self-study programme, or a mixture of both. The person being trained should gain sufficient knowledge so as to be able to apply the detailed rules of the Technical Instructions.
- (e) Training in emergency procedures should include as a minimum:
  - (1) for personnel other than crew members:
    - (i) dealing with damaged or leaking packages; and
    - (ii) other actions in the event of ground emergencies arising from dangerous goods;
  - (2) for flight crew members:
    - (i) actions in the event of emergencies in flight occurring in the passenger compartment or in the cargo compartments; and
    - (ii) the notification to ATS should an in-flight emergency occur;
  - (3) for crew members other than flight crew members:
    - (i) dealing with incidents arising from dangerous goods carried by passengers; or
    - (ii) dealing with damaged or leaking packages in flight.
- (f) Training should be conducted at intervals of no longer than 2 years. If the recurrent training is undertaken within the last 3 calendar months of the validity period, the new validity period should be counted from the original expiry date.

### AMC1 SPA.DG.105(b) Approval to transport dangerous goods

#### PROVISION OF INFORMATION IN THE EVENT OF AN IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCY

If an in-flight emergency occurs the pilot-in-command/commander should, as soon as the situation permits, inform the appropriate ATS unit of any dangerous goods carried as cargo on board the aircraft, as specified in the Technical Instructions.

### GM1 SPA.DG.105(b)(6) Approval to transport dangerous goods

#### PERSONNEL

Personnel include all persons involved in the transport of dangerous goods, whether they are employees of the operator or not.

### AMC1 SPA.DG.110(a) Dangerous goods information and documentation

#### INFORMATION TO THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND/COMMANDER

If the volume of information provided to the pilot-in-command/commander by the operator is such that it would be impracticable to transmit it in the event of an in-flight emergency, an additional summary of the information should also be provided, containing at least the quantities and class or division of the dangerous goods in each cargo compartment.

## **AMC1 SPA.DG.110(b) Dangerous goods information and documentation**

### **ACCEPTANCE OF DANGEROUS GOODS**

- (a) The operator should not accept dangerous goods unless:
  - (1) the package, overpack or freight container has been inspected in accordance with the acceptance procedures in the Technical Instructions;
  - (2) they are accompanied by two copies of a dangerous goods transport document or the information applicable to the consignment is provided in electronic form, except when otherwise specified in the Technical Instructions; and
  - (3) the English language is used for:
    - (i) package marking and labelling; and
    - (ii) the dangerous goods transport document,in addition to any other language provision.
- (b) The operator or his/her handling agent should use an acceptance checklist which allows for:
  - (1) all relevant details to be checked; and
  - (2) the recording of the results of the acceptance check by manual, mechanical or computerised means.

## Subpart H - Helicopter Operations with Night Vision Imaging Systems

### AMC1 SPA.NVIS.110(b) Equipment requirements for NVIS operations

#### RADIO ALTIMETER

- (a) The radio altimeter should:
  - (1) be of an analogue type display presentation that requires minimal interpretation for both an instantaneous impression of absolute height and rate of change of height;
  - (2) be positioned to be instantly visible and discernible from each cockpit crew station;
  - (3) have an integral audio and visual low height warning that operates at a height selectable by the pilot; and
  - (4) provide unambiguous warning to the crew of radio altimeter failure.
- (b) The visual warning should provide:
  - (1) clear visual warning at each cockpit crew station of height below the pilot-selectable height; and
  - (2) adequate attention-getting-capability for typical NVIS operations.
- (c) The audio warning should:
  - (1) be unambiguous and readily cancellable;
  - (2) not extinguish any visual low height warnings when cancelled; and
  - (3) operate at the same pilot-selectable height as the visual warning.

### GM1 SPA.NVIS.110(b) Equipment requirements for NVIS operations

#### RADIO ALTIMETER

An analogue type display presentation may be, for example, a representation of a dial, ribbon or bar, but not a display that provides numbers only. An analogue type display may be embedded into an electronic flight instrumentation system (EFIS).

### GM1 SPA.NVIS.110(f) Equipment requirements for NVIS operations

#### MODIFICATION OR MAINTENANCE TO THE HELICOPTER

It is important that the operator reviews and considers all modifications or maintenance to the helicopter with regard to the NVIS airworthiness approval. Special emphasis needs to be paid to modification and maintenance of equipment such as light emitting or reflecting devices, transparencies and avionics equipment, as the function of this equipment may interfere with the NVGs.

### AMC1 SPA.NVIS.120 NVIS operating minima

#### NVIS OPERATIONS UNDER IFR

- (a) Any limitation in the rotorcraft flight manual should be complied with.
- (b) Night-vision goggles may be used in a flipped-down position during a flight under IFR:
  - (1) under VMC;
  - (2) under IMC:
    - (i) in preparation of the visual segment of an instrument approach or a visual approach;
    - (ii) during the visual segment of an instrument approach or departure;
    - (iii) during a visual approach;

- (iv) in preparation of a transition to VFR.
- (c) The pilot-in-command/commander should not proceed on a visual segment of an IFR flight unless the visual cues required for the visual segment are visible using unaided vision.
- (d) The pilot-in-command/commander should not proceed VFR unless the VFR weather minima are assessed without using unaided vision.

### **GM1 SPA.NVIS.120 NVIS operating minima**

#### **NVIS OPERATIONS UNDER IFR**

The use of night-vision goggles in a flipped-down position does not prevent the use of unaided vision, by looking out below the goggles or to the sides.

### **GM1 SPA.NVIS.130(e) Crew requirements for NVIS operations**

#### **UNDERLYING ACTIVITY**

Examples of an underlying activity are:

- (a) commercial air transport;
- (b) helicopter emergency medical service (HEMS); and
- (c) helicopter hoist operation (HHO).

### **GM1 SPA.NVIS.130(e) Crew requirements for NVIS operations**

#### **OPERATIONAL APPROVAL**

- (a) When determining the composition of the minimum crew, the Brunei DCA should take account of the type of operation that is to be conducted. The minimum crew should be part of the operational approval.
- (b) If the operational use of NVIS is limited to the en-route phase of a commercial air transport flight, a single-pilot operation may be approved.
- (c) Where operations to/from a HEMS operating site are to be conducted, a crew of at least one pilot and one NVIS technical crew member would be necessary (this may be the suitably qualified HEMS technical crew member).
- (d) A similar assessment may be made for night HHO, when operating to unprepared sites.

### **AMC1 SPA.NVIS.130(f) Crew requirements for NVIS operations**

#### **CHECKING OF NVIS CREW MEMBERS**

- (a) The operator proficiency check and line check required in SPA.NVIS.130(f) should have a validity of 12 calendar months. The validity period should be counted from the end of the month when the training was taken. When the check is undertaken within the last 3 months of the validity period, the new validity period should be counted from the previous expiry date.
- (b) These checks may be combined with those checks required for the underlying activity.

### **AMC2 SPA.NVIS.130(f) Crew requirements for NVIS operations**

#### **CREW TRAINING AND CHECKING — NVIS OPERATIONS UNDER IFR**

- (a) The minimum crew should be two pilots, or one pilot and one NVIS technical crew member.
- (b) The crew training and experience should ensure:
  - (1) efficient scanning of the instruments with the night-vision goggles (NVGs) flipped up or down as defined in the standard operating procedures (SOPs);
  - (2) proficiency during the transition phase;

- (3) proficient use of the NVGs on the visual segments of the flight during which they are expected to be used;
  - (4) the continuity of a crew concept.
- (c) A crew member that is involved in NVIS operations under IFR should undergo initial and recurrent training using a suitable FSTD as part of the normal crew complement. The training should cover at least the following items under a variety of weather conditions and cultural lighting:
- (1) transition from instrument to visual flight during the final approach;
  - (2) transition from visual to instrument flight on departure.
- (d) In addition to (b) and (c), a technical crew member that is involved in NVIS operations under IFR should be trained to perform navigation and monitoring functions under IFR, as described under AMC3 SPA.NVIS.130(f). The training should include all of the following on the given helicopter type:
- (1) initial and recurrent general training;
  - (2) initial and recurrent monitoring training;
  - (3) initial and recurrent navigation training;
  - (4) initial and recurrent aircraft/FSTD training focusing on crew cooperation with the pilot;
  - (5) LIFUS.
- (e) An FSTD suitable for the NVIS training described in (c) should meet all of the following criteria:
- (1) be a helicopter FSTD;
  - (2) have a NVIS-compatible cockpit;
  - (3) have a night visual system that can be representative of different moon phases and allows external visual cues to be adjusted to the point where they are no longer visible without NVGs and remain visible with NVGs, when simulating night conditions;
  - (4) The night visual system should be able to support atmospheric conditions such as:
    - (i) more than one cloud layer or one cloud layer with a geographically variable cloud base;
    - (ii) variable visibility; and
    - (iii) snow, light rain and heavy rain with and without NVGs;
  - (5) be of a helicopter type on which the crew member is current unless the crew member receives additional training for the use of the FSTD.
- (f) The person conducting the training defined in (c) above should be a NVIS instructor and should hold an instrument rating in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011.
- (g) The training should have a validity of 12 calendar months. The validity period should be counted from the end of the month when the training was taken. When the training is undertaken within the last 3 months of the validity period, the new validity period should be counted from the previous expiry date.
- (h) The flight crew operator proficiency check should include one transition from instrument to visual flight during the final approach, using NVIS. This manoeuvre may be combined with a 2D or 3D approach to minima.
- (i) NVIS operations under IFR on more than one type or variant with different levels of automation
- (1) The crew member should be provided with differences training or familiarisation.

- (2) The flight crew member should perform the manoeuvre defined in (h) each time on a different type or variant.

### **AMC3 SPA.NVIS.130(f) Crew requirements for NVIS operations**

#### **CREW TRAINING AND CHECKING — TECHNICAL CREW MEMBER TRAINING FOR OPERATIONS UNDER IFR — INITIAL AND RECURRENT GENERAL TRAINING AND CHECKING**

- (a) The technical crew member initial and recurrent training and checking syllabus should include the following items:
- (1) duties in the technical crew member role;
  - (2) map reading, including:
    - (i) ability to keep track with helicopter position on map;
    - (ii) ability to detect conflicting terrain/obstacles on a given route, and at a given altitude;
    - (iii) use of moving maps, as required;
  - (3) basic understanding of the helicopter type in terms of location and design of normal and emergency systems and equipment, including all helicopter lights and operation of doors, and including knowledge of helicopter systems and understanding of the terminology used in checklists;
  - (4) the dangers of rotor-running helicopters;
  - (5) outside lookout during the flight;
  - (6) crew coordination with in-flight call-outs, with emphasis on crew coordination regarding the tasks of the technical crew member, including checklist initiation, interruptions and termination;
  - (7) warnings, and use of normal, abnormal and emergency checklists assisting the pilot as required;
  - (8) the use of the helicopter intercommunications system;
  - (9) basic helicopter performance principles, including the definitions of Category A certification, performance class 1 and performance class 2;
  - (10) operational control and supervision;
  - (11) meteorology;
  - (12) applicable parts of SERA, including instrument flight rules (IFR), as relevant to the tasks of the technical crew member;
  - (13) mission planning;
  - (14) early identification of pilot incapacitation;
  - (15) debriefing; and
  - (16) PBN, as necessary.

#### **INITIAL AND RECURRENT NAVIGATION TRAINING AND CHECKING**

- (b) The initial and recurrent navigation training and checking syllabus should include the following items:
- (1) aeronautical map reading (additional training to (a)(4) above), navigation principles;
  - (2) navigation aid principles and use;

- (3) crew coordination with in-flight call-outs, with emphasis on navigation issues;
- (4) applicable parts of SERA; and
- (5) airspace, restricted areas, and noise-abatement procedures.

#### **INITIAL AND RECURRENT MONITORING TRAINING AND CHECKING**

- (c) The initial and recurrent monitoring training and checking syllabus should include the following items:
- (1) basic understanding of the helicopter type, including knowledge of any limitations to the parameters the crew member is tasked to monitor, and knowledge of the basic principles of flight;
  - (2) instrument reading;
  - (3) inside monitoring during the flight;
    - (i) aircraft state/cockpit cross-check;
    - (ii) automation philosophy and autopilot status monitoring, as relevant;
    - (iii) FMS, as relevant;
  - (4) crew coordination with in-flight call-outs, with emphasis on call-outs and actions resulting from the monitoring process; and  
flight path monitoring.

#### **INITIAL AIRCRAFT/FSTD TRAINING**

- (d) The technical crew member training syllabus should include aircraft/FSTD training focusing on crew cooperation with the pilot.
- (1) The initial training should include at least 4 hours instruction dedicated to crew cooperation unless:
    - (i) the technical crew member has undergone this training under another operator; or
    - (ii) the technical crew member has performed at least 50 missions in assisting the pilot from the front seat as a technical crew member.
  - (2) The training described in (1) should be organised with a crew composition of one pilot and one technical crew member.
  - (3) The training described in (1) should be supervised by a pilot with a minimum experience of 500 hours in either multi-pilot operations or single-pilot operations with a technical crew member assisting from the front seat, or a combination of these.
  - (4) The training may be combined with the LIFUS.

#### **LINE FLYING UNDER SUPERVISION (LIFUS)**

- (e) LIFUS
- (1) LIFUS should take place during the operator's conversion course.
  - (2) Line flights under supervision provide the opportunity for a technical crew member to practise the procedures and techniques he or she should be familiar with, regarding ground and flight operations, including any elements that are specific to a particular helicopter type. Upon completion of the LIFUS, the technical crew member should be able to safely conduct the flight operational duties assigned to him or her according to the procedures laid down in the operator's operations manual.



- (3) LIFUS should be conducted by a suitably qualified technical crew member or commander nominated by the operator.
- (4) LIFUS should include a minimum of five sectors under IFR.

#### **RECURRENT AIRCRAFT/FSTD TRAINING**

(f) Recurrent helicopter/FSTD training

- (1) The recurrent training should focus on crew cooperation and contain a minimum of 2 hours of flight.
- (2) The training described in (1) should take place in the same conditions as the initial training in (d) above.

#### **AMC1 SPA.NVIS.130(f)(1) Crew requirements for NVIS operations**

#### **TRAINING AND CHECKING SYLLABUS**

- (a) The flight crew training syllabus should include the following items:
- (1) NVIS working principles, eye physiology, vision at night, limitations and techniques to overcome these limitations;
  - (2) preparation and testing of NVIS equipment;
  - (3) preparation of the helicopter for NVIS operations;
  - (4) normal and emergency procedures including all NVIS failure modes;
  - (5) maintenance of unaided night flying;
  - (6) crew coordination concept specific to NVIS operations;
  - (7) practice of the transition to and from NVG procedures;
  - (8) awareness of specific dangers relating to the operating environment; and
  - (9) risk analysis, mitigation and management.
- (b) The flight crew checking syllabus should include:
- (1) night proficiency checks, including emergency procedures to be used on NVIS operations; and
  - (2) line checks with special emphasis on the following:
    - (i) local area meteorology;
    - (ii) NVIS flight planning;
    - (iii) NVIS in-flight procedures;
    - (iv) transitions to and from night vision goggles (NVG);
    - (v) normal NVIS procedures; and
    - (vi) crew coordination specific to NVIS operations.
- (c) Whenever the crew is required to also consist of a NVIS technical crew member, he/she should be trained and checked in the following items:
- (1) NVIS working principles, eye physiology, vision at night, limitations, and techniques to overcome these limitations;
  - (2) duties in the NVIS role, with and without NVGs;
  - (3) the NVIS installation;
  - (4) operation and use of the NVIS equipment;
  - (5) preparing the helicopter and specialist equipment for NVIS operations;
  - (6) normal and emergency procedures;
  - (7) crew coordination concepts specific to NVIS operations;
  - (8) awareness of specific dangers relating to the operating environment; and
-

- (9) risk analysis, mitigation and management.

## GM1 SPA.NVIS.130(f) Crew requirements for NVIS operations

### TRAINING GUIDELINES AND CONSIDERATIONS

(a) Purpose

The purpose of this GM is to recommend the minimum training guidelines and any associated considerations necessary for the safe operation of a helicopter while operating with night vision imaging systems (NVISs).

To provide an appropriate level of safety, training procedures should accommodate the capabilities and limitations of the NVIS and associated systems as well as the restraints of the operational environment.

(b) Assumptions

The following assumptions were used in the creation of this material:

- (1) Most civilian operators may not have the benefit of formal NVIS training, similar to that offered by the military. Therefore, the stated considerations are predicated on that individual who has no prior knowledge of NVIS or how to use them in flight. The degree to which other applicants who have had previous formal training should be exempted from this training will be dependent on their prior NVIS experience.
- (2) While NVIS are principally an aid to flying under VFR at night, the two-dimensional nature of the NVG image necessitates frequent reference to the flight instruments for spatial and situational awareness information. The reduction of peripheral vision and increased reliance on focal vision exacerbates this requirement to monitor flight instruments. Therefore, any basic NVIS training syllabus should include some instruction on basic instrument flight.

(c) Two-tiered approach: basic and advanced training

To be effective, the NVIS training philosophy would be based on a two-tiered approach: basic and advanced NVIS training. The basic NVIS training would serve as the baseline standard for all individuals seeking a NVIS endorsement. The content of this initial training would not be dependent on any operational requirements. The training required for any individual pilot should take into account the previous NVIS flight experience. The advanced training would build on the basic training by focusing on developing specialised skills required to operate a helicopter during NVIS operations in a particular operational environment. Furthermore, while there is a need to stipulate minimum flight hour requirements for a NVIS endorsement, the training should also be event-based. This necessitates that operators be exposed to all of the relevant aspects, or events, of NVIS flight in addition to acquiring a minimum number of flight hours. NVIS training should include flight in a variety of actual ambient light and weather conditions.

(d) Training requirements

(1) Flight crew ground training

The ground training necessary to initially qualify a pilot to act as the pilot of a helicopter using NVGs should include at least the following subjects:

- (i) applicable aviation regulations that relate to NVIS limitations and flight operations;
- (ii) aero-medical factors relating to the use of NVGs to include how to protect night vision, how the eyes adapt to operate at night, self-imposed stresses that affect night vision, effects of lighting (internal and external) on night vision, cues utilized to estimate distance and depth perception at night, and visual illusions;
- (iii) NVG performance and scene interpretation;
- (iv) normal, abnormal, and emergency operations of NVGs; and
- (v) NVIS operations flight planning to include night terrain interpretation and factors affecting terrain interpretation.

The ground training should be the same for flight crew and crew members other than flight crew. An example of a ground training syllabus is presented in Table 1 of GM2 SPA.NVIS.130(f).

(2) Flight crew flight training

The flight training necessary to initially qualify a pilot to act as the pilot of a helicopter using NVGs may be performed in a helicopter or FSTD approved for the purpose, and should include at least the following subjects:

- (i) preparation and use of internal and external helicopter lighting systems for NVIS operations;
- (ii) pre-flight preparation of NVGs for NVIS operations;
- (iii) proper piloting techniques (during normal, abnormal, and emergency helicopter operations) when using NVGs during the take-off, climb, en-route, descent, and landing phases of flight that includes unaided flight and aided flight; and
- (iv) normal, abnormal, and emergency operations of the NVIS during flight.

Crew members other than flight crew should be involved in relevant parts of the flight training. An example of a flight training syllabus is presented in Table 1 of GM3 SPA.NVIS.130(f).

(3) Training crew members other than flight crew

Crew members other than flight crew (including the technical crew member) should be trained to operate around helicopters employing NVIS. These individuals should complete all phases of NVIS ground training that is given to flight crew. Due to the importance of crew coordination, it is imperative that all crew members are familiar with all aspects of NVIS flight. Furthermore, these crew members may have task qualifications specific to their position in the helicopter or areas of responsibility. To this end, they should demonstrate competency in those areas, both on the ground and in flight.

(4) Ground personnel training

Non-flying personnel who support NVIS operations should also receive adequate training in their areas of expertise. The purpose is to ensure, for example, that correct light discipline is used when helicopters are landing in a remote area.

(5) Instructor qualifications

A NVIS flight instructor should at least have the following licences and qualifications:

- (i) at least flight instructor (FI(H)) or type rating instructor (TRI(H)) with the applicable type rating on which NVIS training will be given; and
- (ii) logged at least 100 NVIS flights or 30 hours flight time under NVIS as pilot-in-command/commander.

(6) NVIS equipment minimum requirements (training)

While minimum equipment lists and standard NVIS equipment requirements may be stipulated elsewhere, the following procedures and minimum equipment requirements should also be considered:

- (i) NVIS: the following is recommended for minimum NVIS equipment and procedural requirements:
  - (A) back-up power supply;
  - (B) NVIS adjustment kit or eye lane;
  - (C) use of helmet with the appropriate NVG attachment; and
  - (D) both the instructor and student should wear the same NVG type, generation and model.
- (ii) Helicopter NVIS compatible lighting, flight instruments and equipment: given the limited peripheral vision cues and the need to enhance situational awareness, the following is recommended for minimum compatible lighting requirements:
  - (A) NVIS compatible instrument panel flood lighting that can illuminate all essential flight instruments;
  - (B) NVIS compatible hand-held utility lights;
  - (C) portable NVIS compatible flashlight;
  - (D) a means for removing or extinguishing internal NVIS non-compatible lights;
  - (E) NVIS pre-flight briefing/checklist (an example of a NVIS pre-flight briefing/checklist is in Table 1 of GM4-SPA.NVIS.130(f));
  - (F) training references;
  - (G) a number of training references are available, some of which are listed below:

- DO 295 US CONOPS civil operator training guidelines for integrated NVIS equipment
- United States Marine Corp MAWTS-1 Night Vision Device (NVD) Manual;
- U.S. Army Night Flight (TC 1-204);
- U.S. Army NVIS Operations, Exportable Training Package;
- U.S. Army TM 11-5855-263-10;
- Air Force TO 12S10-2AVS6-1;
- Navy NAVAIR 16-35AVS-7; and
- U.S. Border Patrol, Helicopter NVIS Ground and Flight Training Syllabus.

There may also be further documents available from other civil or military sources.

**GM2 SPA.NVIS.130(f) Crew requirements for NVIS operations**

**INSTRUCTION - GROUND TRAINING AREAS OF INSTRUCTION**

A detailed example of possible subjects to be instructed in a NVIS ground instruction is included below. (The exact details may not always be applicable, e.g. due to goggle configuration differences.)

**Table 1: Ground training areas of instruction**

Item	Subject Area	Subject Details	Recommended Time
1	General anatomy and characteristics of the eye	Anatomy: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overall structure of the eye</li> <li>• Cones</li> <li>• Rods</li> </ul> Visual deficiencies: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• myopia</li> <li>• hyperopia</li> <li>• astigmatism</li> <li>• presbyopia</li> </ul> Effects of light on night vision & NV protection physiology: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Light levels                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- illumination</li> <li>- luminance</li> <li>- reflectance</li> <li>- contrast</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Types of vision:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- photopic</li> <li>- mesopic</li> <li>- scotopic</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Day versus night vision</li> <li>• Dark adaptation process:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- dark adaptation</li> <li>- pre-adaptive state</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Purkinje shift</li> <li>• Ocular chromatic aberration</li> <li>• Photochromatic interval</li> </ul>	1 hour

Item	Subject Area	Subject Details	Recommended Time
2	Night vision human factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Night blind spot (as compared to day blind spot)</li> <li>• Field of view and peripheral vision</li> <li>• Distance estimation and depth perception:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- monocular cues</li> <li>- motion parallax</li> <li>- geometric perspective</li> <li>- size constancy</li> <li>- overlapping contours or interposition of objects</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Aerial perspective:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- variations in colour or shade</li> <li>- loss of detail or texture</li> <li>- position of light source</li> <li>- direction of shadows</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Binocular cues</li> <li>• Night vision techniques:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- off-centre vision</li> <li>- scanning</li> <li>- shapes and silhouettes</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	1 hour
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vestibular illusions</li> <li>• Somatogyral illusions:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- leans</li> <li>- graveyard spin</li> <li>- coriolis illusion</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Somatogravic illusions:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- oculographic illusions</li> <li>- elevator illusion</li> <li>- oculoagravic illusions</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Proprioceptive illusions</li> <li>• Dealing with spatial disorientation</li> <li>• Visual illusions:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- auto kinetic illusion</li> <li>- confusion with ground lights</li> <li>- relative motion</li> <li>- reversible perspective illusion</li> <li>- false vertical and horizontal cues</li> <li>- altered planes of reference</li> <li>- height /depth perception illusion</li> <li>- flicker vertigo</li> <li>- fascination (fixation)</li> <li>- structural illusions</li> <li>- size-distance illusion</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Helicopter design limitations:</li> </ul>	

Item	Subject Area	Subject Details	Recommended Time
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- windscreen condition</li> <li>- helicopter instrument design</li> <li>- helicopter structural obstruction</li> <li>- interior lights</li> <li>- exterior lights</li> <li>• Self-imposed stresses:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- drugs</li> <li>- exhaustion</li> <li>- alcohol</li> <li>- tobacco</li> <li>- hypoglycaemia</li> <li>- injuries</li> <li>- physical fitness</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Stress &amp; fatigue:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- acute vs. chronic</li> <li>- prevention</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Hypoxia issues and night vision</li> <li>• Weather/ environmental conditions:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- snow (white-out)</li> <li>- dust (brown-out)</li> <li>- haze</li> <li>- fog</li> <li>- rain</li> <li>- light level</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Astronomical lights (moon, star, northern lights)</li> <li>• Effects of cloud cover</li> </ul>	
3	NVIS general characteristics	Definitions and types of NVIS: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- light spectrum</li> <li>- types of NVIS</li> <li>• Thermal-imaging devices</li> <li>• Image-intensifier devices</li> <li>• Image-intensifier operational theory</li> <li>• Types of image intensifier systems:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- generation 1</li> <li>- generation 2</li> <li>- generation 3</li> <li>- generation 4</li> <li>- type I / II</li> <li>- class A &amp; B minus blue filter</li> </ul> </li> <li>• NVIS equipment               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- shipping and storage case</li> <li>- carrying case</li> <li>- binocular assembly</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	1 hour

Item	Subject Area	Subject Details	Recommended Time
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- lens caps</li> <li>- lens paper</li> <li>- operators manual</li> <li>- power pack (dual battery)</li> <li>- batteries</li> <li>• Characteristics of NVIS:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- light amplification</li> <li>- light intensification</li> <li>- frequency sensitivity</li> <li>- visual range acuity</li> <li>- unaided peripheral vision</li> <li>- weight</li> <li>- flip-up device</li> <li>- break-away feature</li> <li>- neck cord</li> <li>- maintenance issues</li> <li>- human factor issues</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Description and functions of NVIS components:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- helmet visor cover and extension strap</li> <li>- helmet NVIS mount and attachment points</li> <li>- different mount options for various helmets</li> <li>- lock release button</li> <li>- vertical adjustment knob</li> <li>- low battery indicator</li> <li>- binocular assembly</li> <li>- monocular tubes</li> <li>- fore and aft adjustment knob</li> <li>- eye span knob</li> <li>- tilt adjustment lever</li> <li>- objective focus rings</li> <li>- eyepiece focus rings</li> <li>- battery pack</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	
4	NVIS care & cleaning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Handling procedures</li> <li>• NVIS operating instructions:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- pre-mounting inspection</li> <li>- mounting procedures</li> <li>- focusing procedures</li> <li>- faults</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Post-flight procedures;</li> <li>• Deficiencies: type and recognition of faults:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- acceptable faults                   <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- black spots</li> <li>- chicken wire</li> <li>- fixed pattern noise (honeycomb effect)</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul>	1 hour

Item	Subject Area	Subject Details	Recommended Time
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- output brightness variation</li> <li>- bright spots</li> <li>- image disparity</li> <li>- image distortion</li> <li>- emission points</li>   <li>- unacceptable faults: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- shading</li> <li>- edge glow</li> <li>- flashing, flickering or intermittent operation</li> </ul> </li>   <li>• Cleaning procedures</li> <li>• Care of batteries</li> <li>• Hazardous material considerations;</li> </ul>	
5	Pre- & Post- Flight Procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inspect NVIS</li> <li>• Carrying case condition</li> <li>• Nitrogen purge due date</li> <li>• Collimation test due date</li> <li>• Screens diagram(s) of any faults</li> <li>• NVIS kit: complete</li> <li>• NVIS binocular assembly condition</li> <li>• Battery pack and quick disconnect condition</li> <li>• Batteries life expended so far</li> <li>• Mount battery pack onto helmet: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- verify no LED showing (good battery)</li> <li>- fail battery by opening cap and LED illuminates (both compartments)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Mount NVIS onto helmet</li> <li>• Adjust and focus NVIS</li> <li>• Eye-span to known inter-pupillary distance</li> <li>• Eye piece focus ring to zero</li> <li>• Adjustments: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- vertical</li> <li>- fore and aft</li> <li>- tilt</li> <li>- eye-span (fine-tuning)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Focus (one eye at a time at 20 ft, then at 30 ft from an eye chart) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- objective focus ring</li> <li>- eye piece focus ring</li> <li>- verify both images are harmonised</li> <li>- read eye-chart 20/40 line from 20 ft</li> </ul> </li> <li>• NVIS mission planning</li> <li>• NVIS light level planning</li> <li>• NVIS risk assessment</li> </ul>	1 hour



Item	Subject Area	Subject Details	Recommended Time
6	NVIS terrain interpretation and environmental factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Night terrain interpretation</li> <li>• Light sources: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- natural</li> <li>- lunar</li> <li>- solar</li> <li>- starlight</li> <li>- northern lights</li> <li>- artificial</li> <li>- cultural</li> <li>- infra-red</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Meteorological conditions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- clouds/fog</li> <li>- indications of restriction to visibility:</li> <li>- loss of celestial lights</li> <li>- loss of ground lights</li> <li>- reduced ambient light levels</li> <li>- reduced visual acuity</li> <li>- increase in video noise</li> <li>- increase in halo effect</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Cues for visual recognition: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- object size</li> <li>- object shape</li> <li>- contrast</li> <li>- ambient light</li> <li>- colour</li> <li>- texture</li> <li>- background</li> <li>- reflectivity</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Factors affecting terrain interpretation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ambient light</li> <li>- flight altitudes</li> <li>- terrain type</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Seasons</li> <li>• Night navigation cues: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- terrain relief</li> <li>- vegetation</li> <li>- hydrographical features</li> <li>- cultural features</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	1 hour
7	NVIS training & equipment requirements	<p>Cover the relevant regulations and guidelines that pertain to night and NVIS flight to include as a minimum:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Crew experience requirements;</li> <li>• Crew training requirements;</li> <li>• Airspace requirements;</li> <li>• Night / NVIS MEL;</li> </ul>	

Item	Subject Area	Subject Details	Recommended Time
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NVIS / night weather limits;</li> <li>• NVIS equipment minimum standard requirements.</li> </ul>	
8	NVIS emergency procedures	Cover relevant emergency procedures: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inadvertent IMC procedures</li> <li>• NVIS goggle failure</li> <li>• Helicopter emergencies:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- with goggles</li> <li>- transition from goggles</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	1 hour
9	NVIS flight techniques	Respective flight techniques for each phase of flight for the type and class of helicopter used for NVIS training	1 hour
10	Basic instrument techniques	Present and confirm understanding of basic instrument flight techniques: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Instrument scan</li> <li>• Role of instruments in NVIS flight</li> <li>• Unusual attitude recovery procedures</li> </ul>	1 hour
11	Blind cockpit drills	Perform blind cockpit drills: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Switches</li> <li>• Circuit breakers</li> <li>• Exit mechanisms</li> <li>• External / internal lighting</li> <li>• Avionics</li> </ul>	1 hour

**GM3 SPA.NVIS.130(f) Crew requirements for NVIS operations**

**FLIGHT TRAINING - AREAS OF INSTRUCTION**

A detailed example of possible subjects to be instructed in a NVIS flight instruction is included below.

**Table 1: Flight training areas of instruction**

Item	Subject Area	Subject Details	Recommended Time
1	Ground operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NVIS equipment assembly</li> <li>• Pre-flight inspection of NVISs</li> <li>• Helicopter pre-flight</li> <li>• NVIS flight planning:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- light level planning</li> <li>- meteorology</li> <li>- obstacles and known hazards</li> <li>- risk analysis matrix</li> <li>- CRM concerns</li> <li>- NVIS emergency procedures review</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Start-up/shut down</li> <li>• Goggling and degoggling</li> </ul>	1 hour
2	General handling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Level turns, climbs, and descents</li> <li>• For helicopters, confined areas and sloped landings</li> <li>• Operation specific flight tasks</li> <li>• Transition from aided to unaided flight</li> <li>• Demonstration of NVIS related ambient and cultural effects</li> </ul>	1 hour
3	Take-offs & landings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At both improved illuminated areas such as airports/airfields and unimproved unlit areas such as open fields</li> <li>• Traffic pattern</li> <li>• Low speed manoeuvres for helicopters</li> </ul>	1 hour
4	Navigation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Navigation over variety of terrain and under different cultural lighting conditions</li> </ul>	1 hour
5	Emergency procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Goggle failure</li> <li>• Helicopter emergencies</li> <li>• Inadvertent IMC</li> <li>• Unusual attitude recovery</li> </ul>	1 hour

**GM4 SPA.NVIS.130(f) Crew requirements for NVIS operations**

**NVIS PRE-FLIGHT BRIEFING/CHECKLIST**

A detailed example of a pre-flight briefing/checklist is included below.

**Table 1: NVIS pre-flight briefing/checklist**

Item	Subject
1	Weather: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• METAR/forecast</li> <li>• Cloud cover/dew point spread/precipitation</li> </ul>
2	OPS items: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NOTAMs</li> </ul>

Item	Subject
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IFR publications backup/maps</li> <li>• Goggles adjusted using test set (RTCA Document DO-275 [NVIS MOPS], Appendices G &amp; H give suggested NVG pre-flight and adjustment procedures and a ground test checklist)</li> </ul>
3	<p>Ambient light:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Moon rise/set/phase/position/elevation</li> <li>• % illumination and millilux (MLX) for duration of flight</li> <li>• Recommended minimum MLX: 1.5</li> </ul>
4	<p>Mission:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mission outline</li> <li>• Terrain appreciation</li> <li>• Detailed manoeuvres</li> <li>• Flight timings</li> <li>• Start/airborne/debrief</li> <li>• Airspace coordination for NVIS</li> <li>• Obstacles/minimum safe altitude</li> <li>• NVIS goggle up/degoggle location/procedure</li> <li>• Instrument IFR checks</li> </ul>
5	<p>Crew:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Crew day/experience</li> <li>• Crew position</li> <li>• Equipment: NVIS, case, video, flashlights</li> <li>• Lookout duties: left hand seat (LHS) – from 90° left to 45° right, RHS – from 90° right to 45° left;</li> <li>• Calling of hazards/movements landing light</li> <li>• Transfer of control terminology</li> <li>• Below 100 ft AGL – pilot monitoring (PM) ready to assume control</li> </ul>
6	<p>Helicopter:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Helicopter configuration</li> <li>• Fuel and CG</li> </ul>
7	<p>Emergencies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NVIS failure: cruise and low level flight</li> <li>• Inadvertent IMC/IFR recovery</li> <li>• Helicopter emergency: critical &amp; non-critical</li> </ul>

### GM5 SPA.NVIS.130(f) Crew requirements for NVIS operations

#### CREW TRAINING AND CHECKING — SUITABLE FSTD — NVIS OPERATIONS UNDER IFR

The FSTD may be a generic FSTD and may have no motion system.

### AMC1 SPA.NVIS.140 Information and documentation

#### OPERATIONS MANUAL

The operations manual should include:

- equipment to be carried and its limitations;
- the minimum equipment list (MEL) entry covering the equipment specified;
- risk analysis, mitigation and management;
- pre- and post-flight procedures and documentation;

- (e) selection and composition of crew;
- (f) crew coordination procedures, including:
  - (1) flight briefing;
  - (2) procedures when one crew member is wearing NVG and/or procedures when two or more crew members are wearing NVGs;
  - (3) procedures for the transition to and from NVIS flight;
  - (4) use of the radio altimeter on a NVIS flight; and
  - (5) inadvertent instrument meteorological conditions(IMC)and helicopter recovery procedures, including unusual attitude recovery procedures;
- (g) the NVIS training syllabus;
- (h) in-flight procedures for assessing visibility, to ensure that operations are not conducted below the minima stipulated for non-assisted night VFR operations;
- (i) weather minima, taking the underlying activity into account; and
- (j) the minimum transition heights to/from a NVIS flight.

## **GM1 SPA.NVIS.140 Information and documentation**

### **CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**

#### **Night Vision Imaging System for Civil Operators**

##### **Foreword**

This document, initially incorporated in JAA TGL-34, prepared by a Sub-Group of EUROCAE Working Group 57 “Night Vision Imaging System (NVIS) Standardisation” is an abbreviated and modified version of the RTCA Report DO-268 “Concept Of Operations – Night Vision Imaging Systems For Civil Operators” which was prepared in the USA by RTCA Special Committee 196 (SC-196) and approved by the RTCA Technical Management Committee in March 2001.

The EUROCAE Working Group 57 (WG-57) Terms of Reference included a task to prepare a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) document describing the use of NVIS in Europe. To complete this task, a Sub-Group of WG-57 reviewed the RTCA SC-196 CONOPS (DO-268) to assess its applicability for use in Europe. Whilst the RTCA document was considered generally applicable, some of its content, such as crew eligibility and qualifications and the detail of the training requirements, was considered to be material more appropriately addressed in Europe by at that time other Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR) documents such as JAR-OPS and JAR-FCL. Consequently, WG-57 condensed the RTCA CONOPS document by removing this material which is either already addressed by other JAR documents or will be covered by EASA documents in the future.

In addition, many of the technical standards already covered in the Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Integrated Night Vision Imaging System Equipment (DO-275) have been deleted in this European CONOPS.

##### **Executive summary**

The hours of darkness add to a pilot’s workload by decreasing those visual cues commonly used during daylight operations. The decreased ability of a pilot to see and avoid obstructions at night has been a subject of discussion since aviators first attempted to operate at night. Technology advancements in the late 1960s and early 1970s provided military aviators some limited ability to see at night and therein changed the scope of military night operations. Continuing technological improvements have advanced the capability and reliability of night vision imaging systems to the point that they are receiving increasing scrutiny are generally accepted by the public and are viewed by many as a tool for night flight.

Simply stated, night vision imaging systems are an aid to night VFR flight. Currently, such systems consist of a set of night vision goggles and normally a complimentary array of cockpit lighting modifications. The specifications of these two sub-system elements are interdependent and, as technology advances, the characteristics associated with each element are expected to evolve. The complete description and performance standards of the night vision goggles and cockpit lighting

modifications appropriate to civil aviation are contained in the Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Integrated Night Vision Imaging System Equipment.

An increasing interest on the part of civil operators to conduct night operations has brought a corresponding increased level of interest in employing night vision imaging systems. However, the night vision imaging systems do have performance limitations. Therefore, it is incumbent on the operator to employ proper training methods and operating procedures to minimise these limitations to ensure safe operations. In turn, operators employing night vision imaging systems must have the guidance and support of their regulatory agency in order to safely train and operate with these systems.

The role of the regulatory agencies in this matter is to develop the technical standard orders for the hardware as well as the advisory material and inspector handbook materials for the operations and training aspect. In addition, those agencies charged with providing flight weather information should modify their products to include the night vision imaging systems flight data elements not currently provided.

A FAA study (DOT/FAA/RD-94/21, 1994) best summarised the need for night vision imaging systems by stating, 'When properly used, NVGs can increase safety, enhance situational awareness, and reduce pilot workload and stress that are typically associated with night operations.'

### **Concept of operations - NVIS operations under IFR**

The NVIS can be useful to assess the environment when not in a cloud layer if procedures are established for its use. It may also be useful for decision-making before cancelling IFR and during the transition from instrument flight to visual flight under IFR.

During departure, the NVIS provides extra safety if used correctly. This is especially true for a departure where the instruction is to proceed VFR from the FATO to the initial departure fix (IDF) because VFR departures provide no obstacle protection. It could also be useful for other instrument departures.

During the transition to visual flight, the NVIS provides additional safety because the visibility may be very different with or without the NVIS, and it may help to assess the situation.

The scanning of instruments and of external cues will be modified. Multi-crew operations with SOPs and the relevant training should be in place.

Operator SOPs may define that when one of the crew members uses the NVGs in a flipped-down position, the other should have the NVGs flipped up and should monitor the flight instruments and navigation instruments used for the flight. In this case, the continuity of the crew concept will rely on efficient crew communication.

In other situations and operations, the operator SOPs may also define that both crew members have NVGs in the flipped-down position, using the capability to look below the NVGs to monitor both the instruments and the VMC situation.

## **2. TERMINOLOGY**

### **2.1. Night vision goggles**

A NVG is a binocular appliance that amplifies ambient light and is worn by a pilot. The NVG enhances the wearer's ability to maintain visual surface reference at night.

#### **2.1.1. Type**

Type refers to the design of the NVG with regards to the manner in which the image is relayed to the pilot. A Type 1 NVG is one in which the image is viewed directly in-line with the image intensification process. A Type 1 NVG is also referred to as “direct view” goggle. A Type 2 NVG is one in which the image intensifier is not in-line with the image viewed by the pilot. In this design, the image may be reflected several times before being projected onto a combiner in front of the pilot’s eyes. A Type 2 NVG is also referred to as an “indirect view” goggle.

#### 2.1.2. *Class*

Class is a terminology used to describe the filter present on the NVG objective lens. The filter restricts the transmission of light below a determined frequency. This allows the cockpit lighting to be designed and installed in a manner that does not adversely affect NVG performance.

##### 2.1.2.1. *Class A*

Class A or “minus blue” NVGs incorporate a filter, which generally imposes a 625 nanometer cutoff. Thus, the use of colours in the cockpit (e.g. colour displays, colour warning lights, etc.) may be limited. The blue green region of the light spectrum is allowed through the filter.

##### 2.1.2.2. *Class B*

Class B NVGs incorporate a filter that generally imposes a 665 nanometer cutoff. Thus, the cockpit lighting design may incorporate more colours since the filter eliminates some yellows and oranges from entering the intensification process.

##### 2.1.2.3. *Modified Class B*

Modified Class B NVGs incorporate a variation of a Class B filter but also incorporates a notch filter in the green spectrum that allows a small percentage of light into the image intensification process. Therefore, a Modified Class B NVG allows pilots to view fixed head-up display (HUD) symbology through the NVG without the HUD energy adversely affecting NVG performance.

#### 2.1.3. *Generation*

Generation refers to the technological design of an image intensifier. Systems incorporating these light-amplifying image intensifiers were first used during WWII and were operationally fielded by the US military during the Vietnam era. These systems were large, heavy and poorly performing devices that were unsuitable for aviation use, and were termed Generation I (Gen I). Gen II devices represented a significant technological advancement and provided a system that could be head-mounted for use in ground vehicles. Gen III devices represented another significant technological advancement in image intensification, and provided a system that was designed for aviation use. Although not yet fielded, there are prototype NVGs that include technological advances that may necessitate a Gen IV designation if placed into production. Because of the variations in interpretations as to generation, NVGs will not be referred to by the generation designation.

#### 2.1.4. *OMNIBUS*

The term OMNIBUS refers to a US Army contract vehicle that has been used over the years to procure NVGs. Each successive OMNIBUS contract included NVGs that demonstrated improved performance. There have been five contracts since the mid 1980s, the most current being OMNIBUS V. There may be several variations of NVGs within a single OMNIBUS purchase, and some NVGs from previous OMNIBUS contracts have been upgraded in performance to match the performance of goggles from later contracts. Because of these variations, NVGs will not be referred to by the OMNIBUS designation.

#### 2.1.5. *Resolution and visual acuity*

Resolution refers to the capability of the NVG to present an image that makes clear and distinguishable the separate components of a scene or object.

Visual acuity is the relative ability of the human eye to resolve detail and interpret an image.

## **2.2. Aviation Night Vision Imaging System (NVIS)**

Resolution refers to the capability of the NVG to present an image that makes clear and distinguishable the separate components of a scene or object. Visual acuity is the relative ability of the human eye to resolve detail and interpret an image.

### **2.2.1. Look under (under view)**

Look under is the ability of pilots to look under or around the NVG to view inside and outside the aircraft.

## **2.3. NVIS lighting**

An aircraft lighting system that has been modified or designed for use with NVGs and which does not degrade the performance of the NVG beyond acceptable standards, is designated as NVIS lighting. This can apply to both interior and exterior lighting.

### **2.3.1. Design considerations**

As the choice of NVG filter drives the cockpit lighting design, it is important to know which goggle will be used in which cockpit. Since the filter in a Class A NVG allows wavelengths above 625 nanometers into the intensification process, it should not be used in a cockpit designed for Class B or Modified Class B NVGs. However, since the filter in a Class B and Modified Class B NVGs is more restrictive than that in a Class ANVG, the Class B or Modified Class B NVG can be used with either Class A or Class B cockpit lighting designs.

### **2.3.2. Compatible**

Compatibility, with respect to a NVIS system, includes a number of different factors: compatibility of internal and external lighting with the NVG, compatibility of the NVG with the crew station design (e.g. proximity of the canopy or windows, proximity of overhead panels, operability of controls, etc.), compatibility of crew equipment with the NVG and compatibility with respect to colour discrimination and identification (e.g. caution and warning lights still maintain amber and red colours). The purpose of this paragraph is to discuss compatibility with respect to aircraft lighting. A NVIS lighting system, internal and external, is considered compatible if it adheres to the following requirements:

1. the internal and external lighting does not adversely affect the operation of the NVG during any phase of the NVIS operation;
2. the internal lighting provides adequate illumination of aircraft cockpit instruments, displays and controls for unaided operations and for “look-under” viewing during aided operations; and
3. The external lighting aids in the detection and separation by other aircraft.

NVIS lighting compatibility can be achieved in a variety of ways that can include, but is not limited to, modification of light sources, light filters or by virtue of location. Once aircraft lighting is modified for using NVGs, it is important to keep in mind that changes in the crew station (e.g. addition of new display) must be assessed relative to the effect on NVIS compatibility.

## **2.4. NVIS operation**

A night flight wherein the pilot maintains visual surface reference using NVGs in an aircraft that is NVIS approved

### **2.4.1. Aided**

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Aided flight is flight with NVGs in an operational position.

#### 2.4.2. *Unaided*

Unaided flight is a flight without NVGs or a flight with NVGs in a non-operational position.

### 3. **SYSTEM DESCRIPTION**

#### 3.1. **NVIS capabilities**

NVIS generally provides the pilot an image of the outside scene that is enhanced compared to that provided by the unaided, dark-adapted eye. However, NVIS may not provide the user an image equal to that observed during daylight. Since the user has an enhanced visual capability, situational awareness is generally improved.

##### 3.1.1. *Critical elements*

The following critical elements are the underlying assumptions in the system description for NVIS:

1. aircraft internal lighting has been modified or initially designed to be compatible;
2. environmental conditions are adequate for the use of NVIS (e.g. enough illumination is present, weather conditions are favourable, etc.);
3. the NVIS has been properly maintained in accordance with the minimum operational performance standards;
4. a proper pre-flight has been performed on the NVIS confirming operation in accordance with the continued airworthiness standards and training guidelines; and
5. the pilot(s) has been properly trained and meets recency of experience requirements.

Even when insuring that these conditions are met, there still are many variables that can adversely affect the safe and effective use of NVIS (e.g. flying towards a low angle moon, flying in a shadowed area, flying near extensive cultural lighting, flying over low contrast terrain, etc.). It is important to understand these assumptions and limitations when discussing the capabilities provided by the use of NVIS.

##### 3.1.2. *Situation awareness*

Situation awareness, being defined as the degree of perceptual accuracy achieved in the comprehension of all factors affecting an aircraft and crew at a given time, is improved at night when using NVG during NVIS operations. This is achieved by providing the pilot with more visual cues than is normally available under most conditions when operating an aircraft unaided at night. However, it is but one source of the factors necessary for maintaining an acceptable level of situational awareness.

###### 3.1.2.1. Environment detection and identification

An advantage of using NVIS is the enhanced ability to detect, identify, and avoid terrain and/or obstacles that present a hazard to night operations. Correspondingly, NVIS aid in night navigation by allowing the aircrew to view waypoints and features.

Being able to visually locate and then (in some cases) identify objects or areas critical to operational success will also enhance operational effectiveness. Finally, use of NVIS may allow pilots to detect other aircraft more easily.

##### 3.1.3. *Emergency situations*

NVIS generally improve situational awareness, facilitating the pilot's workload during emergencies. Should an emergency arise that requires an immediate landing, NVIS may provide the pilot with a means of locating a suitable landing area and conducting a landing. The pilot must determine if the use of NVIS during emergencies is appropriate. In certain instances, it may be more advantageous for the pilot to remove the NVG during the performance of an emergency procedure.

### 3.2.1. NVG design characteristics

There are limitations inherent in the current NVG design.

#### 3.2.1.1. Visual acuity

The pilot's visual acuity with NVGs is less than normal daytime visual acuity.

#### 3.2.1.2. Field of view

Unaided field of view (FOV) covers an elliptical area that is approximately 120° lateral by 80° vertical, whereas the field of view of current Type I NVG systems is nominally 40° and is circular. Both the reduced field of view of the image and the resultant decrease in peripheral vision can increase the pilot's susceptibility to misperceptions and illusions. Proper scanning techniques must be employed to reduce the susceptibility to misperception and illusions.

#### 3.2.1.3. Field of regard

The NVG has a limited FOV but, because it is head-mounted, that FOV can be scanned when viewing the outside scene. The total area that the FOV can be scanned is called the field of regard (FOR). The FOR will vary depending on several factors: physiological limit of head movement, NVG design (e.g. protrusion of the binocular assembly, etc.) and cockpit design issues (e.g. proximity of canopy or window, seat location, canopy bow, etc.).

#### 3.2.1.4. NVG weight & centre of gravity

The increased weight and forward CG projection of head supported devices may have detrimental effects on pilot performance due to neck muscle strain and fatigue. There also maybe an increased risk of neck injury in crashes.

#### 3.2.1.5. Monochromatic image

The NVG image currently appears in shades of green. Since there is only one colour, the image is said to be "monochromatic". This colour was chosen mostly because the human eye can see more detail at lower brightness levels when viewing shades of green. Colour differences between components in a scene helps one discriminate between objects and aids in object recognition, depth perception and distance estimation. The lack of colour variation in the NVG image will degrade these capabilities to varying degrees.

#### 3.2.1.6. Ambient or artificial light

The NVG requires some degree of light (energy) in order to function. Low light levels, non-compatible aircraft lighting and poor windshield/window light transmissibility, diminish the performance capability of the NVG. It is the pilot's responsibility to determine when to transition from aided to unaided due to unacceptable NVG performance.

#### 3.2.1.7 LED lights

Some red obstacle lights and other artificial lights that are clearly visible to the naked eye are not visible to NVGs. These obstacle lights may employ LED instead of traditional incandescent sources. The use of LED lights is becoming more common for almost all lighting applications because of their extensive lifetime and low energy consumption.

Aviation red light ranges from about 610 to 700 nanometres (nm), and NVGs approved for civil aviation (having a Class B Minus Blue Filter) are only sensitive to energy ranging from 665 to about 930 nm. LED and other artificial lights may have a relatively narrow emission band (around 630 nm ± 20 nm) and that band is below the range in which NVGs are sensitive and LEDs do not emit infrared energy like incandescent lights for obstacle red lights.

In general terms, NVG users should be aware that obstacle lighting systems and other artificial lights that fall outside the combined visible and near-infrared spectrum of NVGs (approximately 665 to 930 nm) will not be visible to their goggles. Other obstacle lights may use a wavelength very close to the approximate cut-off wavelength of 665 nm and will remain visible to the goggles, but they will be dimmed and will be better seen with the naked eye.

Full awareness of obstacle lights can only be achieved with an unaided scan.

### 3.2.2. Physiological and other conditions

#### 3.2.2.1. Cockpit resource management

Due to the inherent limitations of NVIS operations, there is a requirement to place emphasis on NVIS related cockpit resource management (CRM). This applies to both single and multi-pilot cockpit environments. Consequently, NVIS flight requires effective CRM between the pilot(s), controlling agencies and other supporting personnel. An appropriate venue for addressing this issue is the pre-flight NVIS mission brief.

#### 3.2.2.2. Fatigue

Physiological limitations that are prevalent during the hours of darkness along with the limitations associated with NVGs, may have a significant impact on NVIS operations. Some of these limitations are the effects of fatigue (both acute and chronic), stress, eyestrain, working outside the pilot's normal circadian rhythm envelope, increased helmet weight, aggressive scanning techniques associated with NVIS, and various human factors engineering concerns that may have a direct influence on how the pilot works in the aircraft while wearing NVGs. These limitations may be mitigated through proper training and recognition, experience, adaptation, rest, risk management, and proper crew rest/duty cycles.

#### 3.2.2.3. Over-confidence

Compared to other types of flight operations, there may be an increased tendency by the pilot to over-estimate the capabilities of the NVIS.

#### 3.2.2.4. Spatial orientation

There are two types of vision used in maintaining spatial orientation: central (focal) vision and peripheral (ambient) vision. Focal vision requires conscious processing and is slow, whereas peripheral information is processed subconsciously at a very fast rate. During daytime, spatial orientation is maintained by inputs from both focal vision and peripheral vision, with peripheral vision providing the great majority of the information. When using NVGs, peripheral vision can be significantly degraded if not completely absent. In this case, the pilot must rely on focal vision to interpret the NVG image as well as the information from flight instruments in order to maintain spatial orientation and situation awareness. Even though maintaining spatial orientation requires more effort when using NVGs than during daytime, it is much improved over night unaided operations where the only information is obtained through flight instruments. However, anything that degrades the NVG image to a point where the horizon is not visualised and/or ground reference is lost or significantly degraded will necessitate a reversion to flight on instruments until adequate external visual references can be established. Making this transition quickly and effectively is vital in order to avoid spatial disorientation. Additionally, added focal task loading during the operation (e.g. communications, looking at displays, processing navigational information, etc.) will compete with the focal requirement for interpreting the NVG image and flight instruments. Spatial disorientation can result when the task loading increases to a point where the outside scene and/or the flight instruments are not properly scanned. This potential can be mitigated to some extent through effective training and experience.

#### 3.2.2.5. Depth perception & distance estimation

When flying, it is important for pilots to be able to accurately employ depth perception and distance estimation techniques. To accomplish this, pilots use both binocular and monocular vision. Binocular vision requires the use of both eyes working together, and, practically speaking, is useful only out to approximately 100 ft.

Binocular vision is particularly useful when flying close to the ground and/or near objects (e.g. landing a helicopter in a small landing zone). Monocular vision can be accomplished with either eye alone, and is the type of vision used for depth perception and distance estimation when viewing beyond approximately 100 ft. Monocular vision is the predominant type of vision used when flying fixed wing aircraft, and also when flying helicopters and using cues beyond 100 ft. When viewing a NVG image, the two eyes can no longer provide accurate binocular information, even though the NVG used when flying is a binocular system. This has to do with the way the eyes function physiologically (e.g. accommodation, stereopsis, etc.) and the design of the NVG (i.e. a binocular system with a fixed channel for each eye). Therefore, binocular depth perception and distance estimation tasking when viewing terrain or objects with a NVG within 100 ft is significantly degraded. Since monocular vision does not require both eyes working together, the adverse impact on depth perception and distance estimation is much less, and is mostly dependent on the quality of the NVG image. If the image is very good and there are objects in the scene to use for monocular cueing (especially objects with which the pilot is familiar), then distance estimation and depth perception tasking will remain accurate. However, if the image is degraded (e.g. low illumination, airborne obscuration, etc.) and/or there are few or unfamiliar objects in the scene, depth perception and distance estimation will be degraded to some extent. In summary, pilots using NVG will maintain the ability to accurately perceive depth and estimate distances, but it will depend on the distances used and the quality of the NVG image.

Pilots maintain some ability to perceive depth and distance when using NVGs by employing monocular cues. However, these capabilities may be degraded to varying degrees.

#### 3.2.2.6. Instrument lighting brightness considerations

When viewing the NVG image, the brightness of the image will affect the amount of time it takes to adapt to the brightness level of the instrument lighting, thereby affecting the time it takes to interpret information provided by the instruments. The higher the quality (figure of merit (FO), resolution, filters, contrast, etc.) of the 'tubes', the less critical this effect becomes.

For example, if the instrument lighting is fairly bright, the time it takes to interpret information provided by the instruments may be instantaneous. However, if the brightness of the lighting is set to a very low level, it may take several seconds to interpret the information, thus increasing the heads-down time and increasing the risk of spatial disorientation. It is important to ensure that instrument lighting is kept at a brightness level that makes it easy to rapidly interpret the information. This will likely be brighter than the one is used to during unaided operations. If the NVGs are used in the transition phase from IFR to VFR, the brightness level of the instrument lighting should be set in advance.

#### 3.2.2.7. Dark adaptation time from NVG to unaided operations

When viewing a NVG image, both rods and cones are being stimulated (i.e. mesopic vision), but the brightness of the image is reducing the effectiveness of rod cells. If the outside scene is bright enough (e.g. urban area, bright landing pad, etc.), both rods and cones will continue to be stimulated. In this case there will be no improvement in acuity over time and the best acuity is essentially instantaneous. In some cases (e.g. rural area with scattered cultural lights), the outside scene will not be bright enough to stimulate the cones and some amount of time will be required for the rods to fully adapt. In this case it may take the rods one to two minutes to fully adapt for the best acuity to be realised. If the outside scene is very dark (e.g. no cultural lights and no moon), it may take up to five minutes to fully adapt to the outside scene after removing the NVGs. The preceding are general guidelines and the time required to fully adapt to the outside scene once removing the NVG depends

on many variables: the length of time the NVG has been used, whether or not the pilot was dark adapted prior to flight, the brightness of the outside scene, the brightness of cockpit lighting, and variability in visual function among the population. It is important to understand the concept and to note the time requirements for the given operation.

#### 3.2.2.8. Complacency

Pilots must understand the importance of avoiding complacency during NVG flights. Similar to other specialised flight operations, complacency may lead to an acceptance of situations that would normally not be permitted. Attention span and vigilance are reduced, important elements in a task series are overlooked, and scanning patterns, which are essential for situational awareness, break down (usually due to fixation on a single instrument, object or task). Critical but routine tasks are often skipped.

#### 3.2.2.9. Experience

High levels of NVIS proficiency, along with a well-balanced NVIS experience base, will help to offset many of the visual performance degradations associated with night operations. NVIS experience is a result of proper training coupled with numerous NVIS operations. An experienced NVIS pilot is acutely aware of the NVIS operational envelope and its correlation to various operational effects, visual illusions and performance limitations. This experience base is gained (and maintained) over time through a continual, holistic NVIS training programme that exposes the pilot to NVIS operations conducted under various moon angles, percentage of available illumination, contrast levels, visibility levels, and varying degrees of cloud coverage. A pilot should be exposed to as many of these variations as practicable during the initial NVIS qualification programme. Continued exposure during the NVIS recurrent training will help strengthen and solidify this experience base.

### 4. OPERATIONS

Operations procedures should accommodate the capabilities and limitations of the systems described in Section 3 of this GM as well as the restraints of the operational environment.

All NVG operations should fulfil all applicable requirements in accordance with the Civil Aviation (General) Regulations 2016.

#### 4.1. Pilot eligibility

About 54% of the civil pilot population wears some sort of ophthalmic device to correct vision necessary to safely operate an aircraft. The use of inappropriate ophthalmic devices with NVGs may result in vision performance decrement, fatigue, and other human factor problems, which could result in increased risk for aviation accidents and incidents.

#### 4.2. Operating environment considerations

##### 4.2.1. *Weather and atmospheric obscurants*

Any atmospheric condition, which absorbs, scatters, or refracts illumination, either before or after it strikes terrain, may reduce the usable energy available to the NVG.

##### 4.2.1.1. Weather

During NVIS operations, pilots can see areas of moisture that are dense (e.g. clouds, thick fog, etc.) but may not see areas that are less dense (e.g. thin fog, light rain showers, etc.). The inability to see some areas of moisture may lead to hazardous flight conditions during NVIS operations and will be discussed separately in the next section.

The different types of moisture will have varying effects and it is important to understand these effects and how they apply to NVIS operations. For example:

1. It is important to know when and where fog may form in the flying area. Typically, coastal, low-lying river, and mountainous areas are most susceptible.

2. Light rain or mist may not be observed with NVIS but will affect contrast, distance estimation, and depth perception. Heavy rain is more easily perceived due to large droplet size and energy attenuation.
3. Snow occurs in a wide range of particle sizes, shapes, and densities. As with clouds, rain, and fog, the denser the airborne snow, the greater the effect on NVG performance. On the ground, snow has mixed effect depending on terrain type and the illumination level. In mountainous terrain, snow may add contrast, especially if trees and rocks protrude through the snow. In flatter terrain, snow may cover high contrast areas, reducing them to areas of low contrast. On low illumination nights, snow may reflect the available energy better than the terrain it covers and thus increase the level of illumination.

All atmospheric conditions reduce the illumination level to some degree and recognition of this reduction with NVGs can be difficult. Thus, a good weather briefing, familiarity with the local weather patterns and understanding the effects on NVG performance are important for a successful NVIS flight.

#### 4.2.1.2. Deteriorating weather

It is important to remain cognizant of changes in the weather when using NVGs. It is possible to “see through” areas of light moisture when using NVGs, thus increasing the risk of inadvertently entering IMC. Some ways to help reduce this possibility include the following:

1. Be attentive to changes in the NVG image. Halos may become larger and more diffuse due to diffraction of light in moisture. Scintillation in the image may increase due to a lowering of the illumination level caused by the increased atmospheric moisture. Loss of scene detail may be secondary to the lowering illumination caused by the changing moisture conditions.
2. Obtain a thorough weather brief with emphasis on NVG effects prior to flight.
3. Be familiar with weather patterns in the flying area.
4. Occasionally scan the outside scene. The unaided eye may detect weather conditions that are not detectable to the NVG.

Despite the many methods of inadvertent instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevention, one should have established IMC recovery procedures and be familiar with them.

#### 4.2.1.3. Airborne obscurants

In addition to weather, there may be other obscurants in the atmosphere that could block energy from reaching the NVG, such as haze, dust, sand, or smoke. As with moisture, the size and concentration of the particles will determine the degree of impact. Examples of these effects include the following:

1. high winds during the day can place a lot of dust in the air that will still be present at night when the wind may have reduced in intensity;
2. forest fires produce heavy volumes of smoke that may cover areas well away from the fire itself;
3. the effects of rotor wash may be more pronounced when using NVGs depending on the material (e.g. sand, snow, dust, etc.); and
4. pollution in and around major cultural areas may have an adverse effect on NVG performance.

#### 4.2.1.4. Winter operations

Using NVGs during winter conditions provide unique issues and challenges to pilots.

##### 4.4.1.2.1. Snow

Due to the reflective nature of snow, it presents pilots with significant visual challenges both en-route and in the terminal area. During the en-route phase of a flight the snow may cause distractions to the flying pilot if any aircraft external lights (e.g. anti-collision beacons/strobes, position lights, landing lights, etc.) are not compatible with NVGs. In the terminal area, whiteout landings can create the greatest hazard to unaided night operations. With NVGs the hazard is not lessened, and can be more disorienting due to lights reflecting from the snow that is swirling around the aircraft during the landing phase. Any emergency vehicle lighting or other airport lighting in the terminal area may exaggerate the effects.

#### 4.4.1.2.2. Ice fog

Ice fog presents the pilot with hazards normally associated with IMC in addition to problems associated with snow operations. The highly reflective nature of ice fog will further aggravate any lighting problems. Ice fog conditions can be generated by aircraft operations under extremely cold temperatures and the right environmental conditions.

#### 4.4.1.2.3. Icing

Airframe ice is difficult to detect while looking through NVGs. The pilot will need to develop a proper crosscheck to ensure airframe icing does not exceed operating limits for that aircraft. Pilots should already be aware of icing indicator points on their aircraft. These areas require consistent oversight to properly determine environmental conditions.

#### 4.4.1.2.4. Low ambient temperatures

Depending on the cockpit heating system, fogging of the NVGs can be a problem and this will significantly reduce the goggle effectiveness. Another issue with cockpit temperatures is the reduced battery duration. Operations in a cold environment may require additional battery resources.

### 4.2.2. *Illumination*

NVGs require illumination, either natural or artificial, to produce an image. Although current NVG technology has significantly improved low light level performance, some illumination, whether natural or artificial, is still required to provide the best possible image.

#### 4.2.2.1. Natural illumination

The main sources of natural illumination include the moon and stars. Other sources can include sky glow, the aurora borealis, and ionisation processes that take place in the upper atmosphere.

##### 4.2.2.1.1. Moon phase

The moon provides the greatest source of natural illumination during night time. Moon phase and elevation determines how much moonlight will be available, while moonrise and moonset times determine when it will be available. Lunar illumination is reported in terms of percent illumination, 100% illumination being full moon. It should be noted that this is different from the moon phase (e.g. 25% illumination does not mean the same thing as a quarter moon). Currently, percent lunar illumination can only be obtained from sources on the Internet, military weather facilities and some publications (e.g. Farmers' Almanac).

##### 4.2.2.1.2. Lunar azimuth and elevation

The moon can have a detrimental effect on night operations depending on its relationship to the flight path. When the moon is on the same azimuth as the flight path, and low enough to be within or near the NVG field of view, the effect on NVG performance will be similar to that caused by the sun on the unaided eye during daytime. The brightness of the moon drives the NVG gain down, thus reducing image detail. This can also occur with the moon at relatively high elevations. For example,

it is possible to bring the moon near the NVG field of view when climbing to cross a ridgeline or other obstacle, even when the moon is at a relatively high elevation. It is important to consider lunar azimuth and elevation during pre-flight planning. Shadowing, another effect of lunar azimuth and elevation, will be discussed separately.

#### 4.2.2.1.3. Shadowing

Moonlight creates shadows during night time just as sunlight creates shadows during daytime. However, night time shadows contain very little energy for the NVG to use in forming an image. Consequently, image quality within a shadow will be degraded relative to that obtained outside the shadowed area. Shadows can be beneficial or can be a disadvantage to operations depending on the situation.

##### 4.2.2.1.3.1 Benefits of shadows

Shadows alert aircrew to subtle terrain features that may not otherwise be noted due to the reduced resolution in the NVG image. This may be particularly important in areas where there is little contrast differentiation; such as flat featureless deserts, where large dry washes and high sand dunes may go unnoticed if there is no contrast to note their presence. The contrast provided by shadows helps make the NVG scene appear more natural.

##### 4.2.2.1.3.2 Disadvantages due to shadows

When within a shadow, terrain detail can be significantly degraded, and objects can be regarding flight in or around shadowed areas is the pilot's response to loss of terrain detail. During flight under good illumination conditions, a pilot expects to see a certain level of detail. If flight into a shadow occurs while the pilot is preoccupied with other matters (e.g. communication, radar, etc.), it is possible that the loss in terrain detail may not have been immediately noted. Once looking outside again, the pilot may think the reduced detail is due to an increase in flight altitude and thus begin a descent - even though already at a low altitude. Consideration should be given during mission planning to such factors as lunar azimuth and elevation, terrain type (e.g. mountainous, flat, etc.), and the location of items significant to operation success (e.g. ridgelines, pylons, targets, waypoints, etc.). Consideration of these factors will help predict the location of shadows and the potential adverse effects.

##### 4.2.2.1.4. Sky glow

Sky glow is an effect caused by solar light and continues until the sun is approximately 18 degrees below the horizon. When viewing in the direction of sky glow there may be enough energy present to adversely affect the NVG image (i.e. reduce image quality). For the middle latitudes the effect on NVG performance may last up to an hour after official sunset. For more northern and southern latitudes the effect may last for extended periods of times (e.g. days to weeks) during seasons when the sun does not travel far below the horizon. This is an important point to remember if planning NVG operations in those areas. Unlike sky glow after sunset, the sky glow associated with sunrise does not have an obvious effect on NVG performance until fairly close to official sunrise. The difference has to do with the length of time the atmosphere is exposed to the sun's irradiation, which causes ionisation processes that release near-IR energy. It is important to know the difference in these effects for planning purposes.

#### 4.2.2.2. Artificial illumination

Since NVGs are sensitive to any source of energy in the visible and near-infrared spectrums, there are also many types of artificial illumination sources (e.g. flares, IR searchlights, cultural lighting, etc.). As with any illumination source, these can have both positive and detrimental effects on NVG utilisation. For example, viewing a scene indirectly illuminated by a searchlight can enable the pilot to more clearly view the scene; conversely, viewing the same scene with the searchlight near or within the NVG field of view will reduce the available visual cues. It is important to be familiar with the effects of cultural



lighting in the flying area in order to be able to avoid the associated problems and to be able to use the advantages provided. Also, it is important to know how to properly use artificial light sources (e.g. aircraft IR spotlight). It should be noted that artificial light sources may not always be available or dependable, and this should be taken into consideration during flight planning.

When using NVGs in an area with high-intensity cultural lighting, the lights beyond this area may not be visible. The visibility assessed with the NVGs might be judged to be worse than the unaided visibility.

#### 4.2.3. *Terrain contrast*

Contrast is one of the more important influences on the ability to correctly interpret the NVG image, particularly in areas where there are few cultural features. Any terrain that contains varying albedos (e.g. forests, cultivated fields, etc.) will likely increase the level of contrast in a NVG image, thus enhancing detail. The more detail in the image, the more visual information aircrews have for manoeuvring and navigating. Low contrast terrain (e.g. flat featureless desert, snow-covered fields, water, etc.) contains few albedo variations, thus the NVG image will contain fewer levels of contrast and less detail.

### 4.3. **Aircraft considerations**

#### 4.3.1. *Lighting*

Factors such as aircraft internal and external lighting have the potential to adversely impact NVG gain and thus image quality. How well the windshield, canopy, or window panels transmit near infrared energy can also affect the image. Cleanliness of the windshield directly impacts this issue.

#### 4.3.2. *Cockpit ergonomics*

While wearing NVGs, the pilot may have limited range of head movement in the aircraft. For example, switches on the overhead console may be difficult to read while wearing NVGs. Instruments, controls, and switches that are ordinarily accessible, may now be more difficult to access due to the extended mass (fore/aft) associated with NVGs.

In addition, scanning may require a more concentrated effort due to limited field of view. Lateral viewing motion can be hindered by cockpit obstructions (i.e. door post or seat back design).

#### 4.3.3. *Windshield reflectivity*

Consideration within the cockpit and cabin should be given to the reflectivity of materials and equipment upon the windshield. Light that is reflected may interfere with a clear and unobstructed view. Items such as flight suits, helmets, and charts, if of a light colour such as white, yellow, and orange, can produce significant reflections. Colours that impart the least reflection are black, purple, and blue. This phenomena is not limited to windshields but may include side windows, chin bubbles, canopies, etc.

### 4.4. **Generic operating considerations**

This section lists operating topics and procedures, which should be considered when employing NVIS. The list and associated comments are not to be considered all inclusive. NVIS operations vary in scope widely and this section is not intended to instruct a prospective operator on how to implement a NVIS programme.

#### 4.4.1. *Normal procedures*

##### 4.4.1.1. Scanning

When using NVGs there are three different scan patterns to consider and each is used for different reasons: instrument scan, aided scan outside, and unaided scan outside. Normally, all three are integrated and there is a continuous transition from one to the other depending on the mission, environmental conditions, immediate tasking, flight altitude and many other variables. For example, scanning with the NVG will allow early detection of external lights. However, the bloom caused by the lights will mask the aircraft until fairly close or until the lighting scheme is changed. Once close to the aircraft (e.g. approximately one-half mile for smaller aircraft), visual acquisition can possibly be made unaided or with the NVG. Whether to use the NVG or unaided vision depends on many variables (e.g. external lighting configuration, distance to aircraft, size of aircraft, environmental conditions, etc.). The points to be made are that a proper scan depends on the situation and variables present, and that scanning outside is critical when close to another aircraft. Additionally, for a multi-crew environment, coordination of scan responsibilities is vital.

#### 4.4.1.1.1. Instrument crosscheck scan

In order to effect a proper and effective instrument scan, it is important to predict when it will be important. A start can be made during pre-flight planning when critical phases of flight can be identified and prepared for. For example, it may be possible when flying over water or featureless terrain to employ a good instrument crosscheck. However, the most important task is to make the appropriate decision during flight as conditions and events change. In this case, experience, training and constant attention to the situation are vital contributors to the pilot's assessment of the situation.

#### 4.4.1.1.2. NVG scan

To counteract the limited field of view, pilots should continually scan throughout the field of regard. This allows aircrew to build a mental image of the surrounding environment. How quickly the outside scene is scanned to update the mental image is determined by many variables. For example, when flying over flat terrain where the highest obstacle is below the flight path, the scan may be fairly slow. However, if flying low altitude in mountainous terrain, the scan will be more aggressive and rapid due to the presence of more information and the increased risk. How much of the field of regard to scan is also determined by many variables. For example, if a pilot is anticipating a turn, more attention may be placed in the area around the turn point, or in the direction of the new heading. In this situation, the scan will be limited briefly to only a portion of the field of regard.

As with the instrument scan, it is very important to plan ahead. It may, for example, be possible to determine when the scan may be interrupted due to other tasks, when it may be possible to become fixated on a specific task, or when it is important to maximise the outside scan. An important lesson to learn regarding the NVG scan is when not to rely on visual information. It is easy to overestimate how well one can see with NVGs, especially on high illumination nights, and it is vital to maintain a constant awareness regarding their limitations. This should be pointed out often during training and, as a reminder, should be included as a briefing item for NVG flights.

#### 4.4.1.1.3. Unaided scan

Under certain conditions, this scan can be as important as the others can. For example, it may be possible to detect distance and/or closure to another aircraft more easily using unaided vision, especially if the halo caused by the external lights is masks aircraft details on the NVG image. Additionally, there are other times when unaided information can be used in lieu of or can augment NVG and instrument information.

When using the NVGs in the transition from IFR to VFR, the unaided scan is essential to assess the unaided visibility conditions. Focusing on the first light seen when looking out is an automatic response, but it is vital to continue the scan in order to assess the surrounding weather conditions.

Some examples where unaided scan can enhance safety is where LED-lit obstacles can be encountered (e.g. during low-altitude flying and when performing a reconnaissance of landing areas) or when unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) fly at night with LED navigation lights.

Air operators should incorporate procedures into their manuals and/or SOPs that require periodic unaided scanning when operating at low altitudes, when looking for potential landing areas, and when performing a reconnaissance of a landing area. This may be accomplished by looking under the NVGs, or by briefly placing the NVGs in the stowed (flipped-up) position. Manuals/SOPs should include procedures and call-outs for LED-lit obstacles.

Air operators and pilots are encouraged to report encounters with obstacles equipped with LED lighting systems not visible by NVGs, with pertinent information, to their competent authority.

#### 4.4.1.1.4. Scan patterns

Environmental factors will influence scan by limiting what may be seen in specific directions or by degrading the overall image. If the image is degraded, aircrew may scan more aggressively in a subconscious attempt to obtain more information, or to avoid the chance of missing information that suddenly appears and/or disappears. The operation itself may influence the scan pattern. For example, looking for another aircraft, landing zone, or airport may require focusing the scan in a particular direction. In some cases, the operation may require aircrew in a multi place aircraft to assign particular pilots responsibility for scanning specific sectors.

The restrictions to scan and the variables affecting the scan pattern are not specific to night operations or the use of NVGs, but, due to the NVG's limited field of view, the degree of impact is magnified.

#### 4.4.1.2. Pre-flight planning

##### 4.4.1.2.1. Illumination criteria

The pilot should provide a means for forecasting the illumination levels in the operational area. The pilot should make the effort to request at least the following information in addition to that normally requested for night VFR: cloud cover and visibility during all phases of flight, sunset, civil and nautical twilight, moon phase, moonrise and moonset, and moon and/or lux illumination levels, and unlit tower NOTAMS.

##### 4.4.1.2.2. NVIS operations

An inspection of the power pack, visor, mount, power cable and the binocular assembly should be performed in accordance with the operations manual.

To ensure maximum performance of the NVGs, proper alignment and focus must be accomplished following the equipment inspection. Improper alignment and focus may degrade NVIS performance.

##### 4.4.1.2.3. Aircraft pre-flight

A normal pre-flight inspection should be conducted prior to a NVIS flight with emphasis on proper operation of the NVIS lighting. The aircraft windshield must also be clean and free of major defects, which might degrade NVIS performance.

##### 4.4.1.2.4. Equipment

The basic equipment required for NVIS operations should be those instruments and equipment specified within the current applicable regulations for VFR night operations. Additional equipment required for NVIS operations, e.g. NVIS lighting system

and a radio altimeter must be installed and operational. All NVIS equipment, including any subsequent modifications, shall be approved.

#### 4.4.1.2.5. Risk assessment

A risk assessment is suggested prior to any NVIS operation. The risk assessment should include as a minimum:

1. illumination level
2. weather
3. pilot recency of experience
4. pilot experience with NVG operations
5. pilot vision
6. pilot rest condition and health
7. windshield/window condition
8. NVG tube performance
9. NVG battery condition
10. types of operations allowed
11. external lighting environment.

#### 4.4.1.3. Flight operations

##### 4.4.1.3.1. Elevated terrain

Safety may be enhanced by NVGs during operations near elevated terrain at night. The obscuration of elevated terrain is more easily detected with NVGs thereby allowing the pilot to make alternate flight path decisions.

##### 4.4.1.3.2. Over-water

Flying over large bodies of water with NVGs is difficult because of the lack of contrast in terrain features. Reflections of the moon or starlight may cause disorientation with the natural horizon. The radio altimeter must be used as a reference to maintain altitude.

##### 4.4.1.4. Remote area considerations

A remote area is a site that does not qualify as an aerodrome as defined by the applicable regulations. Remote area landing sites do not have the same features as an aerodrome, so extra care must be given to locating any obstacles that may be in the approach/departure path.

A reconnaissance must be made prior to descending at an unlighted remote site. Some features or objects may be easy to detect and interpret with the unaided eye. Other objects will be invisible to the unaided eye, yet easily detected and evaluated with NVGs.

##### 4.4.1.5. Reconnaissance

The reconnaissance phase should involve the coordinated use of NVGs and white lights. The aircraft's external white lights such as landing lights, searchlights, and floodlights, should be used during this phase of flight. The pilot should select and evaluate approach and departure paths to the site considering wind speed and direction, and obstacles or signs of obstacles.

##### 4.4.1.6. Sources of high illumination

Sources of direct high illumination may have the potential to reduce the effectiveness of the NVGs. In addition, certain colour lights, such as red, will appear brighter, closer and may display large halos.

#### 4.4.2. Emergency procedures

No modification for NVG operations is necessary to the aircraft emergency procedures as approved in the operations manual or approved checklist. Special training may be required to accomplish the appropriate procedures.

#### 4.4.3. Inadvertent IMC

Some ways to help reduce the potential for inadvertent flight into IMC conditions are:

1. obtaining a thorough weather brief (including pilot reports);
2. being familiar with weather patterns in the local flying area; and
3. by looking beneath the NVG at the outside scene.

However, even with thorough planning a risk still exists. To help mitigate this risk it is important to know how to recognise subtle changes to the NVG image that occur during entry into IMC conditions. Some of these include the onset of scintillation, loss of scene detail, and changes in the appearance of halos.

### 5. TRAINING

To provide an appropriate level of safety, training procedures must accommodate the capabilities and limitations of the systems described in Section 3 of this GM as well as the restraints of the operational environment.

To be effective, the NVIS training philosophy would be based on a two-tiered approach: basic and advanced NVIS training. The basic NVIS training would serve as the baseline standard for all individuals seeking a NVIS endorsement. The content of this initial training would not be dependent on any operational requirements. The advanced training would build on the basic training by focusing on developing specialised skills required to operate an aircraft during NVIS operations in a particular operational environment.

Furthermore, while there is a need to stipulate minimum flight hour requirements for a NVIS endorsement, the training must also be event based. This necessitates that pilots be exposed to all of the relevant aspects, or events, of NVIS flight in addition to acquiring a minimum number of flight hours.

### 6. CONTINUING AIRWORTHINESS

The reliability of the NVIS and safety of operations are dependent on the pilots adhering to the instructions for continuing airworthiness. Personnel who conduct the maintenance and inspection on the NVIS must be qualified and possess the appropriate tools and facilities to perform the maintenance.

Acronyms used in this GM

AC	Advisory Circular
AGL	above ground level
ATC	air traffic control
CONOPs	concept of operations
CG	centre of gravity
CRM	cockpit resource management
DOD	Department of Defence
DOT	Department of Transportation
EFIS	electronic flight instrumentation systems
EMS	emergency medical service
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FLIR	forward looking infrared radar

FOR	field of regard
FOV	field of view
GEN	generation
HUD	head-up display
IFR	instrument flight rules
IMC	instrument meteorological conditions
IR	infrared
JAA	Joint Aviation Authorities
MOPS	Minimum Operational Performance Standard
NAS	national airspace system
NOTAMS Notices to Airmen	
NVD	night vision device
NVED	night vision enhancement device
NVG	night vision goggles
NVIS	night vision imaging system
SC	special committee
TFR	temporary flight restrictions
VA	visual acuity
VFR	visual flight rules
VMC	visual meteorological conditions

#### Glossary of terms used in this GM

1. 'Absorptance': the ratio of the radiant energy absorbed by a body to that incident upon it.
2. 'Albedo': the ratio of the amount of light reflected from a surface to the amount of incident light.
3. 'Automatic brightness control (ABC)': one of the automatic gain control circuits found in second and third generation NVG devices. It attempts to provide consistent image output brightness by automatic control of the micro channel plate voltage.
4. 'Automatic gain control (AGC)': comprised of the automatic brightness control and bright source protection circuits. Is designed to maintain image brightness and protect the user and the image tube from excessive light levels. This is accomplished by controlling the gain of the intensifier tube.
5. 'Blackbody': an ideal body of surface that completely absorbs all radiant energy falling upon with no reflection.
6. 'Blooming': common term used to denote the "washing out" of all or part of the NVG image due to de-gaining of the image intensifier tube when a bright light source is in or near the NVG field of view.
7. 'Bright source protection (BSP)': protective feature associated with second and third generation NVGs that protects the intensifier tube and the user by controlling the voltage at the photo cathode.
8. 'Brownout': condition created by blowing sand, dust, etc., which can cause the pilots to lose sight of the ground. This is most commonly associated with landings in the desert or in dusty LZs.
9. 'Civil nautical twilight': the time when the true altitude of the centre of the sun is six degrees below the horizon. Illuminance level is approximately 3.40 lux and is above the usable level for NVG operations.

10. 'Diopter': a measure of the refractive (light bending) power of a lens.
11. 'Electro-optics (EO)': the term used to describe the interaction between optics and electronics, leading to transformation of electrical energy into light or vice versa.
12. 'Electroluminescent (EL)': referring to light emission that occurs from application of an alternating current to a layer of phosphor.
13. 'Foot-candle': a measure of illuminance; specifically, the illuminance of a surface upon which one lumen is falling per square foot.
14. 'Foot-Lambert': a measure of luminance; specifically the luminance of a surface that is receiving an illuminance of one foot-candle.
15. 'Gain': when referring to an image intensification tube, the ratio of the brightness of the output in units of foot-lambert, compared to the illumination of the input in foot-candles. A typical value for a GEN III tube is 25,000 to 30,000 FI/fc. A "tube gain" of 30,000 FI/fc provides an approximate "system gain" of 3,000. This means that the intensified NVG image is 3,000 times brighter to the aided eye than that of the unaided eye.
16. 'Illuminance': also referred to as illumination. The amount, ratio or density of light that strikes a surface at any given point.
17. 'Image intensifier': an electro-optic device used to detect and intensify optical images in the visible and near infrared region of the electromagnetic spectrum for the purpose of providing visible images. The component that actually performs the intensification process in a NVG. This component is composed of the photo cathode, MCP, screen optic, and power supply. It does not include the objective and eyepiece lenses.
18. 'Incandescent': refers to a source that emits light based on thermal excitation, i.e. heating by an electrical current, resulting in a very broad spectrum of energy that is dependent primarily on the temperature of the filament.
19. 'Infrared': that portion of the electromagnetic spectrum in which wavelengths range from 0.7 microns to 1 mm. This segment is further divided into near infrared (0.7-3.0 microns), mid infrared (3.0-6.0 microns), far infrared (6.0-15 microns), and extreme infrared (15 microns-1 mm). A NVG is sensitive to near infrared wavelengths approaching 0.9 microns.
20. 'Irradiance': the radiant flux density incident on a surface. For the purpose of this document the terms irradiance and illuminance shall be interchangeable.
21. 'Lumen': a measurement of luminous flux equal to the light emitted in a unit solid angle by a uniform point source of one candle intensity.
22. 'Luminance': the luminous intensity (reflected light) of a surface in a given direction per unit of projected area. This is the energy used by NVGs.
23. 'Lux': a unit measurement of illumination. The illuminance produced on a surface that is one-meter square, from a uniform point source of one candle intensity, or one lumen per square meter.
24. 'Microchannel plate': a wafer containing between 3 and 6 million specially treated microscopic glass tubes designed to multiply electrons passing from the photo cathode to the phosphor screen in second and third generation intensifier tubes.

25. 'Micron': a unit of measure commonly used to express wavelength in the infrared region; equal to one millionth of a meter.
26. 'Nanometer (nm)': a unit of measure commonly used to express wavelength in the visible and near infrared region; equal to one billionth of a meter.
27. 'Night vision device (NVD)': an electro-optical device used to provide a visible image using the electromagnetic energy available at night.
28. 'Photon': a quantum (basic unit) of radiant energy (light).
29. 'Photopic vision': vision produced as a result of the response of the cones in the retina as the eye achieves a light adapted state (commonly referred to as day vision).
30. 'Radiance': the flux density of radiant energy reflected from a surface. For the purposes of this manual the terms radiance and luminance shall be interchangeable.
31. 'Reflectivity': the fraction of energy reflected from a surface.
32. 'Scotopic vision': that vision produced as a result of the response of the rods in the retina as the eye achieves a dark-adapted state (commonly referred to as night vision).
33. 'Situational awareness (SA)': degree of perceptual accuracy achieved in the comprehension of all factors affecting an aircraft and crew at a given time.
34. 'Starlight': the illuminance provided by the available (observable) stars in a subject hemisphere. The stars provide approximately 0.00022 lux ground illuminance on a clear night. This illuminance is equivalent to about one-quarter of the actual light from the night sky with no moon.
35. 'Stereopsis': visual system binocular cues that are used for distance estimation and depth perception. Three dimensional visual perception of objects. The use of NVGs seriously degrades this aspect of near-depth perception.
36. 'Transmittance': the fraction of radiant energy that is transmitted through a layer of absorbing material placed in its path.
37. 'Ultraviolet': that portion of the electromagnetic spectrum in which wavelengths range between 0.1 and 0.4 microns.
38. 'Wavelength': the distance in the line of advance of a wave from any one point to the next point of corresponding phase; is used to express electromagnetic energy including IR and visible light.
39. 'Whiteout': a condition similar to brownout but caused by blowing snow.

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## Subpart I - Helicopter Hoist Operations

### AMC1 SPA.HHO.110(a) Equipment requirements for HHO

#### AIRWORTHINESS APPROVAL FOR HUMAN EXTERNAL CARGO

- (a) Hoist installations that have been certificated according to any of the following standards should be considered to satisfy the airworthiness criteria for human external cargo (HEC) operations:
- (1) CS 27.865 or CS 29.865;
  - (2) JAR 27 Amendment 2 (27.865) or JAR 29 Amendment 2 (29.865) or later;
  - (3) FAR 27 Amendment 36 (27.865) or later - including compliance with CS 27.865(c)(6); or
  - (4) FAR 29 Amendment 43 (29.865) or later.
- (b) Hoist installations that have been certified prior to the issuance of the airworthiness criteria for HEC as defined in (a) may be considered as eligible for HHO provided that following a risk assessment either:
- (1) the service history of the hoist installation is found satisfactory to the Brunei DCA; or
  - (2) for hoist installations with an unsatisfactory service history, additional substantiation to allow acceptance by the Brunei DCA should be provided by the hoist installation certificate holder (type certificate (TC) or supplemental type certificate (STC) on the basis of the following requirements:
    - (i) The hoist installation should withstand a force equal to a limit static load factor of 3.5, or some lower load factor, not less than 2.5, demonstrated to be the maximum load factor expected during hoist operations, multiplied by the maximum authorised external load.
    - (ii) The reliability of the primary and back-up quick release systems at helicopter level should be established and failure mode and effect analysis at equipment level should be available. The assessment of the design of the primary and back-up quick release systems should consider any failure that could be induced by a failure mode of any other electrical or mechanical rotorcraft system.
    - (iii) The operations or flight manual contains one-engine-inoperative (OEI) hover performance data and procedures for the weights, altitudes, and temperatures throughout the flight envelope for which hoist operations are accepted.
    - (iv) Information concerning the inspection intervals and retirement life of the hoist cable should be provided in the instructions for continued airworthiness.
    - (v) Any airworthiness issue reported from incidents or accidents and not addressed by (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) should be addressed.

### AMC1 SPA.HHO.130(b)(2)(ii) Crew requirements for HHO

#### RELEVANT EXPERIENCE

The experience considered should take into account the geographical characteristics (sea, mountain, big cities with heavy traffic, etc.).

### AMC1 SPA.HHO.130(e) Crew requirements for HHO

#### CRITERIA FOR TWO PILOT HHO

A crew of two pilots should be used when:

- (a) the weather conditions are below VFR minima at the offshore vessel or structure;
- (b) there are adverse weather conditions at the HHO site (i.e. turbulence, vessel movement, visibility); and
- (c) the type of helicopter requires a second pilot to be carried because of:
  - (1) cockpit visibility;
  - (2) handling characteristics; or
  - (3) lack of automatic flight control systems.

### AMC1 SPA.HHO.130(f)(1) Crew requirements for HHO

#### TRAINING AND CHECKING SYLLABUS

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- (a) The flight crew training syllabus should include the following items:
  - (1) fitting and use of the hoist;
  - (2) preparing the helicopter and hoist equipment for HHO;
  - (3) normal and emergency hoist procedures by day and, when required, by night;
  - (4) crew coordination concepts specific to HHO;
  - (5) practice of HHO procedures; and
  - (6) the dangers of static electricity discharge.
- (b) The flight crew checking syllabus should include:
  - (1) proficiency checks, which should include procedures likely to be used at HHO sites with special emphasis on:
    - (i) local area meteorology;
    - (ii) HHO flight planning;
    - (iii) HHO departures;
    - (iv) a transition to and from the hover at the HHO site;
    - (v) normal and simulated emergency HHO procedures; and
    - (vi) crew coordination.
- (i) HHO technical crew members should be trained and checked in the following items:
  - (1) duties in the HHO role;
  - (2) fitting and use of the hoist;
  - (3) operation of hoist equipment;
  - (4) preparing the helicopter and specialist equipment for HHO;
  - (5) normal and emergency procedures;
  - (6) crew coordination concepts specific to HHO;
  - (7) operation of inter-communication and radio equipment;
  - (8) knowledge of emergency hoist equipment;
  - (9) techniques for handling HHO passengers;
  - (10) effect of the movement of personnel on the centre of gravity and mass during HHO;
  - (11) effect of the movement of personnel on performance during normal and emergency flight conditions;
  - (12) techniques for guiding pilots over HHO sites;
  - (13) awareness of specific dangers relating to the operating environment; and
  - (14) the dangers of static electricity discharge.

#### **AMC1 SPA.HHO.140 Information and documentation**

##### **OPERATIONS MANUAL**

The operations manual should include:

- (a) performance criteria;
- (b) if applicable, the conditions under which offshore HHO transfer may be conducted including the relevant limitations on vessel movement and wind speed;
- (c) the weather limitations for HHO;
- (d) the criteria for determining the minimum size of the HHO site, appropriate to the task;
- (e) the procedures for determining minimum crew; and
- (f) the method by which crew members record hoist cycles.

## Subpart J - Helicopter Emergency Medical Service Operations

### GM1 SPA.HEMS.100(a) Helicopter emergency medical service (HEMS) operations

#### THE HEMS PHILOSOPHY

(a) Introduction

This GM outlines the HEMS philosophy. Starting with a description of acceptable risk and introducing a taxonomy used in other industries, it describes how risk has been addressed in this Subpart to provide a system of safety to the appropriate standard. It discusses the difference between HEMS and air ambulance - in regulatory terms. It also discusses the application of operations to public interest sites in the HEMS context.

(b) Acceptable risk

The broad aim of any aviation legislation is to permit the widest spectrum of operations with the minimum risk. In fact it may be worth considering who/what is at risk and who/what is being protected. In this view three groups are being protected:

- (1) third parties (including property) - highest protection;
- (2) passengers (including patients); and
- (3) crew members (including technical crew members) – lowest.

It is for the Legislator to facilitate a method for the assessment of risk - or as it is more commonly known, safety management (refer to Part-ORO).

(c) Risk management

Safety management textbooks describe four different approaches to the management of risk. All but the first have been used in the production of this section and, if it is considered that the engine failure accountability of performance class 1 equates to zero risk, then all four are used (this of course is not strictly true as there are a number of helicopter parts - such as the tail rotor which, due to a lack of redundancy, cannot satisfy the criteria):

- (1) Applying the taxonomy to HEMS gives:
  - (i) zero risk; no risk of accident with a harmful consequence – performance class 1 (within the qualification stated above) - the HEMS operating base;
  - (ii) de minimis; minimised to an acceptable safety target - for example the exposure time concept where the target is less than  $5 \times 10^{-8}$  (in the case of elevated final approach and take-off areas (elevated FATOs) at hospitals in a congested hostile environment the risk is contained to the deck edge strike case - and so in effect minimised to an exposure of seconds);
  - (iii) comparative risk; comparison to other exposure - the carriage of a patient with a spinal injury in an ambulance that is subject to ground effect compared to the risk of a HEMS flight (consequential and comparative risk);
  - (iv) as low as reasonably practicable; where additional controls are not economically or reasonably practicable - operations at the HEMS operating site (the accident site).
- (2) HEMS operations are conducted in accordance with the requirements contained in BAR 6, Part-CAT and BAR 6, Part-ORO, except for the variations contained in SPA.HEMS, for which a specific approval is required. In simple terms there are three areas in HEMS operations where risk, beyond that allowed in Part-CAT and Part-ORO, are identified and related risks accepted:
  - (i) in the en-route phase, where alleviation is given from height and visibility rules;
  - (ii) at the accident site, where alleviation is given from the performance and size requirement; and
  - (iii) at an elevated hospital site in a congested hostile environment, where alleviation is given from the deck edge strike - providing elements of the CAT.POL.H.305 are satisfied.

In mitigation against these additional and considered risks, experience levels are set, specialist training is required (such as instrument training to compensate for the increased risk of inadvertent entry into cloud) and operation with two crew (two pilots, or one pilot and a HEMS technical crew member) is mandated. (HEMS crews and medical passengers are also expected to operate in accordance with good crew resource management (CRM) principles.)

(d) Air ambulance

In regulatory terms, air ambulance is considered to be a normal transport task where the risk is no higher than for operations to the full OPS.CAT and Part-ORO compliance. This is not intended to contradict/complement medical terminology but is simply a statement of policy; none of the risk elements of HEMS should be extant and therefore none of the additional requirements of HEMS need be applied.

To provide a road ambulance analogy:

- (1) if called to an emergency: an ambulance would proceed at great speed, sounding its siren and proceeding against traffic lights - thus matching the risk of operation to the risk of a potential death (= HEMS operations);
- (2) for a transfer of a patient (or equipment) where life and death (or consequential injury of ground transport) is not an issue: the journey would be conducted without sirens and within normal rules of motoring - once again matching the risk to the task (= air ambulance operations).

The underlying principle is that the aviation risk should be proportionate to the task.

It is for the medical professional to decide between HEMS or air ambulance - not the pilot. For that reason, medical staff who undertake to task medical sorties should be fully aware of the additional risks that are (potentially) present under HEMS operations (and the pre-requisite for the operator to hold a HEMS approval). (For example in some countries, hospitals have principal and alternative sites. The patient may be landed at the safer alternative site (usually in the grounds of the hospital) thus eliminating risk - against the small inconvenience of a short ambulance transfer from the site to the hospital.)

Once the decision between HEMS or air ambulance has been taken by the medical professional, the commander makes an operational judgement over the conduct of the flight.

Simplistically, the above type of air ambulance operations could be conducted by any operator holding an AOC (HEMS operators hold an AOC) - and usually are when the carriage of medical supplies (equipment, blood, organs, drugs etc.) is undertaken and when urgency is not an issue.

(e) Operating under a HEMS approval

There are only two possibilities: transportation as passengers or cargo under the full auspices of OPS.CAT and Part-ORO (this does not permit any of the alleviations of SPA.HEMS - landing and take-off performance should be in compliance with the performance Subparts of Part-CAT), or operations under a HEMS approval as contained in this Subpart.

(f) HEMS operational sites

The HEMS philosophy attributes the appropriate levels of risk for each operational site; this is derived from practical considerations and in consideration of the probability of use. The risk is expected to be inversely proportional to the amount of use of the site. The types of site are as follows:

- (1) HEMS operating base: from which all operations will start and finish. There is a high probability of a large number of take-offs and landings at this HEMS operating base and for that reason no alleviation from operating procedures or performance rules are contained in this Subpart.
- (2) HEMS operating site: because this is the primary pick-up site related to an incident or accident, its use can never be pre-planned and therefore attracts alleviations from operating procedures and performance rules, when appropriate.
- (3) The hospital site: is usually at ground level in hospital grounds or, if elevated, on a hospital building. It may have been established during a period when performance criteria were not a consideration. The amount of use of such sites depends on their location and their facilities; normally, it will be greater than that of the HEMS operating site but less than for a HEMS operating base. Such sites attract some alleviation under this Subpart.

(g) Problems with hospital sites

During implementation of the original HEMS rules contained in JAR-OPS 3, it was established that a number of States had encountered problems with the impact of performance rules where helicopters were operated for HEMS. Although States accept that progress should be made towards operations where risks associated with a critical engine failure are eliminated, or limited by the exposure time concept, a number of landing sites exist that do not (or never can) allow operations to performance class 1 or 2 requirements.

These sites are generally found in a congested hostile environment:

- (1) in the grounds of hospitals; or
- (2) on hospital buildings.

The problem of hospital sites is mainly historical and, whilst the authority could insist that such sites are not used - or used at such a low weight that critical engine failure performance is assured - it would seriously curtail a number of existing operations.

Even though the rule for the use of such sites in hospital grounds for HEMS operations attracts alleviation, it is only partial and will still impact upon present operations.

Because such operations are performed in the public interest, it was felt that the authority should be able to exercise its discretion so as to allow continued use of such sites provided that it is satisfied that an adequate level of safety can be maintained - notwithstanding that the site does not allow operations to performance class 1 or 2 standards. However, it is in the interest of continuing improvements in safety that the alleviation of such operations be constrained to existing sites, and for a limited period.

It is felt that the use of public interest sites should be controlled. This will require that a State directory of sites be kept and approval given only when the operator has an entry in the route manual section of the operations manual.

The directory (and the entry in the operations manual) should contain for each approved site:

- (1) the dimensions;
- (2) any non-conformance with ICAO Annex 14;
- (3) the main risks; and
- (4) the contingency plan should an incident occur.

Each entry should also contain a diagram (or annotated photograph) showing the main aspects of the site.

(h) Summary

In summary, the following points are considered to be pertinent to the HEMS philosophy and HEMS regulations:

- (1) absolute levels of safety are conditioned by society;
- (2) potential risk must only be to a level proportionate to the task;
- (3) protection is afforded at levels appropriate to the occupants;
- (4) this Subpart addresses a number of risk areas and mitigation is built in;
- (5) only HEMS operations are dealt with by this Subpart;
- (6) there are three main categories of HEMS sites and each is addressed appropriately; and
- (7) State alleviation from the requirement at a hospital site is available but such alleviations should be strictly controlled by a system of registration.

## GM1 SPA.HEMS.120 HEMS operating minima

### REDUCED VISIBILITY

- (a) In the rule the ability to reduce the visibility for short periods has been included. This will allow the commander to assess the risk of flying temporarily into reduced visibility against the need to provide emergency medical service, taking into account the advisory speeds included in Table 1. Since every situation is different it was not felt appropriate to define the short period in terms of absolute figures. It is for the commander to assess the aviation risk to third parties, the crew and the aircraft such that it is proportionate to the task, using the principles of GM1 SPA.HEMS.100 (a).
- (b) When flight with a visibility of less than 5 km is permitted, the forward visibility should not be less than the distance travelled by the helicopter in 30 seconds so as to allow adequate opportunity to see and avoid obstacles (see table below).

**Table 1: Operating minima – reduced visibility**

Visibility (m)	Advisory speed (kt)
800	50
1500	100
2000	120

### **GM1 SPA.HEMS.125(b)(3) Performance requirements for HEMS operations**

#### **PERFORMANCE CLASS 2 OPERATIONS AT A HEMS OPERATING SITE**

As the risk profile at a HEMS operating site is already well known, operations without an assured safe forced landing capability do not need a separate approval and the requirements does not call for the additional risk assessment that is specified in CAT.POL.H.305 (b)(1).

### **AMC1 SPA.HEMS.125(b)(4) Performance requirements for HEMS operations**

#### **HEMS OPERATING SITE DIMENSIONS**

- (a) When selecting a HEMS operating site it should have a minimum dimension of at least 2 x D (the largest dimensions of the helicopter when the rotors are turning). For night operations, unsurveyed HEMS operating sites should have dimensions of at least 4 x D in length and 2 x D in width.
- (b) For night operations, the illumination may be either from the ground or from the helicopter.

### **AMC1 SPA.HEMS.130(b)(2) Crew requirements**

#### **EXPERIENCE**

The minimum experience level for a commander conducting HEMS flights should take into account the geographical characteristics of the operation (sea, mountain, big cities with heavy traffic, etc.).

### **AMC1 SPA.HEMS.130(d) Crew requirements**

#### **RECENCY**

This recency may be obtained in a visual flight rules (VFR) helicopter using vision limiting devices such as goggles or screens, or in a FSTD.

### **AMC1 SPA.HEMS.130(e) Crew requirements**

#### **HEMS TECHNICAL CREW MEMBER**

- (a) When the crew is composed of one pilot and one HEMS technical crew member, the latter should be seated in the front seat (co-pilot seat) during the flight, so as to be able to carry out his/her primary task of assisting the commander in:
  - (1) collision avoidance;
  - (2) the selection of the landing site; and
  - (3) the detection of obstacles during approach and take-off phases.
- (b) The commander may delegate other aviation tasks to the HEMS technical crew member, as necessary:
  - (1) assistance in navigation;
  - (2) assistance in radio communication/radio navigation means selection;
  - (3) reading of checklists; and
  - (4) monitoring of parameters.
- (c) The commander may also delegate to the HEMS technical crew member tasks on the ground:
  - (1) assistance in preparing the helicopter and dedicated medical specialist equipment for subsequent HEMS departure; or
  - (2) assistance in the application of safety measures during ground operations with rotors turning (including: crowd control, embarking and disembarking of passengers, refuelling etc.).

There may be exceptional circumstances when it is not possible for the HEMS technical crew member to carry out his/her primary task as defined under (a).

This is to be regarded as exceptional and is only to be conducted at the discretion of the commander, taking into account the dimensions and environment of the HEMS operating site.)

- (d) When two pilots are carried, there is no requirement for a HEMS technical crew member, provided that the pilot monitoring performs the aviation tasks of a technical crew member.

### **GM1 SPA.HEMS.130(e)(2)(ii) Crew requirements**

#### **SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS**

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In defining those specific geographical areas, the operator should take account of the cultural lighting and topography. In those areas where the cultural lighting and topography make it unlikely that the visual cues would degrade sufficiently to make flying of the aircraft problematical, the HEMS technical crew member is assumed to be able to sufficiently assist the pilot, since under such circumstances instrument and control monitoring would not be required. In those cases where instrument and control monitoring would be required the operations should be conducted with two pilots.

#### **AMC1 SPA.HEMS.130(e)(2)(ii)(B) Crew requirements**

##### **FLIGHT FOLLOWING SYSTEM**

A flight following system is a system providing contact with the helicopter throughout its operational area.

#### **AMC1 SPA.HEMS.130(f)(1) Crew requirements**

##### **TRAINING AND CHECKING SYLLABUS**

- (a) The flight crew training syllabus should include the following items:
- (1) meteorological training concentrating on the understanding and interpretation of available weather information;
  - (2) preparing the helicopter and specialist medical equipment for subsequent HEMS departure;
  - (3) practice of HEMS departures;
  - (4) the assessment from the air of the suitability of HEMS operating sites; and
  - (5) the medical effects air transport may have on the patient.
- (b) The flight crew checking syllabus should include:
- (1) proficiency checks, which should include landing and take-off profiles likely to be used at HEMS operating sites; and
  - (2) line checks, with special emphasis on the following:
    - (i) local area meteorology;
    - (ii) HEMS flight planning;
    - (iii) HEMS departures;
    - (iv) the selection from the air of HEMS operating sites;
    - (v) low level flight in poor weather; and
    - (vi) familiarity with established HEMS operating sites in the operator's local area register.
- (c) HEMS technical crew members should be trained and checked in the following items:
- (1) duties in the HEMS role;
  - (2) map reading, navigation aid principles and use;
  - (3) operation of radio equipment;
  - (4) use of on-board medical equipment;
  - (5) preparing the helicopter and specialist medical equipment for subsequent HEMS departure;
  - (6) instrument reading, warnings, use of normal and emergency checklists in assistance of the pilot as required;
  - (7) basic understanding of the helicopter type in terms of location and design of normal and emergency systems and equipment;
  - (8) crew coordination;
  - (9) practice of response to HEMS call out;
  - (10) conducting refuelling and rotors running refuelling;
  - (11) HEMS operating site selection and use;
  - (12) techniques for handling patients, the medical consequences of air transport and some knowledge of hospital casualty reception;
  - (13) marshalling signals;



- (14) underslung load operations as appropriate;
- (15) winch operations as appropriate;
- (16) the dangers to self and others of rotor running helicopters including loading of patients; and
- (17) the use of the helicopter inter-communications system.

#### **AMC1 SPA.HEMS.130(f)(2)(ii)(B) Crew requirements**

##### **LINE CHECKS**

Where due to the size, the configuration, or the performance of the helicopter, the line check cannot be conducted on an operational flight, it may be conducted on a specially arranged representative flight. This flight may be immediately adjacent to, but not simultaneous with, one of the biannual proficiency checks.

#### **AMC1 SPA.HEMS.135(a) HEMS medical passenger and other personnel briefing**

##### **HEMS MEDICAL PASSENGER BRIEFING**

The briefing should ensure that the medical passenger understands his/her role in the operation, which includes:

- (a) familiarisation with the helicopter type(s) operated;
- (b) entry and exit under normal and emergency conditions both for self and patients;
- (c) use of the relevant on-board specialist medical equipment;
- (d) the need for the commander's approval prior to use of specialised equipment;
- (e) method of supervision of other medical staff;
- (f) the use of helicopter inter-communication systems;
- (g) location and use of on board fire extinguishers; and
- (h) the operator's crew coordination concept including relevant elements of crew resource management.

#### **AMC1.1 SPA.HEMS.135(a) HEMS medical passenger and other personnel briefing**

##### **HEMS MEDICAL PASSENGER BRIEFING**

Another means of complying with the rule as compared to that contained in AMC1- SPA.HEMS.135 (a) is to make use of a training programme as mentioned in AMC1.1 CAT.OP.MPA.170.

#### **AMC1 SPA.HEMS.135(b) HEMS medical passenger and other personnel briefing**

##### **GROUND EMERGENCY SERVICE PERSONNEL**

The task of training large numbers of emergency service personnel is formidable. Wherever possible, helicopter operators should afford every assistance to those persons responsible for training emergency service personnel in HEMS support. This can be achieved by various means, such as, but not limited to, the production of flyers, publication of relevant information on the operator's web site and provision of extracts from the operations manual.

- (a) The elements that should be covered include:
  - (1) two-way radio communication procedures with helicopters;
  - (2) the selection of suitable HEMS operating sites for HEMS flights;
  - (3) the physical danger areas of helicopters;
  - (4) crowd control in respect of helicopter operations; and
  - (5) the evacuation of helicopter occupants following an on-site helicopter accident.

#### **AMC1 SPA.HEMS.140 Information and documentation**

##### **OPERATIONS MANUAL**

The operations manual should include:

- (a) the use of portable equipment on board;
- (b) guidance on take-off and landing procedures at previously unsurveyed HEMS operating sites;
- (c) (the final reserve fuel, in accordance with SPA.HEMS.150;

- (d) operating minima;
- (e) recommended routes for regular flights to surveyed sites, including the minimum flight altitude;
- (f) guidance for the selection of the HEMS operating site in case of a flight to an unsurveyed site;
- (g) the safety altitude for the area overflown; and
- (h) procedures to be followed in case of inadvertent entry into cloud.

## Subpart K - Helicopter Offshore Operations

### GM1 SPA.HOFO.105(c) Approval for offshore operations

The requirement to inform both Member States (MSs) allows the MSs to mutually decide on how best to exercise their obligations in accordance with ARO.GEN.300(d) and (e) when operations are intended to be performed in a MS other than the MS issuing the approval for offshore operations.

### AMC1 SPA.HOFO.110(a) Operating procedures

#### RISK ASSESSMENT

The operator's risk assessment should include, but not be limited to, the following hazards:

- (a) collision with offshore installations, vessels and floating structures;
- (b) collision with wind turbines;
- (c) collision with skysails;
- (d) collision during low-level instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) operations;
- (e) collision with obstacles adjacent to helidecks;
- (f) collision with surface/water;
- (g) IMC or night offshore approaches;
- (h) loss of control during operations to small or moving offshore locations;
- (i) operations to unattended helidecks; and
- (j) weather and/or sea conditions that could either cause an accident or exacerbate its consequences.

### AMC1 SPA.HOFO.110(a)(4) Operating procedures

#### REFUELLING PROCEDURE

If refuelling with the rotors turning is conducted, a procedure should be established and used in accordance with point CAT.OP.MPA.200.

### AMC1 SPA.HOFO.110(b)(1) Operating procedures

#### OPERATIONAL FLIGHT PLAN

The operational flight plan should contain at least the items listed in AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.175(a) Flight preparation.

### AMC1 SPA.HOFO.110(b)(2) Operating procedures

#### PASSENGER BRIEFING

The following aspects applicable to the helicopter used should be presented and demonstrated to the passengers by audio-visual electronic means (video, DVD or similar), or the passengers should be informed about them by a crew member prior to boarding the aircraft:

- (a) the use of the life jackets and where they are stowed if not in use;
- (b) the proper use of survival suits, including briefing on the need to have suits fully zipped with, if applicable, hoods and gloves on, during take-off and landing or when otherwise advised by the pilot-in-command/commander;
- (c) the proper use of emergency breathing equipment;
- (d) the location and operation of the emergency exits;
- (e) life raft deployment and boarding;
- (f) deployment of all survival equipment; and
- (g) boarding and disembarkation instructions.

When operating in a non-hostile environment, the operator may omit items related to equipment that is not required.

### AMC1.1 SPA.HOFO.110(b)(2) Operating procedures

#### PASSENGER BRIEFING

This AMC is applicable to passengers who require more knowledge of the operational concept, such as sea pilots and support personnel for offshore wind turbines.

The operator may replace the passenger briefing as set out in AMC1 SPA.HOFO.110(b)(2) with a passenger training and checking programme provided that:

- the operator ensures that the passenger is appropriately trained and qualified on the helicopter types on which they are to be carried;
- the operator defines the training and checking programme for each helicopter type, covering all safety and emergency procedures for a given helicopter type, and including practical training;
- the passenger has received the above training within the last 12 calendar months; and
- the passenger has flown on the helicopter type within the last 90 days.

#### **AMC1 SPA.HOFO.110(b)(5) Operating procedures**

##### **AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM (AFCS)**

To ensure competence in manual handling of the helicopter, the operator should provide instructions to the flight crew in the operations manual (OM) under which circumstances the helicopter may be operated in lower modes of automation. Particular emphasis should be given to flight in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and instrument approaches.

#### **GM1 SPA.HOFO.110(b)(9) Operating Procedures**

Emergency flotation systems (EFSs) cannot always be armed safely before the approach when a speed limitation needs to be complied with. In such case, the EFS should be armed as soon as safe to do so.

#### **AMC1 SPA.HOFO.115 Use of offshore locations**

##### **GENERAL**

- (a) The operations manual (OM) relating to the specific usage of offshore helicopter landing areas (Part C for CAT operators) should contain, or make reference to, a directory of helidecks (helideck directory (HD)) intended to be used by the operator. The directory should provide details of helideck limitations and a pictorial representation of each offshore location and its helicopter landing area, recording all necessary information of a permanent nature and using a standardised template. The HD entries should show, and be amended as necessary, the most recent status of each helideck concerning noncompliance with applicable national standards, limitations, warnings, cautions or other comments of operational importance. An example of a typical template is shown in Figure 1 of GM1 SPA.HOFO.115 below.
- (b) In order to ensure that the safety of flights is not compromised, the operator should obtain relevant information and details in order to compile the HD, as well as the pictorial representation from the owner/operator of the offshore helicopter landing area.
- (c) If more than one name for the offshore location exists, the common name painted on the surface of the landing area should be listed, but other names should also be included in the HD (e.g. radio call sign, if different). After renaming an offshore location, the old name should also be included in the HD for the following 6 months.
- (d) Any limitations associated with an offshore location should be included in the HD. With complex installation arrangements, including combinations of installations/vessels (e.g. combined operations), a separate listing in the HD, accompanied by diagrams/pictures, where necessary, may be required.
- (e) Each offshore helicopter landing area should be inspected and assessed based on limitations, warnings, instructions and restrictions, in order to determine its acceptability with respect to the following as a minimum:
  - (1) The physical characteristics of the landing area, including size, load-bearing capability and the appropriate 'D' and 't' values.

Note 1: 'D' is the overall length of the helicopter from the most forward position of the main rotor tip to the most rearward position of the tail rotor tip plane path, or rearmost extension of the fuselage in the case of 'Fenestron' or 'NOTAR' tails.

Note 2: 't' is the maximum allowable mass in tonnes.
  - (2) The preservation of obstacle-protected surfaces (an essential safeguard for all flights). These surfaces are:
    - (i) the minimum 210° obstacle-free surface (OFS) above helideck level;
    - (ii) the 150° limited-obstacle surface (LOS) above helideck level; and

- (iii) the minimum 180° falling '5:1' gradient with respect to significant obstacles below helideck level.

If these sectors/surfaces are infringed, even on a temporary basis, and/or if an adjacent installation or vessel infringes the obstacle-protected surfaces related to the landing area, an assessment should be made to determine whether it is necessary to impose operating limitations and/or restrictions to mitigate any non-compliance with the criteria.

(3) Marking and lighting:

- (i) for operations at night, adequate illumination of the perimeter of the landing area, using perimeter lighting that meets national requirements;
- (ii) for operations at night, adequate illumination of the location of the touchdown marking by use of a lit touchdown/positioning marking and lit helideck identification marking that meet national requirements;
- (iii) status lights (for night and day operations, indicating the status of the helicopter landing area, e.g. a red flashing light indicates 'landing area unsafe: do not land') meeting national requirements;
- (iv) dominant-obstacle paint schemes and lighting;
- (v) condition of helideck markings; and
- (vi) adequacy of general installation and structure lighting.

Any limitations with respect to non-compliance of lighting arrangements may require the HD to be annotated 'daylight only operations'.

(4) Deck surface:

- (i) assessment of surface friction;
- (ii) adequacy and condition of helideck net (where provided);
- (iii) fit for purpose' drainage system;
- (iv) deck edge safety netting or shelving;
- (v) a system of tie-down points that is adequate for the range of helicopters in use; and
- (vi) procedures to ensure that the surface is kept clean of all contaminants, e.g. bird guano, sea spray, snow and ice.

(5) Environment:

- (i) foreign-object damage;
- (ii) an assessment of physical turbulence generators, e.g. structure-induced turbulence due to clad derrick;
- (iii) bird control measures;
- (iv) air flow degradation due to gas turbine exhaust emissions (turbulence and thermal effects), flares (thermal effects) or cold gas vents (unburned flammable gas); and
- (v) adjacent offshore installations may need to be included in the environmental assessment.

To assess for potential adverse environmental effects, as described in (ii), (iv) and (v) above, an offshore location should be subject to appropriate studies, e.g. wind tunnel testing and/or computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis.

(6) Rescue and firefighting:

- (i) systems for delivery of firefighting media to the landing area, e.g. deck integrated firefighting system (DIFFS);
- (ii) delivery of primary media types, assumed critical area, application rate and duration;
- (iii) deliveries of complementary agent(s) and media types, capacity and discharge;
- (iv) personal protective equipment (PPE); and
- (v) rescue equipment and crash box/cabinet.

(7) Communication and navigation (Com/Nav):

- (i) aeronautical radio(s);


- (ii) radio-telephone (R/T) call sign to match the offshore location name with the side identification that should be simple and unique; and
  - (iii) radio log.
- (8) Fuelling facilities:
  - in accordance with the relevant national guidance and legislation.
- (9) Additional operational and handling equipment:
  - (i) windsock;
  - (ii) meteorological information, including wind, pressure, air temperature, and dew point temperature, and equipment recording and displaying mean wind (10-min wind) and gusts;
  - (iii) helideck motion recording and reporting system, where applicable;
  - (iv) passenger briefing system;
  - (v) chocks;
  - (vi) tie-down strops/ropes;
  - (vii) weighing scales;
  - (viii) a suitable power source for starting helicopters (e.g. ground power unit (GPU)), where applicable; and
  - (ix) (equipment for clearing the landing area of snow, ice and other contaminants.
- (10) Personnel:
  - trained helicopter-landing-area staff (e.g. helicopter landing officer/helicopter deck assistant and firefighters, etc.); persons required to assess local weather conditions or communicate with the helicopter by radio-telephony should be appropriately qualified.
- (f) The HD entry for each offshore location should be completed and kept up to date, using the template and reflecting the information and details described in (e) above. The template should contain at least the following (GM1 SPA.HOFO.115 below is provided as an example):
  - (1) details:
    - (i) name of offshore location;
    - (ii) R/T call sign;
    - (iii) helicopter landing area identification marking;
    - (iv) side panel identification marking;
    - (v) landing area elevation;
    - (vi) maximum installation/vessel height;
    - (vii) helideck size and/or 'D' value;
    - (viii) type of offshore location:
      - (A) fixed, permanently manned installation;
      - (B) fixed, normally unattended installation;
      - (C) vessel type (e.g. diving support vessel, tanker, etc.);
      - (D) semi-submersible, mobile, offshore drilling unit;
      - (E) jack-up, mobile, offshore drilling unit;
      - (F) floating production, storage and offloading (FPSO);
    - (ix) name of owner/operator;
    - (x) geographical position, where appropriate;
    - (xi) Com/Nav frequencies and identification;

- (xii) general drawing of the offshore location that shows the helicopter landing area with annotations indicating location of derrick, masts, cranes, flare stack, turbine and gas exhausts, side identification panels, windsock, etc.;
  - (xiii) plan view drawing, and chart orientation from the general drawing to show the above; the plan view should also show the 210-degree sector orientation in degrees true;
  - (xiv) type of fuelling:
    - (A) pressure and gravity;
    - (B) pressure only;
    - (C) gravity only; and
    - (D) none;
  - (xv) type and nature of firefighting equipment;
  - (xvi) availability of GPU;
  - (xvii) deck heading;
  - (xviii) 't' value ;
  - (xix) status light system (Yes/No); and
  - (xx) revision publication date or number; and
- (2) one or more diagrams/photographs, and any other suitable guidance to assist pilots.
- (g) For offshore locations for which there is incomplete information, 'restricted' usage based on the information available may be considered by the operator, subject to risk assessment prior to the first helicopter visit. During subsequent operations, and before any restriction on usage is lifted, information should be gathered and the following should apply:
- (1) pictorial (static) representation:
    - (i) template blanks (GM1 SPA.HOFO.115 is provided as an example) should be available to be filled in during flight preparation on the basis of the information given by the offshore location owner/operator and of flight crew observations;
    - (ii) where possible, suitably annotated photographs may be used until the HD entry and template have been completed;
    - (iii) until the HD entry and template have been completed, conservative operational restrictions (e.g. performance, routing, etc.) may be applied;
    - (iv) any previous inspection reports should be obtained and reviewed by the operator; and
    - (v) an inspection of the offshore helicopter landing area should be carried out to verify the content of the completed HD entry and template; once found suitable, the landing area may be considered authorised for use by the operator; and
  - (2) with reference to the above, the HD entry should contain at least the following:
    - (i) HD revision date or number;
    - (ii) generic list of helideck motion limitations;
    - (iii) name of offshore location;
    - (iv) helideck size and/or 'D' value and 't' value; and
    - (v) limitations, warnings, instructions and restrictions.

**GM1 SPA.HOFO.115 Use of offshore locations**

Figure 1 – Example of a helicopter landing area template

Operator		10-1	Revision Date	
Installation/vessel name		Position	(N/S XXX)	(E/W XXX)
Deck height	Installation height	Highest obstacle within 5 nm	Deck Handling	Deck ident
(XXX ft)	(XXX ft)			
AIMS/ICAO code	Radio	Radio	Deck category	Side ident
			(1/2/3)	
Deck size (m)	T value (XXX kg)	Cleared for (above D or t values)	Installation type	Operator
		(Helicopter type xxx)	(Fixed/semi/etc.)	
Fuel	Ground power	Inspection date	Inspected by	Next due
(Press/gravity/no)	(AC/DC/no)			





Wind direction	Wind speed	Limitations
(All)	(All)	(Performance requirements)



(000-050)	(>30)	
5:1 non-compliant obstacles		
Additional information		

Figure 2 – Example of a helicopter landing area template





## **GM2 SPA.HOFO.115 Use of offshore locations**

Operators should use available standards and regulations provided for operations to offshore locations such as those contained in United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (UK CAA) CAP 437 'Standards for Offshore Helicopter Landing Areas', Norwegian Civil Aviation Regulation BSL D 5-1 or similar national documentation, or ICAO Annex 14, Vol II 'Heliports'.

## **AMC1 SPA.HOFO.120 Selection of aerodromes and operating sites**

### **DESTINATION AERODROME – SUFFICIENT OPERATIONAL CONTINGENCY**

- (a) Any alleviation from the requirement to select an alternate aerodrome under instrument flight rules (IFR) routing from offshore should be based on an individual safety risk assessment with sufficient operational contingency to ensure a safe return from offshore.

#### **REVISED AERODROME OPERATING MINIMA**

- (b) Unless the destination is a coastal aerodrome, the operator should ensure that all the following criteria are met:
- (1) the destination aerodrome has a published instrument approach;
  - (2) the flight time is less than 3 hours; and
  - (3) the published weather forecast valid from 1 hour prior, and 1 hour subsequent to the expected landing time specifies that:
    - (i) the ceiling is at least 700 ft above the minima associated with the instrument approach, or 1 000 ft above the destination aerodrome, whichever is the higher; and
    - (ii) visibility is at least 2 500 m.

### **COASTAL AERODROME**

- (c) A coastal aerodrome is an aerodrome used for offshore operations within 5 nm of the coastline.
- (d) If the coastal aerodrome has a published instrument approach, the operator should use the aerodrome operating minima defined in (b)(3).
- (e) The operator may use the following operating minima by day only, as an alternative to (b)(3):
- (1) the cloud base is at least 400 ft above the minima associated with the instrument approach; and
  - (2) visibility is at least 4 km.
- (f) If descent over the sea is intended to meet VFR criteria, the operator should ensure that the coastal aerodrome is geographically sited so that the helicopter is able, within the rules of the air and within the landing forecast, to proceed inbound from the coast and carry out an approach and landing in full compliance with VFR for the associated airspace category(ies) and any notified route.
- (g) If the operator makes use of the provisions in (e) or (f), the following should be taken into account as part of the risk assessment:
- (1) where the destination coastal aerodrome is not directly on the coast, the required usable fuel for the flight should be sufficient to return to the coast at any time after crossing the coastline, descend safely, carry out an approach under VFR and land, with the VFR fuel reserves intact;
  - (2) the descent to establish visual contact with the surface should take place over the sea away from the coastline and in an area clear of surface obstructions, or as part of the instrument approach;
  - (3) routings and procedures for coastal aerodromes nominated as such should be included in the operations manual (Part C for CAT operators);
  - (4) the MEL should reflect the requirement for airborne radar and radio altimeter for this type of operation; and
  - (5) operational limitations for each coastal aerodrome should be specified in the operations manual.

## **AMC2 SPA.HOFO.120 Selection of aerodromes and operating sites**

### **OFFSHORE DESTINATION ALTERNATE AERODROME**

'Aerodrome' is referred to as 'helideck' in this AMC.

- (a) Offshore destination alternate helideck landing environment

The landing environment at an offshore location proposed for use as an offshore destination alternate helideck should be pre-surveyed, together with the physical characteristics, such as the effect of wind direction and strength,

as well as of turbulence established. This information, which should be available to the pilot-in-command/commander both at the planning stage and in-flight, should be published in an appropriate form in the operations manual (OM) (including the orientation of the helideck) so that the suitability of the alternate helideck can be assessed. This helideck should meet the criteria for size and obstacle clearance appropriate to the performance requirements of the type of helicopter concerned.

(b) Performance considerations

The use of an offshore destination alternate helideck should be restricted to helicopters that can achieve one engine inoperative (OEI) in ground effect (IGE) hover at an appropriate power rating above the helideck at the offshore location. Where the surface of the helideck or prevailing conditions (especially wind velocity) precludes an OEI IGE, OEI out-of-ground effect (OGE) hover performance at an appropriate power rating should be used to compute the landing mass. The landing mass should be calculated based on graphs provided in the operations manual (OM) (Part B for CAT operators). When this landing mass is computed, due account should be taken of helicopter configuration, environmental conditions and the operation of systems that have an adverse effect on performance. The planned landing mass of the helicopter, including crew, passengers, baggage, cargo plus 30-min final reserve fuel (FRF), should not exceed the OEI landing mass of the helicopter at the time of approach to the offshore destination alternate.

(c) Weather considerations

(1) Meteorological observations

When the use of an offshore destination alternate helideck is planned, the meteorological observations, both at the offshore destination and the alternate helideck, should be made by an observer acceptable to the authority responsible for the provision of meteorological services. Automatic meteorological-observation stations may be used.

(2) Weather minima

When the use of an offshore destination alternate helideck is planned, the operator should neither select an offshore location as destination nor as alternate helideck unless the weather forecasts for the two offshore locations indicate that during a period commencing 1 h before and ending 1 h after the expected time of arrival at the destination and the alternate helideck, the weather conditions will be at or above the planning minima shown in the following table:

**Table 1 — Planning minima**

Planning minima		
	Day	Night
Cloud base	600 ft	800 ft
Visibility	4 km	5 km

(3) Conditions of fog

To use an offshore destination alternate helideck, it should be ensured that fog is not forecast or present within 60 nm of the destination helideck and alternate helideck during the period commencing 1 h before and ending 1 h after the expected time of arrival at the offshore destination or alternate helideck.

(d) Actions at point of no return

Before passing the point of no return, which should not be more than 30 min from the destination, the following actions should have been completed:

- (1) confirmation that navigation to the offshore destination and offshore destination alternate helideck can be assured;
- (2) radio contact with the offshore destination and offshore destination alternate helideck (or master station) has been established;
- (3) the landing forecast at the offshore destination and offshore destination alternate helideck have been obtained and confirmed to be at or above the required minima;
- (4) the requirements for OEI landing (see (b) above) have been checked in the light of the latest reported weather conditions to ensure that they can be met; and

- (5) to the extent possible, having regard to information on the current and forecast use of the offshore alternate helideck and on prevailing conditions, the availability of the helideck on the offshore location intended as destination alternate helideck should be guaranteed by the duty holder (the rig operator in the case of fixed installations, and the owner in the case of mobile ones) until the landing at the destination, or the offshore destination alternate helideck, has been achieved or until offshore shuttling has been completed.

#### **AMC1 SPA.HOFO.125 Offshore standard approach procedures (OSAPs)**

##### **AIRBORNE RADAR APPROACH (ARA)**

- (a) Before commencing the final approach, the pilot-in-command/commander should ensure that a clear path exists on the radar screen for the final and missed approach segments. If lateral clearance from any obstacle will be less than 1 nm, the pilot-in-command/commander should:
- (1) approach to a nearby target structure and thereafter proceed visually to the destination structure; or
  - (2) make the approach from another direction leading to a circling manoeuvre.
- (b) The cloud ceiling should be sufficiently clear above the helideck to permit a safe landing.
- (c) Minimum descent height (MDH) should not be less than 50 ft above the elevation of the helideck:
- (1) the MDH for an airborne radar approach should not be lower than:
    - (i) 200 ft by day; or
    - (ii) 300 ft by night; and
  - (2) the MDH for an approach leading to a circling manoeuvre should not be lower than:
    - (i) 300 ft by day; or
    - (ii) 500 ft by night.
- (d) Minimum descent altitude (MDA) may only be used if the radio altimeter is unserviceable. The MDA should be a minimum of the MDH + 200 ft, and be based on a calibrated barometer at the destination or on the lowest forecast barometric pressure adjusted to sea level (QNH) for the region.
- (e) The decision range should not be less than 0.75 nm.
- (f) The MDA/MDH for a single-pilot ARA should be 100 ft higher than that calculated in accordance with (c) and (d) above. The decision range should not be less than 1 nm.
- (g) For approaches to non-moving offshore locations, the maximum range discrepancy between the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) and the weather radar display should not be greater than 0.3 nm at any point between the final approach fix (FAF) at 4 nm from the offshore location and the offset initiation point (OIP) at 1.5 nm from the offshore location.
- (h) For approaches to non-moving offshore locations, the maximum bearing discrepancy between the GNSS and the weather radar display should not be greater than 10° at the FAF at 4 nm from the offshore location.

#### **AMC2 SPA.HOFO.125 Offshore standard approach procedures (OSAPs)**

##### **OSAP — ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER (OEM) — CERTIFIED APPROACH SYSTEM**

Where an OSAP is conducted to a non-moving offshore location (i.e. fixed installation or moored vessel), and an original equipment manufacturer (OEM)-certified approach system is available, the use of automation to reach a reliable GNSS position for that location should be used to enhance the safety of the OSAP.

The OSAP should meet the following requirements:

- (a) The OEM-certified approach system should be approved in accordance with the applicable airworthiness requirements for operations at night and in IMC.
- (b) The aircraft should be equipped with a radar altimeter and a suitable airborne radar.
- (c) The GNSS position of the installation should be retrieved from the area navigation system database or by manual entry if the aircraft flight management system will allow for that.
- (d) The approach system vertical path should be a Baro VNAV or a GNSS SBAS vertical source type. The radar height should be cross-checked (either automatically or by the crew) to avoid erroneous QNH selection.
- (e) The descent angle should be of a maximum of 4°. Up to 6° could be acceptable only if the GS is reduced to 60 kt.

- (f) The minimum descent height (MDH) should not be less than 50 ft above the elevation of the helideck:
  - (1) the MDH for an approach should not be lower than:
    - (i) 200 ft by day; or
    - (ii) 300 ft by night; and
  - (2) the MDH for an approach leading to a circling manoeuvre should not be lower than:
    - (i) 300 ft by day; or
    - (ii) 500 ft by night.
- (g) The minimum descent altitude (MDA) may only be used if the radio altimeter is unserviceable. The MDA should be a minimum of the MDH + 200 ft and should be based on a calibrated barometer at destination or on the lowest forecast barometric pressure adjusted to sea level (QNH) for the region.
- (h) The MDA/H for a single-pilot ARA should be 100 ft higher than that calculated in accordance with (f) and (g) above. The decision range should not be less than 1 NM.
- (i) The approach system lateral path guidance should be capable of at least performance monitoring and alerting function of RNP 0.3 NM up to the missed approach point (MAPt), then RNP 1.0 NM to missed approach holding point.
- (j) The horizontal flight path should be defined in accordance with the RNP capability of the approach system (e.g. offset no lower than the RNP capability).
- (k) The maximum acceptable offset angle between the final inbound course and the installation should be 30°.
- (l) Before commencing the final approach, the pilot-in-command/commander should ensure that a clear path exists on the radar screen for the final and missed approach segments. If lateral clearance from any obstacle is less than the navigation performance, the pilot-in-command/commander should:
  - (3) approach to a nearby target structure and thereafter proceed visually to the destination structure; or
  - (4) make the approach from another direction leading to a circling manoeuvre.
- (m) The minimum decision range (MDR) should not be less than 0.75 NM. The maximum acceptable GS at the MAPt for a 0.75-NM MDR should be 80 kt.
- (n) The segment from the MAPt to destination should not be flown in tailwind conditions. The approach course should be selectable accordingly.
- (o) The aircraft should have the capability to compare the airborne radar picture and GNSS range and bearing data to cross-check the position of the offshore location.

### **GM1 SPA.HOFO.125 Offshore standard approach procedures (OSAPs)**

#### **AIRBORNE RADAR APPROACH (ARA)**

- (a) General
  - (1) The helicopter ARA procedure may have as many as five separate segments: the arrival, initial, intermediate, final approach, and missed approach segment. In addition, the specifications of the circling manoeuvre to a landing under visual conditions should be considered. The individual approach segments can begin and end at designated fixes. However, the segments of an ARA may often begin at specified points where no fixes are available.
  - (2) The fixes, or points, are named to coincide with the beginning of the associated segment. For example, the intermediate segment begins at the intermediate fix (IF) and ends at the final approach fix (FAF). Where no fix is available or appropriate, the segments begin and end at specified points; for example, at the intermediate point (IP) and final approach point (FAP). The order in which the segments are discussed in this GM is the order in which the pilot would fly them in a complete procedure: that is, from the arrival through the initial and intermediate to the final approach and, if necessary, to the missed approach.
  - (3) Only those segments that are required by local conditions applying at the time of the approach need to be included in a procedure. In constructing the procedure, the final approach track, which should be orientated so as to be substantially into the wind, should be identified first as it is the least flexible and most critical of all the segments. When the origin and the orientation of the final approach have been

determined, the other necessary segments should be integrated with it to produce an orderly manoeuvring pattern that does not generate an unacceptably high workload for the flight crew.

- (4) Where an ARA is conducted to a non-moving offshore location (i.e. fixed installation or moored vessel), and a reliable global navigation satellite system (GNSS) position for the location is available, the GNSS/area navigation system should be used to enhance the safety of the ARA. This is achieved by using the GNSS/area navigation system to navigate the helicopter onto, and maintain, the final approach track, and by using the GNSS range and bearing information to crosscheck the position of the offshore location on the weather radar display.
  - (5) Examples of ARA procedures, as well as vertical profile and missed approach procedures, are contained in Figures 1 and 2 below.
- (b) Obstacle environment
- (1) Each segment of the ARA is located in an overwater area that has a flat surface at sea level. However, due to the passage of large vessels which are not required to notify their presence, the exact obstacle environment cannot be determined. As the largest vessels and structures are known to reach elevations exceeding 500 ft above mean sea level (AMSL), the uncontrolled offshore obstacle environment applying to the arrival, initial and intermediate approach segments can reasonably be assumed to be capable of reaching to at least 500 ft AMSL. Nevertheless, in the case of the final approach and missed approach segments, specific areas are involved within which no radar returns are allowed. In these areas, the height of wave crests, and the possibility that small obstacles may be present that are not visible on radar, results in an uncontrolled surface environment that extends to an elevation of 50 ft AMSL.
  - (2) Information about movable obstacles should be requested from the arrival destination or adjacent installations.
  - (3) Under normal circumstances, the relationship between the approach procedure and the obstacle environment is governed by the concept that vertical separation is very easy to apply during the arrival, initial and intermediate segments, while horizontal separation, which is much more difficult to guarantee in an uncontrolled environment, is applied only in the final and missed approach segments.
- (c) Arrival segment
- The arrival segment commences at the last en-route navigation fix, where the aircraft leaves the helicopter route, and it ends either at the initial approach fix (IAF) or, if no course reversal or similar manoeuvre is required, it ends at the IF. Standard en-route obstacle clearance criteria should be applied to the arrival segment.
- (d) Initial approach segment
- The initial approach segment is only required if the intermediate approach track cannot be joined directly. Most approaches will be flown direct to a point close to the IF, and then on to the final approach track, using GNSS/area navigation guidance. The segment commences at the IAF, and on completion of the manoeuvre, it ends at the IP. The minimum obstacle clearance (MOC) assigned to the initial approach segment is 1 000 ft.
- (e) Intermediate approach segment
- The intermediate approach segment commences at the IP, or in the case of straight-in approaches, where there is no initial approach segment, it commences at the IF. The segment ends at the FAP and should not be less than 2 nm in length. The purpose of the intermediate segment is to align the helicopter with the final approach track and prepare it for the final approach. During the intermediate segment, the helicopter should be lined up with the final approach track, the speed should be stabilised, the destination should be identified on the radar, and the final approach and missed approach areas should be identified and verified to be clear of radar returns. The MOC assigned to the intermediate segment is 500 ft.
- (f) Final approach segment
- (1) The final approach segment commences at the FAP and ends at the missed approach point (MAPt). The final approach area, which should be identified on radar, takes the form of a corridor between the FAP and the radar return of the destination. This corridor should not be less than 2 nm wide so that the projected track of the helicopter does not pass closer than 1 nm to the obstacles lying outside the area.
  - (2) On passing the FAP, the helicopter will descend below the intermediate approach altitude and follow a descent gradient which should not be steeper than 6.5 %. At this stage, vertical separation from the offshore obstacle environment will be lost. However, within the final approach area, the MDA/MDH will



provide separation from the surface environment. Descent from 1 000 ft AMSL to 200 ft AMSL at a constant 6.5 % gradient will involve a horizontal distance of 2 nm. In order to follow the guideline that the procedure should not generate an unacceptably high workload for the flight crew, the required actions of levelling off at MDH, changing heading at the offset initiation point (OIP), and turning away at the MAPt, should not be planned to occur at the same time from the destination.

- (3) During the final approach, compensation for drift should be applied, and the heading which, if maintained, would take the helicopter directly to the destination should be identified. It follows that at an OIP located at a range of 1.5 nm, a heading change of 10° is likely to result in a track offset of 15° at 1 nm, and the extended centre line of the new track can be expected to have a mean position approximately 300–400 m to one side of the destination structure. The safety margin built into the 0.75-nm decision range (DR) is dependent upon the rate of closure with the destination. Although the airspeed should be in the range of 60–90 KIAS during the final approach, the ground speed, after due allowance for wind velocity, should not be greater than 70 kt.

(g) Missed approach segment

- (1) The missed approach segment commences at the MAPt and ends when the helicopter reaches the minimum en route altitude. The missed approach manoeuvre is a 'turning missed approach' which should be of not less than 30° and should not, normally, be greater than 45°. A turn away of more than 45° does not reduce the collision risk factor any further nor does it permit a closer DR. However, turns of more than 45° may increase the risk of pilot disorientation, and by inhibiting the rate of climb (especially in the case of an OEI missed approach procedure), may keep the helicopter at an extremely low level for longer than it is desirable.
- (2) The missed approach area to be used should be identified and verified as a clear area on the radar screen during the intermediate approach segment. The base of the missed approach area is a sloping surface at 2.5 % gradient starting from MDH at the MAPt. The concept is that a helicopter executing a turning missed approach will be protected by the horizontal boundaries of the missed approach area until vertical separation of more than 130 ft is achieved between the base of the area and the offshore obstacle environment of 500 ft AMSL that prevails outside the area.
- (3) A missed approach area, taking the form of a 45° sector orientated left or right of the final approach track, originating from a point 5 nm short of the destination, and terminating on an arc 3 nm beyond the destination, should normally satisfy the specifications of a 30° turning missed approach.

(h) Required visual reference

The visual reference required is that the destination should be in view in order to be able to carry out a safe landing.

(i) Radar equipment

During the ARA procedure, colour mapping radar equipment with a 120° sector scan and a 2.5-nm range scale selected may result in dynamic errors of the following order:

- (1) bearing/tracking error of  $\pm 4.5^\circ$  with 95 % accuracy;
- (2) mean ranging error of 250 m; or
- (3) random ranging error of  $\pm 250$  m with 95 % accuracy.

Figure 1 — Horizontal profile





Figure 2 — Vertical profile



**GM2 SPA.HOFO.125 Offshore standard approach procedures (OSAPs)**

**GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM (GNSS)/AREA NAVIGATION SYSTEM – AIRBORNE RADAR APPROACH (ARA)**

Where an ARA is conducted to a non-moving offshore location (i.e. fixed installation or moored vessel), and the GNSS/area navigation system is used to enhance the safety of the ARA, the following procedure or equivalent should be applied:

- (a) selection from the area navigation system database or manual entry of the offshore location;
- (b) manual entry of the final approach fix (FAF) or intermediate fix (IF), as a range of and bearing from the offshore location;
- (c) the full-scale deviation of the GNSS/area navigation system display should be in accordance with the expected navigation performance and be no greater than 1 NM;
- (d) comparison of weather radar and GNSS range and bearing data to cross-check the position of the offshore location;
- (e) use of GNSS guidance to guide the aircraft onto the final approach track during the initial or intermediate approach segments;
- (f) use of GNSS guidance from the FAF towards the offset initiation point (OIP) during the final approach segment to establish the helicopter on the correct approach track and, hence, heading;
- (g) transition from GNSS guidance to navigation based on headings once the track is stabilised and before reaching OIP;
- (h) use of GNSS range of and bearing to the offshore location during the intermediate and final approach segments to cross-check weather radar information (for correct ‘painting’ of the destination and, hence, of other obstacles);
- (i) use of GNSS range of the offshore location to enhance confidence in the weather radar determination of arrival at the OIP and MAP; and
- (j) use of GNSS range of and bearing to the destination to monitor separation from the offshore location.

## **AMC1 SPA.OFO.125(g) Offshore standard approach procedures (OSAPs)**

### **TRAINING AND CHECKING FOR OSAPs**

- (a) Initial training and checking for OSAPs should be conducted either as part of the operator's conversion course or as a separate equipment and procedure training, and should include all of the following:
- (1) ground training, including knowledge of:
    - (i) the structure of the OSAP;
    - (ii) the airborne radar specifications, limitations, modes, and usage;
    - (iii) the area navigation system, as necessary for the envisaged OSAP;
  - (2) aircraft/FSTD training, including all of the following:
    - (i) OSAPs to various offshore sites with and without obstacles or obstructions;
    - (ii) OSAPs in different wind conditions, followed by landings and go-arounds;
    - (iii) OSAPs in the pilot-monitoring, pilot-flying and single-pilot functions, by day and by night, as relevant to the kind of operations;
  - (3) LIFUS;
  - (4) line check.
- (b) The recurrent training and checking programme should include at least one OSAP per year in the pilot-monitoring, pilot-flying and single-pilot functions as relevant to the kind of operations. OSAPs should be part of the annual aircraft/FSTD training, the line check or the operator's proficiency check. Checking is not necessary if training to proficiency is employed.

## **AMC1 SPA.HOFO.140 Performance requirements — take-off and landing at offshore locations**

### **FACTORS**

To ensure that the necessary factors are taken into account, operators not conducting CAT operations should use take-off and landing procedures that are appropriate to the circumstances and have been developed in accordance with ORO.MLR.100 in order to minimise the risks of collision with obstacles at the individual offshore location under the prevailing conditions.

## **AMC1 SPA.HOFO.145 Flight data monitoring (FDM) programme**

### **FDM PROGRAMME**

Refer to AMC1 ORO.AOC.130.

## **GM1 SPA.HOFO.145 Flight data monitoring (FDM) programme**

### **DEFINITION OF AN FDM PROGRAMME**

Refer to GM1 ORO.AOC.130, except for the examples that are specific to aeroplane operation.

## **GM2 SPA.HOFO.145 Flight data monitoring (FDM) programme**

### **ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE AND INDUSTRY GOOD PRACTICE**

- (a) Additional guidance material for the establishment of an FDM programme can be found in:
- (1) International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Doc 10000 — Manual on Flight Data Analysis Programmes (FDAP); and
  - (2) United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (UK CAA) CAP 739 — Flight Data Monitoring.
- (b) Examples of industry good practice for the establishment of FDM can be found in:
- (1) HeliOffshore— Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring (HFDM) Recommended Practice for Oil and Gas Passenger Transport Operations, Version 1.0, September 2020 (HO-HFDM-RP-v1.0);
  - (2) European Operators Flight Data Monitoring forum (EOFDM) — Preparing a memorandum of understanding for an FDM programme;
  - (3) EOFDM — Best practice document: Key performance indicators for a Flight Data Monitoring programme; and

- (4) EOFDM — ‘Breaking the silos’, Fully integrating Flight Data Monitoring into the Safety Management System.
- (c) Table 1 provides examples of FDM event definitions that may be further developed using operator- and helicopter-specific limits. This table is considered illustrative and non-exhaustive. Appendix 5 to HO-HFDM-RP-v1.0 contains other examples of FDM event definitions. More important than the number of FDM event definitions that are programmed in the FDM software is that those definitions cover, as much as practicable, the operational risks that have been identified by the operator.

**Table 1 — Examples of FDM event definitions**

Event title/description	Parameters required	Comments
<b>Ground</b>		
Outside air temperature (OAT) high — Operating limits	OAT	To identify when the helicopter is operated at the limits of OAT.
Sloping-ground high-pitch attitude	Pitch attitude, ground switch (similar)	To identify when the helicopter is operated at the slope limits.
Sloping-ground high-roll attitude	Roll attitude, ground switch (similar)	To identify when the helicopter is operated at the slope limits.
Rotor brake on at an excessive number of rotations (main rotor speed) (NR)	Rotor brake discreet, NR	Rotor brake discreet, NR
Ground taxiing speed — max	Ground speed (GS), ground switch (similar)	To identify when the helicopter is ground taxied at high speed (wheeled helicopters only).
Air taxiing speed — max	GS, ground switch (similar), radio altitude (Rad Alt)	To identify when the helicopter is air taxied at high speed.
Excessive power during ground taxiing	Total torque (Tq), ground switch (similar), GS	To identify when excessive power is used during ground taxiing.
Pedal — max left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) taxiing	Pedal position, ground switch (similar), GS or NR	To identify when the helicopter flight controls (pedals) are used to excess on the ground. GS or NR to exclude control test prior to rotor start.
Excessive yaw rate on ground during taxiing	Yaw rate, ground switch (similar), or Rad Alt	To identify when the helicopter yaws at a high rate when on the ground.
Yaw rate in hover or on ground	Yaw rate, GS, ground switch (similar)	To identify when the helicopter yaws at a high rate when in a hover.
High lateral acceleration (rapid cornering)	Lateral acceleration, ground switch (similar)	To identify high levels of lateral acceleration, when ground taxiing, that indicate high cornering speed.
High longitudinal acceleration (rapid braking)	Longitudinal acceleration, ground switch (similar)	To identify high levels of longitudinal acceleration, when ground taxiing, that indicate excessive braking.

Cyclic-movement limits during taxiing (pitch or roll)	Cyclic stick position, ground switch (similar), Rad Alt, NR or GS	To identify excessive movement of the rotor disc when running on ground. GS or NR to exclude control test prior to rotor start.
Excessive longitudinal and lateral cyclic rate of movement on ground	Longitudinal cyclic pitch rate, lateral cyclic pitch rate, NR	To detect an excessive rate of movement of cyclic control when on the ground with rotors running.
Lateral cyclic movement — closest to LH and RH rollover	Lateral cyclic position, pedal position, roll attitude, elapsed time, ground switch (similar)	To detect the risk of a helicopter rollover due to an incorrect combination of tail rotor pedal position and lateral cyclic control position when on ground.
Excessive cyclic control with insufficient collective pitch on ground	Collective pitch, longitudinal cyclic pitch, lateral cyclic pitch	To detect an incorrect taxiing technique likely to cause rotor head damage.
Inadvertent lift-off	Ground switch (similar), autopilot discreet	To detect inadvertent lifting into hover.
Flight — Take-off and landing		
Day or night landing or take-off	Latitude and Longitude (Lat & Long), local time or UTC	To provide day/night relevance to detected events.
Specific location of landing or take-off	Lat & Long, ground switch (similar), Rad Alt, total Tq	To give contextual information concerning departures and destinations.
Gear extension and retraction — airspeed limit	Indicated airspeed (IAS), gear position	To identify when undercarriage airspeed limitations are breached.
Gear extension & retraction — height limit	Gear position, Rad Alt	To identify when undercarriage altitude limitations are breached.
Heavy landing	Normal/vertical acceleration, ground switch (similar)	To identify when hard/heavy landings take place.
Cabin heater on (take-off and landing)	Cabin heater discreet, ground switch (similar)	To identify use of engine bleed air during periods of high power demand.
High GS prior to touchdown (TD)	GS, Rad Alt, ground switch (similar), elapsed time, latitude, longitude	To assist in the identification of ‘quick stop’ approaches.
Flight — Speed		
High airspeed — with power	IAS, Tq 1, Tq 2, pressure altitude (Palt), OAT	To identify excessive airspeed in flight.

High airspeed — low altitude	IAS, Rad Alt	To identify excessive airspeed in low-level flight.
Low airspeed at altitude	IAS, Rad Alt	To identify a ‘hover out of ground’ effect.
Airspeed on departure (< 300 ft)	IAS, ground switch (similar), Rad Alt	To identify shallow departure.
High airspeed — power off	IAS, Tq 1, Tq 2 or one engine inoperative (OEI) discreet, Palt, OAT	To identify limitation exceedance of power-off airspeed.
Downwind flight within 60 sec of take-off	IA S, GS, elapsed time	To detect early downwind turn after take-off.
Downwind flight within 60 sec of landing	IAS, GS, elapsed time	To detect late turn to final shortly before landing.
Flight — Height		
Altitude — max	Palt.	To detect flight outside of the published flight envelope
Climb rate — max	Vertical speed (V/S), or Palt, or Rad Alt, Elapsed time	Identification of excessive rates of climb (RoC) can be determined from an indication/rate of change of Palt or Rad Alt.
High rate of descent	V/S	To identify excessive rates of descent (RoD).
High rate of descent (speed or height limit)	V/S, IAS or Rad Alt or elevation	To identify RoD at low level or low speed.
Settling with power (vortex ring)	V/S, IAS, GS, Tq.	To detect high-power settling with low speed and with excessive rate of descent.
Minimum altitude in autorotation	NR, total Tq, Rad Alt	To detect late recovery from autorotation.
Low cruising (inertial systems)	GS, V/S, elevation, Lat & Long	To detect an extended low-level flight. Ground speed is less accurate with more false alarms. Lat & Long used for geographical boundaries.
Low cruising (integrated systems)	Rad Alt, elapsed time, Lat & Long, ground switch (similar)	To detect an extended low-level flight.
Flight — Attitude and controls		
Excessive pitch (height related — turnover (T/O), cruising or landing)	Pitch attitude, Rad Alt elevation, Lat & Long	To identify inappropriate use of excessive pitch attitude during flight. Height limits may be used (i.e. on take-off and landing or < 500 ft) — Lat & Long required for specific-location-related limits. Elevation less accurate than Rad Alt. Elevation can be used to

		identify the landing phase in a specific location.
Excessive pitch (speed related — T/O, cruising or landing)	Pitch attitude, IAS, GS, Lat & Long	To identify inappropriate use of excessive pitch attitude during flight. Speed limits may be used (i.e. on take-off and landing or in cruising) — Lat & Long required for specific-location-related limits. GS less accurate than IAS.
Excessive pitch rate	Pitch rate, Rad Alt, IAS, ground switch (similar), Lat & Long	To identify inappropriate use of excessive rate of pitch change during flight. Height limits may be used (i.e. on take-off and landing). IAS only for IAS limit, ground switch (similar) and Lat & Long required for specific-location related limits.
Excessive roll/bank attitude (speed or height related)	Roll attitude, Rad Alt, IAS/GS	To identify excessive use of roll attitude. Rad Alt may be used for height limits, IAS/GS may be used for speed limits.
Excessive roll rate	Roll rate, Rad Alt, Lat & Long, Ground switch (similar)	Rad Alt may be used for height limits, Lat & Long and ground switch (similar) required for specific-location-related and air/ground limits.
Excessive yaw rate	Yaw rate	To detect excessive yaw rates in flight.
Excessive lateral cyclic control	Lateral cyclic position, ground switch (similar)	To detect movement of the lateral cyclic control to extreme left or right positions. Ground switch (similar) required for pre or post T/O.
Excessive longitudinal cyclic control	Longitudinal cyclic position, ground switch (similar)	To detect movement of the longitudinal cyclic control to extreme forward or aft positions. Ground switch (similar) required for pre or post T/O.
Excessive collective pitch control	Collective position, ground switch (similar)	To detect exceedances of the aircraft flight manual (AFM) collective pitch limit. Ground switch (similar) required for pre or post T/O.
Excessive tail rotor control	Pedal position, ground switch (similar)	To detect movement of the tail rotor pedals to extreme left and right positions. Ground switch (similar) required for pre or post T/O.
Manoeuvre G loading or turbulence	Lat & Long, normal accelerations, ground switch (similar) or Rad Alt	To identify excessive G loading of the rotor disc, both positive and negative. Ground switch (similar) required to determine air/ground. Rad Alt required if height limit required.

Pilot workload/turbulence	Collective and/or cyclic and/or tail rotor pedal position and change rate (Lat & Long)	To detect high workload and/or turbulence encountered during take-off and landing phases. Lat & Long required for specific landing sites. A specific and complicated algorithm for this event is required. See United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (UK CAA) Paper 2002/02.
Cross controlling	Roll rate, yaw rate, pitch rate, GS, accelerations	To detect an 'out of balance' flight. Airspeed could be used instead of GS.
Quick stop	GS (min and max), V/S, pitch.	To identify inappropriate flight characteristics. Airspeed could be used instead of GS.
Flight — General		
OEI — Air	OEI discreet, ground switch (similar)	To detect OEI conditions in flight.
Single engine flight	No 1 engine Tq, No 2 engine Tq	To detect single-engine flight.
Torque split	No 1 engine Tq, No 2 engine Tq	To identify engine-related issues.
Pilot event	Pilot event discreet	To identify when flight crews have depressed the pilot event button.
Traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) traffic advisory (TA)	TCAS TA discreet	To identify TCAS alerts.
Training computer active	Training computer mode active or discreet	To identify when helicopter have been on training flights.
High/low rotor speed — power on	NR, Tq (ground switch (similar), IAS, GS)	To identify mishandling of NR. Ground switch (similar), IAS or ground speed required to determine whether helicopter is airborne.
High/low rotor speed — power off	NR, Tq (ground switch (similar), IAS, GS)	To identify mishandling of NR. Ground switch (similar), IAS or ground speed to determine whether helicopter is airborne.
Fuel content low	Fuel contents	To identify low-fuel alerts.
Helicopter terrain awareness and warning system (HTAWS) alert	HTAWS alerts discreet	To identify when HTAWS alerts have been activated.
Automatic voice alert device (AVAD) alert	AVAD discreet	To identify when AVAD alerts have been activated.
Bleed air system use during takeoff (e.g. heating)	Bleed air system discreet, ground switch (similar), IAS	To identify use of engine bleed air during periods of high power demand.



Rotors' running duration	NR, elapsed time	To identify rotors' running time for billing purposes.
Flight — Approach		
Stable approach heading change	Magnetic heading, Rad Alt, ground switch (similar), gear position, elapsed time	To identify unstable approaches.
Stable approach pitch attitude	Pitch attitude, Rad Alt, ground switch (similar), gear position	To identify unstable approaches.
Stable approach rod GS	Altitude rate, Rad Alt, ground switch (similar), gear position	To identify unstable approaches.
Stable approach track change	Track, Rad Alt, ground switch (similar), gear position	To identify unstable approaches.
Stable approach angle of bank	Roll attitude, Rad Alt, ground switch (similar), gear position	To identify unstable approaches.
Stable approach — rod at specified height	Altitude rate, Rad Alt, ground switch (similar), gear position	To identify unstable approaches.
Stable approach — IAS at specified height	IAS, Rad Alt, ground switch (similar), gear position	To identify unstable approaches.
Glideslope deviation above or below	Glideslope deviation	To identify inaccurately flown instrument landing system (ILS) approaches.
Localiser deviation left and right	Localiser deviation	To identify inaccurately flown ILS approaches.
Low turn to final	Elevation, GS, V/S, heading change	Airspeed could be used instead of GS.
Premature turn to final	Elevation, GS, V/S, heading change	Airspeed could be used instead of GS.
Stable approach — climb	IAS (min & max), V/S (min & max), elevation	To identify unstable approaches.
Stable approach — descent	IAS (min & max), V/S, elevation	To identify unstable approaches.
Stable approach — bank	IAS (min & max), V/S, elevation, roll	To identify unstable approaches.
Stable approach — late turn	Heading change, elevation, GS	To identify unstable approaches.

Go-around	Gear select (Rad Alt)	To identify missed approaches. Rad Alt for height limit.
Rate of descent on approach	Altitude rate, Rad Alt, Lat & Long, ground switch (similar)	To identify high rates of descent when at low level on approach. Rad Alt if below specified height, Lat & Long for specified location required.
Flight — Autopilot		
Condition of autopilot in flight	Autopilot discreet	To detect flight without autopilot engaged; per channel for multichannel autopilots.
Autopilot engaged within 10 sec after take-off	Autopilot engaged discreet, elapsed time, ground switch (similar), total Tq, Rad Alt	To identify inadvertent lift-off without autopilot engaged.
Autopilot engaged on ground (postflight or preflight)	Autopilot engaged discreet, elapsed time, ground switch (similar), total Tq, Rad Alt	To identify inappropriate use of autopilot when on ground. Elapsed time required to allow for permissible short periods.
Excessive pitch attitude with autopilot engaged on ground (offshore)	Pitch attitude, autopilot discreet, ground switch (similar), Lat & Long	To identify potential for low NR when helicopter pitches on floating helideck.
Airspeed hold engaged — airspeed (departure or nondeparture)	Autopilot modes discreet, IAS, (ground switch (similar), total Tq, Rad Alt)	To detect early engagement of autopilot higher modes. Ground switch (similar), total Tq and Rad Alt to determine if the flight profile is 'departure'.
Airspeed hold engaged — altitude (departure or non-departure)	Autopilot modes discreet, Rad Alt, (IAS, ground switch (similar), total Tq)	To detect early engagement of autopilot higher modes. IAS, ground switch (similar), total Tq to determine if the flight profile is 'departure'.
Alt mode engaged — altitude (departure or non-departure)	Autopilot modes discreet, Rad Alt, (ground switch (similar), total Tq, IAS)	To detect early engagement of autopilot higher modes. Ground switch (similar), total Tq and Rad Alt to determine if the flight profile is 'departure'.
Alt mode engaged — airspeed (departure or non-departure)	Autopilot modes discreet, IAS, (ground switch (similar), total Tq, Rad Alt)	To detect early engagement of autopilot higher modes. IAS, ground switch (similar), total Tq to determine if the flight profile is 'departure'.
Heading mode engaged — speed	Autopilot modes discreet, IAS	To detect engagement of autopilot higher modes below minimum speed limitations. Ground switch (similar), total Tq and Rad Alt to determine if the flight profile is 'departure'.
V/S mode active — below specified speed	Autopilot modes discreet, IAS	To detect engagement of autopilot higher modes below minimum speed limitations.

VS mode engaged — altitude	Autopilot modes discreet, IAS,	To detect early engagement of (departure or non-departure) (WOW, total Tq, Rad Alt) autopilot higher modes. Ground switch (similar), total Tq and Rad Alt to determine if the flight profile is 'departure'.
Flight director (FD) engaged — speed	FD discreet, IAS	To detect engagement of autopilot higher modes below minimum speed limitations.
FD-coupled approach or take off — airspeed	FD discreet, IAS, ground switch (similar)	To detect engagement of autopilot higher modes below minimum speed limitations.
Go-around mode engaged — airspeed	Autopilot modes discreet, IAS, ground switch (similar), total Tq, Rad Alt	To detect engagement of autopilot higher modes below minimum speed limitations.
Flight without autopilot channels engaged	Autopilot channels	To detect flight without autopilot engaged; per channel for multichannel autopilots.

#### AMC1 SPA.HOFO.150 Aircraft tracking system

##### GENERAL

Flights should be tracked and monitored from take-off to landing. This function may be achieved by the air traffic services (ATS) when the planned route and the planned diversion routes are fully included in airspace blocks where:

- (a) ATS surveillance service is normally provided and supported by ATC surveillance systems locating the aircraft at time intervals with adequate duration; and
- (b) the operator has given to competent air navigation services (ANS) providers the necessary contact information.

In all other cases, the operator should establish a detailed procedure describing how the aircraft tracking system is to be monitored, and what actions and when are to be taken if a deviation or anomaly has been detected.

#### GM1 SPA.HOFO.150 Aircraft tracking system

##### OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE

The procedure should take into account the following aspects:

- (a) the outcome of the risk assessment made when the update frequency of the information was defined;
- (b) the local environment of the intended operations; and
- (c) the relationship with the operator's emergency response plan.

Aircraft tracking data should be recorded on the ground and retained for at least 48 h. Following an accident or a serious incident subject to investigation, the data should be retained for at least 30 days, and the operator should be capable of providing a copy of this data without delay.

#### AMC1 SPA.HOFO.155 Vibration health monitoring (VHM) system

##### GENERAL

Any VHM system should meet all of the following criteria: (a) VHM system capability

The VHM system should measure vibration characteristics of rotating critical components during flight, using suitable vibration sensors, techniques, and recording equipment. The frequency and flight phases of data measurement should be established together with the type certificate holder (TCH) during the initial entry into service. In order to appropriately manage the generated data and focus upon significant issues, an alerting system should be established; this is normally

automatic. Accordingly, alert generation processes should be developed to reliably advise maintenance personnel of the need to intervene and help determine what type of intervention is required. (b) Approval of VHM installation

The VHM system, which typically comprises vibration sensors and associated wiring, data acquisition and processing hardware, the means of downloading data from the helicopter, the ground-based system and all associated instructions for operation of the system, should be certified in accordance with CS-29 or equivalent, established by the Agency.

Note: for applications that may also provide maintenance credit (see Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular (AC) 29-2C Miscellaneous Guidance (MG) 15), the level of system integrity required may be higher. (c) Operational procedures

The operator should establish procedures to address all necessary VHM subjects. (d) Training

The operator should determine which staff will require VHM training, determine appropriate syllabi, and incorporate them into the operator's initial and recurrent training programmes.

### **GM1 SPA.HOFO.155 Vibration health monitoring (VHM) system**

#### **GENERAL**

Operators should utilise available international guidance material provided for the specification and design of VHM systems.

Further guidance can be found in:

- (a) CS 29.1465 Vibration health monitoring and associated AMC;
- (b) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular (AC) 29-2C Miscellaneous Guidance (MG) 15 — Airworthiness Approval of Rotorcraft Health Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS); and
- (c) United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (UK CAA) CAP 753 — Helicopter Vibration Health Monitoring.

### **GM1 SPA.HOFO.160(a)(1) Additional equipment requirements**

#### **PUBLIC ADDRESS (PA) SYSTEM**

When demonstrating the performance of the PA system or that the pilot's voice is understandable at all passengers' seats during flight, the operator should ensure compatibility with the passengers' use of ear defenders/ear plugs (hearing protection). The operator should only provide hearing protection that is compatible with the intelligibility of the PA system or pilot's voice, as appropriate.

### **GM1 SPA.HOFO.160(a)(2) Additional equipment requirements**

#### **RADIO ALTIMETER**

For additional information, please refer to AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.145 Radio altimeters and AMC2 CAT.IDE.H.145 Radio altimeters, as well as to GM1 CAT.IDE.H.145 Radio altimeters.

### **AMC1 SPA.HOFO.165(c) Additional procedures and equipment for operations in hostile environment**

#### **EMERGENCY BREATHING SYSTEM (EBS)**

The EBS of SPA.HOFO.165(c) should be an EBS system capable of rapid underwater deployment.

### **AMC1 SPA.HOFO.165(d) Additional procedures and equipment for operations in hostile environment**

#### **INSTALLATION OF THE LIFE RAFT**

- (a) Projections on the exterior surface of the helicopter that are located in a zone delineated by boundaries that are 1.22 m (4 ft) above and 0.61 m (2 ft) below the established static waterline could cause damage to a deployed life raft. Examples of projections that need to be considered are aerials, overboard vents, unprotected split-pin tails, guttering, and any projection sharper than a three-dimensional right-angled corner.
- (b) While the boundaries specified in (a) above are intended as a guide, the total area that should be considered should also take into account the likely behaviour of the life raft after deployment in all sea states up to the maximum in which the helicopter is capable of remaining upright.
- (c) Wherever a modification or alteration is made to a helicopter within the boundaries specified, the need to prevent the modification or alteration from causing damage to a deployed life raft should be taken into account in the design.
- (d) Particular care should also be taken during routine maintenance to ensure that additional hazards are not introduced by, for example, leaving inspection panels with sharp corners proud of the surrounding fuselage surface, or by allowing door sills to deteriorate to a point where their sharp edges may become a hazard.

## **AMC1 SPA.HOFO.165(h) Additional procedures and equipment for operations in a hostile environment**

### **EMERGENCY EXITS AND ESCAPE HATCHES**

In order for all passengers to escape from the helicopter within an expected underwater survival time of 60 sec in the event of capsizing, the following provisions should be made:

- (a) there should be an easily accessible emergency exit or suitable opening for each passenger;
- (b) an opening in the passenger compartment should be considered suitable as an underwater escape facility if the following criteria are met:
  - (1) the means of opening should be rapid and obvious;
  - (2) passenger safety briefing material should include instructions on the use of such escape facilities;
  - (3) for the egress of passengers with shoulder width of 559 mm (22 in.) or smaller, a rectangular opening should be no smaller than 356 mm (14 in.) wide, with a diagonal between corner radii no smaller than 559 mm (22 in.), when operated in accordance with the instructions;
  - (4) non-rectangular or partially obstructed openings (e.g. by a seat back) should be capable of admitting an ellipse of 559 mm x 356 mm (22 in. x 14 in.); and
  - (5) for the egress of passengers with shoulder width greater than 559 mm (22 in.), openings should be no smaller than 480 mm x 660 mm (19 in. x 26 in.) or be capable of admitting an ellipse of 480 mm x 660 mm (19 in. x 26 in.);
- (c) suitable openings and emergency exits should be used for the underwater escape of no more than two passengers, unless large enough to permit the simultaneous egress of two passengers side by side:
  - (1) if the exit size provides an unobstructed area that encompasses two ellipses of size 480 mm x 660 mm (19 in. x 26 in.) side by side, then it may be used for four passengers; and
  - (2) If the exit size provides an unobstructed area that encompasses two ellipses of size 356 mm x 559 mm (14 in. x 22 in.) side by side, then it may be used for four passengers with shoulder width no greater than 559 mm (22 in.) each; and
- (d) passengers with shoulder width greater than 559 mm (22 in.) should be identified and allocated to seats with easy access to an emergency exit or opening that is suitable for them.

## **GM1 SPA.HOFO.165(h) Additional procedures and equipment for operations in a hostile environment**

### **SEAT ALLOCATION**

The identification and seating of the larger passengers might be achieved through the use of patterned and/or colour-coded armbands and matching seat headrests.

## **AMC1 SPA.HOFO.165(i) Additional procedures and equipment for operations in a hostile environment**

### **MEDICALLY INCAPACITATED PASSENGER**

- (a) A 'Medically incapacitated passenger' means a person who is unable to wear the required survival equipment, including life jackets, survival suits and emergency breathing systems (EBSs), as determined by a medical professional. The medical professional's determination should be made available to the pilot-in-command/commander prior to arrival at the offshore installation.
- (b) The operator should establish procedures for the cases where the pilot-in-command/commander may accept a medically incapacitated passenger not wearing or partially wearing survival equipment. To ensure proportionate mitigation of the risks associated with an evacuation, the procedures should be based on, but not be limited to, the severity of the incapacitation, sea and air temperature, sea state, and number of passengers on board.

In addition, the operator should establish the following procedures:

- (1) under which circumstances one or more dedicated persons are required to assist a medically incapacitated passenger during a possible emergency evacuation, and the skills and qualifications required;
- (2) seat allocation for the medically incapacitated passenger and possible assistants in the helicopter types used to ensure optimum use of the emergency exits; and
- (3) evacuation procedures related to whether or not the dedicated persons as described in (1) above are present.

## **AMC1 SPA.HOFO.170(a) Crew requirements**

### **FLIGHT CREW TRAINING AND CHECKING**

- (a) Flight crew training programmes should:
  - (1) improve knowledge of the offshore operations environment with particular consideration of visual illusions during approach, introduced by lighting, motion and weather factors;
  - (2) improve crew cooperation specifically for offshore operations;
  - (3) provide flight crew members with the necessary skills to appropriately manage the risks associated with normal, abnormal and emergency procedures during flights by day and night;
  - (4) if night operations are conducted, give particular consideration to approach, go-around, landing, and take-off phases;
  - (5) include instructions on the optimum use of the helicopter's automatic flight control system (AFCS);
  - (6) for multi-pilot operation, emphasise the importance of multi-crew procedures, as well as the role of the pilot monitoring during all phases of the flight; and
  - (7) include standard operating procedures.
- (b) Emergency and safety equipment training should focus on the equipment fitted/carried. Water entry and sea survival training, including operation of all associated safety equipment, should be an element of the recurrent training, as described in AMC1 ORO.FC.230(a)(2)(iii)(F).
- (c) The training elements referred to above should be assessed during: operator proficiency checks, line checks, or, as applicable, emergency and safety equipment checks.
- (d) Training and checking should make full use of full flight simulators (FFSs) for normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures related to all aspects of helicopter offshore operations (HOFO).

## Subpart L - Single-Engined Turbine Aeroplane Operations At Night Or In Instrument Meteorological Conditions (Set-IMC)

### AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105 SET-IMC operations approval

#### ANNUAL REPORT

After obtaining the initial approval, the operator should make available to the Brunei DCA on an annual basis a report related to its SET-IMC operations containing at least the following information:

- (a) the number of flights operated;
- (b) the number of hours flown; and
- (c) the number of occurrences sorted by type.

### AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(a) SET-IMC operations approval

#### TURBINE ENGINE RELIABILITY

- (a) The operator should obtain the power plant reliability data from the type certificate (TC) holder and/or supplemental type certificate (STC) holder.
- (b) The data for the engine-airframe combination should have demonstrated, or be likely to demonstrate, a power loss rate of less than 10 per million flight hours. Power loss in this context is defined as any loss of power, including in-flight shutdown, the cause of which may be traced to faulty engine or engine component design or installation, including design or installation of the fuel ancillary or engine control systems.
- (c) The in-service experience with the intended engine-airframe combination should be at least 100 000 h, demonstrating the required level of reliability. If this experience has not been accumulated, then, based on analysis or test, in-service experience with a similar or related type of airframe and turbine engine might be considered by the TC/STC holder to develop an equivalent safety argument in order to demonstrate that the reliability criteria are achievable.

### AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(b) SET-IMC operations approval

#### MAINTENANCE PROGRAMME

The following maintenance aspects should be addressed by the operator:

- (a) Engine monitoring programme

The operator's maintenance programme should include an oil-consumption-monitoring programme that should be based on engine manufacturer's recommendations, if available, and track oil consumption trends. The monitoring should be continuous and take account of the oil added. An engine oil analysis programme may also be required if recommended by the engine manufacturer. The possibility to perform frequent (recorded) power checks on a calendar basis should be considered.

The engine monitoring programme should also provide for engine condition monitoring describing the parameters to be monitored, the method of data collection and a corrective action process, and should be based on the engine manufacturer's instructions. This monitoring will be used to detect propulsion system deterioration at an early stage allowing corrective action to be taken before safe operation is affected.

- (b) Propulsion and associated systems' reliability programme

A propulsion and associated systems' reliability programme should be established or the existing reliability programme supplemented for the particular engine-airframe combination. This programme should be designed to early identify and prevent problems, which otherwise would affect the ability of the aeroplane to safely perform its intended flight.

Where the fleet of SET-IMC aeroplanes is part of a larger fleet of the same engine-airframe combination, data from the operator's total fleet should be acceptable.

For engines, the programme should incorporate reporting procedures for all significant events. This information should be readily available (with the supporting data) for use by the operator, type certificate (TC) holders, and the Brunei DCA to help establish that the reliability level set out in AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(a) is achieved. Any adverse trend would require an immediate evaluation to be conducted by the operator in consultation with the Brunei DCA. The evaluation may result in taking corrective measures or imposing operational restrictions.

The engine reliability programme should include, as a minimum, the engine hours flown in the period, the power loss rate for all causes, and the engine removal rate, both rates on an annual basis, as well as reports with the operational context focusing on critical events. These reports should be communicated to the TC holder and the Brunei DCA.

The actual period selected should reflect the global utilisation and the relevance of the experience included (e.g. early data may not be relevant due to subsequent mandatory modifications that affected the power loss rate). After the introduction of a new engine variant and whilst global utilisation is relatively low, the total available experience may have to be used to try to achieve a statistically meaningful average.

### AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(c) SET-IMC operations approval

#### TRAINING PROGRAMME

The operator's flight crew training and checking, established in accordance with ORO.FC, should incorporate the following elements:

(a) Conversion training

Conversion training should be conducted in accordance with a syllabus devised for SET-IMC operations and include at least the following:

- (1) normal procedures:
  - (i) anti-icing and de-icing systems operation;
  - (ii) navigation system procedures;
  - (iii) radar positioning and vectoring, when available;
  - (iv) use of radio altimeter; and
  - (v) use of fuel control, displays interpretation;
- (2) abnormal procedures:
  - (i) anti-icing and de-icing systems failures;
  - (ii) navigation system failures;
  - (iii) pressurisation system failures;
  - (iv) electrical system failures; and
  - (v) engine-out descent in simulated IMC; and
- (3) emergency procedures:
  - (i) engine failure shortly after take-off;
  - (ii) fuel system failures (e.g. fuel starvation);
  - (iii) engine failure other than the above: recognition of failure, symptoms, type of failure, measures to be taken, and consequences;
  - (iv) depressurisation; and
  - (v) engine restart procedures:
    - (A) choice of an aerodrome or landing site; and
    - (B) use of an area navigation system;
  - (vi) air traffic controller (ATCO) communications;
  - (vii) use of radar positioning and vectoring (when available);
  - (viii) use of radio altimeter; and
  - (ix) practice of the forced landing procedure until touchdown in simulated IMC, with zero thrust set, and operating with simulated emergency electrical power.

(b) Conversion checking

The following items should be checked following completion of the SET-IMC operations conversion training as part of the operator's proficiency check (OPC):



- (1) conduct of the forced landing procedure until touchdown in simulated IMC, with zero thrust set, and operating with simulated emergency electrical power;
  - (2) engine restart procedures;
  - (3) depressurisation following engine failure; and
  - (4) engine-out descent in simulated IMC.
- (c) Use of simulator (conversion training and checking)
- Where a suitable full flight simulator (FFS) or a suitable flight simulation training device (FSTD) is available, it should be used to carry out training on the items under (a) and checking of the items under (b) above for SET-IMC operations conversion training and checking.
- (d) Recurrent training
- Recurrent training for SET-IMC operations should be included in the recurrent training required by Subpart FC (FLIGHT CREW) of Annex III (Part-ORO) to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 for pilots carrying out SET-IMC operations. This training should include all items under (a) above.
- (e) Recurrent checking
- The following items should be included into the list of required items to be checked following completion of SET-IMC operations recurrent training as part of the OPC:
- (1) conduct of the forced landing procedure until touchdown in simulated IMC, with zero thrust set, and operating with simulated emergency electrical power;
  - (2) engine restart procedures;
  - (3) depressurisation following engine failure; and
  - (4) emergency descent in simulated IMC.
- (f) Use of simulator (recurrent training and checking)
- Following conversion training and checking, the next recurrent training session and the next OPCs including SET-IMC operations items should be conducted in a suitable FFS or FSTD, where available.

#### **AMC2 SPA.SET-IMC.105(c) SET-IMC operations approval**

##### **CREW COMPOSITION**

- (a) Unless the pilot-in-command has a minimum experience of 100 flight hours under instrument flight rules (IFR) with the relevant type or class of aeroplane including line flying under supervision (LIFUS), the minimum crew should be composed of two pilots.
- (b) A lesser number of flight hours under IFR on the relevant type or class of aeroplane may be acceptable to the Brunei DCA when the flight crew member has significant previous IFR experience.

#### **AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) SET-IMC operations approval**

##### **FLIGHT PLANNING**

- (a) The operator should establish flight planning procedures to ensure that the routes and cruising altitudes are selected so as to have a landing site within gliding range.
- (b) Notwithstanding (a) above, whenever a landing site is not within gliding range, one or more risk periods may be used for the following operations:
  - (1) over water;
  - (2) over hostile environment; or
  - (3) over congested areas.

Except for the take-off and landing phase, the operator should ensure that when a risk period is planned, there is a possibility to glide to a non-congested area.

The total duration of the risk period per flight should not exceed 15 min unless the operator has established, based on a risk assessment carried out for the route concerned, that the cumulative risk of fatal accident due to an engine failure for this flight remains at an acceptable level (see GM2 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2)).

- (c) The operator should establish criteria for the assessment of each new route. These criteria should address the following:
- (1) the selection of aerodromes along the route;
  - (2) the identification and assessment, at least on an annual basis, of the continued suitability of landing sites (obstacles, dimensions of the landing area, type of the surface, slope, etc.) along the route when no aerodrome is available; the assessment may be performed using publicly available information or by conducting on-site surveys;
  - (3) assessment of en route specific weather conditions that could affect the capability of the aeroplane to reach the selected forced landing area following loss of power (icing conditions including gliding descent through clouds in freezing conditions, headwinds, etc.);
  - (4) consideration of landing sites' prevailing weather conditions to the extent that such information is available from local or other sources; expected weather conditions at landing sites for which no weather information is available should be assessed and evaluated taking into account a combination of the following information:
    - (i) local observations;
    - (ii) regional weather information (e.g. significant weather charts); and
    - (iii) terminal area forecast (TAF)/meteorological aerodrome report (METAR) of the nearest aerodromes; and
  - (5) protection of the aeroplane occupants after landing in case of adverse weather.
- (d) At the flight planning phase, any selected landing site should have been assessed by the operator as acceptable for carrying out a safe forced landing with a reasonable expectation of no injuries to persons in the aeroplane or on the ground. All information reasonably practical to acquire should be used by the operator to establish the characteristics of landing sites.
- (e) Landing sites suitable for a diversion or forced landing should be programmed into the navigation system so that track and distance to the landing sites are immediately and continuously available. None of these preprogrammed positions should be altered in-flight.

#### **AMC2 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) SET-IMC operations approval**

##### **ROUTE AND INSTRUMENT PROCEDURE SELECTION**

The following should be considered by the operator, as appropriate, depending on the use of a risk period:

- (a) **Departure**
- The operator should ensure, to the extent possible, that the instrument departure procedures to be followed are those guaranteeing that the flight path allows, in the event of power loss, the aeroplane to land on a landing site.
- (b) **Arrival**
- The operator should ensure, to the extent possible, that the arrival procedures to be followed are those guaranteeing that the flight path allows, in the event of power loss, the aeroplane to land on a landing site.
- (c) **En route**
- The operator should ensure that any planned or diversionary route should be selected and be flown at an altitude such that, in the event of power loss, the pilot is able to make a safe landing on a landing site.

#### **AMC3 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) SET-IMC operations approval**

##### **LANDING SITE**

A landing site is an aerodrome or an area where a safe forced landing can be performed by day or by night, taking into account the expected weather conditions at the time of the foreseen landing.

- (a) The landing site should allow the aeroplane to completely stop within the available area, taking into account the slope and the type of the surface.
- (b) The slope of the landing site should be assessed by the operator in order to determine its acceptability and possible landing directions.
- (c) Both ends of the landing area, or only the zone in front of the landing area for one-way landing areas, should be clear of any obstacle which may be a hazard during the landing phase.

## GM1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) SET-IMC operations approval

### LANDING SITE

- (a) When selecting landing sites along a route to be operated, it is recommended to prioritise the different types of landing sites as follows:
- (1) aerodromes with available runway lighting;
  - (2) aerodromes without available runway lighting;
  - (3) non-populated fields with short grass/vegetation or sandy areas.
- (b) When assessing the suitability of a landing site which is not an aerodrome, it is recommended to consider the following landing site criteria:
- (1) size and shape of the landing area:
    - (i) landing sites with a circular shape providing multiple approach paths depending on the wind; and
    - (ii) for other cases, landing sites with a minimum width of 45 m; and
  - (2) type of surface:

the surface of the landing area should allow a safe forced landing to be conducted.

## GM2 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(2) SET-IMC operations approval

### SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT FOR A SPECIFIC ROUTE

(a) Introduction

The risk assessment methodology should aim at estimating for a specific route the likelihood of having fatalities due to emergency landing caused by engine failure. Based on the outcome of this risk assessment, the operator may extend the duration of the risk period beyond the maximum allowed duration if no landing site is available within gliding range.

(b) The safety target

The overall concept of SET-IMC operations is based on an engine reliability rate for all causes of 10 per million flight hours, which permits in compliance with SET-IMC requirements an overall fatal accident rate for all causes of 4 per million flight hours.

Based on accident databases, it is considered that the engine failure event does not contribute by more than 33 % to the overall fatal accident rate. Therefore, the purpose of the risk assessment is to ensure that the probability of a fatal accident for a specific flight following engine failure remains below the target fatal accident rate of  $1.3 \times 10^{-6}$ .

(c) Methodology

The methodology aims at estimating the likelihood of failing to achieve a safe forced landing in case of engine failure, a safe forced landing being defined as a landing on an area for which it is reasonably expected that no serious injury or fatalities will occur due to the landing even though the aeroplane may suffer extensive damage.

This methodology consists of creating a risk profile for a specific route, including departure, en route and arrival airfield and runway, by splitting the proposed flight into appropriate segments (based on the flight phase or the landing site selected), and by estimating the risk for each segment should the engine fail in one of these segments. This risk profile is considered to be an estimation of the probability of an unsuccessful forced landing if the engine fails during one of the identified segments.

When assessing the risk for each segment, the height of the aeroplane at which the engine failure occurs, the position relative to the departure or destination airfield or to an emergency landing site en route, and the likely ambient conditions (ceiling, visibility, wind and light) should be taken into account, as well as the standard procedures of the operator (e.g. U-turn procedures after take-off, use of synthetic vision, descent path angle for standard descent from cruising altitude, etc.).

The duration of each segment determines the exposure time to the estimated risk. The risk is estimated based on the following calculation:

Segment risk factor = segment exposure time (in s)/3 600 × probability of unsuccessful forced landing in this segment × assumed engine failure rate per flight hour (FH).

By summing up the risks for all individual segments, the cumulative risk for the flight due to engine failure is calculated and converted to risk on a 'per flight hour' basis. This total risk must remain below the target fatal accident rate of  $1.3 \times 10^{-6}$  as under (b) above.

(d) Example of a risk assessment

An example of such a risk assessment is provided below. In any case, this risk assessment is an example designed for a specific flight with specific departure and arrival aerodrome characteristics. It is an example of how to implement this methodology, and all the estimated probabilities used in the table below may not directly apply to any other flight.

The meaning of the different parameters used is further detailed below:

AD/Other: 'AD' is ticked whenever only aerodromes are selected as landing sites in the segment concerned. 'Other' is ticked if the selected landing sites in the segment concerned are not aerodromes. When a risk period is used by the operator, none of the two boxes (neither 'AD' nor 'Other') are ticked.

Segment exposure time: this parameter represents the duration of each segment in seconds (s).

Estimated probability of an unsuccessful forced landing if engine fails in the segment: probability of performing in the segment a safe forced landing following engine power loss.

Segment risk factor: risk of an unsuccessful forced landing (because of power loss) per segment (see formula above).

Segments of flight	Assumed height or height band above ground level (AGL) in ft	LANDING SITE		Segment exposure time (in s)	Cumulative flight time from start of take-off to end of segment (in s)	Assumed engine failure rate per FH			1,00x 10 <sup>-5</sup>	Comment on estimation of unsuccessful outcome
		AD	Other			Estimated probability of unsuccessful forced landing if engine fails in this segment	Segment risk factor	Cumulative risk per flight		
Take-off (T-O) ground roll	0 ft	X		20	20	0.01 %	5.56 x 10 <sup>-12</sup>	5.56 x 10 <sup>-12</sup>		T-O aborted before being airborne. Runway long enough to stop the aircraft.
Climb-out	0-50 ft	X		8	28	0.10 %	2.22 x 10 <sup>-11</sup>	2.78 x 10 <sup>-11</sup>		Aircraft aborts T-O and lands ahead within runway length available
	50-200 ft	X		10	38	1.00%	2.78x10 <sup>-10</sup>	3.06x10 <sup>-10</sup>		
	200-1 100 ft			36	74	100.00 %	1.00x10 <sup>-7</sup>	1.00x10 <sup>-7</sup>		Aircraft has to land ahead outside airfield with little height for manoeuvring
	1 100-2 000 ft	X		36	110	50.00%	5.00x10 <sup>-8</sup>	1.50x10 <sup>-7</sup>		U-turn and landing at opposite q-code for magnetic heading of a runway (QFU) possible.
	2 000-4 000 ft	X		80	190	25.00%	5.56x10 <sup>-8</sup>	2.06x10 <sup>-7</sup>		
Climbing to en route height	4 000-10 000ft	X	X	240	430	5.00%	3.33x10 <sup>-8</sup>	2.39x10 <sup>-7</sup>		Aircraft able to operate a glide-in approach
Cruising: emergency area available	≤ 10 000 ft	X		5400	5830	5.00%	7.50x10 <sup>-7</sup>	9.89x10 <sup>-7</sup>		En route cruising time with available landing sites along the route within gliding range.
Cruising: emergency area NOT available	≤ 10 000 ft			300	6130	100.00%	8.33x10 <sup>-7</sup>	1.82x10 <sup>-6</sup>		En route cruising time without available landing sites within gliding range.

Descent to initial approach fix for instrument flight rules (IFR) approach	10 000-4 000 ft on a 4° slope (1 200 ft/min)	X		300	6430	5.00%	4.17X10 <sup>-8</sup>	1.86X10 <sup>-6</sup>	Descent with available landing sites within gliding range, and destination not reachable
Aircraft has to descend below the glide approach capability to set up for a normal powered landing from 1 000 ft on a 3° approach path	4 000-1 000 ft on the approach		X	150	6580	50.00%	2.08X10 <sup>-7</sup>	2.07X10 <sup>-6</sup>	Aircraft descends below the height needed to maintain a glide approach for reaching the airfield. Therefore, it may land short of airfield if engine fails.
Aircraft descends on a 3° approach path	1 000 -50 ft on approach at 120 kt (600 ft/min)			95	6 675	100.00 %	2.64 x 10 <sup>-7</sup>	2.34 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>	Aircraft assumes 3° glideslope, regained to ensure normal landing. Therefore, it may undershoot the landing field if engine fails at this late stage.
Landing	50 ft above threshold until touchdown			10	6 685	5.00 %	1.39 x 10 <sup>-9</sup>	2.34 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>	Aircraft over runway. Engine is to be idled anyway, but failure, while airborne, may surprise pilot and result in hard landing.
Landing ground run	Touchdown to stop			15	6700	0.01%	4.17X10 <sup>-12</sup>	2.34X10 <sup>-6</sup>	Aircraft on ground. Risk negligible, if engine stops on the example runway (very long) providing that all services are retained
								1.26 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>	Risk per flight

The following likelihood scale may be used to determine the estimated probability of an unsuccessful forced landing:

Probability in %	Description
0	Impossible
0-1	Negligible likelihood/remote possibility
1-10	Possible but not likely
10-35	Moderately likely
35-65	Possible
65-90	Likely
90-99	Almost certain
99-100	Certain

#### **AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.105(d)(4) SET-IMC operations approval**

##### **CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES**

When a risk period is used during the take-off or landing phase, the contingency procedures should include appropriate information for the crew on the path to be followed after an engine failure in order to minimise to the greatest extent possible the risk to people on the ground.

#### **AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(b) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations**

##### **ATTITUDE INDICATORS**

A backup or standby attitude indicator built in the glass cockpit installations is an acceptable means of compliance for the second attitude indicator.

#### **AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(d) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations**

##### **AIRBORNE WEATHER-DETECTING EQUIPMENT**

The airborne weather-detecting equipment should be an airborne weather radar, as defined in the applicable Certification Specification — European Technical Standard Order (CS-ETSO) issued by the Agency, or equivalent.

#### **AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(f) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations**

##### **AREA NAVIGATION SYSTEM**

The area navigation system should be based on a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) stand-alone receiver or multi-sensor system, including at least one GNSS sensor, to enable at least required navigation performance approach (RNP APCH) operations without vertical guidance.

#### **GM1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(f) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations**

##### **AREA NAVIGATION SYSTEM**

Acceptable standards for the area navigation system are ETSO-145/146c, ETSO-C129a, ETSO-C196a or ETSO-C115 issued by the Agency, or equivalent.

#### **GM1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(h) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations**

##### **LANDING LIGHTS**

In order to demonstrate the compliance of its aeroplane's landing lights with the 200-ft illumination capability requirement, and in the absence of relevant data available in the aircraft flight manual (AFM), the operator should liaise with the type certificate (TC) holder or supplemental type certificate (STC) holder, as applicable, to obtain a statement of compliance.

**GM1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(i)(7) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations**

**ELEMENTS AFFECTING PILOT'S VISION FOR LANDING**

Examples of elements affecting pilot's vision for landing are rain, ice and window fogging.

**AMC1 SPA.SET-IMC.110(l) Equipment requirements for SET-IMC operations**

**EMERGENCY ENGINE POWER CONTROL DEVICE**

The means that allows continuing operation of the engine within a sufficient power range for the flight to be safely completed in the event of any reasonably probable failure/malfunction of the fuel control unit should enable the fuel flow modulation.



## Subpart M – ELECTRONIC FLIGHT BAGS (EFBs)

### AMC1 SPA.EFB.100(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — operational approval

#### SUITABILITY OF THE HARDWARE

(a) Placement of the display

The placement of the display should be consistent with the intended use of the EFB and should not create unacceptable workload for the pilot or require undue 'head-down' movements during critical phases of flight. Displays used for EFB chart applications should be located so as to be visible from the pilot's station with the minimum practicable deviation from their lines of vision when looking forward along the flight path.

(b) Display characteristics

Consideration should be given to the long-term degradation of a display as a result of abrasion and ageing. AMC 25-11 (paragraph 3.16a) may be used as guidance to assess luminance and legibility aspects.

Information displayed on the EFB should be legible to the typical user at the intended viewing distance(s) and under the full range of lighting conditions expected in a flight crew compartment, including direct sunlight.

Users should be able to adjust the screen brightness of an EFB independently of the brightness of other displays in the flight crew compartment. In addition, when incorporating an automatic brightness adjustment, it should operate independently for each EFB in the flight crew compartment. Brightness adjustment using software means may be acceptable provided that this operation does not adversely affect the flight crew workload.

Buttons and labels should have adequate illumination for night use. 'Buttons and labels' refers to hardware controls located on the display itself.

All controls should be properly labelled for their intended functions, except if no confusion is possible.

The 90-degree viewing angle on either side of each flight crew member's line of sight may be unacceptable for certain EFB applications if aspects of the display quality are degraded at large viewing angles (e.g. the display colours wash out or the displayed colour contrast is not discernible at the installation viewing angle).

(c) Power source

The design of a portable EFB system should consider the source of electrical power, the independence of the power sources for multiple EFBs, and the potential need for an independent battery source. A non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered includes:

- (1) the possibility to adopt operational procedures to ensure an adequate level of safety (for example, a minimum preflight level of charge);
- (2) the possible redundancy of portable EFBs to reduce the risk of exhausted batteries;
- (3) the availability of backup battery packs to ensure that there is an alternative source of power.

Battery-powered EFBs that have aircraft power available for recharging the internal EFB batteries are considered to have a suitable backup power source.

For EFBs that have an internal battery power source, and that are used as an alternative for paper documentation that is required by CAT.GEN.MPA.180, the operator should either have at least one EFB connected to an aircraft power bus, or have established and documented mitigation means and procedures to ensure that sufficient power with acceptable margins will be available during the whole flight.

(d) Environmental testing

Environmental testing, in particular testing for rapid decompression, should be performed on EFBs that host applications that are required to be used during flight following a rapid decompression, and/or on EFBs with an environmental operational range that is potentially insufficient with respect to the foreseeable flight crew compartment operating conditions.

The information from the rapid-decompression test of an EFB is used to establish the procedural requirements for the use of that EFB device in a pressurised aircraft. Rapid-decompression testing should follow the EUROCAE ED-14D/RTCA DO-160D (or later revisions) guidelines for rapid-decompression testing up to the maximum operating altitude of the aircraft at which the EFB is to be used.

- (1) Pressurised aircraft: if a portable EFB has successfully completed rapid-decompression testing, then no mitigating procedures for depressurisation events need to be developed. If a portable EFB has failed the rapid-decompression testing while turned ON, but successfully completed it when turned OFF, then procedures should ensure that at least one EFB on board the aircraft either remains OFF during the applicable flight phases, or is configured so that no damage will be incurred should rapid decompression occur in flight at altitudes higher than 10 000 ft above mean sea level (AMSL).

If an EFB system has not undergone a rapid-decompression test or it has failed the test, then alternate procedures or a paper backup should be available for the related type B EFB applications.

- (2) Non-pressurised aircraft: rapid-decompression testing is not required for an EFB used in a non pressurised aircraft. It should be demonstrated that the EFB can operate reliably up to the maximum operating altitude of the aircraft. If the EFB cannot be operated at the maximum operating altitude of the aircraft, procedures should be established to preclude operation of the EFB above the maximum demonstrated EFB operating altitude while still maintaining the availability of any required aeronautical information displayed on the EFB.

The results of testing performed on a specific EFB model configuration (as identified by the EFB hardware manufacturer) may be applicable to EFBs of the same model used in other aircraft installations, in which case these generic environmental tests may not need to be duplicated. The operator should collect and retain:

- (1) evidence of these tests that have already been accomplished; or
- (2) suitable alternative procedures to deal with the total loss of the EFB system.

Rapid decompression tests do not need to be repeated if the EFB model identification and the battery type do not change.

The testing of operational EFBs should be avoided if possible to preclude the infliction of unknown damage to the devices during testing.

Operators should account for the possible loss or erroneous functioning of the EFB in abnormal environmental conditions.

The safe stowage and the use of the EFB under any foreseeable environmental conditions in the flight crew compartment, including turbulence, should be evaluated.

#### **AMC2 SPA.EFB.100(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

##### **CHANGES**

Modifications to an EFB system may have to be introduced either by the EFB system supplier, the EFB applications developer, or by the operator itself.

Those modifications that:

- (a) do not result in a hardware change that would require a re-evaluation of the HMI and human factors aspects in accordance with AMC1 SPA.EFB.100(b)(2);
- (b) do not bring any change to the calculation algorithms of a type B EFB application;
- (c) do not bring any change to the HMI of a type B EFB application that requires a change to the flight crew training programme or operational procedures;
- (d) introduce a new type A EFB application or modify an existing one (provided its software classification remains type A);
- (e) do not introduce any additional functionality to an existing type B EFB application; or
- (f) update an existing database necessary to use an existing type B EFB application, may be introduced by the operator without the need to be approved by the Brunei DCA.

These changes should, nevertheless, be controlled and properly tested prior to use during flights.

The modifications in the following non-exhaustive list are considered to meet these criteria:

- (a) operating system updates;
- (b) chart or airport database updates;
- (c) updates to introduce fixes (i.e. patches); and
- (d) installation and modification of a type A EFB application.

For all other types of modification, the operator should apply the change management procedure approved by the Brunei DCA in accordance with ARO.GEN.310(c). This includes the extension of the use of an EFB system, for which the operator already holds an approval, to another aircraft type of the operator's fleet.

In the specific case of a complete change of the hardware hosting the EFB application, the operator should demonstrate to the Brunei DCA that the new hardware is suitable for the intended use of the EFB application as per AMC1 SPA.EFB.100(b).

### **AMC3 SPA.EFB.100(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)**

#### **OPERATIONAL EVALUATION TEST**

- (a) The operator should perform an operational evaluation test which should enable verification that the relevant requirements of SPA.EFB have been satisfied before a final decision is made on the operational use of the EFB.

An operational evaluation test should be performed by operators seeking an operational approval for the use of a type B EFB application. This does not apply to changes to a type B EFB application whose use has already been approved by the the Brunei DCA.

The operator should notify the Brunei DCA of its intention to perform an operational evaluation test by providing a plan, which should contains at least the following information:

- (1) the starting date of the operational evaluation test;
- (2) the duration of the operational evaluation test;
- (3) the aircraft involved;
- (4) the EFB hardware and type(s) of software including version details;
- (5) the EFB policy and procedure manual;
- (6) their EFB risk assessment; and
- (7) for type B EFB applications that replace the paper documentation without initial retention of a paper backup, and type B EFB applications that do not replace the paper documentation:
  - (i) a simulator line-oriented flight training (LOFT) session programme to verify the use of the EFB under operational conditions including normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions; and
  - (ii) a proposed schedule to allow the Brunei DCA to observe the EFB application use in actual flight operations.

The operational evaluation test should consist of an in-service proving period with a standard duration of 6 months. A reduced duration may be considered after taking into account the following criteria:

- (1) the operator's previous experience with EFBs;
- (2) a high number of flights operated monthly;
- (3) the intended use of the EFB system; and
- (4) the mitigation means defined by the operator.

An operator wishing to reduce the duration of the operational evaluation test to less than 6 months should provide the Brunei DCA with the appropriate justification in its operational evaluation plan.

The Brunei DCA may ask for an operational evaluation test lasting more than 6 months if the number of flights operated in this period is not considered sufficient to evaluate the EFB system.

The general purpose of the in-service proving period for type B EFB applications that replaces the paper documentation is for the operator to demonstrate that an EFB system provides at least the levels of accessibility, usability and reliability of the paper documentation.

For all type B EFB applications, the proving period should show that:

- (1) the flight crew members are able to operate the EFB applications;
- (2) the operator's administration procedures are in place and function correctly;
- (3) the operator is capable of providing timely updates to the applications on the EFB, where a database is involved;

- (4) the introduction of the EFB does not adversely affect the operator's operating procedures, and that alternative procedures provide an acceptable equivalent if the EFB system is not available;
- (5) for a system including uncertified elements (hardware or software), that the system operates correctly and reliably; and
- (6) the assumptions used for the risk assessment are not disproved for the type of operations intended (with or without a paper backup).

In the case of charts or in-flight weather (IFW) applications displaying the own-ship position in flight, the in-service proving should allow to confirm the absence of frequent losses of position and to assess the resulting workload for the flight crew.

The operator may remove the paper backup once it has shown that the EFB system is sufficiently robust.

(b) Final operational report

The operator should produce and retain a final operational report, that summarises all the activities performed and the means of compliance that were used, supporting the operational use of the EFB system.

**AMC4 SPA.EFB.100(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)**

**EFB APPLICATIONS WITH ETSO AUTHORISATIONS**

EFB software applications may be approved by EASA e.g. by means of an ETSO authorisation. Such approved EFB applications are considered to be compliant with the requirements of SPA.EFB.100(b) that are included in the scope of the approval, provided that the EFB software is installed and used in conformity with its installation and operational instructions and limitations.

**GM1 SPA.EFB.100(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

**FINAL OPERATIONAL REPORT**

An example of typical items for the final operational report is provided below:

- (a) System description and classification of the EFB system:
  - (1) a general description of the EFB system and of the hardware and software applications.
- (b) Software applications:
  - (1) a list of the type A EFB applications installed;
  - (2) a list of the type B EFB applications installed; and
  - (3) a list of the miscellaneous software applications installed.
- (c) Hardware:

For portable EFBs used without installed resources, relevant information about or reference to:

  - (1) the EMI compliance demonstration;
  - (2) the lithium battery compliance demonstration;
  - (3) the depressurisation compliance demonstration; and
  - (4) details of the power source.

For portable EFBs served by installed resources:

  - (1) details of the airworthiness approval for the mounting device;
  - (2) a description of the placement of the EFB display;
  - (3) details of the use of installed resources;
  - (4) information on the EMI compliance demonstration;
  - (5) information on the lithium battery compliance demonstration;
  - (6) information on the depressurisation compliance demonstration;
  - (7) details of the power source;

(8) details of any data connectivity.

For installed EFBs:

(1) details of the airworthiness approval for installed equipment.

(d) Certification documentation:

(1) EFB limitations contained within the AFM;

(2) guidelines for EFB application developers; and

(3) guidelines for EFB system suppliers.

(e) Specific considerations for performance applications:

(1) details of performance data validation performed.

(f) Operational assessment:

(1) details of the EFB risk assessment performed;

(2) details of the human-machine interface (HMI) assessment performed for type B EFB applications;

(3) details of flight crew operating procedures:

(i) for using EFB systems with other flight crew compartment systems;

(ii) ensuring flight crew awareness of EFB software/database revisions;

(iii) to mitigate and/or control increased workload; and

(iv) describing flight crew responsibilities for performance and weight and balance calculations;

(4) details of proposed compliance monitoring oversight of the EFB system;

(5) details of EFB system security measures;

(6) details of EFB administration procedures, including provision of the EFB policy and procedures manual and EFB administrator qualifications;

(7) details of the procedure for electronic signatures;

(8) details of the system for routine EFB system maintenance;

(9) details of EFB training including flight crew training:

(i) initial training;

(ii) differences training; and

(iii) recurrent training;

(10) Report of the operational evaluation test:

(i) proposals for the initial retention of a paper backup;

(ii) proposals for the commencement of operations without any paper backup;

(10) EFB platform/hardware description;

(11) a description of each software application to be included in the assessment;

(12) a human factors assessment for the complete EFB system, human-machine interface (HMI), and all the software applications that covers:

(i) the flight crew workload in both single-pilot and multi-pilot aircraft;

(ii) the size, resolution, and legibility of symbols and text;

(iii) for navigation chart displays: access to desired charts, access to information within a chart, grouping of information, general layout, orientation (e.g. track-up, north-up), depiction of scale information.

## **GM2 SPA.EFB.100(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

### **EVALUATION BY EASA**

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The operator may use the results of an EFB application evaluation performed by EASA to support its application to Brunei DCA for an operational approval.

### **AMC1 SPA.EFB.100(b)(1) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

#### **RISK ASSESSMENT**

(a) General

Prior to the use of any EFB system, the operator should perform a risk assessment for all type B EFB applications and for the related EFB hardware, as part of its hazard identification and risk management process.

If an operator makes use of a risk assessment established by the software developer, the operator should ensure that its specific operational environment is taken into account.

The risk assessment should:

- (1) evaluate the risks associated with the use of an EFB;
- (2) identify potential losses of function or malfunction (with detected and undetected erroneous outputs) and the associated failure scenarios;
- (3) analyse the operational consequences of these failure scenarios;
- (4) establish mitigating measures; and
- (5) ensure that the EFB system (hardware and software) achieves at least the same level of accessibility, usability, and reliability as the means of presentation it replaces.

In considering the accessibility, usability, and reliability of the EFB system, the operator should ensure that the failure of the complete EFB system, as well as of individual applications, including corruption or loss of data, and erroneously displayed information, has been assessed and that the risks have been mitigated to an acceptable level.

This risk assessment should be defined before the beginning of the trial period and should be amended accordingly, if necessary, at the end of this trial period. The results of the trial should establish the configuration and use of the system. Once the operator has been granted the operational approval for the use of the related EFB applications, it should ensure that the related risk assessment is maintained and kept up to date.

When the EFB system is intended to be introduced alongside a paper-based system, only the failures that would not be mitigated by the use of the paper-based system need to be addressed. In all other cases, and especially when an accelerated introduction with a reduced trial period or a paperless use of a new EFB system is intended, a complete risk assessment should be performed.

(b) Assessing and mitigating the risks

Some parameters of EFB applications may depend on entries that are made by flight crew/dispatchers, whereas others may be default parameters from within the system that are subject to an administration process (e.g. the runway line-up allowance in an aircraft performance application). In the first case, mitigation means would mainly concern training and flight crew procedure aspects, whereas in the second case, mitigation means would more likely focus on the EFB administration and data management aspects.

The analysis should be specific to the operator concerned and should address at least the following points:

- (1) The minimisation of undetected erroneous outputs from applications and assessment of the worst credible scenario;
- (2) Erroneous outputs from the software application, including:
  - (i) a description of the corruption scenarios that were analysed; and
  - (ii) a description of the mitigation means;
- (3) Upstream processes including:
  - (i) the reliability of root data used in applications (e.g. qualified input data, such as databases produced under ED-76/DO-200A, 'Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data');
  - (ii) the software application validation and verification checks according to relevant industry standards, if applicable; and

- (iii) the independence between application software components, e.g. robust partitioning between EFB applications and other airworthiness certified software applications;
- (4) A description of the mitigation means to be used following the detected failure of an application, or of a detected erroneous output;
- (5) The need for access to an alternate power supply in order to ensure the availability of software applications, especially if they are used as a source of required information.

As part of the mitigation means, the operator should consider establishing reliable alternative means to provide the information available on the EFB system.

The mitigation means could be, for example, one of, or a combination of, the following:

- (1) the system design (including hardware and software);
- (2) a backup EFB device, possibly supplied from a different power source;
- (3) EFB applications being hosted on more than one platform;
- (4) a paper backup (e.g. quick reference handbook (QRH)); and
- (5) procedural means.

EFB system design features such as those assuring data integrity and the accuracy of performance calculations (e.g. a 'reasonableness' or 'range' check) may be integrated in the risk assessment to be performed by the operator.

#### **AMC1 SPA.EFB.100(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

##### **HUMAN–MACHINE INTERFACE ASSESSMENT AND HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS**

- (a) The operator should perform an assessment of the human–machine interface (HMI), the installation, and aspects governing crew resource management (CRM) when using the EFB system.

The HMI assessment is key to identifying acceptable mitigation means, e.g.:

- (1) to establish procedures for reducing the risk of making errors; and
- (2) to control and mitigate the additional workload related to EFB use.

- (b) The assessment should be performed by the operator for each kind of device and application installed on the EFB. The operator should assess the integration of the EFB into the flight deck environment, considering both physical integration (e.g. anthropometrics, physical interference, etc.) and cognitive ergonomics (the compatibility of look and feel, workflows, alerting philosophy, etc.).

- (1) Human–machine interface

The EFB system should provide a consistent and intuitive user interface within and across the various hosted applications and with flight deck avionics applications. This should include but is not limited to data entry methods, colour-coding philosophies, and symbology.

- (2) Input devices

When choosing and designing input devices such as keyboards or cursor-control devices, applicants should consider the type of entry to be made and also flight crew compartment environmental factors, such as turbulence, that could affect the usability of that input device. Typically, the performance parameters of cursor-control devices should be tailored for the function of the intended application as well as for the flight crew compartment environment.

- (3) Consistency

- (i) Consistency between EFBs and applications:

Particular attention should be paid to the consistency of all interfaces, in particular when one provider develops the software application and another organisation integrates it into the EFB.

- (ii) Consistency with flight deck applications:

Whenever possible, EFB user interfaces should be consistent with the other flight deck avionics applications with regard to design philosophy, look and feel, interaction logic, and workflows.

- (4) Messages and the use of colours

For any EFB system, EFB messages and reminders should be readily and easily detectable and intelligible by the flight crew under all foreseeable operating conditions.

The use of red and amber colours should be limited and carefully considered. EFB messages, both visual and aural, should be, as far as practicable, inhibited during critical phases of the flight.

Flashing text or symbols should be avoided in any EFB application. Messages should be prioritised according to their significance for the flight crew and the message prioritisation scheme should be documented in the operator's EFB policy and procedure manual.

Additionally, during critical phases of the flight, information necessary to the pilot should be continuously presented without uncommanded overlays, pop-ups, or pre-emptive messages, except for those indicating the failure or degradation of the current EFB application. However, if there is a regulatory or technical standard order (TSO) requirement that is in conflict with the recommendation above, that requirement should take precedence.

(5) System error messages

If an application is fully or partially disabled or is not visible or accessible to the user, it may be desirable to have an indication of its status available to the user upon request. Certain non-essential applications such as those for email connectivity and administrative reports may require an error message when the user actually attempts to access the function, rather than an immediate status annunciation when a failure occurs. EFB status and fault messages should be documented in the operator's EFB policy and procedure manual.

(6) Data entry screening and error messages

If any user-entered data is not of the correct format or type needed by the application, the EFB should not accept the data. An error message should be provided that communicates which entry is suspect and specifies what type of data is expected. The EFB system should incorporate input error checking that detects input errors at the earliest possible point during entry, rather than on completion of a possibly lengthy invalid entry.

(7) Error and failure modes

(i) Flight crew errors:

The system should be designed to minimise the occurrence and effects of flight crew errors and to maximise the identification and resolution of errors. For example, terms for specific types of data or the format in which latitude/longitude is entered should be the same across systems.

(ii) Identifying failure modes:

The EFB system should alert the flight crew of EFB system failures.

(8) Responsiveness of applications

The EFB system should provide feedback to the user when a user input is performed. If the system is busy with internal tasks that preclude the immediate processing of a user input (e.g. performing calculations, self-tests, or refreshing data), the EFB should display a 'system busy' indicator (e.g. a clock icon) to inform the user that the system is occupied and cannot process inputs immediately.

The timeliness of the EFB system response to a user input should be consistent with an application's intended function. The feedback and system response times should be predictable in order to avoid flight crew distractions and/or uncertainty.

(9) Off-screen text and content

If the document segment is not visible in its entirety in the available display area, such as during 'zoom' or 'pan' operations, the existence of off-screen content should be clearly indicated in a consistent way. For some intended functions, it may be unacceptable if certain portions of documents are not visible. Also, some applications may not require an off-screen content indicator when the presence of off screen content is readily obvious. This should be evaluated based on the application and its intended operational function. If there is a cursor, it should be visible on the screen at all times while in use.

(10) Active regions

Active regions are regions to which special user commands apply. The active region can be text, a graphic image, a window, frame, or some other document object. These regions should be clearly indicated.

(11) Managing multiple open applications and documents



If the electronic document application supports multiple open documents, or the system allows multiple open applications, an indication of which application and/or document is active should be continuously provided. The active document is the one that is currently displayed and responds to user actions. The user should be able to select which of the open applications or documents is currently active. In addition, the user should be able to find which flight crew compartment applications are running and easily switch to any of these applications. When the user returns to an application that was running in the background, it should appear in the same state as when the user left that application, with the exception of differences stemming from the progress or completion of processing performed in the background.

(12) Flight crew workload

The positioning of the EFB and the procedures associated with its use should not result in undue flight crew workload. Complex, multi-step-data-entry tasks should be avoided during take-off, landing, and other critical phases of the flight. An evaluation of the EFB intended functions should include a qualitative assessment of the incremental flight crew workload, as well as the flight crew system interfaces and their safety implications.

**AMC1 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

**EFB ADMINISTRATOR**

The operator should appoint an EFB administrator responsible for the administration of the EFB system within the operator's organisation. The EFB administrator is the primary link between the operator and the EFB system and software suppliers.

The EFB administrator function may be contracted to an external organisation in accordance with ORO.GEN.205.

Complex EFB systems may require more than one individual with appropriate authority within the operator's management structure to perform the administration process, but one person should be designated as the EFB administrator responsible for the complete system.

The EFB administrator is the person in overall charge of the EFB system, and should be responsible for ensuring that any hardware conforms to the required specification, and that no unauthorised software is installed. They should also be responsible for ensuring that only the current versions of the application software and data packages are installed on the EFB system.

The EFB administrator should be responsible:

- (a) For all the EFB applications installed, and for providing support to the EFB users regarding these applications;
- (b) For checking potential security issues associated with the applications installed;
- (c) For hardware and software configuration management of the EFBs, and, in particular, for ensuring that no unauthorised software is installed.

The EFB administrator should ensure that miscellaneous software applications do not adversely impact on the operation of the EFB and should include miscellaneous software applications in the scope of the configuration management of the EFB.

This does not preclude EFB devices from being allocated to specific flight crew members.

In those cases where it is demonstrated that miscellaneous software applications run in a way that is fully segregated and partitioned from the EFB or avionics applications (e.g. on a separate operating system on a distinct 'personal' hard drive partition that is selected when the EFB boots up), the administration of these miscellaneous software applications can be exercised by the flight crew members instead of by the EFB administrator.

- (d) For ensuring that only valid versions of the application software and current data packages are installed on the EFB system; and
- (e) For ensuring the integrity of the data packages used by the applications installed.

The operator should make arrangements to ensure the continuity of the management of the EFB system in the absence of the EFB administrator.

Each person involved in EFB administration should receive appropriate training for their role and should have a good knowledge of the proposed system hardware, operating system and relevant software applications, and also of the appropriate regulatory requirements related to the use of EFBs. The content of this training should be determined with the aid of the EFB system supplier or application supplier.

The operator should ensure that the persons involved in EFB administration keep their knowledge about the EFB system and its security up to date.

### **AMC2 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

#### **EFB POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL**

The operator should establish procedures, documented in an EFB policy and procedures manual, to ensure that no unauthorised changes take place. The EFB policy and procedures manual may be fully or partially integrated in the operations manual.

The EFB policy and procedures manual should also address means to ensure that the content and databases of the EFB are valid and up to date, in order to ensure the integrity of the EFB data. This may include establishing revision-control procedures so that flight crew members and others can ensure that the contents of the system are current and complete. These revision control procedures may be similar to the revision control procedures used for paper or other storage means.

The EFB policy and procedures manual should also clearly identify those parts of the EFB system that can be accessed and modified by the operator's EFB administration process and those parts that are only accessible by the EFB system supplier.

For data that is subject to a revision cycle control process, it should be readily evident to the user which revision cycle has been incorporated in the information obtained from the system. Procedures should specify what action to take if the applications or databases loaded on the EFB are outdated. This manual should at least include the following:

- (a) All EFB-related procedures, including:
  - (1) operating procedures;
  - (2) security procedures;
  - (3) maintenance procedures;
  - (4) software control procedures;
- (b) Management of changes to content/databases;
- (c) Notifications to crews of updates;
- (d) If any applications use information that is specific to the aircraft type or tail number, guidance on how to ensure that the correct information is installed on each aircraft;
- (e) Procedures to avoid corruption/errors when implementing changes to the EFB system; and
- (f) In cases involving multiple EFBs in the flight crew compartment, procedures to ensure that they all have the same content/databases installed.

The EFB administrator should be responsible for the procedures and systems documented in the EFB policy and procedures manual that maintain EFB security and integrity. This includes system security, content security, access security, and protection against malicious software.

### **AMC3 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

#### **PROCEDURES**

(a) General

If an EFB system generates information similar to that generated by existing certified systems, procedures should clearly identify which information source will be the primary, which source will be used for backup information, and under which conditions the backup source should be used. Procedures should define the actions to be taken by the flight crew when information provided by an EFB system is not consistent with that from other flight crew compartment sources, or when one EFB system shows different information than the other.

In the case of EFB applications providing information which might be affected by Notice(s) to Airmen NOTAMS (e.g. Airport moving map display (AMMD), performance calculation, etc.), the procedure for the use of these applications should include the handling of the relevant NOTAMS before their use.

(b) Flight crew awareness of EFB software/database revisions

The operator should have a procedure in place to verify that the configuration of the EFB, including software application versions and, where applicable, database versions, are up to date. Flight crew members should have the ability to easily verify the validity of database versions used on the EFB. Nevertheless, flight crew members should not be required to confirm the revision

dates for other databases that do not adversely affect flight operations, such as maintenance log forms or a list of airport codes. An example of a date-sensitive revision is that applied to an aeronautical chart database. Procedures should specify what actions should be taken if the software applications or databases loaded on the EFB system are outdated.

(c) Procedures to mitigate and/or control workload

Procedures should be designed to mitigate and/or control additional workload created by using an EFB system. The operator should implement procedures to ensure that, while the aircraft is in flight or moving on the ground, flight crew members do not become preoccupied with the EFB system at the same time. Workload should be shared between flight crew members to ensure ease of use and continued monitoring of other flight crew functions and aircraft equipment. These procedures should be strictly applied in flight and the operator should specify any times when the flight crew may not use a specific EFB application.

(d) Dispatch

The operator should establish dispatch criteria for EFB systems. The operator should ensure that the availability of the EFB system is confirmed by preflight checks. Instructions to the flight crew should clearly define the actions to be taken in the event of any EFB system deficiency.

Mitigation should be in the form of maintenance and/or operational procedures for items such as:

- (1) replacement of batteries at defined intervals as required;
- (2) ensuring there is a fully charged backup battery on board;
- (3) the flight crew checking the battery charging level before departure; and
- (4) the flight crew switching off the EFB in a timely manner when the aircraft power source is lost.

In the event of a partial or complete failure of the EFB, specific dispatch procedures should be followed. These procedures should be included either in the minimum equipment list (MEL) or in the operations manual, and should ensure an acceptable level of safety.

Particular attention should be paid to establishing specific dispatch procedures allowing to obtain operational data (e.g. performance data) in case of a failure of an EFB hosting an application that normally provides such calculated data.

When the integrity of data input and output is verified by cross-checking and gross-error checks, the same checking principle should be applied to alternative dispatch procedures to ensure equivalent protection.

(e) Maintenance

Procedures should be established for the routine maintenance of the EFB system and detailing how unserviceability and failures are to be dealt with to ensure that the integrity of the EFB system is preserved. Maintenance procedures should also include the secure handling of updated information and how this information is validated and then promulgated in a timely manner and in a complete format to all users.

As part of the EFB system's maintenance, the operator should ensure that the EFB system batteries are periodically checked and replaced as required.

Should faults or failures of the system arise, it is essential that such failures are brought to the immediate attention of the flight crew and that the system is isolated until rectification action is taken. In addition to backup procedures to deal with system failures, a reporting system should be in place so that the necessary corrective action, either to a particular EFB system or to the whole system, is taken in order to prevent the use of erroneous information by flight crew members.

(f) Security

The EFB system (including any means used for updating it) should be secure from unauthorised intervention (e.g. by malicious software). The operator should ensure that adequate security procedures are in place to protect the system at the software level and to manage the hardware (e.g. the identification of the person to whom the hardware is released, protected storage when the hardware is not in use) throughout the operational lifetime of the EFB system. These procedures should guarantee that, prior to each flight, the EFB operational software works as specified and the EFB operational data is complete and accurate. Moreover, a system should be in place to ensure that the EFB does not accept a data load that contains corrupted contents. Adequate measures should be in place for the compilation and secure distribution of data to the aircraft.

Procedures should be transparent and easy to understand to follow and to oversee that:

- (1) if an EFB is based on consumer electronics (e.g. a laptop) which can be easily removed, manipulated, or replaced by a similar component, that special consideration is given to the physical security of the hardware;

- (2) portable EFB platforms are subject to allocation tracking to specific aircraft or persons;
- (3) where a system has input ports, and especially if widely known protocols are used through these ports, or internet connections are offered, that special consideration is given to the risks associated with these ports;
- (4) where physical media are used to update the EFB system, and especially if widely known types of physical media are used, that the operator uses technologies and/or procedures to assure that unauthorised content cannot enter the EFB system through these media.

The required level of EFB security depends on the criticality of the functions used (e.g. an EFB that only holds a list of fuel prices may require less security than an EFB used for performance calculations).

Beyond the level of security required to assure that the EFB can properly perform its intended functions, the level of security that is ultimately required depends on the capabilities of the EFB.

(g) Electronic signatures

Part-CAT and Part-M may require a signature when issuing or accepting a document (e.g. load sheet, technical logbook, notification to captain (NOTOC)). In order to be accepted as being equivalent to a handwritten signature, electronic signatures used in EFB applications need, as a minimum, to fulfil the same objectives and to assure the same degree of security as the handwritten or any other form of signature that they are intended to replace. AMC1 CAT.POL.MAB.105(c) provides the means to comply with the required handwritten signature or its equivalent for mass and balance documentation.

On a general basis, in the case of required signatures, an operator should have in place procedures for electronic signatures that guarantee:

- (1) their uniqueness: a signature should identify a specific individual and should be difficult to duplicate;
- (2) their significance: an individual using an electronic signature should take deliberate and recognisable action to affix their signature;
- (3) their scope: the scope of the information being affirmed with an electronic signature should be clear to the signatory and to the subsequent readers of the record, record entry, or document;
- (4) their security: the security of an individual's handwritten signature is maintained by ensuring that it is difficult for another individual to duplicate or alter it;
- (5) their non-repudiation: an electronic signature should prevent a signatory from denying that they affixed a signature to a specific record, record entry, or document; the more difficult it is to duplicate a signature, the likelier it is that the signature was created by the signatory; and
- (6) their traceability: an electronic signature should provide positive traceability to the individual who signed a record, record entry, or any other document.

An electronic signature should retain those qualities of a handwritten signature that guarantee its uniqueness. Systems using either a PIN or a password with limited validity (timewise) may be appropriate in providing positive traceability to the individual who affixed it. Advanced electronic signatures, qualified certificates and secured signature-creation devices needed to create them in the context of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 are typically not required for EFB operations.

### **AMC4 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

#### **FLIGHT CREW TRAINING**

- (a) Flight crew members should be given specific training on the use of the EFB system before it is operationally used. Training should at least include the following:
  - (1) an overview of the system architecture;
  - (2) preflight checks of the system;
  - (3) limitations of the system;
  - (4) specific training on the use of each application and the conditions under which the EFB may and may not be used;
  - (5) restrictions on the use of the system, including cases where the entire system, or some parts of it, are not available;

- (6) procedures for normal operations, including cross-checking of data entry and computed information;
- (7) procedures to handle abnormal situations, such as a late runway change or a diversion to an alternate aerodrome;
- (8) procedures to handle emergency situations;
- (9) phases of the flight when the EFB system may and may not be used;
- (10) human factors considerations, including crew resource management (CRM), on the use of the EFB; and
- (11) additional training for new applications or changes to the hardware configuration.

As far as practicable, it is recommended that the training simulator environments should include the EFBs in order to offer a higher level of representativeness.

Consideration should also be given to the role that the EFB system plays in operator proficiency checks as part of recurrent training and checking, and to the suitability of the training devices used during training and checking.

EFB training should be included in the relevant training programme established and approved in accordance with ORO.FC.

(b) EFB training and checking

(1) Assumptions regarding flight crew members' previous experience

Training for the use of the EFB should be for the purpose of operating the EFB itself and the applications hosted on it, and should not be intended to provide basic competence in areas such as aircraft performance, etc. Initial EFB training, therefore, should assume basic competence in the functions addressed by the software applications installed.

Training should be adapted to the flight crew's experience and knowledge.

(2) Programmes crediting previous EFB experience

Training programmes for the EFB may give credit for trainees' previous EFB experience. For example, previous experience of an aircraft performance application hosted on a portable EFB and using similar software may be credited towards training on an installed EFB with a performance application.

(3) Initial EFB training

Training required for the granting of an aircraft type rating may not recognise variants within the type nor the installation of particular equipment. Any training for the granting of a type qualification need not, therefore, recognise the installation or the use of an EFB unless it is installed equipment across all variants of the type. However, where training for the issuing of the type rating is combined with the operator's conversion course, the training syllabus should recognise the installation of the EFB where the operator's standard operating procedures (SOPs) are dependent on its use.

Initial EFB training may consist of both ground-based and flight training, depending on the nature and complexity of the EFB system. An operator or approved training organisation (ATO) may use many methods for ground-based EFB training including written handouts or flight crew operating manual (FCOM) material, classroom instruction, pictures, videotapes, ground training devices, computer-based instruction, flight simulation training devices (FSTDs), and static aircraft training. Ground-based training for a sophisticated EFB lends itself particularly to computer-based training (CBT). Flight EFB training should be performed by a suitably qualified person during line flying under supervision (LIFUS) or during differences or conversion training.

The following areas of emphasis should be considered when defining the initial EFB training programme:

- (i) The use of the EFB hardware and the need for proper adjustment of lighting, etc., when the system is used in flight;
- (ii) The intended use of each software application together with any limitations or prohibitions on its use;
- (iii) Proper cross-checking of data inputs and outputs if an aircraft performance application is installed,;
- (iv) Proper verification of the applicability of the information being used if a terminal chart application is installed;
- (v) The need to avoid fixation on the map display if a moving map display is installed,;
- (vi) Handling of conflicting information;
- (vii) Failures of component(s) of the EFB; and

(viii) Actions to be taken following the failure of component(s) of the EFB, including cases of battery smoke or fire.

(4) Initial EFB checking

(i) Initial ground EFB checking

The check performed following the ground-based element of initial EFB training may be accomplished by the use of a questionnaire (oral or written) or as an automated component of the EFB CBT, depending on the nature of the training performed.

(ii) Skill test and proficiency check

Where the operator's SOPs are dependent on the use of the EFB on the particular aircraft type or variant, proficiency in the use of the EFB should be assessed in the appropriate areas (e.g. item 1.1, item 1.5, etc., of Appendix 9 for Part-FCL to BAR 1.

(iii) Operator proficiency check

Where an operator's SOPs are dependent on the use of an EFB, proficiency in its use should be assessed during the operator proficiency check (OPC). Where the OPC is performed on an FSTD not equipped with the operator's EFB, proficiency should be assessed by another acceptable means.

(iv) Line check

Where an operator's SOPs are dependent on the use of an EFB, proficiency in its use should be assessed during a line check.

(v) Areas of emphasis during EFB checking:

(A) Proficiency in the use of each EFB application installed;

(B) Proper selection and use of EFB displays;

(C) Where an aircraft performance application is installed, proper cross-checking of data inputs and outputs;

(D) Where a chart application is installed, proper checking of the validity of the information and the use of the chart clip function;

(E) Where a moving map display is installed, maintenance of a proper outside visual scan without prolonged fixation on the EFB, especially during taxiing; and

(F) Actions to be taken following the failure of component(s) of the EFB, including cases of battery smoke or fire.

(c) Differences or familiarisation training

When the introduction of the use of an EFB requires differences or familiarisation training to be carried out, the elements of initial EFB training should be used, as described above.

(d) Recurrent EFB training and checking

(1) Recurrent EFB training

Recurrent training is normally not required for the use of an EFB, provided the functions are used regularly in line operations. Operators should, however, include normal EFB operations as a component of the annual ground and refresher training.

In the case of mixed-fleet operations, or where the EFB is not installed across the fleet, additional recurrent training should be provided.

(2) Recurrent EFB checking

Recurrent EFB checking should be integrated in those elements of the licence proficiency check, the operator proficiency check and the line check applicable to the use of an EFB.

(e) Suitability of training devices

Where the operator's SOPs are dependent on the use of an EFB, the EFB should be present during the operator's training and checking. Where present, the EFB should be configured and operable in all respects as per the relevant aircraft. This should apply to:

(1) the operator's conversion course;

- (2) differences or familiarisation training; and
- (3) recurrent training and checking.

Where the EFB system is based on a portable device used without any installed resources, it is recommended that the device should be present, operable, and used during all phases of the flight during which it would be used under the operator's SOPs.

For all other types of EFB systems, it is recommended that the device should be installed and operable in the training device (e.g. an FFS) and used during all phases of the flight during which it would be used under the operator's SOPs. However, an operator may define an alternative means of compliance when the operator's EFB system is neither installed nor operable in the training device.

Note: It is not necessary for the EFB to be available for those parts of the training and checking that are not related to the operator or to the operator's SOPs.

### **AMC5 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

#### **PERFORMANCE AND MASS AND BALANCE APPLICATIONS**

##### (a) General

Performance and mass and balance applications should be based on existing published data found in the AFM or performance manual, and should account for the applicable CAT.POL performance requirements. The applications may use algorithms or data spreadsheets to determine results. They may have the capability to interpolate within the information contained in the published data for the particular aircraft but they should not extrapolate beyond it.

To protect against intentional and unintentional modifications, the integrity of the database files related to performance and to mass and balance (the performance database, airport database, etc.) should be checked by the program before performing any calculations. This check can be run once at the start-up of the application.

Each software version should be identified by a unique version number. The compatibility between specific modules of a performance or mass and balance software application and the specific software revisions installed on a specific host (e.g. model of computer) should be ensured. The performance and mass and balance applications should record each computation performed (inputs and outputs) and the operator should have procedures in place to retain this information for at least 3 months.

The operator should ensure that aircraft performance or mass and balance data provided by the application is correct compared with the data derived from the AFM (e.g. for take-off and landing performance data) or from other reference data sources (e.g. mass and balance manuals or databases, in-flight performance manuals or databases) under a representative cross-check of conditions (e.g. for take-off and landing performance applications: take-off and landing performance data on dry, wet, and contaminated runways, with different wind conditions and aerodrome pressure altitudes, etc.).

The operator should establish procedures to define any new roles that the flight crew and, if applicable, the flight dispatcher, may have in creating, reviewing, and using performance calculations supported by EFB systems. In particular, the procedures should address cases where discrepancies are identified by the flight crew.

##### (b) Testing

The demonstration of the compliance of a performance or mass and balance application should include evidence of the software testing activities performed with the software version candidate for operational use.

The testing can be performed by either the operator or a third party, as long as the testing process is documented and the responsibilities are identified.

The testing activities should include human-machine interface (HMI) testing, reliability testing, and accuracy testing.

HMI testing should demonstrate that the application is not prone to error and that calculation errors can be detected by the flight crew with the proposed procedures. The testing should demonstrate that the applicable HMI guidelines are followed and that the HMI is implemented as specified by the application developer and in paragraph (f).

Reliability testing should show that the application in its operating environment (operating system (OS) and hardware included) is stable and deterministic, i.e. identical answers are generated each time the process is entered with identical parameters.

Accuracy testing should demonstrate that the aircraft performance or mass and balance computations provided by the application are correct in comparison with data derived from the AFM or other reference data sources, under a representative cross section of conditions (e.g. for take-off and landing performance applications: runway state and

slope, different wind conditions and pressure altitudes, various aircraft configurations including failures with a performance impact, etc.).

The demonstration should include a sufficient number of comparison results from representative calculations throughout the entire operating envelope of the aircraft, considering corner points, routine and break points.

Any difference compared to the reference data that is judged significant should be examined and explained. When differences are due to more conservative calculations or reduced margins that were purposely built into the approved data, this approach should be clearly mentioned. Compliance with the applicable certification and operational rules needs to be demonstrated in any case.

The testing method should be described. The testing may be automated when all the required data is available in an appropriate electronic format, but in addition to performing thorough monitoring of the correct functioning and design of the testing tools and procedures, operators are strongly suggested to perform additional manual verification. It could be based on a few scenarios for each chart or table of the reference data, including both operationally representative scenarios and 'corner-case' scenarios.

The testing of a software revision should, in addition, include non-regression testing and testing of any fix or change.

Furthermore, an operator should perform tests related to its customisation of the applications and to any element pertinent to its operation that was not covered at an earlier stage (e.g. airport database verification).

(c) Procedures

Specific care is needed regarding the flight crew procedures concerning take-off and landing performance or mass and balance applications. The flight crew procedures should ensure that:

- (1) calculations are performed independently by each flight crew member before data outputs are accepted for use;
- (2) a formal cross-check is made before data outputs are accepted for use; such cross-checks should utilise the independent calculations described above, together with the output of the same data from other sources on the aircraft;
- (3) a gross-error check is performed before data outputs are accepted for use; such gross-error checks may use either a 'rule of thumb' or the output of the same data from other sources on the aircraft; and
- (4) in the event of a loss of functionality of an EFB through either the loss of a single application, or the failure of the device hosting the application, an equivalent level of safety can be maintained; consistency with the EFB risk assessment assumptions should be confirmed.

(d) Training

The training should emphasise the importance of executing all take-off and landing performance or mass and balance calculations in accordance with the SOPs to assure fully independent calculations.

Furthermore, due to optimisations included at various levels in performance applications, flight crew members may be confronted with new procedures and different aircraft behaviour (e.g. the use of multiple flap settings for take-off). The training should be designed and provided accordingly.

Where an application allows the computing of both dispatch results (from regulatory or factored calculations) and other results, the training should highlight the specificities of those results. Depending on the representativeness of the calculations, flight crew members should be trained on any operational margins that might be required.

The training should also address the identification and the review of default values, if any, and assumptions about the aircraft status or environmental conditions made by the application.

(e) Specific considerations for mass and balance applications

In addition to the figures, a diagram displaying the mass and its associated centre-of-gravity (CG) position should be provided.

(f) Human-factors-specific considerations

Input and output data (i.e. results) shall be clearly separated from each other. All the information necessary for a given calculation task should be presented together or be easily accessible.

All input and output data should include correct and unambiguous terms (names), units of measurement (e.g. kg or lb), and, when applicable, an index system and a CG-position declaration (e.g. Arm/%MAC). The units should match the ones from the other flight-crew-compartment sources for the same kind of data.



Airspeeds should be provided in a form that is directly useable in the flight crew compartment, unless the unit clearly indicates otherwise (e.g. Knots Calibrated Air Speed (KCAS)). Any difference between the type of airspeed provided by the EFB application and the type provided by the aircraft flight manual (AFM) or flight crew operating manual (FCOM) performance charts should be mentioned in the flight crew guides and training material.

If the landing performance application allows the computation of both dispatch (regulatory, factored) and other results (e.g. in-flight or unfactored), flight crew members should be made aware of the computation mode used.

(1) Inputs:

The application should allow users to clearly distinguish user entries from default values or entries imported from other aircraft systems.

Performance applications should enable the flight crew to check whether a certain obstacle is included in the performance calculations and/or to include new or revised obstacle information in the performance calculations.

(2) Outputs:

All critical assumptions for performance calculations (e.g. the use of thrust reversers, full or reduced thrust/power rating) should be clearly displayed. The assumptions made about any calculation should be at least as clear to the flight crew members as similar information would be on a tabular chart.

All output data should be available in numbers.

The application should indicate when a set of entries results in an unachievable operation (for instance, a negative stopping margin) with a specific message or colour scheme. This should be done in accordance with the relevant provisions on messages and the use of colours.

In order to allow a smooth workflow and to prevent data entry errors, the layout of the calculation outputs should be such that it is consistent with the data entry interface of the aircraft applications in which the calculation outputs are used (e.g. flight management systems).

(3) Modifications:

The user should be able to easily modify performance calculations, especially when making last minute changes.

The results of calculations and any outdated input fields should be deleted whenever:

- (i) modifications are entered;
- (ii) the EFB is shut down or the performance application is closed; or
- (iii) the EFB or the performance application has been in a standby or 'background' mode for too long, i.e. such that it is likely that when it is used again, the inputs or outputs will be outdated.

### **AMC6 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

#### **AIRPORT MOVING MAP DISPLAY (AMMD) APPLICATION WITH OWN-SHIP POSITION**

(a) General

An AMMD application should not be used as the primary means of navigation for taxiing and should be only used in conjunction with other materials and procedures identified within the operating concept (see paragraph e)).

When an AMMD is in use, the primary means of navigation for taxiing remains the use of normal procedures and direct visual observation out of the flight-crew-compartment window.

Thus, as recognised in ETSO-C165a, an AMMD application with a display of own-ship position is considered to have a minor safety effect for malfunctions that cause the incorrect depiction of aircraft position (own-ship), and the failure condition for the loss of function is classified as 'no safety effect'.

(b) Minimum requirements

AMMD software that complies with European Technical Standard Order ETSO-C165a is considered to be acceptable.

In addition, the system should provide the means to display the revision number of the software installed.

To achieve the total system accuracy requirements of ETSO-C165a, an airworthiness-approved sensor using the global positioning system (GPS) in combination with a medium-accuracy database compliant with EUROCAE ED-99C/RTCA DO-272C, 'User Requirements for Aerodrome Mapping Information,' (or later revisions) is considered one acceptable means.

Alternatively, the use of non-certified commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) position sources may be acceptable in accordance with AMC7 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3).

(c) Data provided by the AMMD software application developer

The operator should ensure that the AMMD software application developer provides the appropriate data including:

(1) installation instructions or the equivalent as per ETSO-C165a Section 2.2 that address:

- (i) the identification of each specific EFB system computing platform (including the hardware platform and the operating system version) with which this AMMD software application and database was demonstrated to be compatible;
- (ii) the installation procedures and limitations for each applicable platform (e.g. required memory resources, configuration of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) antenna position);
- (iii) the interface description data including the requirements for external sensors providing data inputs; and
- (iv) means to verify that the AMMD has been installed correctly and is functioning properly.

(2) any AMMD limitations, and known installation, operational, functional, or performance issues of the AMMD.

(d) AMMD software installation in the EFB

The operator should review the documents and the data provided by the AMMD developer, and ensure that the installation requirements of the AMMD software in the specific EFB platform and aircraft are addressed. Operators are required to perform any verification activities proposed by the AMMD software application developer, as well as identify and perform any additional integration activities that need to be completed; and

(e) Operational procedures

Changes to operational procedures of the aircraft (e.g. flight crew procedures) should be documented in the operations manual or user's guide as appropriate. In particular, the documentation should highlight that the AMMD is only designed to assist flight crew members in orienting themselves on the airport surface so as to improve the flight crew members' positional awareness during taxiing, and that it is not to be used as the basis for ground manoeuvring.

(f) Training requirements

The operator may use flight crew procedures to mitigate some hazards. These should include limitations on the use of the AMMD function or application. As the AMMD could be a compelling display and the procedural restrictions are a key component of the mitigation, training should be provided in support of an AMMD.

All mitigation means that rely on flight crew procedures should be included in the flight crew training. Details of the AMMD training should be included in the operator's overall EFB training.

**AMC7 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

**USE OF COMMERCIAL OFF-THE-SHELF (COTS) POSITION SOURCE**

COTS position sources may be used for AMMD EFB applications and for EFB applications displaying the own-ship position in-flight when the following considerations are complied with:

(a) Characterisation of the receiver:

The position should originate from an airworthiness approved GNSS receiver, or from a COTS GNSS receiver fully characterised in terms of technical specifications and featuring an adequate number of channels (12 or more).

The EFB application should, in addition to position and velocity data, receive a sufficient number of parameters related to the fix quality and integrity to allow compliance with the accuracy requirements (e.g. the number of satellites and constellation geometry parameters such as dilution of position (DOP), 2D/3D fix).

(b) Installation aspects:

If the COTS position sources are stand-alone PEDs, they should be treated as C-PEDs and their installation and use should follow the requirements of CAT.GEN.MPA.140.

If an external COTS position source transmits wirelessly, cyber security aspects have to be considered.

Non-certified securing systems should be assessed according to paragraph (h) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(a).

(c) Practical evaluation:

As variables can be introduced by the placement of the antennas in the aircraft and the characteristics of the aircraft itself (e.g. heated and/or shielded windshield effects), the tests have to take place on the type of aircraft in which the EFB will be operated, with the antenna positioned at the location to be used in service.

(1) COTS used as a position source for AMMD

The test installation should record the data provided by the COTS position source to the AMMD application.

The analysis should use the recorded parameters to demonstrate that the AMMD requirements are satisfactorily complied with in terms of the total system accuracy (taking into account database errors, latency effects, display errors, and uncompensated antenna offsets) within 50 metres (95 %). The availability should be sufficient to prevent distraction or increased workload due to frequent loss of position.

When demonstrating compliance with the following requirements of DO-257A, the behaviour of the AMMD system should be evaluated in practice:

- (i) indication of degraded position accuracy within 1 second (Section 2.2.4 (22)); and
- (ii) indication of a loss of positioning data within 5 seconds (Section 2.2.4 (23)); conditions to consider are both a loss of the GNSS satellite view (e.g. antenna failure) and a loss of communication between the receiver and the EFB.

(2) COTS position source used for applications displaying own-ship position in flight:

Flight trials should demonstrate that the COTS GNSS availability is sufficient to prevent distraction or increased workload due to frequent loss of position.

**AMC8 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

**CHART APPLICATIONS**

The navigation charts that are depicted should contain the information necessary, in an appropriate form, to perform the operation safely. Consideration should be given to the size, resolution and position of the display to ensure legibility whilst retaining the ability to review all the information required to maintain adequate situational awareness.

In the case of chart application displaying own-ship position in-flight, AMC10 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) is applicable.

**AMC9 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

**IN-FLIGHT WEATHER APPLICATIONS**

(a) General

An in-flight weather (IFW) application is an EFB function or application enabling the flight crew to access meteorological information. It is designed to increase situational awareness and to support the flight crew when making strategic decisions.

An IFW function or application may be used to access both information required to be on board (e.g. World Area Forecast Centre (WAFC) data) and supplemental weather information.

The use of IFW applications should be non-safety-critical and not necessary for the performance of the flight. In order for it to be non-safety-critical, IFW data should not be used to support tactical decisions and/or as a substitute for certified aircraft systems (e.g. weather radar).

Any current information from the meteorological documentation required to be carried on board or from aircraft primary systems should always prevail over the information from an IFW application.

The displayed meteorological information may be forecasted and/or observed, and may be updated on the ground and/or in flight. It should be based on data from certified meteorological service providers or other reliable sources evaluated by the operator.

The meteorological information provided to the flight crew should be, as far as possible, consistent with the information available to users of ground-based aviation meteorological information (e.g. operations control centre (OCC) staff, flight dispatchers, etc.) in order to establish common situational awareness and to facilitate collaborative decision-making.

(b) Display

Meteorological information should be presented to the flight crew in a format that is appropriate to the content of the information; coloured graphical depiction is encouraged whenever practicable.

The IFW display should enable the flight crew to:

- (1) distinguish between observed and forecasted weather data;
- (2) identify the currency or age and validity time of the weather data;
- (3) access the interpretation of the weather data (e.g. the legend);
- (4) obtain positive and clear indications of any missing information or data and determine areas of uncertainty when making decisions to avoid hazardous weather; and
- (5) be aware of the status of the data link that enables the necessary IFW data exchanges.

Meteorological information in IFW applications may be displayed, for example, as an overlay over navigation charts, over geographical maps, or it may be a stand-alone weather depiction (e.g. radar plots, satellite images, etc.).

If meteorological information is overlaid on navigation charts, special consideration should be given to HMI issues in order to avoid adverse effects on the basic chart functions.

In case of display of own-ship position in flight, AMC10 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) is applicable.

The meteorological information may require reformatting to accommodate for example the display size or the depiction technology. However, any reformatting of the meteorological information should preserve both the geo-location and intensity of the meteorological conditions regardless of projection, scaling, or any other types of processing.

(c) Training and procedures

The operator should establish procedures for the use of an IFW application.

The operator should provide adequate training to the flight crew members before using an IFW application. This training should address:

- (1) limitations of the use of an IFW application:
  - (i) acceptable use (strategic planning only);
  - (ii) information required to be on board; and
  - (iii) latency of observed weather information and the hazards associated with utilisation of old information;
- (2) information on the display of weather data:
  - (i) type of displayed information (forecasted, observed);
  - (ii) symbology (symbols, colours); and
  - (iii) interpretation of meteorological information;
- (3) identification of failures and malfunctions (e.g. incomplete uplinks, data-link failures, missing info);
- (4) human factors issues:
  - (i) avoiding fixation; and
  - (ii) managing workload.

**AMC10 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

**APPLICATIONS DISPLAYING OWN-SHIP POSITION IN FLIGHT**

(a) Limitations

The display of own-ship position in flight as an overlay to other EFB applications should not be used as a primary source of information to fly or navigate the aircraft.

Except on VFR flights over routes navigated by reference to visual landmark, the display of the own-ship symbol is allowed only in aircraft having a certified navigation display (moving map).

In the specific case of IFW applications, the display of own-ship on such applications is restricted to aircraft equipped with a weather radar.

(b) Position source and accuracy

The display of own-ship position may be based on a certified GNSS or GNSS-based (e.g. GPS/IRS) position from certified aircraft equipment or on a portable COTS position source in accordance with AMC7 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3).

The own-ship symbol should be removed and the flight crew notified if:

- (1) the position source indicates a degraded accuracy. The threshold to consider that the accuracy is degraded should be commensurate with the navigation performance required for the current phase of flight and should not exceed 200 m when the own-ship is displayed above a terminal chart (i.e. SID, STAR, or instrument approach) or a depiction of a terminal procedure;
- (2) the position data is reported as invalid by the GNSS receiver; or
- (3) the position data is not received for 5 seconds.

(c) Charting data considerations

If the map involves raster images that have been stitched together into a larger single map, it should be demonstrated that the stitching process does not introduce distortion or map errors that would not correlate properly with a GNSS-based own-ship symbol.

(d) Human machine interface (HMI)

(1) Interface

The flight crew should be able to unambiguously differentiate the EFB function from avionics functions available in the cockpit, and in particular with the navigation display.

A sufficiently legible text label 'AIRCRAFT POSITION NOT TO BE USED FOR NAVIGATION' or equivalent should be continuously displayed by the application if the own-ship position depiction is visible in the current display area over a terminal chart (i.e. SID, STAR, or instrument approach) or a depiction of a terminal procedure.

(2) Display of own-ship symbol

The own-ship symbol should be different from the ones used by certified aircraft systems intended for primary navigation.

If directional data is available, the own-ship symbol may indicate directionality. If direction is not available, the own-ship symbol should not imply directionality.

The colour coding should not be inconsistent with the manufacturer philosophy.

(3) Data displayed

The current map orientation should be clearly, continuously and unambiguously indicated (e.g., Track-up vs North-up).

If the software supports more than one directional orientation for the own-ship symbol (e.g., Track-up vs North-up), the current own-ship symbol orientation should be indicated.

The chart display in track-up mode should not create usability or readability issues. In particular, chart data should not be rotated in a manner that affects readability.

The application zoom levels should be appropriate for the function and content being displayed and in the context of providing supplemental position awareness.

The pilot should be able to obtain information about the operational status of the own-ship function (e.g. active, deactivated, degraded).

During IFR, day-VFR without visual references or night VFR flight, the following parameters' values should not be displayed:

- (i) Track/heading;
- (ii) Estimated time of arrival (ETA);
- (iii) Altitude;
- (iv) Geographical coordinates of the current location of the aircraft; and
- (v) Aircraft speed.

(4) Controls

If a panning and/or range selection function is available, the EFB application should provide a clear and simple method to return to an own-ship-oriented display.

A means to disable the display of the own-ship position should be provided to the flight crew.

(e) Training and procedures

The procedures and training should emphasise the fact that the display of own-ship position on charts or IFW EFB applications should not be used as a primary source of information to fly or navigate the aircraft or as a primary source of weather information.

(1) Procedures:

The following considerations should be addressed in the procedures for the use of charts or IFW EFB application displaying the own-ship position in flight by the flight crew:

- (i) Intended use of the display of own-ship position in flight on charts or IFW EFB applications;
- (ii) Inclusion of the EFB into the regular scan of flight deck systems indications. In particular, systematic cross-check with avionics before being used, whatever the position source; and
- (iii) Actions to be taken in case of identification of a discrepancy between the EFB and avionics.

(2) Training:

Crew members should be trained on the procedures for the use of the application, including the regular cross-check with avionics and the action in case of discrepancy.

**GM1 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

**EFB POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL**

The items that follow are the typical contents of an EFB policy and procedures manual that can be part of the operations manual. The proposed outline is very extensive. It may be adapted to the specific EFB system and to the size and complexity of the operations in which the operator is involved.

- (a) Revision history;
- (b) List of effective pages or paragraphs;
- (c) Table of contents;
- (d) Introduction:
  - (1) Glossary of terms and acronyms;
  - (2) EFB general philosophy, environment, and dataflow;
  - (3) EFB system architecture;
  - (4) Limitations of the EFB system;
  - (5) Hardware description;
  - (6) Operating system description;
  - (7) Detailed presentation of the EFB applications;
  - (8) EFB application customisation;
  - (9) Data management:
    - (i) data administration;
    - (ii) organisation and workflows;
    - (iii) data loading;
    - (iv) data revision mechanisms;
    - (v) approval workflow;
    - (vi) data publishing and dispatch;
    - (vii) customisation;

- (viii) how to manage operator-specific documents;
- (ix) airport data management;
- (x) aircraft fleet definition;
- (10) Data authoring:
  - (i) navigation and customisation;
- (e) Hardware and operating system control and configuration:
  - (1) Purpose and scope;
  - (2) Description of the following processes:
    - (i) hardware configuration and part number control;
    - (ii) operating system configuration and control;
    - (iii) accessibility control;
    - (iv) hardware maintenance;
    - (v) operating system updating;
  - (3) Responsibilities and accountability;
  - (4) Records and filing;
  - (5) Documentary references;
- (f) Software application control and configuration:
  - (1) Purpose and scope;
  - (2) Description of the following processes:
    - (i) version control;
    - (ii) software configuration management;
    - (iii) application updating process;
  - (3) Responsibilities and accountability;
  - (4) Records and filing;
  - (5) Documentary references;
- (g) (g) Flight crew:
  - (1) Training;
  - (2) Operating procedures (normal, abnormal, and emergency);
- (h) Maintenance considerations;
- (i) EFB security policy:
  - (1) Security solutions and procedures.

### **GM2 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

#### **FLIGHT CREW TRAINING**

The following might be a typical training syllabus, provided that it does not contradict the operational suitability data established in accordance with BAR 8.

- (a) Ground-based training:
  - (1) System architecture overview;
  - (2) Display unit features and use;
  - (3) Limitations of the system;

- (4) Restrictions on the use of the system:
    - (i) phases of the flight;
  - (5) alternate procedures (e.g. MEL);
  - (6) Applications as installed;
  - (7) Use of each application;
  - (8) Restrictions on the use of each application:
    - (i) phases of the flight;
    - (ii) alternate procedures (e.g. MEL);
  - (9) Data input;
  - (10) Cross-checking of data inputs and outputs;
  - (11) Use of data outputs;
  - (12) Alternate procedures (e.g. MEL);
- (b) Flight training:
- (1) Practical use of the display unit;
  - (2) Display unit controls;
  - (3) Data input devices;
  - (4) Selection of applications;
  - (5) Practical use of applications;
  - (6) Human factors considerations, including CRM;
  - (7) Situational awareness;
  - (8) Avoidance of fixation;
  - (9) Cross-checking of data inputs and outputs;
  - (10) Practical integration of EFB procedures into SOPs;
  - (11) Actions following the failure of component(s) of the EFB, including cases of battery smoke or fire; and
  - (12) Management of conflicting information.

### **GM3 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

#### **SECURITY**

Examples of typical safety and security defences are contained in the following non-exhaustive list:

- (a) Individual system firewalls;
- (b) The clustering of systems with similar safety standards into domains;
- (c) Data encryption and authentication;
- (d) Virus scans;
- (e) Keeping the OS up to date;
- (f) Initiating air–ground connections only when required and always from the aircraft;
- (g) ‘Whitelists’ for allowed internet domains;
- (h) Virtual private networks (VPNs);
- (i) Granting of access rights on a need-to-have basis;
- (j) Troubleshooting procedures that consider security threats as potential root causes of EFB misbehaviour, and provide for responses to be developed to prevent future successful attacks when relevant;



- (k) Virtualisation; and
- (l) Forensic tools and procedures.

#### **GM4 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

##### **IN-FLIGHT WEATHER (IFW) APPLICATIONS**

'Reliable sources' of data used by IFW applications are the organisations evaluated by the operator as being able to provide an appropriate level of data assurance in terms of accuracy and integrity. It is recommended that the following aspects be considered during that evaluation:

- (a) The organisation should have a quality assurance system in place that covers the data source selection, acquisition/import, processing, validity period check, and the distribution phase;
- (b) Any meteorological product provided by the organisation that is within the scope of the meteorological information included in the flight documentation as defined in MET.TR.215(e) (Annex V (Definitions of terms used in Annexes II to XIII) to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/13775) should originate only from authoritative sources or certified providers and should not be transformed or altered, except for the purpose of packaging the data in the correct format. The organisation's process should provide assurance that the integrity of those products is preserved in the data for use by the IFW application.

#### **GM5 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

##### **USE OF COMMERCIAL OFF-THE-SHELF (COTS) POSITION SOURCE – PRACTICAL EVALUATION**

The tests should consist of a statistically relevant sample of taxiing. It is recommended to include taxiing at airports that are representative of the more complex airports typically accessed by the operator. Taxiing segment samples should include data that is derived from runways and taxiways, and should include numerous turns, in particular of 90 degrees or more, and segments in straight lines at the maximum speed at which the own-ship symbol is displayed. Taxiing segment samples should include parts in areas of high buildings such as terminals. The analysis should include at least 25 inbound and/or outbound taxiing segments between the parking location and the runway.

During the tests, any unusual events (such as observing the own-ship symbol in a location on the map that is notably offset compared to the actual position, the own-ship symbol changing to non-directional when the aircraft is moving, and times when the own-ship symbol disappears from the map display) should be noted. For the test, the pilot should be instructed to diligently taxi on the centre line.

#### **GM6 SPA.EFB.100(b)(3) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs) — Operational approval**

##### **APPLICATIONS DISPLAYING OWN-SHIP POSITION IN FLIGHT**

The depiction of a circle around the EFB own-ship symbol may be used to differentiate it from the avionics one.

## Subpart N – HELICOPTER-IN-SPACE APPROACHES AND DEPARTURES WITH REDUCED VFR MINIMA

**AMC1 SPA.PINS-VFR.100 Helicopter point-in-space (PinS) approaches and departures with reduced VFR minima**

**GENERAL**

- (a) The operating minima prescribed in the Annex (Rules of the air) to Regulation (EU) No 923/2012 should apply under VFR, unless one of the following applies:
- (1) The VFR segment of the flight follows a PinS approach and the distance from the missed approach point (MAPt) to the destination is less than 5 km.
  - (2) The VFR segment of the flight is a departure with the intention of transitioning to IFR at the IDF and the distance from the take-off to the initial departure fix (IDF) is less than 5 km.
  - (3) The VFR segment of the flight follows the planned cancellation of the IFR flight plan at or above the MAPt or decision point of an instrument approach, the destination is different from the aerodrome attached to the instrument approach, the distance from the planned point of cancellation of IFR to the destination is less than 5 km, and the operator charts the obstacle environment on the VFR segment of the flight.
- (b) The VFR segment of the flight follows a PinS approach and the distance from the missed approach point (MAPt) to the destination is less than 5 km.
- (c) The VFR segment of the flight is a departure with the intention of transitioning to IFR at the IDF and the distance from the take-off to the initial departure fix (IDF) is less than 5 km.
- (d) The VFR segment of the flight follows the planned cancellation of the IFR flight plan at or above the MAPt or decision point of an instrument approach, the destination is different from the aerodrome attached to the instrument approach, the distance from the planned point of cancellation of IFR to the destination is less than 5 km, and the operator charts the obstacle environment on the VFR segment of the flight.

**Table 1**

<b>VFR operating minima BY DAY</b>		
<b>When instructed to 'proceed VFR' following an instrument approach</b>		
x is the distance between the MAPt and the heliport or operating site		
<b>X</b>	<b>Visibility</b>	<b>Ceiling</b>
x < 1 000 m	1 000 m	MDH or 300 ft*
1 000 m ≤ x ≤ 3 000 m	x or 1 500 m, whichever is lower	MDH or 400 ft*
3 000 m < x ≤ 5 000 m	1 500 m	MDH or 600 ft*

Note: In Class B/C/D airspace, a special VFR clearance is needed and may require higher minima in accordance with local airspace restrictions.

\* Whichever is higher.

**Table 2**

<b>VFR operating minima BY DAY</b> <b>When instructed to 'proceed VFR' prior to an IFR departure</b>		
x is the distance between the heliport or operating site and the IDF		
<b>X</b>	<b>Visibility</b>	<b>Ceiling</b>
x < 1 000 m	1 000 m	MDH or 300 ft*
1 000 m ≤ x ≤ 3 000 m	x or 1 500 m, whichever is lower	MDH or 400 ft*
3 000 m < x ≤ 5 000 m	1 500 m	MDH or 600 ft*

Note: In Class B/C/D airspace, a special VFR clearance is needed and may require higher minima in accordance with local airspace restrictions.

\* Whichever is higher.

**Table 3**

<b>VFR operating minima BY NIGHT</b> <b>When instructed to 'proceed VFR' following an instrument approach</b>		
x is the distance between the MAPt and the heliport or operating site		
<b>X</b>	<b>Visibility</b>	<b>Ceiling</b>
x < 1 000 m	2 000 m	MDH or 600 ft*
1 000 m ≤ x ≤ 3 000 m	x + 1 500 m	MDH + 200 ft or 600 ft*
3 000 m < x ≤ 5 000 m	5 000 m	MDH + 200 ft or 600 ft*

\* Whichever is higher.

**Table 4**

<b>VFR operating minima BY NIGHT</b>		
<b>When instructed to 'proceed VFR' prior to an IFR departure</b>		
x is the distance between the heliport or operating site and the IDF		
<b>X</b>	<b>Visibility</b>	<b>Ceiling</b>
$x < 1\,000\text{ m}$	2 000 m	MDH or 600 ft*
$1\,000\text{ m} \leq x \leq 3\,000\text{ m}$	$x + 1\,500\text{ m}$	MDH + 200 ft or 600 ft*
$3\,000\text{ m} < x \leq 5\,000\text{ m}$	5 000 m	MDH + 200 ft or 600 ft*

\* Whichever is higher.

- (e) The operator should define SOPs that describe the VFR segment of the departure and approach, including the transition from IFR to VFR and the transition from VFR to IFR.
- (f) The operator should provide a thorough description of the following elements; the description may be provided by means of a chart and should be included in the operations manual or other document:
  - (1) the environment in the vicinity of the VFR segment of the flight;
  - (2) the visual cues that are useful for the purpose of VFR navigation and that should be available on departure or for the continuation of the flight at the MAPt;
  - (3) the relevant obstacles.
- (g) The operator should ensure that the elements in (e) are updated on a regular basis.
- (h) The operator should encourage occurrence reporting and have a safety analysis capability. (h) The pilot-in-command/commander should have at least 1 000 hours of flying experience on helicopters, and 100 hours of instrument time on helicopters.
- (i) The pilot-in-command/commander should undergo initial and yearly recurrent FSTD training or checking, covering the following items:
  - (1) 3D approach operation to minima;
  - (2) go-around on instruments;
  - (3) 2D approach operation to minima;
  - (4) at least one of the 3D or 2D approach operations should be a PinS approach followed by a transition to VFR and a VFR landing;
  - (5) in the case of multi-engined helicopters, a simulated failure of one engine should be included in either the 3D or 2D approach operation to minima;

- (6) where appropriate to the helicopter type, approach with flight control system/flight director system malfunctions, flight instrument and navigation equipment failures;
  - (7) recovery from unusual attitudes by instrument;
  - (8) loss of VMC during the VFR segment of flight;
  - (9) VFR departure followed by a manoeuvre back to the take-off location;
  - (10) VFR departure to the IDF followed by an IFR departure.
- (j) The training and checking elements of an approved training programme may be credited towards compliance with point (i) and need not be duplicated.
  - (k) The training under (i) should take place on a suitable FSTD, corresponding to the helicopter type on which the operations take place.